The Collapse of the CTV Building - Assignment Example

? CTV Building Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 4 2. Analysis 6 2 Key Role Players 6 2.2 Key Stakeholders 10 3. Evaluation of consequences 14 4. Summary and Conclusion 14 References 15 Executive Summary This report identifies the main key role players and stakeholders of the collapse of the CTV building. The report produced by the Royal Commission had also officially identified the key players after the disaster. This report aims to evaluate the faults on the part of the key players and stakeholders leading to technical deficiencies in the design of the building. Gerald Shirtcliff was the CTV building’s site manager and he was later found to have faked his qualifications and therefore was not up to the mark. The head of the consultation firm, ARCL, Alan Reay was said to be “ultimately responsible” even though his designer and engineer David Harding was inexperienced in working with multi-storey buildings. This is because Reay had supervised Harding and therefore he was responsible for relying too much on the incompetent engineer. According to Reay, he thought that Harding being a registered engineer was eligible for the task. In reality Harding lacked the necessary experience and was also inexperienced to use the software Etabs with which the seismic testing of the building was done. Moreover, the Christchurch City Council was blamed for having issued a building permit despite the presence of structural weaknesses. The weaknesses were further deepened after the 2010 Christchurch earthquake and the Christchurch City Council had a very brisk assessment of the building. John Drew was criticized for allowing only one check to be performed by a structural engineer after the 2010 earthquake. Bill Jones of the construction company Williams Construction was competent but lacked the skills since it was his first contract. All in all, The deficiency has been a cumulative result of the incompetence of the individuals involved in the designing and construction. CTV Building 1. Introduction On 22nd February 2011, at about 12.51 p.m. a loud rumble is heard and almost simultaneously, the ground starts shaking intensely. The air becomes filled with white dust. It becomes difficult for the people witnessing it to stay on their feet. The boulders start breaking and falling on the streets and a chaos strikes. People start running here and there in confusion in order to protect themselves from the falling debris. The road starts to crush and bend as it the ground shakes (Wilson, 2012). These are the live moment experiences of Alex, a witness of the massive, life threatening earth quake that took place in Christchurch, New Zealand on 22nd February 2011. The earth quake had a magnitude of 6.3 units on the Richter scale and was extremely savage and disastrous. Figure 1. Tragic Aftermath. This picture shows the damaged building. The Press. (March 26, 2013). Tragic aftermath [Photograph]. Retrieved from The Canterbury Television building was huge and employed a large number of people including doctors, dentists, counselors, journalists, TV crews and the list goes on. The earthquake killed 115 people including international students enrolled in a language school that was also located inside the building. Search and rescue teams from various countries such as United Kingdom and Japan flew to New Zealand in order to recover the dead bodies that had been buried deep inside the remains (Bryant, 2013). The CTV building had collapsed completely and there was little hope that anyone could have survived beneath it. Three critical factors caused its collapse, as described in a report released after the earthquake. Firstly, there was a violent horizontal ground shake that took place. Secondly, the columns were brittle and lastly, the layout of the structural walls was asymmetrical (International Business Times, 2012). Figure 2. A rescue worker walks through the rubble in central Christchurch. Reuters / Mark Baker / Pool. (March 2, 2011). A rescue worker walks through the rubble in central Christchurch [Photograph]. Retrieved from 2. Analysis 2.1 Key Role Players Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission: The Royal Commission was a major role player after the collapse of the CTV Building. It was established to produce a report on the causes that led to the collapse and its members included Sir Ron Carter, Justice Mark Cooper and Richard Fenwick (The Press, 2012). Its inquiries started in April 2011 and it finally produced a Final Report in November 2012 consisting of three parts and a total of 7 volumes. The report mentioned the key players in the crash of the CTV building and most importantly it found out that a number of engineering and construction errors led to its collapse. It also found out that the 2010 earthquake had weakened it and the assessment team consisting of council building officials wrongly “green stickered” it (Davison, 2012). Since the commission played such an important part in identifying the key players by conducting an enquiry and releasing a report on the failures and the requirements of the building. Figure 3. Royal Commission members from left to right, Sir Ron Carter, Justice Mark Cooper and Richard Fenwick. Stacy Squires (n.d.). Commissioners: Sir Ron Carter left, Justice Mark Cooper and Richard Fenwick [Photograph]. Retrieved