All Philosophical Problems Caused by Sloppy Reasoning - Essay Example

 Wittgenstein held that most if not all philosophical problems are caused by sloppy reasoning, inaccurate use of language or asking absurd or meaningless questions. “Philosophical theories, he suggests, are attempts to answer questions that are not really questions at all (they are nonsense), or to solve problems that are not really problems” (Richter, 2004). It is key to note that, when Wittgenstein suggests in Proposition 4.003 of the Tractatus that “Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all”, he is not suggesting that the solution he proposes, rectifying the improper use of language, solves all problems. Clearly, philosophical problems remain, though Wittgenstein had felt that he had solved them finally enough to retire after publishing the Tractatus (Richter, 2004). But by solving the issue of language, one can make sure that one is not making a mountain out of a molehill, asking absurd issues or creating issues where there are none. Anyone who has had the unpleasant experience of talking at cross-purposes with someone else knows that many problems are simply caused by poor assumptions as to what terms mean. Kripke suggests that Wittgeinstein's work boils down to a “sceptical challenge”. The terms of this challenge doubt that anything said can be unequivocally meaningful. The strongest case against the sceptical position would be mathematics. Philosophers since the sceptical revolution of epistemology that Hume led have largely agreed that complete, rigorous knowledge of the empirical world is impossible. But math and logic are sometimes held to be beyond this. Yet Wittgenstein's work, being semantical and semiotic, actually impugns even math. 2 + 2 = 4 is straight forward enough, but to be sensible, one has to assume that it is meant that the symbol 2 matches the concept of “two”, that the plus sign means addition, and that the equals sign indicates an equation (Kusch). Strictly speaking, in Kripke's view, one cannot make those assumptions. “The 'sceptical challenge' is thus ontological rather than epistemic; the sceptic seeks to show not that you are somehow unable to track the facts of what you mean, but that there are no facts for you track”. To decode 2 + 2 = 4 requires more than the rules of mathematics, no matter how rigorous: It requires socially agreed-upon assertability conditions, like “2 is two, + indicates the mathematical function of addition and = means the equal function”. In strict Chinese or any non-Arabic numeral language, 2 + 2 = 4 is gibberish; in Roman, the closest one would get would be II + II = IV. Rule-following behavior can only be empirically determined in social conditions (Kusch). If person X takes “2 + 2 = 4” to mean, “I should go and get some milk”, there is no possible way for any other observer to understand that that was what was meant. Person X would have to explain, and even once she had, there would be no way to determine what 2 + 2 = 5 meant in her interpretation. Kripke's extension of Wittgenstein seems more than he would have personally done. Wittgenstein was certain that, once basic inaccuracies about language were resolved, conversation could proceed. Kripke seems to be saying that there is a possibility for those issues to be unresolvable, which is entirely opposed to Wittgenstein's core thrust. In a sense, then, Kripke is extending Wittgenstein much like Kant extended Hume. Cavell's The Claim of Reason (504) might seem similar: They both seem to embrace a sceptical project. But in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (65), Cavell says, “[I]f Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein is right, then mine must be wrong”. This is because Cavell views scepticism in the Wittgensteinian perspective as far less-ironclad: “Kripke subordinates the role of the criteria in the Investigations, hence... underrate[s] drastically... the issue of the ordinary” (Cavell, 1991, 65). Much like Hume's interpretations have fallen into a strict sceptical camp and a common sense camp, so too can Wittgenstein be seen as making an interminable gulf of meaning between people (Kripke's perspective) or instead noting that, in practice, people are capable of communicating even with mistakes so that the sceptical challenge can actually be overcome (Cavell's perspective). Bioethics is an emerging and vitally important field. As humanity gains the ability to transform life, questions of identity and morality logically emerge. Cloning might make someone less unique. There are serious questions as to how much biology determines and shapes human identity. There may be no bright line between the traditional husbandry of plants and animals and complex DNA alteration thereof, and if that is the case, there may be no logical break against altering humanity. If humanity can be evolved, changed or warped, the moral universe humans live in might irrevocably change. It seems that the classic Western stipulation of the equality of people under the law and as regards rights may require a rough biological equality, possible to abstract into existence prior to genetic engineering but possibly absurd afterwards. Authors like Nussbaum, Dworkin and others