The Philosophy of Science and The Problem of Confirming Scientific Hypotheses - Essay Example

? The Philosophy of Science and The Problem of Confirming Scientific Hypotheses ? and number ? ? submitted The Philosophy of Science and The Problem of Confirming Scientific Hypotheses What is the philosophy of science? The answer is actually simple. First, we must be aware of the fact that the various sciences make certain claims about the nature of the universe and human beings. In the process of making these claims, scientists use concepts such as cause and effect, theory, hypothesis, prediction, laws of nature, and so forth. What philosophy of science does is to examine these concepts and to ask questions about them. In this essay, I shall focus on the problem of understanding how observation and theory confirm scientific hypotheses. “What connection between an observation and a theory makes that observation evidence for the theory” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.39)? Herein, I shall argue that although science fails to provide certainty and reliability in confirming scientific hypotheses, a theory of confirmation is not impossible; what is impossible is to model a scientific theory of confirmation to that of a formal theory of confirmation. In this light, despite the problems induction poses, confirming scientific hypotheses is necessarily inductive. Given this, I shall divide my paper into four main parts. The first part will discuss with the problem of confirmation in relation to induction. Herein, I shall discuss David Hume’s (1978) problem of induction, a theory closely related to the problem of confirming scientific hypotheses. The second part will discuss the theory of confirmation in relation to scientific explanations. Herein, Carl Hempel’s (1965) model for scientific explanation will be emphasized. In the third section, I shall focus on Nelson Goodman’s (1983) “new riddle of induction.” Herein, I shall emphasize on Goodman’s distinction between a theory of confirmation, to that of a “formal theory of confirmation.” In this section, I shall discuss the problems that induction pose to confirming scientific hypotheses, as well as the implications of eliminating an inductive approach towards confirmation. Finally, the fourth section will consist of my stand and conclusion regarding the said problem. Confirmation and Induction “The confirmation of theories is closely connected to another classic issue in philosophy: the problem of induction” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p. 39). Scientists reason inductively in order to confirm their hypotheses. But does it mean to reason inductively? An Inductive argument on the other hand is one wherein even if the premises are true, the conclusion can only be probably true. For example: The swan I saw last Monday was white. The swan I saw last Tuesday was white. The swan I saw last Wednesday was white. Therefore, all swans are white. Given the said example, it can be said that the conclusion, “all swans are white” is not a conclusion that is absolutely true, because its contrary is possible. Case in point, in Australia, there are swans, which are black. This in effect, questions the validity of the conclusion. Now according to scientists, it is better to reason deductively rather than inductively, because in deductive reasoning, we can be certain if we start with true premises, the analysis will be true as well. Inductive reasoning can take us to false contradictions. Now the problem of induction is magnified in Hume’s (1978) “problem of induction.” Here, Hume uses the process of induction to question inductive reasoning itself. To his view, how sure are we that induction works? Just because induction worked in the past, it does not follow that induction will work in the future or in reference to future events. Hume’s view is founded on his explanation of the uniformity of nature. This assumes the rational order of the universe. This type of order is characterized in a spectrum of regularities wherein the events and relations among things that we have not examined yet, will be the same as the nature of events that transpired in the past. For example, chalks falling, followed by chalks breaking; the sun rising during the day, followed by it setting in the evening. However, Hume brings up the question as to how certain we could be about this uniformity found in nature. To his view, it is possible to conceive of a non-uniformed world filled with deviations, irregularities, and possibilities – such as chalks falling and not breaking, the sun rising and not setting. This in effect, puts to question the certainty of the uniformity found in nature. For instance, scientific theories demonstrate that the sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening. However Hume indicates that there is a probability that even though it is shown that the sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening, it does not follow that such an event will necessarily happen in the future. This, as a result, questions both the uniformity in nature and the credibility of inductive reasoning. However, if induction is the primary method of analysis that science uses to confirm their hypotheses, then that would entail science to be questionable as well. How are we to attain reliability in our scientific hypotheses given this dilemma? How are we to