These patterns according to him are clearly divisible in six steps. He also argues that humans can do much more than just witness a catastrophe. Similarly, Perrow in his published book "Normal Accidents" mentions that due to the fact that people are incompetent when it comes to 'handling complexity' (Perrow, 1984) therefore accidents at composite facilities come by easily. Both, Turner and Perrow's work is highly regarded, which were only possible due to society's resolve to find a way to avoid accidents. Turner also points out in his above referred works that usually it is the un-tested innovation that causes the disaster. He refers to accidents at Hixon in 1968 and Summerland in 1973.
Moving from physical disasters to corporate ones, the writer talks about the opportunity for isomorphic learning where in firms specialize into a special segment and engineer the best possible way of doing that job. This way significant time is saved as organizations can out source a particular activity and don't have to spend time to learn it to do the right way. Not only this complex processes can be better performed by the task masters. Errors in these processes are usually human, and therefore learning to deal with infrequent events is what isomorphic learning is all about.
Analyzing these disasters one realizes how similar they are at the time of happening. Human errors are seen to be a major player as far as financial disasters is concerned. Therefore, according to the writer there is a severe need to learn from these mistakes, so that such incidents can be avoided. Although the work that the writer of the article has cited from the authors is pretty much credible, however, more supportive work would make the argument stronger. Incorporating research and studies gives a lot of weight to the examination.
Disasters, according to Turner, are caused due to various reasons. His thorough analysis characterizes them as follows:
1. When small and large organizations work together on a project. As both use different systems there is always a higher chance that lapses in system can take place.
2. Tasks that are not properly elaborated and seemingly look easier than they really are.
3. revising goals frequently and not communicating them in time, and changing practices
4. out of date regulations
5. employees occupied with their routine work are usually not able to take time out to supervise different out sourced activities
Turner and Pidgeon emphasize that complexity of problems compounds as the number of information handlers' increase as many new views generate as well as variation in information. This is an inherent problem in today's organizations.
Perrow analyzes the problem of Three Mile Island differently. He establishes three important indices which usually form the ground of large scale financial accidents. The first one he refers as 'familiarity' is the over-confidence we have and we usually assume that everyone knows as much as we know. Dorner, believes that due to this over-confidence, we do not re-evaluate things in our mind and that incomplete information always is misleading.
John Adams categorizes risk into three main categories. Ones that can be assessed base on our personal experiences. Second are the