have tried to settle these issues, but they are immensely thorny. When philosophy struggles to make general commentary, the application of a theoretical lens can be of immense use. Applying the capabilities approach to bioethics provides rich insight into what the just path for the application of biotechnology is. Robeyns defines the capability approach thusly: “The core characteristic of the capability approach is its focus on what people are effectively able to do and to be, that is, on their capabilities. This contrasts with philosophical approaches that concentrate on people’s happiness or desire-fulfilment, or on theoretical and practical approaches that concentrate on income, expenditures, consumption or basic needs fulfilment. A focus on people’s capabilities in the choice of development policies makes a profound theoretical difference, and leads to quite different policies compared to neo-liberalism and utilitarian policy prescriptions” (2003, 5). The capabilities approach immediately exposes some of the problems and some of the issues of bioethics. But bioethics and the capability approach do not end with the idea of providing DNA treatment. Nussbaum (2001) points out that there is a gender problem to the capabilities approach, where gendered definitions of capabilities and the operation of gendered institutions can serve to stymie justice. Aside from gender, state, economic and racial oppression and institutions must be considered. The specter of racist or classist eugenics raises its ugly head with the bioethics issue, as do inequalities emerging from the uneven application of biological technology on people. So does the issue of institutions aiming to inculcate more obedience or national fervor. Thus, bioethics exposes a core problem with capabilities analysis: Whose capabilities are salient? Which capabilities deserve to be improved? Can a capability like the capability for obedience truly be considered a capability? In any respect, even putting aside these hairy theoretical issues, the access to health care given biotechnology and material opulence is certainly immensely unjust from many theoretical perspectives. In Just Health, Norman Daniels pursues three core questions (2008, 11). First: Is health of special moral importance? He finds that, looking at other commonly accepted goods, that health is of particular importance because it is determinative of so many other goods. Second: When is health inequality unjust? Health inequality is overwhelmingly associated with racial, gender, class, ethnic and other consistent inequalities, magnifies those inequalities and makes them into matters of life and death, so in those instances, they are patently unjust. Third: How can health care needs be met fairly? The last concern is not just philosophical but also deeply economic, since it requires highly sophisticated feasibility analysis to even begin to answer, but the first two are fair game. Daniels rejects a rights theory of health care access (2008, 15). He does so not because he finds the arguments uncompelling (or compelling) but because “Rights are not moral fruits that spring up from bare earth, fully ripened, without cultivation”; rather, a right can only be defined in the context of society’s shared agreements and access to resources as well as by a theoretical framework that helps to answer broader questions. In addition, rights are not axiomatic. Most Westerners outside of the United States (and indeed many in the US) accept that there is a right to health care especially when there is such opulence available to provide it. But that right, like free speech, is limited based on other rights. What are some examples of competing rights? There is the trivial, that providing universal health care can trample on the rights of free market providers. But to provide more just health to the population would require training more doctors, which could require pushing more students to medical school who don’t want to go that direction. Many other competing rights issues should be explored to establish to what degree universal health care provision can be justified. Works Cited Cavell, S. 1991, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism: The Carus Lectures, 1988, Literary Collections. Chomsky, N. 2004, Chomsky on Anarchism, AK Press. Cooke, EF. “On the Possibility of a Pragmatic Discourse Bioethics:1 Putnam, Habermas, and the Normative Logic of Bioethical Inquiry”, The Journal of Medicine & Philosophy, vol. 28 no. 5-6. Kush, M. “Rule Skepticism: Searle's Criticism of Kripke's Wittgenstein”. Academia. Available at: http://univie.academia.edu/MartinKusch/Papers/166136/ Rule_Scepticism_Searles_Criticism_of_Kripkes_Wittgenstein Nussbaum, MC. 2001, Women and human development: the capabilities approach, Cambridge University Press. Richter, DJ. 2004, “Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951)”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Robeyns, IE. 2003, “The Capability Approach: An Interdisciplinary Introduction”, Capability Approach. Stone, JR. 2008, “Healthcare Inequality, Cross-Cultural Training, and Bioethics: Principles and Applications”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 17 pp. 216-226, March. Read More