The Battle as the Main Substance - Assignment Example

 The History Arguments of NCO “Training and leader development must include a historical perspective – especially of the conduct of battle.” Gen. Frederick M. Franks, Jr. The topic under discussion involves an analysis of the relationship between, history, theory, doctrine, in the evolution of military tactics on the battlefield. It is said that history repeats itself. We study history because an understanding of events and circumstances that happened in the past is important in order to recognize their recurrence in present events even as they develop. Knowing this enables us to competently address these situations early enough to mitigate adverse effects, or to maximize any favorable opportunities. A historical perspective is also necessary for a student of military science to better appreciate the role of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), by understanding how this role evolved throughout history. The fact that NCOs are given good training in the present day is because of the efforts and achievements of the NCOs in the past. Today, the modern NCO is relied upon by the Army to capably “train, test, judge, reward, and discipline soldiers” well into the future (The NCO, 2001). It is therefore the position of this paper that history, theory, and doctrine are important considerations in the evolution of military tactics on the battlefield. The following are the arguments that support this position. The battle analysis method was developed by the US Army Command and General Staff College to provide a format by which any military professional may find insight from historical battles and campaigns, in order to help deepen his or her understanding of warfare. It is intended to be a general guide for military personnel to ensure that significant actions or factors that affect the outcome of a battle or military operation are not overlooked (University of Southern Mississippi ROTC, p. 51). It is comprised of the following checklist: First, define the subject. This involves determining what, where, when, who and why about the study that is being undertaken. It is important to ascertain the date of the battle, its location, and the adversaries involved. This step involves looking for good sources of information such as books, articles, the Internet, and so forth. Second, set the stage (review the setting). From the mass of data, the information is reduced to the essentials among which are the strategic factors, the operational settings, and the tactical situation. In the latter, it is helpful to be guided by the OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment). Thirdly, describe the action. This step in battle analysis is the main substance of what people consider military history. The battle should be studied chronologically, with the importance of progression of events derived in the analysis. First, the opening moves of the opposing forces in the battle should be examined, to determine which side gained the early advantage over the other. Detail should then be drawn for the major phases, and the key events and decisions that turned the battle in favor of either side. Finally the outcome should be stated: which party won the battle; what the objective was and whether the objective was attained or not; and what the long-term repercussions of the battle had been. Fourth, draw lessons learned (assess the significance). Lastly, the significance of the encounter should be assessed. This comprises the most important aspect of battle analysis. In this step, the information derived about the action is analyzed to yield important lessons for the future. It involves relating causes of why something happened, to the effects of these events. The insights derived therein, called the “constants of war” form part of the timeless lessons useful in future encounters (USM-ROTC, n.d.). Aside from the foregoing, military theory must be considered in the nature of battlefield, command, and transformation. As to battlefields, military forces are structured and ranked, and therefore behave in relatively defineable patterns given the locale and contour of battlefields. Combatants usually fight in an established manners and patterns depending upon their training, culture and organization. Battlefield theory may provide information on the position of combatants during the course of battle, the details of the manner in which they are dressed and their equipment. In this regard, archaeological investigations of past battlefields in past wars have yielded information on the deployment of troops, firing positions, fields of fire, the types of weaponry used, unit or individual movement during the battle, weapon trajectory, and range of firing by determining forces of projectile impact. This information, coupled with the knowledge of the outcome of the battle, provides important insight for use in future battles (Battlefield Archaeology of North America, n.d.). As to command, the overabundance of information and advanced communication capabilities come close to the point of overwhelming decision makers. Modern theories of command and control address concepts of organizations and communications, seeking to construct models that enable the effective decision-making in time of peace and war. It also includes a deeper understanding of the high-level, creative aspects of command systems as well as the direct-order and control aspects (Builder, Bankes & Nordin, 1999). Finally, as to transformation, it should be recalled that in 1999, a vision of Army Transformation was introduced by Gen. Eric Shinseki, conceived of an Army that responds to innovations quickly through the harnessing of the potential of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The Objective (now Future) Force to result from