The Responsibility to Protect Issues - Essay Example

?Introduction The Responsibility to Protect was established in 2001 through the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignity (ICISS). Basically it states that countries have the responsibility to protect their citizens, and, as long as the country is performing this function, then the country has sovereignty over its affairs. However, if the state is unwilling or unable to do this, then its sovereignty is temporarily suspended, the international community takes over the responsibility to protect, and other nations can step in to protect that country’s citizens (Pattison, 2009, p. 1). There has always been a traditional emphasis on state sovereignty, which means that every nation state is free to govern its country and its people as it sees fit, without intervention from other countries. That said, there have always been threats to this sovereignty, due to the global nature of the world and nations who try to intervene for various purposes. However, until the early 2000s, there has not been a perspective that the sovereignty of nations should be compromised in the cases of mass genocide and the like, or at least there has not been the perspective that there should be a doctrine to address this, and that this doctrine should be viewed through the eyes of the victims. That all changed with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. This doctrine, while imperfect, and viewed with a great deal of suspicion by many countries as a “Trojan Horse” through which nations can invade one another with ostensible humanitarian goals, has still been beneficial to some extent, although has not seemed to go far enough in abating atrocities that have occurred around the world. This paper will examine the nature of sovereignty, the origins of the responsibility to protect, and the effect it has had on the world community since its inception. The Traditional Meaning of Sovereignty In order to better understand the concept of the responsibility to protect, and how it diverges from traditional understandings, one must understand the meaning of state sovereignty, which has been described as “a defining principle of interstate relations and the foundation of world order” (Supplement to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty). Traditionally, nation-states have sovereignty, which means that each nation is free to rule over its people as it sees fit, and dispose of its resources in same manner. However, this power is not absolute, and it subjected to regulations and constraints from the international body (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, p. 12). One of the traditional tenets of state sovereignty is the tenet that each nation respects other nation’s sovereignty, so that the policy of non-intervention is the international norm. If this is violated, and another nation penetrates a nation’s sovereignty, then the offended nation has the right to defend itself (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, p. 12). The United Nations was the body that protected state sovereignty. However, the concept of state sovereignty has always been a tenuous one. The powerful typically invade the province of nations, and the globalization of today’s world recognizes that environmental, cultural and economic influences do not respect national borders, partly due to new technologies and advances in communication (Supplement to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) The traditional notion of sovereignty has further evolved to where states agree that sovereignty is a responsibility. As such, states agree that protecting its citizens is a condition for maintaining its sovereignty. Further, as a condition of sovereignty, national leaders are accountable for their own actions, and nations are accountable to the international bodies for how that nation treats its populace (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, p. 12). The Responsibility to Protect The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has its genesis on 2000, when the Canadian government commissioned the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to examine how human rights, intervention and state sovereignty are related. This request was spurred by the events in Rwanda, where 800,000 people died through genocide, and Somalia, Srebrenica and East Timor during the 1990s, where similar human catastrophes occurred (Brown, 2008, p. 8). From there, the ICISS created a report about these interrelationships and were the first to state that the right to intervene should become the responsibility to protect (Bellamy & Williams, 2005, p. 28). The issue was also distinguished from humanitarian intervention, and the report stressed that R2P and humanitarian intervention are not the same thing, in that the perspective that R2P takes is the perspective of those needing help (Stahn, 2007, p. 103). At the same time, it stated that intervention is only authorized when the host state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, while stating that intervention “should be situated alongside prevention and post-conflict rebuilding” (Bellamy & Williams, 2005, p. 28). The nation states were thus thrust into the role of being moral agents (Chandler, 2004, p. 62). R2P is also, according to Bellamy, a “speech act and catalyst for action” (Luck, 2010, p. 357). From there, the United Nations put forth a report in 2004 titled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” (United Nations General Assembly, p. 6). In this report, it acknowledges that the United Nations