Strengthening U.S. Homeland Security Policies against Potential Islamic Jihad Union Attacks - Research Paper Example

? Strengthening U.S. Homeland Security Policies against Potential Islamic Jihad Union Attacks and Number Due Abstract This paper proposes specific ways through which the U.S. Homeland Security Policies can be enhanced in order to deter potential attacks of the Islamic Jihad Union. Specifically, it aims to justify its thesis that although there is an efficient and effective implementation of the major policies in the federal government level, emphasis must be placed toward enhancing the execution of such polices in the local level, especially in border and transportation security. In this regard, this paper takes a close look at the Islamic Jihad Union (formerly Islamic Jihad Group) by dividing its discussion in three parts. The first part provides a brief background of IJU through an examination of its organizational structure, ideology, and overall goals. The second part understands the capabilities of the group in spreading terrorism by analyzing its recruitment and training program, as well as its strategic planning sessions. The last part scrutinizes the series of attacks carried out by the group in two waves: the 2004 attacks and the 2006-2008 attacks. After the intensive study on IJU, this paper shifts its focus on the U.S. Homeland Security Policies by giving special attention on three significant areas: (1) border and transportation security; (2) domestic counter-terrorism; and (3) emergency preparedness and response. The recommendations contained in this paper are categorized into two. The first is meant to tighten border and transportation security by stating the necessity of providing a robust incentive plan for the volunteer members in the immigration, as well as by developing improved checkpoint guidelines in roads, highways, and ports as initiated by the local state groups. The second is meant to bolster domestic counter-terrorism measures by increasing the number of NTTF members, and by tapping third-party groups that provide special investigative services. Introduction Since the bombing of the Twin Towers, the U.S. has been adamant in tightening its homeland security policies and programs. The executive branch, in collaboration with the legislative and the judiciary branches, has created, developed, and implemented essential laws that are aimed at protecting U.S. citizens from various threats of terrorism. Unfortunately, as the different breakthroughs in communication and modern weaponry continue to take place, so do the threats from these notorious terrorist groups. Thus, it is in the critical study of the background, tactics and strategies of these terrorist groups that the U.S. can further enhance its current homeland security policies. In this paper, we first take a close look at the Islamic Jihad Union (formerly Islamic Jihad Group) in order to understand the group’s historical background, its primary ideologies and goals, and its basic strategies. Then, we examine the U.S. Homeland Security Policy by specifically highlighting on the policies regarding these issues: border and transportation security; domestic counter-terrorism; and emergency preparedness and response. Through this review, we intend to underscore the policies’ strengths and weaknesses in order to provide sound and implementable recommendations which are targeted to enhance such policies. At the end of this paper, we seek to justify the paper’s thesis that although there is an efficient, accurate, and effective implementation of the major policies in the federal government level, emphasis must be placed on enhancing the execution in the local level, specifically on border and transportation security. I. The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) The discussion on the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is to be divided into three parts. The first part will give a brief background of the group by looking at its organizational structure, ideology, and overall goals. The next part will understand the capabilities of the group in spreading terrorism by focusing on its recruitment and training program, as well as its strategic planning sessions. The last part will analyze the series of attacks carried out by the group in two waves: the 2004 attacks and the 2006-2008 attacks. A. Brief Background: Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) was founded in March 2002 by breakaway fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the Tribal Areas in Pakistan. The organization initially called itself Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), but after several failed attacks in Uzbekistan in 2004 and 2005, it changed its name to Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and became closer to the notorious al-Qa’ida (Sandee, 2008). This group has been responsible for several high profile bombings in Uzbekistan, and is scattered throughout Central Asia and South Asia (U.S. Department of State, 2006). The known founders of the IJG are Nadzhmiddin Kamoldinovich Jalolov (a.k.a. Abu Yahya), Muhammad Fatih (a.k.a. Commander Ahmad), and Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov (a.k.a. Mansur Suhail or Abu Huzaifa.). The other known supporters of the group are Kh. Ismoilov and Ahmad Bekmirzayev (Sandee, 2008). IJU’s attacks in Uzbekistan, as claimed by the members themselves, were aimed against the government of Uzbekistan and its servants who administered the policy of violence while openly considering these actions as proof of orders from Allah (Sandee, 2008). In this sense, IJU wanted to give the words of Allah a higher meaning and to retaliate against these