The Four Main Branches in Philosophy - Term Paper Example

of A Panoramic Perspective of Four Main Branches in Philosophy Philosophy aims towards the pursuit of truth, and is conceived as the love of wisdom. Philosophy can thus be associated with two main ideas: truth and wisdom. Truth is what every philosopher seeks, and wisdom is what every philosopher attains. Vague as it may seem, this is what makes philosophy enigmatic yet valuable. In this essay, I shall explore four main branches of philosophy, namely, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics. These four branches are different from one another with regards to its concerns, but they nevertheless intersect at certain points. The reason for such is that all of philosophy, as mentioned above, aims towards one goal, i.e. truth. Therefore, regardless of what aspect of reality is focused on, philosophy remains wherever truth is sought after. The Philosophy of Mind: Identity of Minds “Of all the mysteries in the world, none is more puzzling than the mind” (Poundstone 222). This section aims to discuss a concept that has taken for granted, namely, the human mind. What is the identity of the human mind? What is the difference between our mental from non-mental phenomena? What is the difference between my mental states of believing it will rain from physical objects such as pencils and papers? Upon addressing the aforementioned problem, I shall focus on the behaviorist view of the mind, specifically, logical behaviorism. I shall argue that the claims of logical behaviorism are merely based on the assumption that the mental states cause certain corresponding bodily or behavioral states. However, if it is only based on an assumption, then its entire theory is unfounded, and thus invalid. Thus logical behaviorism will not suffice to provide an analysis of the identity of the mind. Logical Behaviorism is the view, which claims that mental phenomena are identical with neurophysiological events in the brain such as behaviors (Fodor 86). Statements that are characterized by mental terms such as I desire to attend graduate school, I am in pain, and I believe that the weather is getting warmer, are identical with and reducible to statements characterized by behavioral terms such as I will complete my assignments regularly, I am disposed to limp, and I will wear light clothes today when I leave the house. Herein, “the property of being in a certain mental state is identical with the property of being in a certain neurophysiological state” (Fodor 86). In other words, mental terms are characterized in terms of their corresponding manifested physical behaviors. Given that mental states are nothing but neurophysiological behavioral states, either the mental states that mental terms refer to do not exist or such mental states exist. For, in claiming that one’s mental states can be understood with reference to its corresponding behavioral state, then we no longer are talking about mental states per se, but behavioral states for that matter. For instance, I say “I think it’s going to rain” and before stepping out of the door, I bring with me an umbrella. Herein, the act or behavior of bringing an umbrella with me can be identified with my assertion that “I think it’s going to rain.” Thus, under this view, the simplest solution is sought. For, every non-objective mental state can be identified with an objective physical state, which in turn makes it verifiable. But will this tactic of reducing mental states to behavioral dispositions sufficient so as to account for the mind’s identity? I disagree. For, in order to claim that mental terms refer to behaviors is to assume that both mind and body are necessarily interconnected so as to produce a corresponding behavior for each mental term. Hence, logical behaviorism only makes sense, provided that both mind and body causally interact with each other. Moreover, it seems quite absurd to portray this view as a possible view of the mind for it leads to a kind of neuronal chauvinism, wherein we would have to exhaust all the mental terms and know which behavior to assign it to. Doing that could lead to an infinite regress, since the states of our behaviors are dynamic and thus cannot be operationalized. It is in this regard that any form of behavioral analysis will not suffice to provide an analysis of the identity of the mind and its mental states. In relation to analyzing the identity of our mental states is our mode of verifying such. As shown here, behaviorism equates this to our physical behaviors, which is an empirical mode of verification. This leads us to the branch of epistemology, wherein methods and theories are sought that will enable us to claim that we do have knowledge. In the next section, I shall focus on David Hume’s epistemology. Epistemology: On Defending Hume’s Empiricist Principle Hume’s epistemology is founded upon his theory of ideas and impressions, from which he builds his theory of meaning. This can be stated as follows: all our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, which correspond to them and which they exactly represent. In other words, “where there is no impression, then the idea is meaningless” (Lavine 156). He establishes this as his empiricist principle. Herein, we understand Hume's empiricist principle to mean that true knowledge must be derived from sensory experience alone. However, a problem arises. If one were to take the empiricist principle itself, questioning its own validity, one would realize that it fails to answer to itself, for Hume’s theory of meaning itself is not readily traceable