Role of Turkey in the Arab World - Essay Example

? 4 Neoottomanism in Turkey and the Role of Turkey in the new formation of the Arab World Ottomanism is a political doctrine, first appeared in Ottoman Empire; it was launched in the second half of the XIX century by the young Turkish officers, so-called "Young Turks", planning to make a revolution against the regime of Abdul Hamid II. Originally, the doctrine proclaimed "the equality of all Ottomans," i.e., all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, without distinction of nationality and religion. But after Young Turks’ rise to power in 1908, this doctrine became an instrument of their struggle against national demands of the non-Turkish peoples and the ideological justification for their intention to create the Unified Ottoman Empire. Thus, ottomanism transformed into the ideology of pan-Turkism. The Turkish leaders of the late XX - early XXI century, especially Recep Tayyip Erdogan, updated the doctrine of ottamanism-pan-Turkism, turning it into so-called neoottomanism. Modern Turkish leaders advocated the creation of an integrated economic and cultural-linguistic space that has commonality of interests; it is the main essence of this ideology. However, neo-Ottomanism implies the dominant influence of Turkey not only on Turks, but even more - non-Turkic peoples and countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire at different time. The doctrine of "neoottomanism" was not completely comprehended even by its originators. Nowadays a lot of European and American politicians are greatly concerned about the given ideology and they do not want to stay away from it. United States, for example, hatch the plans to create a unified Turkic political space dominated by Turkey, and are interested in supporting the sovereignty of newly independent states of Central Eurasia. A heavy blow to this "subtle pan-Turkism", i.e. neoottomanism, was stroke by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, members of which were two Turkic states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Islamic one – Tajikistan. Uzbekistan led its own political game for a certain period, but then, joined the CSTO. Turkmenistan's foreign policy tends to neutrality at the present time. Under the auspices of the U.S., such projects as The Black Sea Cooperation and GUAM were developed. If earlier the U.S. was more interested in strengthening Turkey's influence on the Balkans, nowadays - on Northern and Southern Caucasus, Crimea, Ukraine, Bessarabia, as well as Syria, Lebanon and Iraq - as vectors, amplifying the Turkish-Russian confrontation. "Political and operational" role of Turkey in these regions is the most attractive for the U.S. But practice shows that the U.S. is not confident in the effectiveness of such role-based participation of Turkey, even in these projects. Yes, Turkey could play a leading role in the formation and activity of GUAM, but Western politicians are in no hurry to pedal its role. Turkey activities in Georgia, especially in some regions, such as Ajaria and Abkhazia, as well as in Dagestan and Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygeya, Krasnodar territory, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo Macedonia, and Bessarabia can only be seen in part of a joint Turkish-American project. All other joint plans of the United States and Turkey in Central Asia are minor, in fact. Issues, related to the presence of Turkey military machine in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Crimea, are always discussed between the military and intelligence services of both countries. Turkey's position in these regions is much stronger than that in Central Asia. Only the situation in Iran, especially in its north-western regions, can be compared with Turkey positions in the above regions. In 2001, the present minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu published his voluminous work “Strategic depth: the international position of Turkey”, in which he analyzed the regional and geopolitical interests and priorities of Turkey; he also put forward a series of theoretical assessments and propositions. After the victory of Justice and Development party in 2002, the Turkish political circles started paying much more attention to the views of political analyst Davutoglu, afterwards, when he became a minister of foreign affairs, these theoretical postulates were implemented into the practical field. Nowadays, despite of a number of various theories ever worked out by Davutoglu, only so-called ideology of neoottomanism enjoys a great popularity and recognition throughout Turkey. It should be emphasized that some provisions are clearly expressed in foreign policy of Turkey. It is possible to formulate the postulates of the given policy this way: Turkey strives to play political, diplomatic, economic and spiritual part, and moreover, to assume being a leader among a number of regions of former Ottoman Empire, in the East, the Balkans and North Africa, in particular. Turkey tries to apply a “zero conflicts with neighbors” principle towards Caucasus, at the same time striving to play the key role in regional conflicts and become a “judge and mediator”. Besides, Turkey amplifies its presence (especially, economic one) in Caucasian states, in Azerbaijan and Georgia, in particular (Nur Batur, 2010). According to “Times”, “But this Turkey is trying to “post-modernize” itself. One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems with Turkey’s immediate “near abroad.” This effort stands in contrast with the “traditional” Turkish policy of letting these frozen conflicts fester, and is much more