Diplomacy And the International System - Essay Example

?Postgraduate Diplomacy Law and Global Change Topic: Diplomacy and the International System Essay Question: Following the Lisbon Treaty, is Europe presenting a cohesive foreign policy to the world? Make sure you use relevant theories. I. Introduction The Lisbon Treaty represents the common standard of agreement binding the European Union for 27 nations, and one of the main goals of the EU is to present a cohesive foreign policy on international issues. The Lisbon Treaty integrates national and supra-national politics in the public leadership positions that represent the EU officially, creating the possibility that the sectarian issues that have divided European politics traditionally could result in factionalism under the new structure. This essay will first look at the leadership of the EU that relates to foreign policy articulation and implementation and discuss the issues of regionalism and cohesion in the greater context of the important historical events post-Lisbon. The essay will also explore issues of foreign policy related to the use of national armies in international peace, reconstruction, and conflict operations as an extension of EU policy within the context of political dissent. Finally, the essay will analyze the difference between qualified majority voting and universal consensus as it relates to Lisbon requirements on foreign policy decisions and the use of military force by the European Union. In conclusion, the essay will summarize academic research in the field and consider the theory that the Treaty of Lisbon represents a ‘third-generation’ of regionalism. (Langenhove & Marchesi, 2008) II. Historical Approach & Critical Methodology “The study of the phenomenon of regionalism has been intrinsically linked to the study of the process of European integration following World War II. As a regional scheme, the European Communities and then the European Union represent an advanced example of institutionalised regionalism. At the same time, European integration as a project, has been pictured as a clear political success in terms of achieving prosperity and stability in a given territory where war and violence was the rule. This led to the partial identification of the process of regionalism with the European experience in two ways. On the one hand, it was implied that the global process of regionalism had to take Europe as a model and as an outcome. On the other hand, regionalism in itself came to be considered a political project, and regional integration around the world was viewed as a desirable and ‘good’ outcome to complement and support global governance.” + Luk Van Langenhove & Daniele Marchesi (2008), Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of Third Generation Regional Integration, As the changes required by the Lisbon Treaty are currently being implemented by the EU, the essay will first discuss the new relationships of foreign policy decision making articulated in the treaty with reference to the historical context. Particularly, this method will explore the conflict of relations between a nation’s foreign policy as defined by domestic goals, the requirements of other treaty and charter-based organizations such as NATO and the UN, and the new EU foreign policy structure based on unanimity. The requirements of unanimous decisions in foreign policy will be further discussed in relation to dissent, and the way dissenting states can use their influence in EU foreign policy decision-making to influence or change policy. The essay will provide evidence from research built from historical documents and official statements of political leaders in order to review the practical application of policy in the EU foreign policy decision-making process. III. Cohesion in EU Foreign Policy after the Lisbon Treaty The first aspect to consider in reviewing the effect of the Lisbon Treaty on an integrated EU foreign policy based on consensus and unanimity is how the new accord relates to the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty of Rome, and other fundamental accords of the European Union. One of the most important changes under the new structure ushered in by Lisbon is the leadership hierarchy of the EU has been changed to create a more charismatic and public presence. Fundamentally, the Lisbon Treaty establishes the leadership of the EU on foreign policy issues to be articulated through the following branches: The President of the European Council The European Council The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The Vice-President of the Commission The External Relations Council The “President of the European Council” is appointed by the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy consolidates many of the powers held by numerous officials under the previous treaty structure. (Europa, 2011) As these leaders will come inevitably from a local European power base, there is considerable possibility for the attempt to promote a central leadership to instead promote sectarianism, regionalism, and factionalism based on national state interests, charismatic politics, personal and traditional rivalries, etc. The EU desires that this leadership represent to unanimous view of 27 nations, but by nature the diversity of populations in the EU may prevent just such a consensus from arising. The major campaign being promoted in EU public relations is to stress the importance of the Treaty of Lisbon in reflecting the political structure that is required to represent the 27 members of the community. The positions of President and Vice President are constructed from accord, consensus, and unanimity within the European community, and as such, are said to represent a new relation of governance between the nation-state and UN. The integration of EU leadership positions with national and domestic political parties and movements inevitably guarantees that there cannot be actual consensus on the supra-national level, because it does not exist on the local level in the first instance. However, EU officials and theoreticians point out that contrary to popular criticisms like these, there actually is a broad consensus of agreement on the fundamentals of civil society. For example, the frameworks of civil, political, and human rights all show a common agreement in current international law that the EU seeks to promote and further through foreign policy. Thus, in many ways the EU leadership represents the common secular humanist values that bind Europeans collectively