Aviation Security and Airports - Term Paper Example

?Aviation Security and Its Impact on Airports Introduction That millions of people travel from country to country via air travel cannot be denied, nor can it be disputed that air travel is fast becoming the only way to get around the world – in fact, the United States alone has over 639 million passengers passing through its airports annually (US Department of Transportation, 2001). It follows, then, that airports are among the only places in any given location where multitudes of people are present at any time of day, whether during late night, early morning or the hours in between. Taking this into account, it can then convincingly argued that airports, more than any other single location, are ‘places that never sleep’. This particular fact is even less arguable than the first two, and has in fact become common knowledge. It is precisely because of this that every airport, without exception, will have more than a few shops and establishments operating there, hoping to make money off the many inbound and outbound passengers – so much so that some airports could easily be mistaken for full-blown shopping malls. Fastfood chains are also omnipresent in airports for those who wish to grab a bite before or after a long flight, not to mention travel agents for those who wish to avail of tours and other travel packages. However, there are also those who would use such knowledge to achieve much more sinister ends, such as al-Qaeda who precipitated 9/11 by slamming airliners into the World Trade Center as well as the Pentagon. An even more recent example is what happened in August 2006, where airports all over the United States, United Kingdom and Canada had to beef up security due to imminent bomb threats – especially notable for being the first time the US Terror Alert Level had ever been raised to ‘red’ (Barrot, 2006). Without a doubt, then, airport management has the responsibility of ensuring the safety of their arriving as well as departing passengers. It was in fact the aforementioned incident that led to airports the world over stepping up their security measures permanently. While airport security could hardly have been called lax since 9/11 (Transport Security Administration, 2011), the most recent update to airport security has included a more thorough body check that includes the crotch – an addition that has seen fierce debate on whether to prioritize safety or privacy of passengers. This being the case, this paper aims to examine the very concept of airport security, from the simplest possible definition to the currently existing security measures. All in all, the intent is to reflect whether the current security measures are adequate, whether they are lacking, or whether they are a bit excessive, and then from there, to make suggestions on what can still be improved. Airport Security – An Overview Belger (2001) of the US Federal Aviation Administration defines airport and aviation security as a set of techniques and methods employed to safeguard aircrafts and airport, passengers and crew against crime, as well as to support national security and counterterrorism policies. Inbound and outbound passengers, regardless of reputation or stature, are subject to a thorough search for weapons, drugs, explosives and other contraband in order to make flights as safe as possible (Schneier, 2004). Not even well-known public figures are exempt from this SOP, as evidenced from how even Senator Al Gore himself went through such a stringent inspection. As detailed on the website of the Transportation Security Administration (2011), over 700 security checkpoints and over 7,000 baggage checking areas exist all over America’s checkpoints today. Each day, in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security Technology Research Lab (TSA, 2011) new technologies and procedures are being tried and tested in order to maximize the efficiency of security checks with the intent of ensuring utmost safety and security for traveling passengers. An estimated 43,000 Transportation Security Officers nationwide are charged with inspecting at least 2 million passengers each day, searching luggage and frisking travelers in search of any forbidden items such as weapons, drugs and explosives. Of course, given the highly adaptable and modern nature of today’s terrorist movements, so too must these officers be able to further refine and improve on their procedures. This is precisely why covert testing is often conducted to keep officers alert and ready in case genuine, potential threats show up (TSA, 2011). Various methods are used in continuously ensuring and improving the quality of the safety measures, such as the Threat Image Projection (TIP) which randomly superimposes images of bombs into real carry-on bags, as well as the Aviation Security Assessment Program (ASAP) which involves actual, if inert, bomb parts planted within the luggage of TSA and other government employees. The continual implementation of such systems serves as a means for TSA officers to stay alert and on guard against the equally devious and sneaky terrorists, who are constantly looking for new ways to circumvent the efforts employed by the world’s governments to foil their evil schemes. In this scenario, the words ‘better to be safe than sorry’ hold especially true. The overall idea, then, is to make it as hard as possible for terrorists and other would-be miscreants to slip through and wreak havoc. Currently Existing Security Measures and Their Flaws Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) system in particular is one of the best-known systems being used to detect and spot terrorists before they strike, and is intended not only to apprehend more criminals, but also to expedite security screening in general (O’Harrow, 2002). And while this system had already been in place since 1999, the time that has passed since 9/11 has but served to intensify interest in the potential of CAPS as a valuable counterterrorism