The Canterbury Television (CTV) Building-Case Analysis - Assignment Example

? The Canterbury Television (CTV) Building-Case Analysis The Canterbury Television (CTV) Building-Case Analysis Executive Summary Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, have become a common occurrence in recent times. Earthquakes have particularly been common in Southern Asia and some parts of Europe. Most of the earthquakes witnessed in recent times have had devastating effects. Therefore, architects are advised to ensure that modern buildings meet the building standards capable of withstanding seismic waves of reasonably high magnitude. New Zealand is one of the European countries that have suffered from a series of earthquakes in the recent past. One such earthquake occurred on 22 February 2011 in Christchurch killing 184 individuals. Investigations conducted after the incident showed that the building collapsed due to poor design and construction. In addition, a number of players and stakeholders were associated with the incident, a number of them culpable. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. Key Role-players and Stakeholders 4 3. Management and Organizational Factors Associated with the Incident 9 4. Summary and Conclusions 10 5. Recommendations 10 References 11 The Canterbury Television (CTV) Building-Case Analysis 1. Introduction Natural disasters such as earthquakes have become a common occurrence in recent times. Earthquakes have particularly been common in Southern Asia and parts of Europe. Most of the earthquakes witnessed in recent times have had devastating effects. In New Zealand, the Canterbury Television (CTV) Building was the most affected by the earthquake that hit Christchurch on 22 February 2011, according to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (2012) report. The building collapsed to the ground leading to the death of 115 of the 184 people who perished in Christchurch. The collapse of Canterbury Television (CTV) Building in Christchurch on 22 February 2011 was one of a kind. Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (2012) indicates that the building collapsed when an earthquake, 6.1 in magnitude, hit Christchurch in New Zealand. However, it took many by surprise to learn that only the CTV Building collapsed due to the earthquake, leading to the death of 115 people (Wright & Greenhill, 2012). This hinted to the fact that there was something amiss in the design of the building. It was argued that there was no reason for the building to be the only one affected whereas there were many other buildings adjacent to it. Investigations have identified a number of key role players who were responsible in one way or another for the collapse of the building. Most of the role players in the incident double up as stakeholders. This report seeks to identify the key role-players and stakeholders linked to the CTV Building and its consequences. In addition, the paper will provide an analysis and evaluation of the key management and organizational factors linked to the incident, both prior to and after the incident. 2. Key Role-players and Stakeholders 2.1 David Harding David Harding, the architect who designed CTV building, is the first role-player blamed for the collapse of the building. According to Wright and Greenhill (2012), the building did not meet standards when it was built in 1986. Investigations showed that Harding worked beyond his level of competence since his structural plans had several flaws that an experienced designer would otherwise not have committed. Vervaeck and Daniell (2012) also indicated that Harding, the designer of the CTV building, had no tangible experience in designing multistory buildings like CTV. According to Vervaeck and Daniell (2012), the building had poorly designed joints between the columns and beams. As a result, the reinforcement holding the beam and columns together were too weak and did not comply with building standards set in 1986. The concrete used in making the columns also had inadequate steel reinforcements, making them brittle and too weak to withstand high tension such as that of produced by an earthquake of 6.3 magnitude on the Richer scale. In addition, the joints where the pre-cast concrete and columns meet were very weak since the designer reportedly failed to roughen it, which was a serious omission. The building twisted during the earthquake due to extra strain placed on the columns. Associated Press (2012) attributed the twisting of the building to the asymmetrical layout of the CTV sheer walls by the architect. Therefore, it becomes evident that Harding, the architect who designed the building was highly culpable for the incident due to his poor design of the building. Figure one shows rescue workers at the collapsed CTV Building site. Fig 1: Rescue workers at the site of the collapsed CTV Building Source: The Guardian 2.2 Alan Reay Alan Reay, Harding’s boss, was also to blame for the poor structure (see appendix 1) of the building due to his hands-off approach. Reay is blamed for the incident since despite knowing that Harding was ill equipped to design the building, he went ahead to appoint him for the job (Davison, 2012). Reay’s claim that Harding had enough experience to design the building was completely unfounded. As a result, he is culpable since he awarded Harding the job without reviewing his work to determine his competence in designing multistory buildings like CTV building. As earlier stated, findings show that Harding had no experience in designing such buildings. Had Reay reviewed some of his works prior to awarding him the contract, he could have noted the design problems and would have chosen a different architect for the job. According to Wright and Greenhill (2012), Reay did not even review Harding’s drawings. This makes it difficult to understand on what ground he allowed Harding to design the building. 