compatible with US and European interests. The list of Turkish initiatives under the AKP is impressive: accepting the Annan Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999 rapprochement with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating in the signing of recognition protocols, warming and productive relations with both Baghdad and Erbil (the latter complemented by significant reforms in Turkey’s relations with its own Kurdish population). The signature accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria. While this road to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria’s accommodation of prior Turkish governments’ demands (relinquishing claims on Turkey’s Hatay province, expelling Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer. As noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of regional problems, from Lebanon to Iran.” (Times, 2010). Today, there is an opinion that exactly Ahmed Davutoglu appears to be a leader and architect of neoottoman ideology, however, there are some direct evidences that similar ideas and discussions on neoottomanism existed long before Davutoglu, and all he did was simply systematizing and processing them. The ex-president of Turkey Turgut Ozal, when speaking of Balkan Muslims, also made a number of applications, directly referring to neoottomanism. In the mid 1990ies Abdul Gul, the deputy of Islam party called “Refah” (“Welfare”), had an interview with one famous Turkish publicist, in which he recollected his old dream of creating an alliance between Turkey and neighboring Arab countries, in which Turkey would play the key role. Nowadays, when being the president of Turkey, Abdul Gul’s and his supporters’ dreams have acquired some systematic character and taken significant place in foreign policy of the country. Neoottomanism is directed towards launching a diplomatic, political, and economic activity in focus-regions (Middle East, the Balkans, North Africa and Caucasus), assuming the role of mediator in regional conflicts, becoming an “exporter” of democracy and modernization to the Middle East and mediator between the Oriental and Occidental countries, thus, rising the credibility of Turkey among the focus-regions. Recently, Turkey has started working on its rapprochement with other Arabian countries and growth of its credibility. Warming of relations with Syria and activating the economic relations with this country can serve as the brightest example of this fact. However, according to some analysts, the very first and the loudest reveal of neoottomanism took place in Davos, where the Turkish prime-minister Erdogan criticized the Israel bluntly for its Palestinian policy and then left the Meeting Room. After the incident, there was an armed conflict between the Turkish ships and Israel militaries in the Gaza strip that preceded the extremely rough statements of Turkish authorities and cold in Turkish-Israel relations. Exactly after the given incident there followed Turkish image rise, especially among the social circles: suffice it to say, that there were lots of anti-Israel demonstrations in a number of Arabian countries; the protestant carried the Turkish flag to show their support to the viewpoint of Erdogan. Together with the Turkish credibility rise, the personal rating of Erdogan is also increasing: in accordance with the sociological surveys, conducted by the Arabian Mass Media, he was awarded as the man of the year; people call their newborn children in his honor and so forth. The Turkish foreign policy is praised in Palestine, Davutoglu is considered to be contemporary Henry Kissinger, and some senior Palestinian officials regard the neoottoman ideology as the key to resolving some problems relating the Middle East. Still, “Erdogan’s political success – together with a number of messy scandals resulting in public investigation – has meant that the Turkish General Staff now plays a much smaller role in defining Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey’s support to NATO is still strong, but it now lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war instinct of General Staff brought to the mix” (Times, 2010). The president of Libya Kaddafy, when speaking of Libyan-Turkish relations, noticed that they are all ottomans, thus stressed the necessity to maintain friendly and cooperative relations between two states. Ideas of this kind do not always find support and understanding among other institutions and political parties. In their view, the fascination with this kind of Turkish influence is fraught with unpredictable consequences that threaten Turkish state. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the various Ottoman ethnic groups around Turkey became a part of its foreign policy. Defending the term "Ottoman ethnic groups”, Turkish historians refer to the Ottoman Empire: lots of Muslim nations, at least, their political and politico-religious leaders, recognized the Ottoman sultan as their sovereign, the sultan of the Faithful. Indeed, in the sultans’ firmans it was said they could patronize Muslim peoples, which were under the domination of the Christian rulers. Pan -Turkism policy has ceased to be a self-sufficient factor in the context of reality- the Turkish foreign policy needed different doctrines aimed at strengthening Turkey's influence in those regions and countries with no Turkic-speaking ethnic group, but where were ethnic groups and peoples, predominantly-Muslim, that were to some extent oriented toward Turkey. Along with the spread of influence on Ottoman ethnic groups, Turkey aims secure a grip on some Turkic ethnic group, having no statehood. Some Turkish politicians - primarily those associated with the Nationalist Action Party and local organizations of concentrated nationalism - are skeptical about the role and importance of non-Turkic ethnic groups, believing that the country's foreign policy should be aimed at creating the global Turkish Empire, in which there is no place for non-Turkic peoples. But such position was not taken seriously even in the 50ies and 70ies, when the only mention of any ethnic groups, different from Turkic, caused Turkey’s suspicion and wariness. In the current time of much greater openness of Turkish society, such ideas are anachronistic. Moreover, a prominent Turkish political scientist, professor of Ankara University, Mustafa Aydin calls upon paying serious attention to non-Turkic ethnic groups, inhabiting the neighboring regions of Turkey, as well as enhancing its role in foreign and domestic policy, regarding it as an important factor in strengthening the Turkish state. In September 2006, at the International Conference on Regional Policy, held in Tehran, Mustafa Aydin delivered a report on the Mid-east and Central Asian cultural solidarity. Talking about the peculiarities and cultural features, distinguishing the population of these regions, the political scientist, encouraged Turkey and Iran to take the initiative of a new political and cultural space formation, because most peoples of these two regions, according to Aydin, were the bearers of Turkic and Iranian cultures. Some Iranian authors, including the Institute of International Studies and Foreign Ministry of Iran, reacted to the idea of ??such a deliberate synthesis of different cultures dubiously, considering it to be an attempt of Turkish expansion. Thus, new challenges in Turkish foreign policy put forward the necessity of developing certain principles and approaches that are consistently implemented in public policy at the ideological foundation of the two doctrines - Panturkism and neo-Ottomanism. This policy, subjected to implementation in the context of the “Ottoman nationalities”, rests on the principles of religious solidarity, which is unacceptable under current circumstance. Turkey opposes granting sovereignty to Turkic and non-Turkic ethnic groups, preferring to bind these ethnic groups to their residence places and thus, strengthening their positions and influence throughout the local communities to lobby for the interests of Turkey. Proceeding from the same principles and techniques, the identification of the Turkic ethnic groups and Turkish-Anatolian nation is acceptable only in the cultural, historical and linguistic perspective, but not politically. Turkey does not intend to treat all these ethnic groups as some fragments of the Turkic super ethnos, political homeland of which shall be deemed to Turkey. Because recognition of the Turkish nation’s "fragments" should be followed by recognition of their inherent right to migrate to Turkey eventually, and thus resolving the political problems connected with their residence place. Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarian Turks, Macedonian Turks, the Turks of Northern Greece (Eastern Thrace), a South Serbian Turks, Iranian Turks, Azerbaijanis, Kumyks, Balkars, Astrakhan Tatars, Turkomans, Ashraf and Uzbeks of Afghanistan, the Uighurs of China, the Kazakhs of China and other Turkic ethnic groups are attached to their residence place, in accordance with Turkish propaganda and literature. Though easily defined by common criteria and referred to Turkic super ethnos, these ethnic groups are of great interest for Turkey, primarily, as a Turkish political interests’ vehicle in various regions. Turkey's policy, which became the benchmark for political and social organizations of mentioned ethnic groups, has led to the following results. Turkish population in Bulgaria, quite rightly ranked among the Turks of Anatolia as a minority ethnic group, has achieved unparalleled political success: it is widely represented in the parliament (determines the outcome of a vote), the executive and local authorities. Efforts are being made to enhance the country’s role in foreign policy; the Balkan opponents of Turkey are concerned about current policies in Bulgaria. The activation of the Turkish factor resulted in Bulgarian reluctance to demonstrate its friendly attitude towards Greece, and partially - to Serbia. Under pressure of some Turkish organizations, Bulgaria took the neutral position in Cyprus problem. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian country is gradually turning into Bulgarian-Turkish country. To continue the process, Turkey repeats the precedent of the 80ies, limiting the migration of Bulgarian Turks to the country - their ethnic homeland. According to the Bulgarian political scientists, there are no separatist attitudes from the Turkish side in Bulgaria, the goal is not division of Bulgaria, but its complete subordination to the interests of Turkey, where the Turkish community would get rid of the status of an ethnic minority, and become the state-forming nation. Comparatively small groups in Serbia (60 thousand) and Greece (120 thousand) are a good pretext for the manipulation of Turkey in various European structures. In fact, both groups of ethnic minorities are being cherished tenderly by Council of Europe and the European Union, and to some extend – even NATO, insisting on the Turkish population rights being observed by Serbia and Greece. Thus, Turks’ position in the Greek part of Thrace provoked a long discussion between Turkey and Greece, plunging some international organizations into the political disassembly. Targeting Turkey's policy led to the creation of the Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova, geographically situated in Bessarabia at the interchange of transit routes of the Black Sea and the Danube. Gagauzians are very important for Turkey as an Orthodox ethos gravitating to it. Now Gagauzia is virtually under the Turkish protectorate; the country is supposed to repeat the fate of Chuvash Turkic and Ugric Christian ethnic groups, certain part of the Volga Tatars, Mari, Udmurt and Mordovians, Bulgarian and Serbian Turkish proselytes that adopted Christianity. Despite the demonstration of good neighborly relations, Turkey continues insisting on Georgia's commitment of deploying Meskhetians on its territory, hoping to create the autonomy in the future, and thus, establish control over Georgia by juggling the same tools - political ethnic group, which acquired the elements of statehood. The Meskhetians’ return to South Georgia is a part of Turkish state policy .The return of relatively small group of Meskhetians (10 - 30 000) will be a powerful factor of Turkish influence on Georgia, and probably on the entire South Caucasus. In the 90ies, Turkey took over the political and social revitalization of Azeri population in Kvemo Kartli region, a strategically important province of Georgia, control over which could provide control over the major utilities of the South Caucasus. Turkish agents come into contact with the Georgian elite, including the administration of Kvemo Kartli region, creating a pro-Turkish lobby in Georgian society. Then Turkey went on the offensive - has activated Turkic-speaking ethnic group of this Georgian province with unmistakable purpose of achieving the political autonomy. Absorption of the Crimea and the adjacent micro-regions is supposed to be the most important geopolitical and geostrategic problem for Turkey. None of the geopolitical trends can be compared with the Crimean. But this is the most difficult task, since the number of Tatars in Crimea is not so significant, emigrant potential is largely exhausted and the local population and authorities keep on resisting the Crimean Tatar territorial expansion. Despite the European appearance, knowledge of Russian language, familiarizing with Russian culture, some educational qualifications, the Slavic population does not perceive the Crimean Tatars as a partner with who they are ready to live side by side on the Crimean territory. Turkey tries to resolve the problem by means of one or an other political force in Ukraine; it appeals to European institutions and international humanitarian and human rights organizations, but the problems in the Crimea are increasing, making it difficult for Turkey to achieve its coveted goals - the expansion to this strategically important territory, which would provide control over the Black Sea-Caucasus region, greatly strengthening the geo-strategic position of Turkey. Turkish policy in the Crimea is associated with such factor as Turkish-Ukrainian relations that become more and more important for Turkey, trying to build a new regional policy, taking into account the formation of the geopolitical situation. Both Turkey and Ukraine are interested in fruitful cooperation, being the leading countries of the Black Sea basin and holding significant economic and political opportunities. Ukraine seeks to integrate into NATO and the EU, and it is not a desirable circumstance for Turkey. Turkey does not wish the U.S. and NATO strengthening their presence in the Black Sea, as it would lead to a fundamental reduction of strategic significance of Turkey to the Western community. Ukrainian integration to NATO will lead to greater confrontation with Russia and thus affect Turkish interests, which are increasingly linked to cooperation with Russia. If the earlier confrontation was an important factor of Turkey’s acquiring significant geopolitical position, now it becomes problematic. In connection with the new U.S. plans for the Black Sea Area, the strengthening of regional confrontation may become a serious constraint in the development of safety and economy of Turkey. At any balance of forces in Eastern Europe, including the Black Sea and Caucasus, Ukraine will have to build their relations with both the West and the East, so Ankara considers Ukraine as a very good strategic partner. In the North Caucasus there are four ethnic groups that can be attributed to the potential agents of Turkey’s influence. They are Karachais Kumyks, Nogai, and Turkmenistan. All of them are related to the Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, Turkic population of Kvemo Kartli region, and partly – to the individual groups of Turkish population in Bulgaria (Varna District). The roots of these ethnic groups date back to Kipchaks (Polovtsy). One can count dozens of publications devoted to the idea of ??creating an international association of Qypchaq peoples that would unite them on the basis of ethnic identity and lead to political and socio-cultural solidarity. This idea is being promoted actively; various meetings and seminars with representatives of the elites of all four nations are being organized on-site. Under such circumstances, the top priority task is the transformation of international public opinion - the four ethnic groups should be considered by the international community as indigenous autochthonous people, endowed with a historical right to the possession of certain territories, having its own language and a kind of written culture, as well as characterized by the original cultural traits. Turkish propaganda probes the living conditions of these peoples in these countries very carefully, trying to find any pretext for convicting