officials whom they deemed as the real enemies of Islam. As stated in an online article by Reuters (2007) entitled “Who are the Islamic Jihad Group”, the destabilization of the Uzbekistan government was part of the group’s long-term plan of establishing an Islamic State. Aside from this, their attacks were also an expression of support for the jihad (holy war) of their Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and in other Muslim communities. From an ideological standpoint, the Islamic jihad (holy war) aspires to overthrow the secular Arab regimes in order to build an Islamic pan-Arab empire (Ganor, 1993). In this light, the jihad views war against the Jews (the instigators of Western imperialism) as an initial and essential step to fulfill the goals of Islam. B. IJU’s Capabilities: Recruitment and Training, Targeting and Tactics The primary recruits of IJU are comprised of two groups: (1) Turks in Turkey and in Turkish communities in Muslim Europe, and (2) Muslim converts from Europe (Sandee, 2008). Before the group’s major organizational change in 2005, Najmiddin Jalolov, head of IJU was in charge of the links between the group and other international terrorist organizations. Stationed outside of Uzbekistan, he coordinated the financing of the members’ combat training in special camps abroad (Sandee, 2008). Ahmad Bekmirzayev, a.k.a. Molik, directed the criminal gang in Uzbekistan. Through his influence, the gang was able to possess a great number of firearms and ammunition, hand-made explosive devices, instruction manuals, religious literature, forged documents, and many other things (Sandee, 2008). According to Roggio (2010), most of IJU’s members are referred to as German Taliban, and in their recently released video, these fighters were seen training at camps and conducting military operation in ‘German Taliban villages’ in Bajaur and in Northern Waziristan. Patterned after the classic al-Qa’ida training facilities in Afghanistan, most of the exercises done in these villages were meant to enhance the fighters’ physical as well as cognitive skills. As mentioned by one of IJU’s facilitators, they would purposively set up a skill test in the most random scenarios. For example, while one member is having a meal, someone would snatch the plate from his hands and the leaders would watch how the member reacts. Living in these villages, however, was marked by frugality and discipline. As narrated by one member, he used to live in a mud hut with his wife and children. He paid 1500 rupees (approximately $20) to every fighter and 500 rupees for each child. As he reiterated, the present conditions in these villages allow them to better perform jihad. Since jihad requires money, it is just practical for them to channel most of their funds into firearms and other fighting devices. All available information seems to indicate that the group trains groups of 15 to 25 recruits at a time (Sandee, 2008). Recently, though, IJU sent small groups of fighters to conduct guerilla operations in Nuristan, Paktia, and Paktika. After the changing of the group’s name to IJU in 2005, its connections with al-Qa’ida strengthened. Through this relationship, IJU was able to receive its badly needed funds. As a result, its major operations were more controlled by the global terrorist organization. C. Islamic Jihad Union’s Attacks The attacks of the IJU, as stated earlier, are to be discussed in two waves: the 2004 attacks and the 2006-2008 attacks. As for the 2004 attacks, the first one transpired during the night of March 28, 2004 when the house of a pensioner in the village of Qahramon exploded (Sandee, 2008). The house was believed to be the headquarters of a local IJU cell and was used as a bomb making factory. Nine people died in the blast. Two other attacks happened on the morning of March 29, 2004 at Tashkent. At 5:00am local time, IJU fighters attacked police check-points near the Tashkent tractor plant on Qushbegim Street which killed three policemen. Between 9:00am to 10:00am, two female suicide bombers blew themselves up at the compound of the Chorsu Bazaar—one at the entrance of a store, and another at a close mosque (Sandee, 2008). In July 30, 2004, the group carried out coordinated bombing attacks in Tashkent against the U.S. and Israeli embassies, and the Office of the Uzbek General Prosecutor (Reuters, 2007). Two local guards were killed at the entrance of the Israeli embassy when a suicide bomber set off his explosive vest (Sandee, 2008). On the other hand, seven people got injured in a blast in the entrance hall of the Prosecutor General’s Office while two were wounded in the U.S. embassy bombing. As pointed out by Spencer (2004), all these attacks killed two people and injured at least nine others. Fortunately, however, the suicide bombers failed to reach the premises of the Israeli and U.S. embassies. As for the third suicide bomber in the Office of the Uzbek General Prosecutor, no one was killed except the bomber himself. In total, 47 people were killed from March to July 2004. Among these were 10 policemen, 33 IJU fighters (including their leader Ahmad Bekmirzayev) and 3 civilians. As for the 2006 to 2008 attacks, the first explosion happened on October 4, 2006 at the biggest public park of Rawalpindi, Ayub Park—close to the residency of President Pervez Musharraf. The next day, two live rockets were found at the side of Constitution Avenue, about 200 meters from the road to the President’s residence (Sandee, 2008). By 2008, IJU shifted its operations in support of al-Qa’ida’s plans. As seen in the videos released by the group in 2008, IJU focused its training efforts on committing suicide attacks on NATO bases and on convoys in