to a corresponding impression on which it depends and therefore is meaningless (Groothuis 5). Does this really imply that Hume’s very own foundational principle is meaningless after all? Where does the impression of Hume’s idea – that where there is no impression, the idea is meaningless – lie? In addressing this criticism raised against Hume’s foundational principle, I make it my task to defend him. For despite such a criticism, Hume’s empiricist principle nevertheless remains valid. We all know that mathematical propositions are self-evidently certain; they can be demonstrated by deductive logic, which will prove them to be true. For example, the equation (1+1 = 2) does not have any impression, because in the first place, "1", "+", "=", and "2" do not have an objective representation that can be experienced. So in effect, they turn out as ideas without impressions, but it would be absurd to consider the equation (1+1=2) as meaningless. Propositions such as these give us knowledge of the relation of ideas, which indeed has absolute certainty, but on the other hand, do not give us information about existence or facts. This is because such propositions are based upon deduction, and must therefore be ‘necessary truths’, which Hume accepts as a valid structure for his claim that “where there is no impression, the idea is meaningless” (Lavine 156). Hence, my solution is as follows: instead of us asking ‘where’ the impression of his empiricist principle lies, affirming its validity by reductio ad absurdum is, I believe, the only alternative left to defend Hume from this fatal criticism. How will this defend his so-called principle? The answer is simple, for to think of its negation or opposite, is absurd. And thus Hume’s empiricist principle must be true based on the law of excluded middle, which states that a proposition must be either true or false, otherwise it would violate the principle of non-contradiction, and that cannot be so (Copi and Cohen 368). Hence, although Hume’s empiricist principle fails to be verified through observation or fails to possess a corresponding direct impression, it does not mean that is meaningless. For to think of its opposite, i.e. to perceive of a meaningful idea that does not have a corresponding impression in reality is simply unthinkable and absurd for Hume. Logical coherence is a significant factor in any philosophical branch, such as in the philosophy of religion; much of the issues revolving around this branch deal with the existence or non-existence of God. In relation to this is the debate regarding the problem of evil. Primarily, this problem concerns itself with the compatibility between the existence of God and the existence of evil. I shall turn to my discussion of this problem in the next section. Philosophy of Religion: The Problem of Evil The problem of evil can be stated as follows: How do we reconcile the proposition that an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God exists with the claim that there is evil? (Weed 361) Thus, upon addressing the aforementioned problem, I shall, in turn, address the following question: can we, by rejecting the proposition “God exists”, resolve the problem of evil, i.e. incompatibility between both? Intuition would tell us that this would indeed solve the problem. However, in this essay, I shall argue that rejecting the claim that God exists, will not resolve the problem of evil. Yet why is this the case? Allow me to first sketch my argument, after of which, I shall provide an explanation for it. QUESTION: Whether we can resolve the problem of evil by rejecting the proposition “God exists.” PROBLEM OF EVIL: How do we reconcile proposition (G) and proposition (E)? (G). God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (E). There is evil Given Premise: It is not the case that God exists Main Claim: We cannot resolve the problem of evil Argument: 1. It is not the case that God exists (Premise) 2. If it is not the case that God exists, then it is not the case that (G) 3. If it is not the case that (G) then there is nothing to reconcile with the existence of evil 4. So it follows that if it is not the case that God exists, then there is nothing to reconcile with the existence of evil 5. If there is nothing to reconcile with the existence of evil, then we cannot resolve the problem of evil 6. Hence, if it is not the case that God exists, then we cannot resolve the problem of evil. 7. It is not the case that God exists 8. Therefore, we cannot resolve the problem of evil As stated above, the problem of evil is concerned with reconciling God’s existence and the existence of evil, for if God is all-good, then why does he permit evil to exist? However, I argued for my position in a different light. In order to prove my point, I formulated a logical proof. I began by starting with the given premise, that “it is not the case that God exists.” Herein, I argued that rejecting the proposition “God exists”, would nullify the existence of any of God’s attributes, one of which is his being omnibenevolent or all-good. If such an attribute did not exist, then there would be no problem of evil, for there would be nothing to reconcile with the existence of evil. If there would be nothing to reconcile in the first place, or rather, if there was no “problem of evil”, then there would be nothing for us to solve then. Therefore, given the question as to whether we can resolve the problem of evil by rejecting the proposition that “God exists”, my stand is that we cannot resolve it in this manner, for it nullifies the very issue at hand. The problem of evil