Madness: A result of individual rights being nullified by societal rights - Research Paper Example

August 10, Social Insanity and the General Will Subverted in “The Yellow Wallpaper” and “Seasons of Madness” Insanity is usually understood to be a purely mental phenomenon, in which something is severely wrong with the sufferer. However, another definition is possible. This definition has to do less with the individual alone than with the individual in relation to the rest of society, and hinges around something similar to what Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jacob Talmon discuss in their explorations of democracy. Both men are interested in what Rousseau calls the “Social Contract,” which is essentially the individual’s privileging of society’s rights over his or her own. Although this theory do not deal explicitly with insanity, its system of social understanding serves as a good model to explain the way society constructs its ideas of madness. These social constructions, and the submission to the will of the general population, can rob a rational, normal individual of their rights and life. Rousseau’s theorizing—and Talmon’s critical response to it—are less clear than they may be, especially when applying them to something other than politics. However, two short stories which show just the sorts of thing they are talking about are Gilman's “The Yellow Wallpaper” and al Shaykh's “Seasons of Madness,” which both show social constructions of insanity. In Gilman's story, set in 19th century America, the madness of her character is set upon her by society, but becomes debilitating and very real after she has been supposedly cured of her ailment. On the other hand, al Shaykh's story, which is set in a 20th century Middle Eastern society, portrays a madness chosen for more selfish social reasons, and which the character is able to set aside when she wants to. Regardless, both stories do show some of the dangers involved in treating madness as a purely mental phenomenon, and argue somewhat for an understanding of insanity as a social construction in some cases. Taken together, and when viewed through the political and philosophical ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jacob Talmon, the stories make a convincing argument that insanity is socially constructed, and that this can be dangerous. In most cases, when someone is labeled insane by society it is because there is something severely wrong with how their brain works, or at least how it relates to reality. However, insanity could also be understood as an individual's refusal to fit himself or herself into the consensus of what reality should be. In “The Yellow Wallpaper,” this happens when the narrator constantly refuses to stop writing and using her imagination. In “Seasons of Madness,” it is apparent in Fatin’s pretended insanity, which she uses to distance herself from what her husband and family expects of her. In these cases, the individual's insanity is not so much a serious mental illness as a rejection of what society deems right and proper. This would suggest that the reason society as a whole puts those suffering from insanity into asylums may be to protect them, as well as society, from their own selfish rejections of the consensus view. On the other hand, as both short stories show, this idea is ripe for abuse: if insanity is not necessarily a mental problem, serious harm could be done to sufferers by treating them as if it is. The unnamed narrator in “The Yellow Wallpaper” ends up insane in truth where before she was just different to other people. Fatin at the end of her story is caught up in others’ perceptions of her as insane even though she has just admitted to being perfectly rational. Rousseau is the older theorist, and his “Social Contract,” written in the late 1700s, is considered by many a classic of political theory. In it, Rousseau famously described man as being “born free, and everywhere … in chains” (14). He argues that the way to help man be free in life is through the use of the “Social Contract,” the giving up of individual will for the sake of the general will—the difference in what someone’s “particular interest may suggest” and somebody’s will “as a citizen” (Rousseau 26). This general will, to Rousseau, is very important in achieving freedom, as when ruled by the individual will, man is actually a slave to himself. However, when people realize that “that there is no possible authority over us other than us” (Mistery 135), they can escape from this slavery and, as a whole, force themselves to obey their own general will and become free. This is what Rousseau’s assertion that “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so… means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free” means (27). According to Froese, Rousseau’s social contract and general will are examples of the importance for him of morality and freedom, which are “not only compatible, but necessarily interdependent” (581). In essence, this is because for an individual to be free, he or she must accept the moral truth that humans are intrinsically social creatures. Each individual must realize he is “a social individual who cannot conceive of [his] individuality apart from the community” (Froese 589). This also explains Rousseau’s famous statement about man being born in chains: “The existence of the community forces the individual to transcend narrow selfish interests” and focus on the freedom of the whole (Froese 592). Jacob Talmon critiques Rousseau’s ideas in his The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, pointing out the contradiction of the individual who is “said to obey nothing but his own will” but is also “urged to conform to some objective criterion” (41). Some of the problems with Rousseau’s idea of the general will lie in his assumption that this will would work “to create harmony and unanimity” (Talmon 42). Clearly, mankind is not always so benevolent and kind. In fact, sometimes they are quite the opposite, creating a sort of democracy which, instead of freeing people, enslaves them to this popular will, as Talmon’s title of “Totalitarian Democracy” suggests. Although it is important to note that part of Rousseau’s system is that it is “one of mutual constraint,” where people do not use the general will for bad purposes (Mistery 137), the general will can in fact be manipulated by those in power, and practically has to be for the system of democracy to work at all. Rousseau himself understood this when he emphasizes that “leaders must put only questions of a general nature to the people, and, moreover, must know how to put the right question” (Talmon 46). According to Talmon, this goes beyond good governance and is a situation where unanimity (and thus democracy) “must be engineered through intimidation, election tricks, or the organization of the spontaneous popular expression” (46). In other words, “whose will is [the general will], and what is the relation between that will, the subject, and the sovereign” (Mistery 133)? Taken to extremes, this idea of the general will becomes totalitarianism, the subjection and rule of the many by the few. Worse, though, it is a totalitarianism where the people doing the oppressing are actually those being