tool. This system makes use of a profile of sorts, a ‘mold’ of what a typical terrorist would be like, and compares each and every passenger to that mold. Passengers whose profiles match the CAPS terrorist profile most closely are then put on a special watch list, and are often subject to special procedures at the airport, including their luggage being repeatedly stripped down in search of forbidden devices. In short, those who happen to be on that watch list are frequently reminded of their status. Said system had been developed as per the Gore Commission, and while highly classified, can somehow be examined more closely thanks to the details existing on newer, more advanced CAPS modules certain companies are developing (United States Subcommittee on Aviation, 2002). CAPS usually has entire volumes worth of historical data on terrorist activities at its disposal, and the data on current passengers is compared and contrasted with these records with the intent of better identifying which persons are most likely to be terrorists. If, for instance, prior records show terrorists buying one-way tickets and being frequent flyers on international flights, the system will prioritize international passengers travelling on one-way tickets. And while the master profile created by the CAPS is kept secret at all times, one can still gain an idea by looking at the ones being singled out. The CAPS that has been implemented since 1999 is limited to considering one’s history of ticket purchases, but is said to eventually advance such that it will be capable of taking into account a more complex set of data, from the relevant bits such as criminal records to the more harmless, innocuous details such as one’s history of credit card purchases. As it is, it relies extensively on government databases to acquire the information it needs to compare passengers against the profile of what a terrorist is supposed to be. Those falling within the top 3-8% rating are immediately flagged for inspection, with an added number of random designations as mandated by Gore Commission guidelines (National Academy Press, 2000). The idea behind the CAPS is relatively simple, even if the procedures it employs are slightly less so. That is, it aims to better safeguard the safety of the airport as well as that of the passengers by exercising greater vigilance. Not only is it mandated that each and every passenger is to be subject to thorough inspection before being allowed to board a plane, the select few whose profiles show the most similarities to that of what a terrorist supposedly is are also subject to special treatment and inspection procedures. That is, they know perfectly well what their status is once they find themselves being subject to additional inspection. Why the CAPS Fails However, therein lies the flaw of such a system: since the special treatment is a telltale sign that one is on the watch list, those who do not receive it can safely assume that they are not on it, that they are judged as ‘safe’, ‘tame’ or otherwise ‘harmless’ by airport authorities. Because everyone subject to the CAPS is subject to open scrutiny, it would be easy for them to tell what kind of profile would be a closest match to the CAPS – and how to avoid it. This is summed up by Chakrabarti and Strauss (2002) as the Carnival Booth Effect, due to how it all but encourages would-be terrorists to beat the CAPS. Another failing of the CAPS is that it relies too much on stereotyping; that is, it involves comparing each and every individual passing through an airport to a stereotypical image or profile of what constitutes a terrorist or criminal. That it involves making assumptions about what a terrorist would look like, how one would behave and what kind of baggage he would be carrying, among other things, can hardly be called anything else but discrimination. For instance, between a neat, well-dressed Caucasian man and an Arab, the latter is much more likely to be mislabeled as a terrorist – all other things being equal. In general, the further up one is on the social hierarchy, the less plausible it is for that person to be perceived as a possible terrorist or criminal. The exact problem with this is that, first of all, stereotypes may not always be applicable and may in fact have already been long-discredited. For instance, while it had once been said after 9/11 that Arabs in particular are to be subject to inspection over anyone else, the fact of the matter is that homegrown terrorists are now equally likely to exist, and equally likely to be poised to strike (Ervin, 2006). An example of one such homegrown terrorist is John Walker Lindh, the so-called American Taliban hailing from Marin County, California (Tyrangiel, 2001), not to mention the rather more infamous Ted Kaczynski and Tim McVeigh. It should especially be noted that McVeigh, having been a former member of the Armed Forces – not to mention, a candidate for the Green Berets – is about the furthest one can get from the typical terrorist mold. As can be seen from how terrorists still manage to bomb highly populated areas such as subways and from the aforementioned August 2006 incident, it is difficult to come up with a specific profile of what a terrorist is supposed to be like – not least since such organizations have learned to look for recruits who appear to be the least likely candidates for terrorists. The image of a terrorist as a poor kid from a war-torn Arab country is fast becoming distorted, to the point that the ones that one needs to be careful of these days are the ones who look like anything but a terrorist or criminal. Regardless of how some may feel, the reality is that no one group has the monopoly on terrorism; it is not one’s ethnicity or nationality that makes him a terrorist, but his choices and actions. If anything, terrorists these days would be more likely to refrain from using Arab boys as suicide bombers in foreign countries, and instead look for new recruits in those countries. Given how American authorities