CTV Building Collapse: Case Report - Assignment Example

? CTV Building Collapse: Case Report Executive summary The growing environmental issues like global warming and climate change have notably changed the geological structure of the earth which in turn has increased the possibility of earthquakes. The February 2011 Christchurch earthquake collapsed the CTV building, which was constructed in 1986. A number of investigations were carried out to figure out the causes of the building collapse and all the investigation reports pointed to poor building design and construction operations. The principal engineer Alan Reay employed an inexperienced engineer (David Harding) for the building design. In addition, Reay did not supervise the operations of Harding and hence many potential defects in the construction process had gone unidentified. To worsen the problem, the construction manager failed to properly guide the building’s foreman. The Christchurch City Council issued a permit for this deficient building design under external pressure and also the local authorities issued a ‘green sticker’ for the CTV building following a magnitude 7.0 earthquake in September 2010. As a result, the occupants of the CTV building believed that it can survive earthquakes of that range and hence they continued to stay in this building. This paper will identify the key role-players and stakeholders that can be associated with the CTV building and its consequences. This report will also analyze the key management and organizational factors related to the failure. Table of Content 1. Introduction 2. Case analysis 2.1 Brief overview 2.2 Key role players and stakeholders 2.3 Management and organizational factors 3. Summary and conclusions 4. Recommendations 5. References 1. Introduction The Canterbury Television building at the Cashel and Madras Streets in Christchurch, constructed in 1986 was the headquarters of CTV and some other companies. This building later became one of the highlights of the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake because it collapsed during the earthquake and took the lives of 115 people, which represented over half of the total fatalities. The Royal Commission of Inquiry conducted an investigation to identify the causes of building collapse and found that the deficient building design and the engineer’s inexperience significantly contributed to this catastrophe. The investigation report also pointed that the building structure did not meet three 1986 building standards. In the report prepared by Dr Clark Hyland and Ashley Smith, the authors indicated that “the building was susceptible to intense horizontal ground shaking, a lack of flexibility in its supporting columns, and the asymmetrical layout of the shear or structural walls, made the building twist excessively” (as cited in One news, July 09, 2012). 2. Case analysis 2.1 Brief overview The building collapsed during the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake with only a part of the wall that included the lift shaft left undamaged. According to a final report released by the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, the six-storey building collapsed ‘within 10-20 seconds of the onset of the magnitude 6.3 earthquake’ (BBC Asia). Within minutes after the collapse of the building, a fire started. Although most of the victims died as an impact of the collapse, it is assumed that some people were burnt to death whereas some others might have drowned during the fire prevention efforts. The King’s Education was located on the CTV building there were 87 regular students, 27 visiting students, and 17 staff members at the time of the earthquake. The school lost hard copy and server records of student details and this situation adversely affected the school’s efforts to identify the missing students. The disaster took the lives of 115 people. The bodies of four victims could not be identified because the high temperature of the fire had damaged DNA traces completely. Only seven people could survive this dreadful disaster and three of them were on the Level 6 at the time of earthquake. 2.2 Key role players 2.2.1 Consulting head Reay employed David Harding for the building design on the strength of the belief that he had adequate experience. In fact, Harding had little previous experiences in designing buildings of more than two floors. The assessment reveals that Reay left Harding to work unsupervised even though he was not much experienced to design a six-storey building. Harding should not have been permitted to go on with the design work without his work being reviewed timely. 2.2.2 Design engineer According to a rapid assessment by Christchurch City Council building officers (reported in News.com, December 10, 2012), Harding failed to effectively evaluate the intensity of the loads the building’s beams and columns need to carry during the process of an earthquake. This failure resulted in brittle joints. The report also says that Harding was ‘working beyond his competence’ in developing that particular building design. 