the innovations transformation should be “capable of operational maneuvers from strategic distances, early arrival cin a crisis, and decisively attacking and defeating the center of gravity of an adversary” (Calhoun, 2004). The theory of change guides the transformation of the army towards the vision expounded on by Shinseki. For what reason should we study military doctrine? Principally, it is to understand doctorial trend over time and common behaviors. Military doctrine “provides the intellectual structure for the practitioners, military commanders at every level and their staffs and subordinates, to think sensibly about the application of military forces and be guided by sound reasoning” (Chapman, 2009:1-2). The tenets and very concept of military doctrine changes over time and place; however, it plays a crucial role in the determination and information of military policy. Understanding military doctrine is important because it explains how and why countries had conducted military operations in the past, why they currently engage in such operations, and in what manner they may be expected to conduct them in the future (Chapman, 2009:3). There are views and opinions that would tend to oppose the position taken here. For one, the study of history, theory and doctrine are touted as determinative of correct decision-making and military policy in the present. However, this is not always the case. There have been instances when even the most carefully-considered situations addressed in the light of historical, theoretical, and doctrinal modeling, still resulted in disastrous consequences. One such example was the situation in Iraq, where the combination of history, theory and doctrine prompted the executive to decide on an aggressive move, the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Prior to the launching of the offensive, officials in the Bush Administration were at odds concerning the implementation of the “shock-and-awe” plan. Shock and awe, otherwise known as rapid dominance, is a military doctrine which necessitates the use of overwhelming power and spectacular displays of force to quickly gain dominance in the battlefield. The aim of the display was to demoralize the enemy and quickly destroy their will to fight, thus obtaining a quick end to the hostilities, with few casualties. Unfortunately for the U.S., what to them was “shock and awe” was labeled as “terrorism” by the Arabs, and inflamed resentment against the invaders. Although the United States used the same approach against Afghanistan in the previous year, it did not produce the desired results because Al Qaeda had a persistent will to fight to the death. Then, as with this time in Iraq, while the initial encounter appeared to prove successful, the succeeding counterinsurgency (“the larger war”) proved costly, lengthy, and wore down the good will of the people for the administration. While the campaign in Iraq was well executed, but the reconstruction efforts were not because of an inaccurate forecast of the ensuing armed conflict (Metz, 2007). Another misappreciation of the historical effect occurred in the Philippine Islands in 1901. During that time, the Philippine-American War was officially ended with the fall of General Aguinaldo, but Filipino revolutionary generals refused to surrender, thus paving the way for a continuation of hostilities. Because the Americans, thinking they were successfully pursuing a policy of peaceful cultural assimilation, underestimated the freedom loving Filipinos. As a result, though only armed with bolos, the Filipinos caught the Americans off guard and hacked 48 soldiers, most of them at their breakfast. 22 were wounded, and only 4 were unharmed. The incident is studied today as the Massacre at Balangiga (Nebrida, 1997). All things considered, the study of history, theory and doctrine still provide an important source of preparation to meet military exigencies. The role of the Non Commissioned Officer remains pivotal in translating doctrine into a success. The lessons taught by doctrine are abstract and theoretical, and it requires a keen and perceptive NCO to translate these tenets into plans and actions in the battlefield. The NCO has direct command over the rank and file; therefore, it is he who creates the crucial link between the principles and the plans that execute them. References Anon. (n.d.) Battlefield Archaeology of North America. Accessed 22 February 2011 from http://www.jrank.org/history/pages/5939/Battlefield-Archaeology-North-America.html Builder, C. H.; Bankes, S.C.; & Nordin, R (1999) Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control. Rand, National Defense Research Institute Calhoun, M.T. (2004) Complexity and Army Transformation. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies. Chapman, B. (2009) Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook. Sta. Barbara, California: Greenwood Publishing Group Metz, S. (2007) Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy. U.S.Government, Department of the Army. Accessed 22 February 2011 from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub752.pdf Nebrida, V. (1997) “The Balangiga Massacre: Getting Even,” Philippine History Group of Los Angeles. Accessed 22 February 2011 from http://www.bibingka.com/phg/balangiga/default.htm “The NCO: Module 1 - Primary Leadership Development Course,” (2001) U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. 1 June 2001 Fort Bliss, Texas. Accessed 21 February 2011 from http://tsg3.us/tnsg_lib/pldc_school/basic_nco/lesson_1.pdf University of Southern Mississipi (USM) - ROTC. (n.d.) “Introduction to Battle Analysis.” Accessed 22 February 2011 from http://www.usm.edu/armyrotc/400/MSL%20402%20Cadet%20Lessons/MSL%20402%20Cadet%20Text/MSL%20402_Officership_Section_II_Intro_to_Battle_Analysis.pdf Read More