How Fair Is the Congressional Redistricting Process - Dissertation Example

? How Fair is the Congressional Redistricting Process? Introduction: A Review of Literature How Fair is the Congressional Redistricting Process? Introduction: A Review of Literature Congressional restricting is a method by which the United States creates electoral boundaries to align with population fluctuations throughout the country. These population fluctuations are determined by the most recent U.S. census data. States each have their own laws regarding the boundary-development of these legislative districts, but ultimately must meet Federal regulations. Some have criticized the fairness of the congressional redistricting process because of its tendency to promote domination of one party over the other in many states, as well as the ability for states to design maps that place opposing parties into fewer districts. According to Hirsch (2003), the current congressional redistricting process veers significantly from the ideals proposed by the original Framers of the United States Constitution. These individuals created the House of Representatives, which was designed to both stand apart from the Senate, Presidency, and Supreme Court, as well as mediate these governmental entities. The 2001-2002 congressional redistricting efforts revealed the strong partisan bias that many critics contend is skewing redistricting maps and misrepresenting the peoples' true sentiments. Unfortunately, Hirsch (2003) argues that there is no easy cure for the biases in the congressional redistricting process. As long as a bipartisan system dominates pubic thought, redistricting will always favor one political side or the other in a given state. Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court will intervene with gerrymanders that prevent partisan biases, although state legislation must limit the extent to which redistricting reflects political factors on their own, rather than economic and social factors. McDonald (2004) notes that redistricting continues to be one of the most prevalent and contentious campaigns in the American political system. The United States utilizes multiple redistricting institutions, McDonald notes, which can be categorized into two types. First, some institutions engage in redistricting that follows normal legislative processes, and second, there are those that enact by way of a redistricting commission. In the former, one party tends to control state government and the redistricting process results in a political gerrymander. With the latter, commissions engage in voting and compromise to draw districting boundaries. Regardless of the redistricting institution, McDonald argues that with so much at stake, those involved in the redistricting process often behave in a one-sided fashion. Congressional redistricting will always result in either a partisan gerrymander, a bipartisan incumbent protection plan, or court intervention (McDonald, 2004). Karlan (2002) contends that the Supreme Court has been unwilling to apply any form of strict scrutiny in the past with regard to congressional redistricting and when faced with the prospect of re-segregating state legislatures and congressional delegations. In addition to partisan concerns, redistricting has been also driven by racial motivations and other minority-based social factors. According to Karlan (2002), the U.S. Constitution demands that states arrange electoral institutions to reduce any existing effects of prior redistricting discrimination. Such electoral districting promotes a racially-polarized voting pattern that undermines needs of minority racial groups. The Supreme Court is responsible for confront these discrimination sin the redistricting process and to promote an electoral system that is open to members of minority groups. The current flaws in the congressional redistricting process within the United States have caused the issue of fairness to be called into question. Fairness is a key component of congressional redistricting, as it reflects general American values and has far-reaching implications within the population. The concept of fairness is one that is difficult to define, and has seldom been researched in the political science community. The current literature explores the notion of fairness with respect to congressional redistricting and the effectiveness of programs based on these notions of fairness. Fairness As previous research (e.g., Hirsch, 2003; Karlan, 2002; McDonald, 2004) suggests, the notion of fairness can exist on multiple levels and modalities. Congressional redistricting must equally represent the needs of political parties (e.g., Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004), as well as minorities and underrepresented racial and social groups (Karlan, 2002). The current literature review examines the idea of fairness on three levels, each with separate operational definitions for research purposes. Technical Fairness Technical fairness is operationally defined as the use of demographics and communities of interest in order to define the districts. Each district must be represented equally based on sex, age, race, religion, and other prevalent demographic variables. Districts must also have a population requirement, and a very small deviation (.5%) between the districts. This notion of technical fairness is the foundation of congressional redistricting as intended by the House of Representatives (Kisrch, 2003). At their core, districts must equally and technically represent their populations, and congressional redistricting is the manner by which these political needs are met. Continuity has existed in the development of public administration with