2.2.3 Christchurch City Council The report points that Harding’s building design did not comply with the local bylaws and therefore the Christchurch City Council should not have issued a construction permit for that design. Even though the council engineers had concerns about the potency of the design, they were ‘under pressure to approve it’. Reay also forced the Council to issue a permit although he ‘knew very little about the structural details of the building’ (News.com, December 10, 2012). 2.2.4 Construction manager Similarly, the building site’s foreman did not receive proper guidance from the construction manager Gerald Shirtcliff because he (Shirtcliff) had not spent enough time at the construction site to perform his tasks flawlessly (The Australian News, December 10, 2012). Currently Shirtcliff faces police investigation on allegations regarding misrepresentation of his engineering qualifications. 2.2.5 Foreman The foreman of the CTV building, Jones, was a carpenter basically and he had developed construction skills over the years. Hence, he was not qualified enough to manage the construction activities. 2.2.6 Structural draughtsmen Many structural draughtsmen had worked to develop dimensions for the architectural drawings designed by the engineer. 2.2.7 Deputy building engineer – 1 The deputy building engineer of the City Council (Graeme Tapper) had raised concerns regarding the structural issues regarding the connection of the floors to the north wall. 2.2.8 Building engineer Bryan Bluck, the building engineer of the City Council was convinced by Reay that Tapper’s objections were not reasonable. 2.2.9 Deputy building engineer – 2 Peter Nicholas, the second in charge deputy engineer, had the duty to check the designer’s calculations in order to review his design and assumptions. 2.2.10 Pre-purchase review Finally, the Holmes Consulting Group had reviewed the CTV building and identified a non-compliance with building conventions at that time. 2.3 Key stakeholders 2.3.1 Prime West Corporation Limited It purchased three land plots in Cashel and Madras Streets where the CTV building was constructed. 2.3.2 Williams construction Williams Construction had to a submit design for the office building and its Managing Director wanted to widen the floor area in order improve leasing facilities. 2.3.3 Consulting engineer Reay’s Alan M. Reay Consulting Engineer (ARCE) was chosen as the CTV building’s structural design engineer. Williams Construction had jointly worked with ARCE on several projects previously. 2.3.4 City Council The authorities have issued a ‘green sticker’ for the CTV building even after a magnitude 7.0 earthquake in September 2010 (Associate Press, the guardian, 10 December 2012). Hence, the people continued to use this building believing that this six-storey building can survive such earthquakes successfully. 2.3.5 Smart Group Limited Smart Group Limited purchased Williams Property Holdings Limited at the time of the construction of foundation and first floor of the CTV building. 2.3.6 Union Construction Limited Union Construction Limited was founded as a new construction firm and Brooks, Scott, and Shirtcliff hold a 10 percent take each in the company. The company became insolvent after the completion of the CTV building. 2.3.7 CTV and other tenants Canterbury Television and many other tenants had occupied the building at the time of the earthquake and it increased the fatality of the disaster. 2.3.8 New owner The Crown purchased the land for Eastern Frame and an earthquake memorial at the disaster spot was considered. 2.3.9 Royal Commission of Inquiry The Royal Commission Inquiry conducted an in-depth investigation into the root causes of the building collapse and questioned individuals who related to the CTV building in some or other ways. 2.3.10 The victims Official reports indicate that the 115 people killed include King’s Education students (70), teachers (5), and staff (4) on Level 4; Canterbury Television employees (16) on Levels 1 and 2; medical centre staff (13), patients (5), and a bystander; and a Relationship Services Administrator on Level 6 (The Australian News, 10th December, 2012)). 2.4 Management and organizational factors Among the six specific reasons for the building collapse pointed out by the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, five directly relate to the design or construction of the building (QSA). Hence, a number of management and organizational factors contributed to this fatal incident. First, the City Council permitted an issue for the building construction under intense pressure even though the building design had not complied with accepted standards. According to an investigation conducted by the Associated Press in 2011 (the guardian, 10 December 2012), the routine inspection checks that are carried out following earthquakes to verify the safety of buildings fail to predict how effectively those buildings would survive future quakes. The Associated Press indicated that city officials and building occupants in the Christchurch misunderstood that a ‘green sticker’ would ensure the potentiality of a building to stay intact during future quakes. Therefore, the City Council officials failed to enlighten the public about what the green sticker really means. In other words, the City Council persuaded the CTV building occupants to continue to stay there instead of issuing a prior safety warning to them. Evidently, none of the three building officials who issued a ‘green sticker’ for the CTV building was an engineer. In addition, some drawbacks in management decision making during the building construction notably contributed to this catastrophe (One news). There were no governing bodies to coordinate and supervise the CTV building construction operations. As a result, the safety of the building design was compromising. 