in identity, and there is widespread consensus on the broader political points of this identity in concepts like democracy, freedom/liberty, human and/or natural rights, elections, and other ideals. Similarly, the treaty of Lisbon is very much in accord with the progressive view of society and the constructivist path of evolving international law: “The Treaty of Lisbon amends the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (essentially the Treaty of Maastricht) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) (essentially the Treaty of Rome), which is renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Both treaties have the same legal rank. Even if the new Treaty is no longer overtly a constitutional treaty, it manages to preserve most of the important achievements of the Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe which was signed in 2004 but never ratified.” (Duff, 2007) Another aspect that goes against popular criticisms of the EU is that the growth of its institutions and policy-making apparatuses actually reflects the political will of the people. The defeat of the Treaty in popular referendum elections led to the view that the European Union was being imposed by a top-down process of central bureaucratic leadership on a people who were already over-burdened by national governments and in no need of a new authority structure. The contrary view is that the European Union is the most progressive, swiftly changing and dynamic political community of the world. Furthermore, in this aspect, it can also be seen as representing the people’s will in a globalized society and increasingly borderless economy. “The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its antecedent, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), are key elements of European integration. They serve as significant points of reference of national foreign policies, especially due to the rapid developments in this field since the end of the 1990s, leading some authors to speak about an ‘almost revolutionary change in member state commitments’ (Smith, 2003: 556). Thus, the provisions for CFSP and, increasingly also the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty.” (Wessels & Bopp, 2008) It is characteristic that the EU leadership seeks to build consensus in European foreign policy by consensus. According to the Lisbon Treaty, this is fundamental to the actual reason the governmental body is being organized. Rather than seeking out divisions that politically alienate large portions of the populace from other sectors or in exploiting regions and minorities politically and economically, the EU illustrates a progressive leadership where rights are protected in its policies. This is a vision of guardianship in governance, and bureaucratic in nature. The importance of consensus is foundational in the Treaty of Lisbon and can also be shown in the Treaty’s requirement for unanimity in the use of military force. This unanimity extends to all member states, which suggests that smaller or more radical nations may oppose the EU or block its foreign policy actions by dissenting. As the body is just coming into being following the widespread ratification of Lisbon, it is too early to state precisely if these fears of divisionary national politics will come into force or if the current state of fervor for unity will continue to govern intra-state relations at the international level. In sacrificing its own economic wealth in the Greek and Irish financial crisis, Germany has signaled that it is willing to give against its own economic interest to prevent the greater calamity of an all out collapse of the union. In this manner, the Treaty of Lisbon represents what Ingolf E. A. Pernice calls “a long and complex process of constitutionalization.”(Pernice, 2009) In The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, Ingolf E. A. Pernice describes the historical dynamic represented in the EU as a process of legal constructivism in International Law, writing (2009): “The Treaty of Lisbon (is) one step in a long and complex process of constitutionalization in Europe comprising both the evolving European and the national level of constitutional law. It comments on what is sometimes regarded as the failures in the process of constitution-making, and on the improvements achieved by the reform under the Treaty of Lisbon, both in the light of the concept of multilevel constitutionalism. It explains what multilevel constitutionalism means as a theoretical approach to conceptualize the constitution of the European system as an inter-active process of establishing, dividing, organizing, and limiting powers, involving national constitutions and the supranational constitutional framework as two interdependent components of a legal system governed by constitutional pluralism instead of hierarchies.” (Pernice, 2009) Therefore, while it would appear from popular media that Europe and its centuries of political infighting and wars would continue as such by nature in the EU and prevent unanimity in supra-national governance, the fact is that the European nations and their citizenries share common political and social values. The size of the EU, US, China, and Russian Federation all are similarly broad and diverse in ethnicity. Therefore, the complexity of the body politic is large and extending over 27 nations, but this does not prevent the President and Vice President of the EU from representing the common democratic values of the people in policy. “The ongoing process of trial and error in the continued reform of the Union where constitutional initiatives regularly lead to increasingly extensive debates with modest contractual results, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon yet being uncertain, is taken as an example for explaining multilevel constitutionalism in action: The article seeks to show that both, the process showing increased public participation, and the results achieved in Lisbon are characteristic for the consolidation of a multilevel constitutional structure of a new kind, based upon functioning democratic member states, complementary to them and binding them together in a supranational unit without itself being a state or aiming at statehood.” (Pernice, 2009) The requirement of unanimity on decisions related to foreign policy by the Treaty of Lisbon would similarly seem to make international consensus impossible. However, equally it can be argued that the only situations where the EU should act militarily are those that