respect to technical fairness in the United States, according to Svara, 2001. Throughout its history, the United States has remained fairly consistent with promoting technical fairness in congressional redistricting programs, striving to meet the needs of a large and diverse expanse of conflicting public interests. ?Legal Fairness Congressional redistricting must also meet legal requirements. The notion of legal fairness examines the legal requirements of defining congressional districts other than the technical requirements, as well as the manner in which these legal requirements are accounted for in the congressional redistricting process. A key component to meeting the legal requirements of congressional redistricting is the relationship between public administration and political leaders, notes Svara (2001). An issue that has been counterproductive in meeting the legal fairness needs in congressional redistricting is the false dichotomy of politics and public administration, Svara (2011) further expands. In actuality, public administration and ?politics, while subject to anxiety over the administrative legitimacy of these branches in the United States, have worked complimentarily to serve the public. In the past, efforts to emphasize separation of administrators from political leaders have construed the representation of the public as it pertains to optimal congressional redistricting in a particular region of the country. When efforts are made to collaborate and emphasize interaction and incorporation of administrative leaders in the implementation of legislative policy, the legal redistricting needs can best serve the public's economic, social, and political redistricting concerns. In a speech to the American Political Science Association in 2000, John Gaus Distinguished Lecturer Hebert Simon notes that, based on research with hundreds of complex organizations, systems that emphasize collaboration and interaction best enable the development of fairness, equally, and advancement. As the new age has brought forth a large store of knowledge, collaboration among public administrators and political leaders must rely on each other to synthesize this information into a meaningful picture that best represents the legal redistricting needs of the public. Some debate exists as to the legality of congressional redistricting when so much is at stake in the process, and unclear boundaries delineate respective leaders', administrators', and members of the public's roles within the process. It's evident that congressional redistricting has far-reaching philosophical and legal underpinnings that influence a large number of National outcomes. Redistricting in one state, for example, has the ability to influence the redistricting process of another state. It's clear the redistricting involves legal cooperation at both the state and federal level, although it's not clear to what extent this legal collaboration best meets a state's multiple competing redistricting needs. Public Input Fairness A new requirement for public input is emerging in the congressional redistricting process which is reshaping American political thought, yet recapturing ideals set forth by the original Framers of the United States Constitution and creators of the House of Representatives. The public is currently allowed to submit proposed redistricting maps to congressional officials and representatives, and, according to current experts, these maps need to be taken into consideration by elected redistricting commission members. According to Vigoda (2002), this new method of public administration, referred to as the "New Public Management" movement, has placed increased pressure on state bureaucracies to do a better job to responding to the needs of citizens. This advancement in public administration is essential to the fairness of congressional redistricting (Vigoda, 2002). Unfortunately, a history of citizen passivism in modern societies, as well as low participatory involvement, make this new movement an issue each state must continually confront. Vigoda (2002) provides guidelines for addressing these issues to further develop this level of fairness in public administration, including collaboration, legitimacy, socialization, authorization, and a criticism of current policy. While citizens technically "own" the state, this ownership is symbolic and really falls in the hands of governance (Vigoda, 2002). The public can best serve its own perceived redistricting needs by actively engaging in the process. The public must actively seek to collaborate with public administrators and political leaders, submitting redistricting maps and ideas for effective redistricting proposals. These programs can gain legitimacy through active public involvement and accountability measures set forth by both the public and leaders. Through effective communication, redistricting needs are brought to the attention of mainstream public, who further influence the increased level of public fairness in congressional redistricting. This, in turn, enhances the authenticity of congressional redistricting programs and best serves the needs of the public. Of course, all policy change is initiated by a continual criticism and striving to improve the current policy. This new method of public administration has resulted in a mentality of "serving rather than steering," according to Denhardt and Denhardt (2000). Leaders and representatives are changing their visions, venturing away from old public administration methods, into one built on democratic citizenship, community and civil society, and organizational humanism (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). This system has positively engaged