had affirmed the value of human life, but did not put forth articles to protect human life and rights, while there was an Article, Article 2.7, which states that intervention into matters that are a internal to a state is prohibited (United Nations General Assembly, p. 56). The report goes on to state that genocide is a threat to the security of all nations, and a crime under international law, therefore would not be tolerated. As such, the phrase officially shifted from the right to intervene, which applies to certain states, to the responsibility to protect, which applies to all states (United Nations General Assembly, p. 56). In other words, the traditional way of phrasing the right of a country to invade another country for humanitarian reasons was the right to intervene, which gave the individual country this right. Now, it is no longer just a right for a country to intervene, but a responsibility, and this responsibility extends to all countries in the international community. The report further states that the responsibility to protect kicks in when there is genocide, large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, or serious violations of international humanitarian law (United Nations General Assembly, p. 57). While this report was the genesis of the idea that nations have the responsibility to protect when there is large-scale genocide and the like, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an international body funded by the Canadian government, pushed for the nation-states to adopt the concept of R2P and adopt it at the 2005 World Summit, which succeeded (Bellamy, 2006, p. 144). The World Summit put the following constraints on the doctrine: (1) that R2P intervention must be authorized by the United Nations Security Council; and (2) the Security Council may only act if a certain threshold has been met, and the target nation is unwilling or unable to act (Bellamy, 2006, “Preventing Future Kosovos,” p. 4). The “just cause” threshold means (a) a large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or (b) large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape” (Bellamy, 2009, p. 56). Some of the other principles of the R2P are that the nations who use the doctrine must have the right intention, and that is to halt or avert human suffering, and these right intentions are better supported by multi-lateral operations, as opposed to unilateral ones, and that regional opinion and the concerned victims must also support the actions; the nations who use the doctrine must do so as the last resort, in that every non-military option has been exhausted, and there must be grounds that these lesser methods would not succeed; the intervention must be proportional to the objective; and there must be a reasonable chance to succeed (Bellamy, 2009, p. 56). Other principles are that the objectives of the operation must be clear; the rules of engagement must be observed; force protection must not be the principal objective; and there must be maximal coordination with humanitarian organizations (Bellamy, 2009, pp. 57-58). The responsibility to protect (R2P), argues Axworthy and Rock (2009) should not only be extended to situations where citizens are dying at the hands of rogue nation-states, but also when they are dying from the aftermath of natural disasters or the outbreak of disease (Axworthy & Rock, 2009, p. 56). Particularly, the R2P doctrine should be activated when the government denies the people access to life-saving treatment and basic necessities, such as water, as well as situations where the nation is unwilling or unable to cope with the disaster and has called for assistance (Axworthy & Rock, 2009, p. 56). Thus, according to Axworthy & Rock, the R2P doctrine should not be confined to cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and the like, but also to situations where the government is not actively involved in killing its citizens, but is denying them life-saving provisions in the event of a natural catastrophe. Problems with R2P R2P is not without its problems. For one, not all nation-states are willing to intervene, and may cast “unreasonable vetoes,” as in the cases of Russia and China who do not view systematic genocide to be necessarily a bad thing, as they treat their own citizens in such a way (Bellamy, 2006, “Preventing Future Kosovos,” p. 4). These countries thus support the sovereignty argument as paramount over R2P (Shukla, 2007, p. 8). Moreover, Russia has expressed concern that nations may be trying to invade other nations on the pretense of protecting human lives, when actually the real motivation is in weakening that particular nation-state, while enhancing their own credibility (Bellamy, 2006, “Preventing Future Kosovos,” p. 4). Bellamy (2006) argues that allowing these unreasonable vetoes without constraint enable permanent members of the United Nations to put the needs of their own countries ahead of the needs of the citizens of the nations committing genocide (Bellamy, 2006, “Preventing Future Kosovos,” p. 4). Another problem is that some nations hold a cynical view of R2P, believing that the R2P doctrine is just another way for nations to intervene in a humanitarian way, and there is typically widespread hostility towards nations who want to conduct humanitarian intervention, especially if done unilaterally (Bellamy, 2009, p. 112). Moreover, some nations feel that the R2P is a way for nations to intervene without the blessing of the UN Security Council (Bellamy, 2008, p. 616). Indeed, governments have used the R2P doctrine for coercive means since its adoption in 