3. Summary and conclusions Pitfalls in building design and construction mainly led to the collapse of the CTV building even though this disaster occurred during an earthquake. The CTV building collapse took the lives of 115 people. The principal engineer Reay employed Harding as the design engineer even though Harding was inexperienced in designing multi-storied buildings. In addition, Reay did not attempt to review the works of Harding. Similarly, the construction manager did not either provide proper guidance to the building’s foreman or spend enough time in the worksite to do his jobs effectively. This inexperienced and inefficient construction team could not identify some key construction defects, which later contributed to the building collapse. Government level investigations reflected that earthquake was only a secondary cause of the building collapse but design and construction failures constituted the primary causes. The City Council officials issued a ‘green sticker’ for the CTV building without proper evaluation and it also contributed to the death of 115 people. Hence, the CTV building collapse can be attributed to the above stated factors. As Macfie (10th December, 2012) reported, the post disaster investigations reflect that construction defects including lack of roughening of construction joints significantly contributed to the collapse of the building. Harding, Shirtcliff, and the foreman had the responsibility to detect those defects timely. However, all the key role players associated with the building construction unjustifiably relied on the ability of others and this situation in turn resulted in the construction of a building structure that had not met the compliance standards. 4. Recommendations In order to ensure the sustainability of buildings, only qualified and experienced designers have to be assigned. In addition, it is necessary to perform a better assessment to evaluate the seismic performance of the particular building design. It is recommendable for principal engineers to review their juniors’ works thoroughly and certify the tasks completed during each stage of the project. In addition, construction managers or other responsible officials must give proper guidance to their subordinates so as to complete the project flawlessly. Throughout the course of the project, it is better to conduct performance assessments to identify defects in building design or construction operations if any. Referring to the opinion of Greenhill (10th December, 2012), it is vital to ‘cast a critical eye’ over every building design in order to avoid this type of fatal incidents. The local authorities concerned have a notable role to play in ensuring the safety of buildings. Those regulating bodies should not approve building designs, which do not comply with the building standards at that time. Local authorities concerned have to perform periodical reviews of buildings to determine their potential life period. For this, the assistance of engineering experts is essential. References Associated Press. (10 December 2012). New Zealand quake report finds building failures. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/10/new-zealand-quake-report-ctv-building The Australian News. (10th December, 2012). Christchurch earthquake building wrongly approved: royal commission. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/christchurch-earthquake-building-wrongly-approved-royal-commission/story-e6frg6so-1226533729584 BBC News. (9 February 2012). “New Zealand quake: CTV building 'was sub-standard”'. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16958906 Greenhill, M. (10th December, 2012). CTV needed a critical eye – engineer. The Press News. Retrieved from http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch-earthquake-2011/7467010/CTV-needed-a-critical-eye-engineer Macfie, R. (10th December, 2012). CTV building catastrophe: a catalogue of tragic failure. Listener. Retrieved from http://www.listener.co.nz/commentary/letter-from-christchurch/the-ctv-building-catastrophe/ News.com. (December 10, 2012). Report slams NZ CTV building construction. Retrieved from http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/report-into-ctv-building-collapse-due/story-e6frfkui-1226533306726 One News. (July 09, 2012). Authors of CTV report scrutinised at inquiry. Retrieved from http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/authors-ctv-report-scrutinised-inquiry-4961200 QSA. A look at the proposed changes to the CDM regulations. December sees fall in construction output . retrieved from http://www.qsassociates.co.uk/report-condemns-deficient-design-of-nz-quake-collapse-building/ Read More