is rooted upon the incompatibility of goodness and evil, with the former being attributed to God. Thus, when we say for instance that killing another person is bad, we also mean that we ought not to kill other people. But aren’t these two statements different? After all, the first statement is a statement of fact while the latter is a moral statement of value. This finally leads us to the fourth and last branch of philosophy that I will discuss, namely, ethics. Herein, the concept “good” is treated differently. Focus is placed on ontology of the moral and ethical judgments we usually make. But how do we judge such moral claims? Is there an objective standard for analyzing moral judgments? If so, does it mean that objective moral facts exist? In the next section, I shall focus on a specific area within the philosophical branch of ethics, namely, meta-ethics. Ethics: Are there Objective Moral Facts? Issues within meta-ethics deal primarily with second order moral philosophy. Take for instance the following: Is smoking bad? This question falls under first order moral philosophy. However if I ask: What does it mean to claim that smoking is bad? This falls under second order moral philosophy. In short, second order moral philosophy deals with questions about questions. Meta-ethics primarily deals with second order moral philosophy as well. It does not attempt to ask what are right and what are wrong actions; rather, it attempts to investigate on what it means to claim that a certain action is right or wrong. Herein, I shall focus on moral relativism. J.L. Mackie’s (1977) argument from relativity is one instance. It starts from the claim that there are moral disagreements. Although disagreements occur in other areas of our lives, morality seems essentially to be about certain ways of living. For, people adhere to such beliefs because this is how they live. The main target of the argument from relativity is the objectivity of moral values (Joyce and Kirchin 95). Moral codes are relative to a particular society. So, if moral objectivism is true then moral claims are claims about the world, i.e. moral facts. But it is not the case that moral claims are claims about the world. Therefore, moral objectivism is false. Moral Relativism argues that “morality arises when a group of people reaches an implicit understanding or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with one another” (Harman 3). This is evident in most cultures. A proponent of this view, aside from Mackie, is Gilbert Harman. Harman furthers Mackie’s thesis by saying that a moral judgment could make sense only in relation to this agreement within a given society. Hence, for him, there are also no objective moral facts, for they are always relative to a given society. I argue that it is not the case that there are no objective moral facts. The fact that we can judge moral claims as either true or false, means that such claims are nevertheless based on facts. The fact that moral relativists use logic to construct their arguments, as well as to verify the truth of their premises, implies the presence of objectivity. And the fact that by their use of language, they imply statements of value, then that would mean that they do accept a universal standard for moral reasoning. It is in this regard that the position of moral relativism is false, for it is not necessarily the case that there are no objective moral facts. Conclusion Despite the differences between the concerns of the four respective branches of philosophy, they nevertheless are interconnected, as shown in this essay. This is because philosophy operates at the same level of inquiry, regardless of its specialized field of study. It all aims towards truth, with the hope of attaining wisdom. Philosophical inquiries are sought after for its own sake. Its approach is mostly theoretical, yet it nevertheless extends its applications in reality. This philosophical perspective puts great emphasis on argumentation, logic and critical reasoning. This is seen evident in the different sections in this paper. Indeed, this is the only tool that philosophers have in order to prove to their audience that his or her theory is the most plausible theory to accept. This is the mark of learning philosophy, for it teaches one to think beyond ordinary convention. Works Cited Copi, Irving and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic 13th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009. Print. Fodor, Jerry. “The Mind-Body Problem.” Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Ed. Maureen Eckert. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,Inc., 2006. Print. Groothuis, Douglas. Questioning Hume’s Theory of Meaning. Westmont: InterVarsity Press. 17 Jun. 2002. Web. 27 Apr. 2011. Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Defended.” The Philosophical Review 84.1 (1975): 3-22. Print. Joyce, Richard and Simon Kirchin. A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory. New York: Springer, 2010. Print. Lavine, Thelma Z. From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophical Quest. New York: Bantam Books, 1985. Print. Mackie, J. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin, 1977. Print. Poundstone, William. Labyrinths of Reason. New York: Anchor Books, 1990. Print. Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965. Print. Weed, Jennifer Hart. “Boethius and the Problem of Evil.” An Anthology of Philosophical Studies. Eds. Patricia Hanna, Adrianne McEvoy, and Penelope Voutsina. Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research, 2006. 361-372. Print. Read More