provoke such a terrible and universal response in the citizenry across nations and culture, ethnic, and language barriers. For example, modern European Union foreign policy is required to be based in unanimity of decision between such a wide and diverse block of nation-states that it is limited in acting in the narrow or self-interest defined policies that would alienate other nations or large populations of the community. This requirement of unanimity actually acts as a check on the use of power and military force by the EU in a very efficient way. Yet, it is not clear in practice how this will conflict with State interest and other international groups such as NATO and the UN. As Pedro Courela writes in The Lisbon Strategy and Foreign Policy: The Missing Link (2007): “European integration studies have focused extensively on the EU as a foreign policy actor. Such studies have asked whether a political entity such as the EU can exert the same kind of influence on the international sphere as a sovereign state; they have concentrated on the balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in foreign policy; or on the fact that the recent development of military capabilities by the Union means that it is no longer the archetype of the ‘civilian power’ that uses exclusively civilian means to persuade (rather than coerce) third parties.” (Courela, 2007) In some issues of EU policy making, a qualified majority is accepted in decision making, whereas in foreign policy and defence related issues, unanimity is required. Thus, one can illustrate three main processes effecting the formulation of communal EU foreign policy on contemporary issues: National State Interest in Foreign Policy Qualified Majority Voting in EU Policy Unanimous Decisions in Foreign Policy It is important to note that without a nation-state’s implicit consent, armed forces from a country cannot be mobilized or deployed. As the European Union states clearly: “Military capabilities remain in national hands. The Treaty foresees that Member States can make available civilian and military resources to the Union for the implementation of its Common Security and Defence operations. However, any Member State has the right to oppose such operations and all contributions to them will be always on a voluntary basis. A group of Member States who are willing and have the necessary capability will be able to undertake disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and peace-keeping tasks. No Member State can be forced to participate in such operations.” (Europa, 2011) From this, two main areas of analysis become important for review: Common Security and Defence Operations EU Member State Foreign Policy Dissent As William S. DeCamp Jr. asks in ESDP: NATO's Demise or Opportunities for NATO? (2005) “The Europeans are well into establishing a security identity in the European Union (EU) known as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Concurrently, the U.S. has put a lot of emphasis in transforming NATO into an effective, modern warfighting entity capable of deploying out of Europe. A major question arises: ‘Can the EU develop a capacity for security structures without causing NATO's demise?’” (DeCamp, 2005) The drive to create a unified European Defence force that operates in a manner similar to NATO and may share or oppose NATO’s own foreign policy goals overtly or subtly is positioned in relation to the ability of the States, weak and strong, to object or dissent to the policy on fundamental ground. As yet, there are few nations to unilaterally oppose violence or the use of armed forces as a means to settle political issues or engage in peace-making and nation building in conflict regions. The Lisbon Treaty is still too young in many ways to determine how this process of dissent will be used to protect national state interest and economic advantage. However, as noted, the unanimity requirements of the Treaty on decisions relating to foreign policy limit the EU to positioning on foreign policy only to areas of agreement among all member States, and this by nature forces consensus. Nevertheless, some nations such as France are pushing for an expanded EU military body, and this may threaten the existence of NATO itself as a European treaty organization in the future, as its goals and structures become redundant to those of the EU. “France will assume the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union on July 1, 2008. And Sarkozy has already made it clear that the centerpiece of his (exceptionally ambitious) agenda will be the full development of an autonomous European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)... Sarkozy’s central proposal for the French presidency of the EU revolves around using provisions in the Lisbon Treaty that call for 'permanent structured cooperation' to create what many believe in effect will become a common EU army. In practice, the French plan is to proceed around an inner core of the biggest European countries ('strengthened cooperation' in eu-rospeak) called the G-6: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. (Other countries can join this initial group at any time.) France wants each G-6 country 1) to con-tribute 10,000 troops to a 60,000-strong 'common intervention force' and 2) to commit to spending a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense. France also wants the EU to have its own independent military planning capability (with its headquarters in Brussels).” (Kern, 2008) The ability to rally troops from multi-national alliances is a common theme in all modern military conflicts, but the concept of a standing European Army is decidedly new. The fundamentals from the viewpoint of military strategy are obvious, for in order for a military to function together as a cohesive force there must be training, joint exercises, and an integrated military command structure. The EU in this manner may actually encourage a greater over-all European military re-armament and deployment of force in the future, rather than strictly limiting its foreign policy to civilian and advisory roles. The most important outcome of this process is the likely dissolution of NATO and replacement of the treaty obligations and organization by the EU military command. NATO is this context can be viewed as an old and outdated political organization based in Cold War and pre-EU goals that are no longer consistent with the internal organization of the EU member states. By this logic, NATO will likely be replaced completely in