from < http://www.stuff.co.nz/lightbox/the-press/photos/7164858/CTV-royal-commission-hearing?KeepThis=true> Prime Minister John Key Being the Prime Minister, John Key also played a very vital role as he was a responsible individual. He accepted the report by the Royal Commission and made statements that the families of the victims have to be provided with answers regarding the collapse (Davison, 2012). He also said that the findings of the commission report will not help the families of those who were killed (Davison 2012). Institute of professional Engineers (IPENZ) IPENZ was an engineering body that endorsed the commission report in order to take action over it against the construction firm, Alan Reay Consultancy Firm Ltd. (ARCL) and the designers of the building. Later Maurice Williamson, the Building and Construction Minister criticized the engineering bodies including IPENZ on not having taken any action (Watkins, 2013).. As the commission report mentioned boss of ARCL, Alan Reay and his engineer David Harding to be guilty, the engineering firm should have taken action against them. Nevertheless, it had an important role in the post-collapse scenario. Chartered Professional Engineering Council This was another engineering body that was criticized by Maurice Williamson on not having taken any action against the constructors and designers of the building (Watkins, 2013). David Harding was a “registered” engineer and that is why the chartered Professional engineering council also had a hand in this event as Harding was incompetent and had no experience in using the software, Etabs which was a computerized modeling program. This program was also used to test the seismic strength of the CTV building. Building and Construction Minister, Maurice Williamson Maurice Williamson made an effort for a law change that would allow cases like the CTV building collapse to be charged with the crime of corporate murder (Watkins, 2013).. The professional engineering bodies including the Institution of Professional Engineers (IPENZ) and the Chartered Professional Engineers Council were criticized by Williamson for their incompetence in acting against those who were involved. Williamson also gave instructions to perform checks on buildings that were similar to the CTV building in design so that further similar situations could be avoided. He said that he could not take chance with similar buildings (Geelong Advertiser, 2012). If Williamson had not given such instructions, he would have to be answerable in case of future failures. Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment This ministry played probably one of the most significant roles in the recovery of Canterbury after the collapse. It supported continual improvements in engineering practice and it has been involved in the rebuilding and repairing of buildings and homes. It has worked with local authorities as well as various other ministries in order to help the displaced people and provide them with accommodation. It has also performed technical investigations about the faults in the CTV building and has also helped the Royal Commission. It has also studied the building policy so as to review the seismic performance (Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment “Annual Report”, 2011/2012). Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) This local authority has developed strategies along with the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) and the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment for improving the thermal performance of houses. It has also provided affordable housing that has met the best practice requirements (Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment “Annual Report”, 2011/2012). Ministry of Social Development (MSD) This ministry worked with Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment to run an accommodation program called Canterbury Earthquake Accommodation Service (CETAS) so that people could be housed after their displacement following the CTV building collapse. This ministry has provided relief to the effected people and is therefore a key role player. Holmes Consulting Firm In 1990 the engineering firm, Holmes Consulting Firm made a report that found out that the building might not be complying with the standards. Indeed this was the case that resulted in its failure and the same finding was found out by the Department of housing and building (DBH) after the collapse. Rescue Workers The efforts of the rescue team members cannot be ignored as they removed the bodies found under the rubble. Rescue workers also arrived from other countries including Japan as there were many foreign victims including Chinese and Japanese due to the presence of a language school in the CTV building. 