explain scientific phenomena, given that the method of confirmation used by science is itself questionable? In the next section, I shall discuss the theory behind scientific explanations, in relation to scientific confirmation. Explanation and Confirmation The main objective of science is to provide a cogent explanation of the phenomenal world. Now the essence of scientific explanation is conveyed in the view of Carl Hempel. According to Hempel (1965), scientific explanation involves a couple of points: first, scientific explanations concern itself with “why seeking questions.” For example, if Darwin is right that humans evolved from apes, then why then do apes stopped evolving into humans? Second, Hempel (1965) argued that scientific explanations are conveyed and schematized in the form of a “logical structure of an argument,” particularly, a deductive argument wherein the truth of the conclusion rests on the justification of its premises. In line with this, the logical structure of scientific explanations entails 3 elements, namely: (1) the premises should always entail the conclusion . Under this element, scientific explanations should be deductive, for they conform to the mechanics of a deductive argument. (2) The premises should all be “true.” And (3) The premises should at least contain one general law. To elaborate further on these elements, Hempel’s logical structure of scientific explanations can be illustrated as follows: General Law Particular Facts Phenomena to be explained How does this scheme work? Take for instance the following: the demise of a plant can be explained by the lack of sunlight and the inability to photosynthesize. Thus, since the plant did not get much sunlight, it, in effect failed to photosynthesize and as a result, it perished. Now given this example, how are we to confirm this, given the aforementioned model? This can be illustrated as follows: General Law = (Sunlight + photosynthesis) Particular Facts = (The plant itself that lacked sunlight) Phenomena to be explained = (Demise of the plant) The main point of Hempel’s model is to show that the phenomenon to be explained is covered by some general law of nature. Carl Hempel provides an example, which illustrates the dynamics and validity of the logical structure of scientific explanation; it goes like this: you are on a beach on a bright sunny day, and you are lying down on the beach…now you notice that there is a 20meter shadow and a 15meter pole in front of you. Now if we regard the shadow as the explanandum or phenomenon to be explained, this is how it will be conveyed: “The sunrays casts a bearing of a 37 degree right angle on the 15meter pole which in effect, casted a 20meter shadow on the beach”, so if we put it according to the logical structure: General Law = Light travels in straight lines (laws of sunrays) & laws of trigonometry) Particular Facts = Angle of elevation casted by the sun rays is 37 degrees and the pole is 15 meters high Phenomena to be explained = 20 meter shadow casted on the beach But despite its coherence, Hempel’s model is problematic, because it is too liberal in the sense that it allows something to count as a scientific explanation even though it is not. Assuming that the “phenomenon to be explained” is the 15 meter pole and the “particular facts” are the shadow and the angle of elevation, this will be illustrated as follows: General Law = light travels in straight lines (laws of sunrays) and laws of trigonometry Particular Facts = Angle of elevation is 37 degrees and the shadow is casted 20meters on the beach Phenomenon to be explained = Pole is 15 meters high. With this information, we can claim that the pole is “15 meters” high because it was deduced by the shadow it casts along with the optical light, and the laws of trigonometry. This however is an “absurd” explanation to show why the pole is 15meters high. The real explanation why the pole is 15 meters high is because the carpenter decided to build it in that way. In this manner, Hempel’s model is too liberal and misconstrues non-scientific explanations for scientific ones. Thus, Hempel’s model can result to forms of ambiguity. Given this dilemma, what then is the basis for confirming scientific hypothesis? How is confirmation to be made possible in science? In the next section, I shall propose Nelson Goodman’s proposal to the said problem. A Theory of Confirmation vs. A Formal Theory of Confirmation Given the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that science takes an inductive approach in confirming scientific hypotheses. Inductivism implies “science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience” (Chalmers, 1999, p. 1). A general perspective held of science is that scientific knowledge is proven knowledge that is acquired through observation and experimentation. In other words, “personal opinion, or preferences have no place in science. Science is objective; scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven knowledge” (Chalmers, 1982, p. 179). An inductivist view of science is primarily based on inductive reasoning, which starts from observation, and which leads to the formulation of certain laws and theories. These laws, in turn, are what constitute scientific knowledge. However, as Hume has pointed out, we have no basis for confirming our hypotheses based on the uniformities found in nature. Thus, scientific