2005, such as when France tried to use the doctrine to supply humanitarian aid to Burma after 2008’s Cyclone Nargis, a move that was criticized by China, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Africa (Bellamy, 2008, p. 617). Additionally, several prominent members of the UN have bolstered the view that R2P is more about the new-found right to forcibly intervene then it is about protecting citizens (Bellamy, 2008, p. 617). All this has led some nations to believe that the R2P is merely a “Trojan Horse” for the right to intervene (Bellamy, 2008, p. 617). However, Weiss (2007) believes that “overzealous military action for insufficient humanitarian reasons…certainly is no danger. Rather, the real threat to international society comes from doing nothing while condoning massive suffering in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, overlooking slaughter in northern Uganda, and observing Sudan’s slow-motion genocide” (Weiss, 2007, p. 52). While these are arguments that the R2P doctrine is too much, or that it is overly ambitious, there is another camp that states that he doctrine is too little, or is not ambitious enough. These arguments are the that threshold’s bar is set too high, in that the doctrine is only invoked in cases of large-scale loss of life (Bellamy, 2009, p. 62). Moreover, as argued below, there was not a word about gender, despite the fact that there were moves by the Security Council to identify the role of women in security and peace, including “the requirement for UN personnel to receive gender training; the need to protect women and girls and their human rights during and after armed conflict; and the need to mainstream gender throughout the UN system” (Bellamy, 2009, p. 62). As an extension of this argument, Charlesworth (2010) states that international norms that have been developed through this doctrine are not sufficiently focused on the plight of women around the world, in part due to the lack of women on the different councils that created the doctrine (Charles, 2010, p. 241). This is in line with the fact that women, and the reality of their lives, do not play a large part in shaping international principles. Women do not really play a part in the R2P conception, except for some passing notes about mass rape. Moreover, the doctrine concentrates on the actions of the government, how these actions affect the citizens of the nation-state, when the violence against women, around the world, are mainly perpetrated by the woman’s family and community (Charles, 2010, p. 242). For all of these reasons, the R2P doctrine does not go far enough in addressing the plight of women, 2/3 of whom, around the world, will be subjected to violence during her lifetime (Charles, 2010, p. 242). Yet another problem with the R2P, according to De Waal (2007), is that the emphasis is on whether and when to intervene, not on how and why (De Waal, 2007, p. 1045). Some groups who are advocates of the doctrine simply assume that the objectives of protection are achievable, but are not aware of the logistics of how these objectives are to be carried out. For instance, in Darfur, there were erroneous and inflated expectations for what UN troops could do in that country, which fed inflated hopes and fears in that country (De Waal, 2007, p. 1045). Another misconception was put forth by the International Crisis Group, who believed that disarmament was the job of peacekeepers, when this is, in actuality, rarely the case ( De Waal, 2007, p. 1045). Therefore, the guidelines do not provide guidance on how the objectives of the doctrine are to be carried out, and what the aims are once they are carried out, which breed confusion about what can realistically be done, which, in turn, might cause more harm than good. Moreover, the responsibility to protect not only means the responsibility to intervene to protect citizens, but to rebuild after intervention, which means staying in the country to assure that good governance takes place, building a durable peace and sustainable development (Ghreciu & Welsh, 2009, p. 125). Anybody who has witnessed the United States efforts in Iraq, which was not exactly a humanitarian intervention, but an effort to ostensibly disarm Saddam Hussein, and seen how the United States has spent literally trillions of dollars on the conflict that has, thus far, lasted almost 9 years, will see the dangers in nation-building. But, like the Iraq conflict, if a nation breaks it, they buy it, so to speak, and this could prove to be a quagmire that most countries will not touch, for good reason. The Effect of R2P Alex Bellamy (2010) has assessed the effects of R2P on the international stage, as it has been over five years since the concept was adopted by the UN. He starts by assessing that the doctrine has been used inconsistently, and not always for its stated purpose. For instance, Kofi Annan used the doctrine in Kenya, where there was post-election violence, as a part of a diplomatic strategy; Russia has used it in Georgia to justify its unilateral military action there (Bellamy, 2010, p. 148). In the case of Russia, this use of intervention was widely rejected, and there was no support for Russia’s claims of genocide; in the case of Kenya, however, the action was widely supported, and was effective in that it brokered an end to the violence there (Bellamy, 2010, p. 149). Other places where it has been used since 2005 have been Sudan, in which the UN Security Council invoked the doctrine, and a peace operation has been deployed, along with the mandatory protection of civilians, and the matter being referred to