Europe and replaced by the common military policy of the EU as articulated and formed by member states under the charter of the Lisbon Treaty. As Anna Vallianatou writes in EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon Treaty context: from Venus to Minerva myth: “EU foreign policy is often depicted in the literature and, especially, after 9/11 as a civilian power with the charms of Venus: its impact on the modern interdependent world is based on trade and diplomacy avoiding the use of force, while its force of persuasion derives from its own internal model. Both the EUISS report and the debate in the subsequent roundtable, apart from the individual analysis of the EU role on various geographic regions (Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, Africa, Balkans, Brazil, China, Iran, Middle East, Russia and Eastern Neighbourhood Policy and the EU in the Mediterranean), focused on the nature of EU external action in the changing multipolar international arena. It was stipulated that the EU remains a civilian power, with limited use of force, always guaranteed by broad international legitimacy. The EU, as a normative power, always bases its external action on the principle of democracy, on human rights and the rule of law while, according to the EUISS Report, it is in its interests to promote the international acceptance of the concept of effective multilateralism in exercising its international role.” (Vallianatou, 2010) IV. Summary & Conclusions In conclusion, it is significant that the Treaty of Lisbon requires the unanimous decision of EU member states in undertaking foreign policy decisions and that all use of military force be equally approved by consensus. This acts as a fundamental limit to power in EU authority, and forces the building of community around core European secular values such as democracy, freedom, elections, human rights, and others that represent the best of the evolutionary thought of these nations’ collective history. The Treaty preserves the right of member nations to dissent, but the “newness” of the Lisbon Treaty makes it less certain as to date how this will influence the policy decisions and actions taken by the EU. Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a ground-swell of support politically for the collective decision making process of European Unity. However, in time, this political consensus may further fracture into sectarianism, regionalism, or other forms of factionalism and prevent common action. “Is Europe about to rise as a full political actor on the world stage? Conventional wisdom had it that European integration in foreign policy, security and defence was unlikely to amount to much very quickly. More recently, however, a diverse group of scholars has argued that pan-European political actorhood had gained considerable substance. Surveying the recent literature, pertinent related writings and relevant primary materials on the matter, this article identifies and systematizes the many different factors affecting European high-politics actorhood in the early 21st century. A fully grown international actor Europe, it finds, remains a longer-term project rather than an imminent prospect.” (Krotz, 2009) The theory that this process can be seen as a new stage of internationalism and evolution of governance is promoted by many academics. For example, Langenhove & Marchesi write that the EU represents a “third-generation of regionalism” that is broadly based on shared political and social values. The first generation was economic unity, as represented by the Euro and common economic zone of the EU. The second generation related to the regulation of the domestic economies from a supra-national sphere, as well as the applicability of international oversight committees related to the conservatorship of values or social and political rights. In emerging with a unified voice on foreign policy issues and international relations, the EU entered the third generation of regionalism. (Langenhove & Marchesi, 2008) “Among the numerous integration schemes that have mushroomed in Europe since the end of World War II, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a unique process and as a prototype of what can been defined as a ‘third-generation’ of regionalism. In this view, the EU has developed beyond a mainly economic integration process (first generation regionalism), to a deeply institutionalised and politicised union, competent at various degrees in an all-encompassing spectrum of internal policies (second generation or ‘new regionalism’). In this process of widening/deepening of policies, structures and membership, the EU has become a global actor present in the international fora where once only states operated (third generation).” (Langenhove & Marchesi, 2008) Whether or not the EU can overcome national-self interest as a divisionary force in international politics remains unknown, as does the extent to which it can act as a unified force for all 27 nations involved. The positioning of the shared values of European history as the rationale behind a progressive and safeguarding form of international government in foreign policy has a wider popular understanding and political support in the grass roots than is commonly assumed, and in this manner, the EU may actually be representative of a wider movement in history rather than a top-down, technocratic imposition. The real test of the union is found in situations where nations like Germany are forced to submit to and accept policies that go against their national state interest in favor of the larger interest of maintaining the progress of European unity, as in the recent financial crises. However, domestic political interests may prohibit the efficient use of EU military power in the future in ways unforeseen by current analysis, forcing the EU leadership into only accepting policy positions with broad consensus, a position well suited for a limited supra-national government in guardianship of the civil rights of society. V. Sources Cited Blockmans, Steven and Wessel, Ramses A (2009), The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty Make the EU More Effective?, J Conflict Security Law, doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krp020, First published online: October 1, 2009, Web, viewed 23 January 2011, . Courela, Pedro (2007), The Lisbon Strategy and Foreign Policy: The Missing Link, Estrategia N? 22-23, 1? Semestre 2007, Web, viewed 23 January 2011, . 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