2.2 Key Stakeholders Gerald Shirtcliff Gerald Shirtcliff was the CTV site’s construction manager. He refused to appear at the Royal Commission hearing. The commissioners doubted his credibility and later it was found out that he had used false qualifications (Greenhill, 2012). He was inadequate in performing the task of a construction manager effectively. Alan Reay Alan Reay was the boss of Alan Reay Consultancy Firm (ARCL) who was found to be mainly responsible as the head of the construction firm that designed the CTV building. He did point his fingers at the designer and engineer of his firm, David Harding but he accepted that he was “ultimately responsible” (Greenhill, 2012). Figure 4. Alan Reay. The head of the firm Alan Reay Consultants Ltd. NZ Herald. (August 7, 2012). Alan Reay [Photograph]. Retrieved from David Harding David Harding was the designer of the CTV building and worked under ARCL. Harding was incompetent and inexperienced in working with multi-storey buildings. He also did not have any experience working with the software Etabs. This led to the deficiencies in design of the CTV building (Greenhill, 2012). Figure 5. David Harding. The engineer and designer of the CTV building. The Press (August 15, 2012). Apology: David Harding [Photograph]. Retrieved from Christchurch City Council The building had many major deficiencies yet in 1986 a building permit was issued by Christchurch City Council. The commissioners said that the council should not have given the consent (Greenhill, 2012). Bill Jones Williams Construction built the CTV building. Its site supervisor Bill Jones was competent enough but the CTV building project was his first design-build contract hence he lacked the guidance. The commission mentioned that he was working in a situation he was not used to and this contributed towards the failure (Greenhill, 2012). John Drew John Drew was the building manager at the CTV building and also the owner of The Clinic, which was a fourth level tenant. After the 2010 earthquake the CTV building had weakened and the building had to be checked for structural faults by an engineer David Coatsworth. Drew only allowed one check after the earthquake and did not provide the drawings of the building plan. He could have had an inspection check of the CTV building but he did not. Such actions contributed to the technical faults (Greenhill, 2012). David Coatsworth He was the structural engineer who performed a check at the CTV building after the 2010 earthquake. Had he been allowed to perform more inspection checks, the collapse could have been avoided (Greenhill, 2012). Graeme Tapper Graeme Tapper was the building engineer at the Christchurch City Counsel who wrongly signed the building permit in 1986 despite having concerns about its noncompliance with the standards. The wrong authorization of the building permit later led to the collapse (Davison, 2012). The Media The media consistently showed news regarding the CTV building collapse and provided coverage of the commission hearings and other press releases regarding the earthquake. Also, the CTV building employed various journalists and TV crew members and the collapse also affected those involved in the media. Families of Victims After the DBH released their report regarding the collapse, the families of the victims expressed their anger after finding out that the building had not met the required standards. Prime Minister Mr. Key also mentioned releasing the report so as to provide the families with information regarding the collapse. 3. Evaluation of consequences The key stakeholders involved: the consultancy firm, ARCL, the designer, site managers, and engineers including Gerald Shirtcliff, Alan Reay, David Harding, Christchurch City Council, Bill Jones, John Drew, David Coatsworth and so on all contributed to the technical and structural failures that led to the collapse. The building was badly affected by the 2010 earth quake and due to insufficient inspections and checks the faults remained. Due to inefficiencies of the stakeholders and improper inspection of the site, the faults remained hidden until the CTV building finally fell down. 4. Summary and Conclusion Clearly, as Reay admitted himself he is “ultimately responsible” being the boss of the construction company but the lack of communication between him and his engineer Harding proved to be extremely destructive – for the 115 people killed as well as the financial loss this caused. This incident is considered to be the second largest damage to take place in a developed country like the New Zealand after the 9/11 incident which took place in the United States. If the incompetency of Harding had been identified in time, the collapse and the whole destruction it brought could have been avoided. References Bryant, N. (2013). Confessions from Correspondentland: The Dangers and Delights of Life As a Foreign Correspondent. Banbury Rd., Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Davison, I. (2012, December 10). CTV building errors laid bare in report. NZ Herald. Retrieved from Greenhill, M. (2012, December 10). CTV: the key players. The Press. Retrieved from < http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch-earthquake-2011/8060096/CTV-the-key-players> Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2012). Annual Report 2011/2012.Canterbury, NZ. Peredes, A. (2012, February 9). Report Explains Death of 115 People at CTV Building in February Christchurch Quake. International Business Times. Retrieved from < http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/296286/20120210/earthquake-christchurch-ctv-building-report-design.htm> Wilson, B. (2012). Moments in Time: A Collection of Short Stories. United States of America: Trafford Publishing. Watkins, T. & Greenhill, M. (2013, March 26). 'No power' to punish CTV designers. The Press. Retrieved from Checks on CTV copies. (2012, December 11). Checks on CTV copies. Geelong Advertiser. Read More