the International Criminal Court; Myanmar, after Cyclone Nargis, where France attempted to invoke the doctrine, but was roundly rejected by the international body that stated that the doctrine does not apply to natural disasters; Gaza, where Palestine attempted to invoke the doctrine, but was not given support for its claims; The Democratic Republic of Congo, where a peace operation was deployed and there was little dissent for the action; and Myanmar, with the objective of protecting minorities, where it was decided that the doctrine was not applicable to this case, and no action was taken (Bellamy, 2010, p. 150). Moreover, in at least one of these cases, the matter was referred to the international criminal court (ICC). The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an institution that is permanent and independent, and was established “to investigate and prosecute individual perpetrators for the worst crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” (Gready, 2004, p. 104). The court was created through the Rome Statute which was adopted when the diplomatic conference held in Rome, Italy in June-July 1998 concluded. It has its roots in World War II, where the genesis for such a court began, then picked up steam by the United Nations at the end of the Cold War. The United Nations was at the center of the development of this court, as it provided the procedural framework for the ICC, and offered a platform through which Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and like-minded governments were able to partner. This, in turn, invited and empowered thousands of NGOs from around the world to input their expertise and experience into the process of creating the court. The NGOs, being a part of the civil society, was able to push for accountability and push for the highest legal standards to underscore the process (Gready, 2004, p. 105). At the same time, the NGOs who formed a Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), were able to bring transparency to the process of forming this court by distributing public information worldwide about the process (Gready, 2004, p. 105). The framework and the partnerships in turn inspired small and middle-sized states to form an informal coalition of their own, called the like-minded group (LMG) (Gready, 2004, p. 105). Thus, the International Criminal Court is another tool that can be used in the R2P doctrine. Additionally, in two of the cases above, the limits of the R2P doctrine were tested and new standards were set. In the case of Russia, who accused Georgia of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia, the claims were found not to be credible. The incident stemmed from Georgia launching a military assault against the people in the South Ossetia region, with the aim of restoring constitutional order. Russia responded by invading Georgia. Russia claimed that its actions were justified by the R2P, in that Georgia was engaging in genocide, while Georgia vehemently disagreed. The international body agreed with Georgia, stating that Russia had misappropriated the doctrine in this instance, while other countries stated that the Russian response to the crisis was disproportionate (Bellamy, 2010, p. 151). The other limit that was tested was the case of Myanmar. As argued by Axworthy and Rock (2009) above, the R2P doctrine should be used in cases where countries fail to act in the face of a natural disaster. This was the argument that France put forth when it attempted to use the doctrine in Myanmar after a cyclone devastated the region – 138,000 were dead, and 1.5 million were displaced. In this case, despite the obvious suffering, the Myanmar military regime at first refused humanitarian aid to the suffering, which inhibited the deliverance of badly needed supplies and medical assistance. Moreover, even when the aid got to the country, the Myanmar regime insisted on distributing the supplies itself, which made the international community suspicious that the regime would keep the supplies for itself and the military, and not distribute them to the people. France argued that R2P should apply in this case, but this was flatly rejected by the other countries in the UN, which decided that R2P does not apply in cases of natural disaster. In the end, diplomacy forced the Myanmar regime to distribute the supplies to the people, although this was painfully slow, and there was speculation that the mere threat of invoking R2P was enough for the Myanmar regime to relent, so, in this way, the French invoking the doctrine might have been helpful after all (Bellamy, 2010, p. 152). Conclusion The Responsibility to Protect is a good start, but does not seem to go far enough. For instance, in the case of Myanmar, this would seem like an appropriate use of the doctrine, as the military was, in effect, killing people by their inaction. Yet the claims were roundly rejected. Also, the doctrine does not seem to have the desired effect in areas of the world where it is most needed, such as Darfur and Congo, as the killings go on in these countries, seemingly unabated. Therefore, it seems that the doctrine needs more teeth and needs to be invoked more often. Sources Used Axworthy, L & Rock, A. (2009). “R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda,” Global Responsibility to Protect, pp. 54-69. Bellamy, A. (2006). “Whither the Responsibility to Protect?” Ethics and International Affairs, 20(2): 143-169. Bellamy, A. 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(2005). “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” Security Dialogue, 36(1): 27-47. Read More