the authorities of the repressive policy, containing the elements of genocide, as well as ethnic, cultural and economic discrimination. At the same time Turkey sets a number of purposes: the possibility of repatriation of these people, the realization of their right to a historical territory, providing new areas of settlement, expansion of residence area??, granting full-bodied political rights primarily through public-territorial or socio-cultural autonomy. However, Turkey considers these ethnic groups as "bases" for deploying its own policy, as "internal leverage” for involving different states into the orbit of this policy. The logic of this course suggests the following steps for its implementation: the development of separatism and annexing a number of significant ethnic territories from states. In geopolitical and geostrategic terms, non-Turkic Muslim ethnic groups in the Balkans and the Caucasus are even more important for Turkey than Turkic ethnic groups of the Balkans and Eurasia. They are Albanians, Bosnians, the Abkhazians, Adzharians, Adygs, Chechens, Avars, Dargins and others. Belonging to different language groups, these ethnic groups seek political independence and statehood. Finding the issue of their state status unresolved, they are in a state of strong social and political dynamics. Since the beginning of Yugoslavia disintegration, Turkey has taken a radical position, having spent a lot of money to inject political ambitions and provoke claims of Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians to statehood. History of the Yugoslav war ignores the fact of Turkey’s supplying Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians with significant amount of weapons. According to Iranian experts of the IPIS Institute, after the war it was revealed that 30-35% of the weaponry was delivered by Turkey that is incomparably exceeds Iran and Pakistan aid. In 2003, a document on the continuation of weapon supply to former Yugoslavia provinces was sent to NATO. But apparently, the proper reaction of NATO has not followed. Quite illegally, bypassing the installation of NATO, EC and the U.S., Turkey prepared military personnel for Bosnia and Kosovo Albanians. Despite the criticism of the West, the preparation is carried out at two private colleges in the area of ??Fethiye. Turkey relies on quite active Bosnian and Albanian Turkish Diaspora, numbering 2 and 3 million people. Undoubtedly, Turkey has long-term plans for building a strong democratic state with a predominance of Islamic principles in Albanian Kosovo and Bosnia. ,A US journalist Richard Falk underlined the US concerns over the agreement signing, - “Given the generally constructive character of the agreement reached in Tehran, the uncompromisingly hostile reaction in Washington can only be understood in one of two ways, neither of which is reassuring. If the US government, with or without Israeli prodding, had already resolved to impose sanctions, then any development that seems to cast doubt on such a coercive approach would be regarded as unwelcome. The evidence strongly suggests that the United States was determined to go forward with additional sanctions. This made the Brazil-Turkey initiative seem like a deliberate obstruction that was essentially resented as it has been reported that American leaders tried in talk Brasilia and Ankara out of making any independent steps to resolve the crisis” (Richard Falk, 2010). According to “Turkey Analyst”, Davutoglu states that the strategic goal of Turkey is not only playing the part of regional but also global power due to its unique geographical position, historical and diplomatic experience. Prime Minister of Turkey emphasized the democracy and liberty significance for the country. Davutoglu outlined his vision of the perspectives of Turkey in 2023 (year of centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic founding), - Turkey is an EU member; it is in the integration association in the sphere of economic and security with neighboring countries, plays the key role in regional order maintenance; it is an active player on the global stage; it plays a decisive role in international organizations; is among the ten leading economies of the world (Turkey Analyst, vol. 2). Works cited Batur, Nur. "New Ottomans is not a goodwilled description". Sabah Newspaper, vol 4, no 4, 2010. Web. 26 April 2011. Davutoglu, Ahmet. "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, no. 1, 2008: 77-96. Print. Davutoglu, Ahmet ."Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010", Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, no. 3, 2009: 11-17. Print. Falk, Richard. “Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear deal and US resistance to the real new world order”.Redress Information & Analysis, 30 May 2010. Web. 26 April 2011. Hounshell, Blake. "Mr. 'Zero Problems'". Foreign Policy. Web. 26 April 2011. Kaya, M. K. & Karaveli, Halil.Vision or Illusion?Ahmet Davutoglu's State of Harmony in Regional Relations. Turkey Analyst, vol. 2 no. 11. Web. 27 April 2011. Nielsen, Jorgen S. "European Culture and Islam." Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. New York: Macmillan Reference-Thomson/Gale, 2004. Web. 26 April 2011. Simsek, Ayhan. "The changes and challenges of Turkey's foreign policy". Oxford Press, 2010. Web. 27 April 2011 Taspinar, Omer ( 2008). "Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Web. 26 April 20011 Uslu, Emrullah. "Ahmet Davutoglu: The Man Behind Turkey's Assertive Foreign Policy", Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, no. 57, 2009. Web. 25 April 2011. 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