the eastern part of Afghanistan. D. Islamic Jihad Union: Analysis Having studied the Islamic Jihad Union’s background, capabilities, and tactical attacks, it is necessary to underscore that although their movements were focused on destabilizing the secular Uzbek government, the group’s decision to operate under the international terrorist group al-Qa’ida can pose some tremendous threats on the lives of American citizens. The group’s expertise in conducting public bombings, as evidenced by the 2004 attacks in U.S. and Israeli embassies, can reinforce its capacities in terrorism. Thus, it is crucial to review the U.S. Homeland Security Policy in order to analyze its regulations on some important issues related to IJU’s potential threats: (1) border and transportation security; (2) domestic counter-terrorism; and (3) emergency preparedness and response. Firstly, by looking at the border and transportation security measures, we are able to evaluate the capacity of the U.S. in deterring the potential threats that enter the country as carried through the different transportation means. Secondly, by examining the domestic counter-terrorism policies, we can assess the readiness of the federal, state, and local agencies to avoid and counter all forms of domestic terrorism. And lastly, by looking at the emergency preparedness and response, we are able to study the effectiveness and efficiency of the involved agencies in carrying out actions that are geared toward protecting the safety of people whenever such attacks transpire. A graphical summary can be seen in Appendix A. II. U.S. Homeland Security Policy In this part of the paper, we aim to scrutinize the U.S. Homeland Security Policy by banking on the issues previously stated. After which, we identify the weaknesses in these policies and provide some concrete recommendations. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concretized some vital regulations on homeland security as delivered by a multitude of federal, military, and civilian agencies, both within and outside of the DHS. In this regard, we look at three of the six critical mission areas of the DHS. For each part, we examine the roles of the federal government and of the states in the development and execution of some of the programs contained in the policies. A. Border and Transportation Security The federal government spearheads the implementation of security programs for both border and transportation. With this, it ensures that its robust multimodal transportation networks are working properly, which include 3.9 million miles of public roadways; 120,000 miles of major railroad routes; 361 ports; 19,576 general aviation airports, heliports and landing strips; and 459 commercial airports (Transportation Security Administration, n.d.). Because of this tremendous responsibility, DHS is supported by its sub-agencies including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). As for the border issues, the federal government—the DHS in collaboration with the TSA, the ICE, the USCIS, and the USCG—is responsible for the security of the land and maritime borders of the U.S. by looking after the transit of people and goods across its borders through a comprehensive border security program. However, it must be pointed out that the DHS, along with the TSA, is most heavily involved with aviation security through the screening of passengers and cargoes travelling on U.S. commercial air carriers. As for the transport of goods, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) leads in the security inspection of nearly 11 million cargo containers that transit through the U.S. ports. In order to effectively handle this herculean task, the CBP has formed three programs to counter some potential terrorist exploitation of land- and sea-based containers. The first program is called the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which is intended to expedite the processing of shipments at border crossings. The second program is called the Cargo Security Initiative (CSI) which stations some CBP officers in foreign ports to pre-screen some potentially high-risk containers before they are shipped to the U.S. The last program is called the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) which scans U.S. bound containers for nuclear and radiological elements. As for the transport of people, the DHS has launched two important security programs in order to avoid potential terrorist infiltrations. The first one is called the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) which seeks to successfully manage and control the nation’s borders by strengthening the enforcement of immigration laws. This is done by increasing the CBP personnel, constructing fences and other barriers, improving communication systems, and opening new stations that are strategically placed along the borders. The second program is called US-VISIT which is targeted to avoid potential terrorists and illegal aliens from coming into the country. The program begins with the collections and processing of biometric information from visa applications during their application at the U.S. consular offices. This biometric information is collected and checked against security watch lists. After this, the data collected during the visa application are compared against the data collected once the visa holder arrives to make sure that it is the same person. Furthermore, this screening process helps the U.S. in denying the entrance of travelers who may perpetrate terrorist acts. At the state level, local authorities contribute in the tightening of border security by utilizing the state’s assets to deploy more security officials. Aside from this, the state