2.3 The Christchurch City Council (CCC) The Christchurch City Council (CCC) is another key-player associated with the CTV building and its consequences. According to the Royal Commission report, despite the fact that the architect was given a go ahead to put up the building, it did not meet the minimum standards set by the Christchurch City Council at the time of its construction in 1986. As a result, CCC ought not to have issued a building permit as it did in September 1986, according to the Associated Press (2012). In fact, reports show that a CCC inspector did voice his concerns about the design problems but bowed to pressure when Reay intervened. CCC becomes an accomplice in the incident since as the authority in charge of issuing building permits, it ought not to have proceeded to issue a building permit when it had identified design problems prior to the issue of permit. In fact, even if the problems were identified by CCC after the issue of the permit, it had the powers to revoke the permit upon identifying design flaws that might put the building at risk of collapse. Figure 2 shows the CTV building before its collapse. Fig. 2: The CTV building before its collapse Source: Campusoft Engineering 2.4 The Construction Company and Its Employees The construction company was also blamed for the structural failures that led to the collapse of the building following the earthquake. The Associated Press (2012) exposed the construction manager Gerald Schirtcliff as a fraudster and blamed him for the shoddy work done during the construction of the CTV Building. The construction manager failed to identify the design problems committed by the architect, leading to poor guidance to Bill Jones, the site supervisor. Davison (2012) revealed that Jones was a very experienced and competent supervisor, but was working under circumstances he had never been accustomed to. As a construction manager, Schirtcliff ought to have noted the design problems and advised the site supervisor accordingly before the start of the construction. This would have ensured that all the problems are rectified so as to construct a building that meets the building standards of 1986. 2.5 Inspectors The inspectors who certified the construction of the CTV building are also responsible for the failure of the building. Wright, Greenhill, and Rutherford (2012) noted that the construction work was inspected in 1991 by an engineer to check the structural flaws between the north wall and the floors. However, even after noting the structural flaws in the design, no additional review was done by the inspectors to rectify the errors identified. Another inspection conducted in 2010 following an earthquake also gave the construction a clean bill of health. A damage assessment conducted by Engineer David Coatsworth failed to show the shortcomings of the building despite attempting to see the structural drawings, which were never provided. After the analysis, Coatsworth recommended further review, which manager John Dew failed to do before the earthquake incident of 22 February (Davison, 2012). In this regard, the inspectors are responsible to the extent that they ought to have identified the design errors and stopped the construction or the occupation of the building altogether. Taking such a move would have prevented the death of many people that occurred following the earthquake. 2.6 Other Stakeholders The owner of the CTV building is a main stakeholder in the incident since they lost a lot in terms of their investment. Members of the public are also a key stakeholder in the CTV incident. Many people who are members of the public lost their lives as a result of the mistakes of other people. Furthermore, many more were put under risk due to the shoddy work done by different role players. 3. Management and Organizational Factors Associated with the Incident The collapse of CTV building in Christchurch is linked to a number of organizational and management factors. Generally, before awarding a construction contract to a design architect, the management must ensure that the architect is highly competent and has enough experience to construct the building to which the architect is appointed. However, in CTV building case, management failed to appoint a competent and experienced designer. Prince (2012) showed that Harding had no experience in building a multistory building like the CTV resulting in a poor design. He appears to have been corruptly appointed since the tender was not awarded competitively to ensure that the most competent and experienced bidder is awarded the design contract, which was a management malpractice blamed for the collapse