citizens in the articulation of interests and needs that Vigoda (2002) contended were so critical, which can ultimately be translated into more equal redistricting. These new methods of public administration also more accurately reflect the original democratic intentions of the Framers, noted by Hirsch (2003). Causes The multiple biases observed in the congressional redistricting process and the lack of fairness have numerous causes. Unfortunately, these causes are not always easy to trace. A plethora of research in the political sciences expounds on the multiple problems with current congressional redistricting policy in the United States, but little provides suggested solutions. The following section examines research on causes for the social, economic, and political imbalances in congressional redistricting. According to Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000), most empirical studies of congressional elections avoid the concept of redistricting because of the difficult in pinning down root causes, and the existence of many complicated variants influence perceived fairness. These authors contend new and ever-changing boundaries ultimately create headaches for analysts seeking to compare districts over time. However, Ansolabhere and colleagues (2000) developed a mathematical procedure to estimate the degree to which redistricting represented voters in particular regions of the United States. Referred to as "The Natural Experiment," researchers estimated the personal vote in order to measure how partisan incumbents perform in jurisdictions whose boundaries do not change in light of redistricting. The results from Ansolabhere and colleagues' (2000) study shed light on the exploitation of electoral data, and reveals new concerns with redistricting in the United States. According to these authors, the personal vote represents only about half of the incumbency advantage in a state, and its importance varies over time. Interestingly, results also showed that a negative interaction exists between any existing incumbency advantages and the strength of the political party. These findings lead Ansolabehere and colleagues (2000) to conclude that the U.S. is currently operating in the worst of all worlds. On one hand, legislators adopt the personal vote to act separately from a district's policy preferences, thus serving a multitude of other confounding influences. On the other hand, evidence suggests that congressional candidates already are unresponsive to districts' preferences and the adoption of the personal vote holds little influence in the realm of congressional redistricting. Ultimately, these authors conclude that a strong personal vote, combined with strong parties in the House of Representatives, suggest an incumbency advantage is not disastrous and illustrates the advantage of congressional redistricting and the electoral need. Evidence of gerrymandering in the 19th century helps explain the causes of congressional redistricting in the Unites States, according to Engstrom (2006). While considerable debate now exists on the impact of partisan redistricting in the U.S. Congress, it's ultimately essential, Engstrom (2006) argues. Based on the evaluation of statewide, county- and ward-level electoral data from a 30-year span in the late 19th century, Engstrom (2006) illustrates that any scenario in which one party controlled the congressional redistricting process, the districting was systematically engineered to promote a favorable partisan bias. From Engstrom's (2006) research, it's clear to see that biases in the congressional redistricting process have existed since its roots and have continued over the more-than-200-year existence of the United States of America. Any biases ultimately affect partisan composition of state congressional delegations and have helped a particular party control the House of Representatives -- a process that is self-defeating in nature. Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, and Rohde (2007) illustrate additional factors that contribute to biases in congressional redistricting. According to these authors, one of the most prevalent themes emerging in congressional politics is that the change in district boundaries after the process of redistricting is itself a root cause. Based on data connecting congressional districts over a 40-year span in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Carson and colleagues (2007) discovered that an overall trend exists toward political polarization, and that districts have undergone changes as a result of this redistricting. While the effect is modest, it reveals that redistricting promotes party polarization in the House of Representatives, and is a reflection of the polarization of the House versus the Senate (Carson et al., 2007). In the past, polarization in congress has been caused by two main themes: one centering on elite-level changes within a select few leaders and government officials, and another emphasizing the role of changes driven by forces at the electoral level. Carson and colleagues' (2007) findings advance previous research suggesting that the primary causes for bias in redistricting is a result of gerrymandering. Programs While research is unequivocal in pointing out the existing biases within congressional redistricting, the process is important and mandated by the U.S. Constitution. As long as there are states, congressional redistricting will remain a key component of public representation. Important to the process, then, is to adopt the most effect strategies for meeting public need and serving the greatest good by creating boundaries that offer the multitude of political ideals and needs a voice. In the