implements the Immigration and Nationality Act by deputizing local law enforcement officers on a strictly voluntary basis. Unfortunately, such set-up has become a controversial topic in a lot of communities. These authorities also help in bolstering the transportation security of commercial aviation by conducting passenger and baggage screening services. B. Domestic Counter-Terrorism At the federal government level, the Domestic Counter-Terrorism initiatives as being led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), intend to disrupt terrorist operations through bettered coordination among the federal, state and local investigative agencies; as well as by clearer and simpler facilitation of knowledge sharing on investigative expertise. With this in mind, the FBI formed the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) which now exist in 100 key American cities. The JTTFs coordinate with the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) in order to bring together members of law enforcement, intelligence, military, diplomatic services, and homeland security communities from 38 federal agencies and department to execute intelligence and law enforcement procedures. At the state level, local authorities and agencies cannot legally conduct counter-terrorism investigations other than through the JTTFs. In this light, the local agencies may only be called upon to provide support to JTTF counter-terrorism operations through the provision of pertinent data. Thus, there is a vital need for the local agencies to have strong and direct connection with the JTTF. Given this need, unfortunately, majority of local agencies employ less than 50 officers, which makes it difficult for them to assign local personnel to JTTF. To address this problem, the FBI has ensured that counter-terrorism tools are available to every local enforcer nationwide. This was made possible through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized index of criminal justice information—criminal records, stolen properties, fugitives, and missing persons—that is available to local agencies and is operational 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Through the NCIC, the local agencies are able to check criminal histories, fugitive status of people they come into contact with (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). C. Emergency Preparedness and Response The primary actions taken to maintain high level of emergency preparedness and response are encapsulated in the two programs launched by the DHS—the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). Firstly, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) ensures that the federal, state, local and tribal governments work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). With this, the primary measures of the NIMS are based on the values of flexibility and standardization. As for its flexibility, the NIMS can be applied to incidents of any size, complexity and location. As for its standardization, the NIMS allows for the common organizational structuring, resource management system building, personal and equipment certification processing, and communications management. The components of NIMS, along with its evolving system, can be seen in Appendix B. Secondly, the National Response Plan (NRP) is communicated by the DHS to state-level agencies as response to all forms of hazards. Through the NRP, the operational and material supports from the federal government are determined based on the nature of a particular hazardous event. This will then lead to the response to be made by the state-level agencies. As such, the NRP consists of a base plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF) Annexes, and Support Annexes which all describe the necessary federal response given a specific event. In this light, the DHS may declare an event as an incident of national significance whenever there is actual or potential high-impact event that requires coordinated and effective response by involved agencies to save lives and minimize damage (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). The details of NRP can be viewed in Appendix C. With this, it can be claimed that primary goals of the NIMS and the NRP are geared toward the management of hazardous events at the lowest level possible. The use of NIMS strengthens the power of the states in conducting action plans to ensure the safety of the citizens. Analysis and Recommendation Harnessing all the data obtained, both from the intensive look at the Islamic Jihad Group, and from the examination of the projects and programs contained in the three areas of the U.S. Homeland Security Policy, it can be claimed that there is a need to reinforce the role of the states in the carrying out of these projects, with special emphasis on the border and transportation security. The primary reasons behind this overarching recommendation are captured in these three points. Firstly, there is already a tight designation of tasks and responsibilities in the level of federal government as evidenced by the formation of the CBP and SBI for border and transportation security; of JTTF for domestic counter-terrorism; and of NIMS and NRP for emergency preparedness and response. Secondly, states can more effectively manage the communication amongst its police force, state-based investigative agencies, and other third party organizations through the provision of proper tools and techniques which can prevent terrorist attacks, or maintain the safety of people once such actions go undetected. Lastly, and most obviously, the responsibilities of the states still lack clarity and detail. At this point, we intend to go through the