aking into account federal funds, which the University received for educational necessities, the deaf student was supposed to use the services of sign-language interpreter provided by the University. However, the University refused to satisfy the student’s requirement and, therefore, displayed discriminatory attitude to a person with physical deviation (P#3, C#1, L#11-13). The plaintiff demanded the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to provide declaratory relief and oblige the respondent to ensure the services of interpreter. The Federal Court granted preliminary injunction, which forced the University to satisfy the plaintiff’s complaint. This decision was made based on the assumption that Walter Camenisch would prevail on merits. Simultaneously, preliminary injunction took place along with the requirement for the plaintiff to post a security bond of $3,000.00 (1981 P#3, C#1, L#31-35). However, the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals claiming for its mootness caused with the graduation of a student. The Court of Appeals confirmed the preliminary injunction. The University received certiorari (1981, P#3, C#2, L#8-12). But the Supreme Court raised the issue regarding not the question about who should pay for the interpreter, which the Court of Appeals correctly decided to be viewed in a trial on the merits, but whether the District Court exceeded the authority and violated its discretion by granting preliminary relief (1981 P#1, C#2, L#6-7).
Considering the chance that the absence of injunction would harm Walter Camenisch, the District Court granted preliminary injunction based on a judgment on the merits. Preliminary evaluation of the merits showed prevalence of the student. In addition, the court ordered the complainant to ensure security bond for protecting the defendant. The University implemented the court’s decision and the student graduated meanwhile the Court of Appeals rejected the mootness of the case stating that