past, some programs have succeeded and some have failed. The following section addresses programs that have attempted to alleviate bias in congressional redistricting and highlights strategies deemed to be effective in moving forward. Programs designed to alleviate concerns around the congressional redistricting process must occur at both the state and federal level. Bates (2005) examines that congressional authority to require state adoption of independent redistricting commissions to address polarization and political bias is a key component of mediating conflicting interests in the process. This author cites the case of Vieth v. Jubelier as an example of the notion that gerrymandering or legislative and congressional districts have entered the mainstream public's consciousness because of an increased collaboration amongst the public and its leaders. In 2003, Texas legislature adopted a plan to apply neutral redistricting factors to eliminate redistricting biases in the state. Both Republican and Democratic representatives collaborated to revisit redistricting efforts throughout the state of Texas. Though the parties debated for a period, a plan was called to adopt independent redistricting commissions, similar to those noted in McDonald (2004), to apply unbiased congressional redistricting. Bates (2005) highlights the importance of redistricting programs to occur at the state level. Redistricting commissions within each state must align and interact with first state, and then congressional legislature to enact on reducing bipartisan bias. The example of Texas also serves as an example of how neutral redistricting can occur without sacrificing the benefits of opposing political sides. Independent redistricting commissions have also been successful in reducing political biases in Iowa and Oregon (Bates, 2005). Iowa's Legislative Services Agency (LSA) performs the redistricting in the sate, adopting a unique structure that performs redistricting subject to legislative approval. Iowa's system has helped keep congressional districts competitive, while non-partisan (Bates, 2005). On the other hand, structures like the blue-ribbon panel and other bipartisan panels are not congruent with visions of independent redistricting commissions, according to Bates (2005). These models run the risk of concentrating, rather than diluting, the already-prevalent bipartisanship in the United States congressional redistricting process (Bates, 2005). According to Bates (2005), the most theoretically-sound models of eliminating bias and promoting fairness in congressional redistricting are tie-breaker commissions like those in Iowa and Oregon. With these models, even numbers of membership slots are divided amongst the two major parties and a neutral tie-breaking member is chosen to prevent ties. Some argue that is impossible to elect a truly non-partisan tie-breaking official, but Bates (2005) maintains that the approach still remains the most true to the originally intended redistricting philosophy advocated by creators of the U.S. Constitution. McKee, Teigen, and Turgeon (2006) draw on the example of Texas' 2003 congressional redistricting program to highlight the effects of partisan redistricting. While Bates (2005) contends that Texas' attempt at unbiased redistricting was mostly effective, McKee and colleagues (2006) argue that Texas was more strongly biased than ever in a 2003 census. These authors adopted a statistical program to analyze the partisan effects of five plans proposed by Republican state legislators during the congressional redistricting of 2003. Results demonstrated that, of all five Republican plans, each one was strongly biased in favor of the Republican party. This was also the case in the one plan that was actually enacted. Because of these false-attempts at neutral redistricting, Peters (2003) argues for the collaboration of public administration and political leaders to adopt programs that meet the actual public's needs, rather than favoring one partisanship over the other. Changes in public administration toward a model that serves the public have been effective and have infiltrated governance, according to Peters (2003). New programs must have organizational autonomy and self-sufficiency, a degree of control of public employees in the form of a hierarchical structure within organizations, a sense of accountability, a sense of uniformity, and a strong policy and administration (Peters, 2003). "New Public Management" is the method by which governmental redistricting should occur, argues Peters (2003). Dirks and Ferrin (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of trust in leadership based on a variety of leadership and organizational styles. These authors amassed three decades of empirical research on the topic of trust in leadership and discovered 23 mediating variables regarding these two psychological notions. Research consistently demonstrated that more democratic, public-representative decision-making was superior for enhancing trust in the public of public administrators and governmental officials, and this leadership-style consistently was responsible for more effective performance of a variety of outcomes, such as program success and job performance and satisfaction. Dirks and Ferrins' (2002) meta-analytic findings illustrate the importance of democratic, independent redistricting commission for eliminating bias in the congressional redistricting process. Performance Assessments and Outcomes, Case With the adoption of any new public or governmental policy, evaluation of its performance and accountability among those hired to spearhead its objectives is critical. Through effective evaluation methods, interested