three areas again and propose the necessary action plans. As for border and transportation security, since the enforcement of immigration laws is being run under strict voluntary basis, it would be helpful to partner the program with a robust incentive plan which can include the following: (1) increase of monthly allowance of the volunteering officer; (2) enhanced retirement plan for the volunteering officer; and (3) added benefits in terms of health and medical assistantship that can be used by first degree family members. However, it must be stressed that with the bettering of the overall benefits of the program comes the bolstering of the program’s screening and training phases. Firstly, the screening phase can be further developed by coming up with a concrete list of the officer’s responsibilities. This list, just like a corporate employee’s plan of work, outlines all the necessary activities of the officer alongside the needed reports to be submitted at the end of each activity. To ensure that the right persons are chosen in the program, specific demographical and behavioral qualifications can be stated. Secondly, the training phase can be enhanced by conducting proper mentoring sessions with the officers of the Security Border Initiative (SBI) on more efficient information sorting and processing. Aside from the part on the immigration laws, transportation security can also be tightened on the state level by enhancing the checkpoint guidelines in highways, railroads, commercial and public buses, and ports. This can be done through a close coordination of the USCG with the local government units. Process-wise, the development of the checkpoint plan should be initiated by the states as they have direct links with organizations running the said mediums of transportations. Through this engagement, the states are able to identify some areas of improvement as regards: (1) the process of checking the passing vehicles; and (2) conducting safety measures whenever threats are encountered. With these things in mind, the states can now discuss with the USCG some possible ways to improve its security measures. In order to maintain a coherent and efficient flow of communication, representatives can be appointed for each party. As for domestic counter-terrorism, state-based officials that coordinate with the NJTTF can be increased in number from 50 to 60 per state. Through the increase in the number of members, specialization areas per member can be made. In addition to this, some pertinent organizations that conduct extended investigative services, such as fingerprint authenticity verification and identity expositions, can be tapped. With this, it can be ensured that all facets of terrorism techniques are determined and studied carefully by the NTTF. Conclusion With all of these recommendations, it must be noted that the success in deterring all forms of terrorism lies heavily on all the units’ singleness of vision, that is, the upholding of safety and security of the American people. Indeed, no matter how intricate and properly identified the tasks of specific organizations are, if there are no proper coordination, cooperation, and communication among its members, everything will remain ideal and not actual. Thus, just like any national endeavor, eradicating terrorism is an effort that should be done by all involved people. Appendix A Importance of enhancing the three facets of the HSP against IJU attacks Appendix B Component Elements command and management incident command system (ICS) multi-agency coordination systems public information systems Preparedness planning training exercises personnel qualification and certification equipment acquisition and certification mutual aid publications management resource management describe, inventory, mobilize, dispatch, track, and recover incident resources communications and information management incident management communications information management supporting technologies technology and technological systems that provide supporting capabilities to NIMS; technologies include voice and data communications systems, information management systems (i.e., record keeping and resource tracking), and data display systems ongoing management and maintenance provides for review and the refinement of the system and its components over the long term Source: U.S. DHS, NIMS, 2004 Appendix C Source: U.S. DHS, "National Response," 2004, p. 30 List of References Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). National Crime Information Center. Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ncic_brochure.htm. Ganor, Boaz. (1993). The Islamic Jihad: The Imperative of a Holy War. Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa31.htm. Reuters. (2007). Who are the Islamic Jihad Group? Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/05/idUSL05883814. Roggio, Bill. (2010). Islamic Jihad Group Commander Reported killed in Predator Strike. Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/islamic_jihad_group.php. Sandee, Ronald. (2008). The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf. Spencer, Robert. (2004). Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan. Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.jihadwatch.org/2004/07/islamic-jihad-group-of-uzbekistan-claims-responsibility-for-us-israeli-embassy-bombings.html U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2004). National Incident Management System Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2004). National Response Plan. Washington, DC. U.S. Department of State. (2006). IJG: Islamic Jihad Group. Retrieved 1 April 2012 from http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/132. Read More