of the building. In fact, Wright and Greenhill (2012) indicated that even after CCC had identified design flaws in the building, Reay intervened allowing the construction work to continue without conducting a thorough review of Harding’s drawings and competence. The incident also occurred due to poor inspection by the organization. To ensure that a building complies with the building and safety standards, the management ought to have appointed a team of competent engineers to carry out the inspection. However, according to BBC News (2012), CTV building was awarded a green sticker after having been inspected by only three building officials, who turned out not to be engineers. This was an organizational failure since only trained and experienced building safety evaluators should be given the mandate of inspecting buildings after earthquakes. 4. Summary and Conclusions The collapse of CTV building on 22 February 2011 was devastating in as much as it could have been avoided. The incident which was instigated by an earthquake saw115 people die and the CTV building collapse to the ground. According to the investigations on the incident, it emerged that poor design and construction was widely to blame for the collapse of the building. At the same time, several players and stakeholders were widely to blame for the incident. The role-players and stakeholders include the building designer, the construction company, and the inspectors. In addition, the incident occurred due to management and organizational factors such as corruption and failure to appoint competent and trained inspectors. A report on the events will help the victims of the incidence know whom to sue for negligence and damages. Above all the report points to the importance of designing good building in the future, both in New Zealand and the rest of the world. 5. Recommendations Future designers should be keen to avoid design and construction errors identified in the CTV building in the future to ensure the construction of a strong and lasting building in New Zealand and beyond. References Associated Press (2012, Feb. 9). Christchurch earthquake collapse building was substandard. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/09/christchurch-quake-ctv-building-substandard. BBC News (2012, Dec. 10). NZ quake collapse building design 'deficient. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20661984. Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (2012). Report into CTV building collapse released. Retrieved from http://cera.govt.nz/news/2012/report-into-ctv-building-collapse-released-9-february-2012. Davison, I. (2012, Dec. 10). "CTV building errors laid bare in report.” The New Zealand Herald. Retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10853110. Prince, M. (2012, Dec. 12). Faulty building design leads to Christchurch earthquake collapse. Architecture & Design. Retrieved from http://www.architectureanddesign.com.au/news/faulty-building-design-lead-to-christchurch-earthq. Vervaeck, A., & Daniell, J. (2012). Construction errors may have been responsible for the collapse of the Christchurch CTV building (killing 115 people). Retrieved from http://earthquake-report.com/2012/02/21/construction-errors-responsibe-for-the-collapse-of-the-christchurch-ctv-building-killing-115-people/. Wright, M., & Greenhill, M. (2012). CTV royal commission finds deficiencies. Retrieved from http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/8059838/CTV-royal-commission-finds-deficiencies. Wright, M., Greenhill, M., & Rutherford, H. (2012). Catalogue of errors in collapsed building. The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/world/catalogue-of-errors-in-collapsed-building-20121211-2b6o6.html. Appendix Appendix 1: Excerpts from “CTV building errors laid bare in report” The New Zealand Herald. By Isaac Davison A series of engineering, construction and council-related errors over 20 years led to the catastrophic collapse of the CTV building in the second major Christchurch earthquake, a Royal Commission has found. Prime Minister John Key said the commission's report, released this afternoon, made "grim and sobering reading". He said the findings would be of little comfort to the friends and families of the 115 people who were killed in the collapse of the six-storey office block - the biggest loss of life in the February 22, 2011 quake. The Royal Commission concluded that the engineering design of the CTV building was deficient in a number of ways. It should never have been issued with a building permit by the Christchurch City Council in 1986 because it was not built to the standards of the time. After the CTV building collapsed, a number of construction defects were found. While the foreman of the construction was found to be competent, his construction manager Gerald Shirtcliff did not carry out proper or regular inspections at the site. At one point the construction was not supervised for five months. Structural weaknesses in the building were identified during its sale in 1990, but the remedies may have weakened the building's ability to withstand seismic activity. The commission also found that after the September 2010 quake, council assessments declared the building safe without expert advice from an engineer Read More