parties are able to determine the extent to which the program is meeting its objectives and satisfying the population's needs. Little research has specifically examined the effectiveness of congressional redistricting programs in the United States. The following section highlights the benefits of accountability programs, components of effective programs in other fields, and steps leaders at public, state, and federal levels can take to improve accountability amongst congressional redistricting efforts within the United States. Barabas and Jerit (2004) discuss the importance of holding redistricting programs accountable for meeting public need in an unbiased, neutral manner. Specifically focusing on the issue of race, Barabas and Jerit (2004) collected data from the 2001-02 redistricting process in the sate of Illinois. Results showed that the only factor that affects minority representation in redistricting is compactness, or the extent to which a district's geography is dispersed around the center. This finding provides an example as to how seemingly effective redistricting programs may intend to meet public need, though many external, environmental factors can also play a role in a program's effectiveness. Seemingly effective programs may actually be a result of already existing environmental issues such as population distribution. Other factors that must be assessed within a redistricting program, Barabas and Jerit (2004) argue, are contiguity, the preservation of communities of interest within districts, that district lines are drawn to adhere to existing political subdivisions, incumbent protection so that existing incumbents are safe within each district, if the program adheres to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requiring that government officials obtain clearance from the U.S. Attorney General of District Court to be involved in redistricting, or that voters are aware they can preserve the district core based on old districts. By remaining accountable to these principles, Barabas and Jerit (2004) believe redistricting commissions must remain responsible for adopting truly neutral and fair redistricting strategies. As with the findings of Dirk and Ferrins (2002) regarding trust in public leadership, Wang and Wart (2007) contend that fairness, accountability, and performance measures are essential for the development of trust amongst the public. Key to the development of trust is active participation on the public's part, argue Wang and Wart (2007). Within performance assessments, accountability measures, and outcomes, the public must actively engage in the process. Any breach in accountability, or the adoption of redistricting programs that promote favoritism, bias, and political imbalance are likely to deter public trust and defeat the ultimate purpose of congressional redistricting. Any accountability measure must also strive to stress the improvement of administrative and ethical behaviors amongst redistricting officials, public administrators, and political leaders (Wang and Wart, 2007). Kelly (2005) also illustrates the relationship between administrative service performance and citizen satisfaction in public service models. Congressional redistricting models would do well to adopt a market-based entrepreneurial model of public management, which Kelly (2005) deems the new paradigm for public administration. Stressing the accountability of administrative performance, the new paradigm also emphasizes accountability amongst citizens. Accountability is predicated on the notion that the public expects excellent performance from governmental officials, and these performances can be measured in some meaningful way. One highly-effective method of assessing accountability as it pertains to congressional redistricting is through simple checklists and scorecards highlighting important components that the public deems as important to their redistricting needs. One key mediating variable that always reflects the accountability and performance outcomes of any public or governmental program, Kelly (2005) contends, is public satisfaction. This clear and simple indicator provides perhaps the most accurate representation of whether or not congressional redistricting is truly fair. Through simple score-keeping of initiatives and through assessing public satisfaction, the program creates value for all stakeholders in the redistricting process, including the public, public administrators, political leaders, and members of both state and federal legislature. Value is ultimately translated into action and engagement in the redistricting process, key components of trust in leadership (see Dirk & Ferrins, 2002; Wang & Wart, 2007). The democratic leadership advocated by Barabas and Jerit (2004), meets the original intention of the House of Representatives, as reflected in Hirsch (2003). Such data can occur through monitoring public feedback via surveys and value-based instruments. Value-based scorecards of satisfaction and performance standards of productivity and efficiency of congressional redistricting programs address the multiple levels of accountability amongst administrators, citizens, elected officials, and eliminates any shortcuts in addressing public need (Kelly, 2005). Literature Review Summary Congressional restricting is a method by which the United States creates electoral boundaries to align with population fluctuations throughout the country. According to Hirsch (2003), the current congressional redistricting process veers significantly from the ideals proposed by the original Framers of the United States Constitution. While critical to the public representation of the 50 U.S. states, McDonald (2004) notes