in particular are fixated on the stereotypical image of a terrorist as an Arab from countries such as Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, such terrorists would of course focus on gaining recruits who are least likely to be tagged as terrorists, such as Islamic converts of Caucasian, African-American or Latino descent – which, these days, are more common than one would think. In short, the foolishness and bigotry exhibited by some Americans in authority are being used against them, and to a bloody cost. Additionally, it is not only impractical and foolish to perpetuate such stereotypes, but also immoral and unjust. As reported on FOX News (2010), the Obama administration’s decision to prioritize passengers from 14 Arab nations received a public outcry from Muslim and privacy groups - such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) itself – all of whom dismissed it as racial profiling. This in particular is highly ironic, given that Mr. Obama himself hails from one of America’s minority races. To be sure, the present administration has already had its own issues to be dealing with, and perceived flaws that its critics have been picking on since day one; something like this, which could potentially sour relations with the aforementioned 14 nations. This particular development is something that warrants a bit of reconsideration on the administration’s part, especially considering that the President himself is part of a minority. Such accusations would not be without precedent. After all, it can hardly be disputed that today’s typical terrorist will almost always turn out to be a Muslim radical – although this point becomes moot when one realizes how, these days, anyone can be a Muslim radical. It would seem that even some of those in charge of implementing such policies in the first place are not entirely convinced of their necessity, as exemplified by how the article quotes Jim Harper of the Department of Homeland Security privacy committee. Specifically, Harper tells us that such policies are bound to be revised in the near future, and that the government is bound to come up with a compromise in order to avert the public outcry such discriminatory-looking policies would elicit. Thus, objectively speaking, airport security these days still leaves much to be desired. An article on CBC News (2010) quotes Andre Gerotymalos who, in an interview, dismisses such measures as a knee-jerk reaction. More to the point, he calls them annoyances that are unlikely to be effective in the long run – except where incurring the ire of the aforementioned rights groups is concerned – as well as a thinly-veiled attempt by the government to reassure the people that it has the situation under control. And even that is something it fails to do. Conclusion From the above statements, it is safe to say that American airport security, overall, is lacking when it comes to effectiveness. And while the government deserves credit for at least trying to rectify the situation, it is doing things wrong, and its current measures may ultimately serve to do more harm than good. The most that airport security can do, though, is step up its security procedures for everyone rather than just a predefined group of people most likely to be terrorists. More than just implementing special inspection measures for passengers who just happened to fly in from Iran or some other Arab nation, airport officials need to take a closer look at each and every one of their passengers. Otherwise, the bloody cost of another attack may well be too much to bear. References "Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening and Positive Passenger-Bag Matching," (2000) Assessment of Technologies to Improve Airport Security: First Report. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000. "Hearing on Aviation Security with a Focus on Passenger Profiling," (2002) United States Congress Subcommittee on Aviation (27 February 2002), at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/02-27-02/02-27-02memo.html. Airport Security Measures Draw Accusations of ‘Profiling’ (2010) FOX News. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/06/airport-security-measures-draw-accusations-profiling/ Airport security measures ineffective: expert (2010) CBC News. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2010/01/03/bc-airport-security-expert.html Barrot, J. (2006) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1546/2006 of 4 October 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 laying down measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006R1546:EN:NOT Ervin, Clark K. (2006) Stereotyping terrorists: The usual suspects - Editorials & Commentary - International Herald Tribune. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/opinion/27iht-edervin.2066296.html O'Harrow, R (2002) "Intricate Screening Of Fliers In Works Database Raises Privacy Concerns," Washington Post (1 February 2002), p. A01 Schneier, B. (2004) An Easy Path for Terrorists. Boston Globe. Strauss, A. and Chakrabarti, S. (2002) Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System. http://outreach.lib.uic.edu/www/issues/issue7_10/chakrabarti/index.html#note13 TSA: Baggage Screening (2011) Transport Security Administration. http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/checked_baggage.shtm TSA: Covert Testing (2011) Transport Security Administration. http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/covert_testing.shtm TSA: Passenger Screening (2011) Transport Security Administration. http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/security_checkpoints.shtm TSA: Security Screening (2011) Transport Security Administration. http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/index.shtm Tyriangel, J. (2001) "The Taliban Next Door," Time (9 December). U.S. Department of Transportation. (2001) "Airport Activity Statistics of Certificated Air Carriers: Summary Tables," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 2001 Read More