hypotheses are merely probable, for what happens in the past may possibly not happen in the future. However, confirmation cannot take place without induction, for “there cannot be a purely formal theory of confirmation” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p. 50). But if induction is the primary method for confirming scientific hypotheses, then it seems that confirmation in science is not objective, is not reliable, and does not produce objectively proven knowledge. How are we to confirm scientific hypotheses, given this dilemma? According to Goodman, appealing to the concept of probability does not solve the problem of confirmation, for knowledge of probabilities then becomes itself dependent on induction. There is no way that we can be certain about certain observational concepts and theories without the use of induction. And Hume addresses this problem of induction quite clear, i.e. that premises of an inductive argument do not guarantee the truth of its conclusion. For if we were to use a subjective approach in addressing induction, the conclusion still does not hold true of its premises. Any observational statement consists of finite observations, once we derive a generalization from this; we are implying universality upon it. Universal statements are infinite, which is contradictory to our initial finite observations. In addition, induction is limited upon the culture or environment where one is confirming a given hypothesis. For example, we are familiar with the “all swans are white” inductive argument, for whenever we perceive of a swan, we see that it is white. But once we go to Australia, one sees that a black swan actually exists. Hence, it limits the probability of a conclusion derived from induction in terms of its validity or invalidity, for there is always a possibility that our conclusion may not be true. Another limitation to that of probability as a solution to the problem of confirmation is language, for the truth of a given statement relies upon it’s meaning, which is conveyed through language. One cannot disseminate knowledge without language, and one can never be certain about how one interprets meaning upon its language. So the limits of probability to that of the riddle of induction basically lies on the impossibility of certainty and true knowledge derived from such methods. The simplicity of an inductive argument is not to mislead us to false conclusions, ffor there are conditions upon which a certain argument is considered to be a “good” or “bad” argument; and these conditions lie on relative and subjective circumstances that varies given different categories or communities. For Goodman, “a good inductive argument must use terms that have a history of normal use in our community” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, pp.53-54) The opposite of inductive arguments are deductive arguments. Deductive arguments are valid for reasons that their form leads one to a conclusion that is clear and distinct, and is logically certain and true. The significance herein lies not in its content, but in its form, so in this light, induction can never be valid, for its premises yield an infinite number of observations versus that of a universal and general conclusion. The form of an inductive argument is limited to its inference to the best explanation, based upon assumption and not that which is grounded upon certainty (Harman, 1965). Hence, there can never be a formal theory of induction, and as a result, of confirmation. Conclusion Science confirms its hypotheses through induction, for how can we deductively confirm a conclusion derived from an inductive argument when the conclusion derived from its premises are invalid, in so far that it is not a “universal” or is a “self-evident truth;” it is merely an inference to the best possible explanation and thus cannot account for true scientific knowledge. In this light, science is limited by its use of induction as a means of confirmation. But even if the method that science uses to confirm their hypotheses is limited to induction, it does not necessarily mean that confirmation is problematic, for to nullify the reliability of scientific confirmation is to nullify science itself. Thus, even if science fails to provide certainty and reliability in confirming scientific hypotheses, a theory of confirmation is not impossible. What is impossible is to model a scientific theory of confirmation to that of a formal theory of confirmation. Therefore, confirming scientific hypotheses is necessarily inductive. References Chalmers, A. F. (1999). What is this thing called science? An assessment of the nature and status of science and its methods (3rd ed.). St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press. Chalmers, A. F. (1982). What is this thing called science? An assessment of the nature and status of science and its methods (2nd ed.). St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003). Theory and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Goodman, N. (1983). Fact, fiction & forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Harman, G. (1965). Inference to the best explanation. Philosophical Review, 74, 88-95. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York, NY: Free Press. Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, (Eds.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Read More