that redistricting continues to be one of the most contentious campaigns in the American political system. Karlan (2002) contends that the Supreme Court has been unwilling to apply any form of strict scrutiny in the past with regard to congressional redistricting and when faced with the prospect of re-segregating state legislatures and congressional delegations. As previous research (e.g., Hirsch, 2003; Karlan, 2002; McDonald, 2004) suggests, the notion of fairness can exist on multiple levels and modalities. Congressional redistricting must equally represent the needs of political parties (e.g., Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004), as well as minorities and underrepresented racial and social groups (Karlan, 2002). The current literature review examines the idea of fairness on three levels, each with separate operational definitions for research purposes, including: technical fairness, legal fairness, and public input fairness. According to Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000), most empirical studies of congressional elections avoid the causes of bias in redistricting, although there are many. While considerable debate now exists on the impact of partisan redistricting in the U.S. Congress, it's essential, Engstrom, argues. Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, and Rohde (2007) illustrate additional factors that contribute to biases in Congressional redistricting. According to these authors, one of the most prevalent themes emerging in congressional politics is that the change in district boundaries after the process of redistricting is itself a root cause. Programs designed to alleviate concerns around the congressional redistricting process must occur at both the state and federal level. Bates (2005) examines that congressional authority to require state adoption of independent redistricting commissions to address polarization and political bias. Because of these false-attempts at neutral redistricting, Peters (2003) argues for the collaboration of public administration and political leaders to adopt programs that meet the actual public's needs, rather than favoring one partisanship over the other. Barabas and Jerit (2004) discuss the importance of holding redistricting programs accountable for meeting public need in an unbiased, neutral manner. Through the use of effective accountability measures, changes in congressional redistricting measures can best meet the needs of all parties involved, including the public, public administrators, and political leaders on both the state and federal level. While redistricting is flawed in many ways, it will always serve as a key component of public representation, and efforts are best-served in enhancing this process through collaboration and accountability measures. Reference Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., & Stewart, C. (2000). Old voters, new voters, and the personal vote: Using redistricting to measure the incumbency advantage. American Journal of Political Science, 44:1, 17-34. Barabas, J., & Jerit, J. (2004). Redistricting principles and racial representation. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 4:4, 415-435. Bates, R. P. (2005). Congressional authority to require state adoption of independent redistricting commissions. Duke, Law Journal, 55, 333-371. Carson, J. L., Crespin, M. H., Finocchiaro, C. J., & Rohde, D. W. (2007). Redistricting and party polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. American Politics Research, 35, 878. Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. (2000). The new public service: Serving rather than steering. Public Administration Review, 60:6, 549-559. Dirks, K. T, & Ferrin, D. L. (2002). Trust in leadership: Meta-analytic findings and implications for research and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 611-628. Engstrom, E. J. (2006). Stacking the states, stacking the House: The partisan consequences of congressional redistricting in the 19th century. American Political Science Review, 100, 419-427. Hirsch, S. (2003). The United States House of unrepresentatives: What went wrong in the latest round of congressional redistricting. Election Law Journal, 2:2, 179-216. Karlan, P. S. (2002). Easing the spring: Strict scrutiny and affirmative action after the redistricting cases. William and Mary Law Review, 43:3, 1569-1603. Kelly, J. M. (2005). The dilemma of the unsatisfied customer in a market model of public administration. Public Administration Review, 65:1, 76-84. McDonald, M. P. (2004). A comparative analysis of redistricting institutions in the United States, 2001-2002. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 4:4, 371- 395. McKee, S. C., Teigen, J. M., & Turgeon, M. (2006). The Partisan impact of congressional redistricting: The case of Texas, 2001-2003. Social Science Quarterly, 87:2, 308-318. Peters, B. G. (2003). The changing nature of public administration: From easy answers to hard questions. Journal of Administrative Politics, 5, 7-20 Simon, H. A. (2000). Public administration in today's world of organizations and markets. Political Science and Politics, 33:4, 749-756. Svara, J. H. (2001). The myth of dichotomy: Complementarity of politics and administration in the past and future of public administration. Public Administration Review, 61:2, 176-183. Vigoda, E. (2002). From responsiveness to collaboration: Governance, citizens, and the next generation of public administration. Public Administration Review, 62:5, 527-540. Wang, X., & Wart, M. W. (2007). When public administration in administration leads to trust: An empirical assessment of managers' perceptions. Public Administration Review, 265-278. Read More