oppressed, although they do not know it, and so there is a situation where people think they are free but they are actually trapped. “They are in fact accepting and endorsing something which is presented to them as a sole truth, while believing that it is their free choice” (Talmon, 47). One area outside of the political where the real dangers of Rousseau’s ideas come out is in insanity. The treatment of insanity often involves the forced submission of the individual will to that of the general will on the principle that the individual is incapable of making socially responsible decisions. Although in most cases this is necessary, if the diagnosis is wrong, or the treatment is not suited to actually treat it, the individual suffering from insanity will be stuck in a truly horrible situation. The latter is the case in Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper,” a story about a woman who is treated in such a way for madness that by the end of the narrative she has become insane in truth. In Gilman's “Yellow Wallpaper,” the relationship between the supposedly-insane patient and her society takes on a sinister tone. The story is essentially about the way a woman, at the beginning of the story perfectly rational and someone who functions well enough in society, is forced to endure a supposed “treatment” that ends up driving her insane in fact. The worst part is that her husband, the man who is tormenting her, is not mean-spirited. He actually believes she is getting better, convinced that “the place is doing you good” (Gilman 4) and, at the end of the story, faints when he sees what she has become (Gilman 18). For all this the story is chilling. When looked at with the ideas of Rousseau and Talmon in mind, it is clear that what it represents is nothing more or less than a democratic totalitarianism in which the will of the individual is destroyed not for the good of the community, but definitely to the detriment of the sufferer. “Personally,” the narrator writes, “I disagree with their ideas …. But what is one to do?” (Gilman 2). She is willing to submit to the will of her husband and doctor, and what she assumes will be the will of the general populace. This comes from Gilman’s own childhood, where she was a girl who “considered absolute obedience a duty” and stopped daydreaming and imagining things when she was told to (Shumaker 590). In the story, this is shown by the narrator’s willingness to “let it alone” (Gilman 2). Unfortunately, her husband’s recommended treatment is not helpful, and his refusal to listen to her complaints about it lead to the complete ruin of her mind. Submission to the general will can be dangerous, as it is not always correct. In contrast to “Yellow Wallpaper,” the madness of the protagonist in al Shayk's “Seasons of Madness” is something she can put on and take off as she pleases. It is also significantly more selfish than the madness of Gilman’s character. At the end of the story, we learn that Fatin is only pretending to be mad in order to shame her husband into divorcing her, so she can be free to meet her new lover (al Shaykh, 9-10). While the end of the story is somewhat menacing, and does still end with the individual being stripped of her rights in fact as well as just in name, it is not nearly as negative in its connotations as “The Yellow Wallpaper.” In regards to Rousseau, al Shaykh’s story represents another aspect of the social and individual will. The situation Fatin finds herself in at the end of the story, where her husband and mother-in-law refuse to accept that she is actually sane, is entirely her fault. Although this seems result of her individual will refusing to bend to the general will, as represented by the social contract of marriage, the irony of the story is that it actually does fit Rousseau’s patterns. Fatin excuses her behavior by saying she “Feared that the knowledge [that she had never loved him] might fester inside him, a wound refusing to heal” and hoped her pretended madness would allow him to be free of her without worrying (al Shaykh 9). This is still a case, although a less clear-cut one, of an individual working towards the general will. She does not wish to cause her husband any of the pain or embarrassment that would come from a divorce. It is, in some ways, like the contribution Rousseau talks of individuals giving when they enter into the social contract with the general will (26). As with Gilman’s story, there is still the same Totalitarian aspect, as well. Fatin’s husband and mother-in-law essentially rob her of her personal rights when they refuse to accept her truly stated reasons for madness. The story ends on a bleak note as they take these reasons for further madness, saying “She’s crazy, poor thing. Nothing can be done for her” and vowing to take her wherever possible to cure her (al Shaykh 10). There are significant parallels between the stories, despite their differences: Fatin’s fate is the same as that of Gilman’s unnamed narrator, who, whenever she spoke the truth of her feelings, was brushed off by her husband. Fatin, who ultimately is faking her own madness, is similarly ignored when she states the truth—although it may be more her own fault than anyone elses. An examination of Rousseau’s and Talmon’s political thought, however, casts a new light on the treatment of insanity in these two stories. Both stories can be read as parables of a sort, showing some of the dangers of Rousseau’s thought with regards to the general and individual will. There is a sense that madness arises not only from mental conditions, but from a refusal to submit to the general will Rousseau discusses. Further, if this is the case, Talmon’s portrayal of a totalitarian democracy means that there is almost no hope for sufferers of this kind of social insanity. This is clear from Gilman’s narrator, who ends up truly mad by trying to fit herself into the will of the general populace. Although al Shaykh’s narrator, Fatin, does not want to submit to this general will, and wants to be a free woman, in the end it does not matter. If she will not submit, she will be forced, as Rousseau says, but not to be free. She will be forced to be mad, forced to lose her freedom for all time. The general will has destroyed her. Works Cited Gilman, Charlotte P, and Lynne S. Schwartz. The Yellow Wallpaper and Other Writings. New York, N.Y: Bantam Books, 1989. Print. Froese, Katrin. "Beyond Liberalism: the Moral Community of Rousseau's Social Contract." Canadian Journal of Political Science 34.3 (2001): 579-600. Print. Mistery, Deepak. “The Gift of Law: Liberty, Legitimacy, and Authority in The Social Contract.” South African Journal of Philosophy 27.2 (2008): 130-140. Print. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Trans. G.D.H. Cole, ed. New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2008. Print. al Shaykh, Hanan. “A Season of Madness.” I Sweep the Sun Off Rooftops. Trans. Catherine Cobham. New York: Anchor, 1998. Print. 1-11 Shumaker, Conrad. "Too Terribly Good to Be Printed: Charlotte Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper." American Literature 57.4 (1985): 588-599. Print. Talmon, Jacob. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. New York: Norton, 1970. Print. Read More