Prospects of a Future Revolution in Iran - Essay Example

?Topic: Prospects of a Future Revolution in Iran Introduction: Recent dis regarding Iran is often dominated by the question, “Will the Islamic Republic have another revolution in its future or not?” In fact, Iran’s quest for democracy is more than a century old. It began with the Constitutional Movement (1905-1907), resulting in the establishment of a parliament and reemerged with the Iranian Revolution (1979), culminating in the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and its replacement with an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Post-Revolutionary leaders in Iran, in an effort to consolidate their power and destroy opposition, have undertaken a number of social policies focused on rural and urban populations to encourage the development of a healthier, better educated, and more sophisticated society (Keddie, 2006). Although improvements emerged, there has been a socio-cultural realignment, suggesting that the official Iran of devout multitudes may not be a majority, as compared to the “other” Iran of a largely modern, progressive, and pragmatically secular citizenry (Afshari, 2009, p.840). This projection is supported by the June 2009 Green Revolution in which the Islamic Republic of Iran faced a legitimacy crisis, the like of which it had not experienced since its creation in 1979. The 2009 experience has critical differences as well as deja vu similarities to the 1979 Revolution. The clerical cloth of legitimacy has undeniably been tattered in the recent uprising and demonstrations; however, the prospects of another revolution still remain uncertain because of crucial contextual changes. Nevertheless, the interest of the international community for the Green Revolution to succeed and lead Iran to peaceful integration within the world system of nations is a force that can have a significant determining value in the balance of power in Iran domestically. For a long time, academic scholars have tried to identify what produces a revolution. Of all possible factors, political scientist James DeFronzo identifies five as critical for success: Mass frustrations among urban or rural populations that result in popular uprising, dissident elite political movements that pit some elite members against the existing government, unifying motivations for revolution that cut across major groups and mobilize the majority of society’s population behind the goal of revolution, severe political crisis that paralyzes the administrative and coercive capabilities of the state, and permissive or tolerant world context towards the development and success of a revolution in a given nation. In the case of Iran, unified motivation among major groups was the fundamental factor in ensuring the revolutionary success of 1979. More than two decades of autocratic rule caused the social base of support for the Pahlavi monarchy to decline. Loyalists, primarily from the aristocratic core and the non-aristocratic upper class, constituted less than 0.01 percent of the population- a meager force in defense of the regime (Abrahamian 1989: DeFronzo, 304). The majority of the population- the traditional middle class, the modern middle class, and the sub-proletariat class-demanded more reforms, more human rights, more freedom, and more democracy. Two main revolutionary movements formed: The first was the religious movement headed by the Ulema, demanding return to a society based on the Shari’ah and religious administration (Hooker, 1996). The second movement was liberal, promoting modernism, democracy, openness in government, wider participation, and increased social justice via economic development for the poor. Opposition to the regime also included a radical Marxist-Leninist element consisting of the ‘Peoples Fedayeen’ and the ‘People’s Mojahadeen’ (Feldman, 2007). Initially, the Shah and the West fixated on these Leftist elements in the Cold War paradigm, causing them to disregard the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a movement. (Feldman, 2007) Historians, political theorists, and contemporary political pundits all failed to foresee the rise of Khomeini as probable because the era was fully aligned on a dualistic thinking pattern that pitted the liberal, democratic societies of the West against the Eastern block and the Soviet system based on Marxist-Leninism. In this manner, few people globally predicted the success or continuation of the Khomeini version of national liberation or the establishment of a theocracy in the late 20th Century, because it had simply not happened as a political model in the modern era. To a certain degree, the underestimation of the original Islamic Revolution is critical, given the resources that the West subsequently dedicated to repressing and combating this force across the world. This suggests that, having known how the Islamic Revolution would develop, the Western forces would have combated it in a similar form to Marxism in an effort to maintain world order. What instead happened was that the religious establishment, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, recognized the indigenous strains of culture and religious identity that united the different discontented groups and exploited this common thread to promote revolutionary change. By responding to the social context with modern progressive idioms and an innovative interpretation of the Shi’a doctrine of velayat-e Faqih (‘Rule of the Jurist’), the Shi’ite establishment- including more than 80,000 religious centers and 200,000 clerics-successfully merged the different groups into a unified front (Disertation: Social Origins of Iranian Revolution). Seeking to overthrow the Shah, Khomeini realized the importance of gaining allegiance of those loyal to the regime, particularly the army. In turn, he mobilized the unified front- consisting of the religious movement, the liberal movement, and the leftist movement- to neutralize the powerful armed forces. He cleverly chose to depict society as an unjust struggle between the mostazafin (‘oppressed’) against the mostakberin (‘oppressors’) (Abrahamian, 26). Employing the Shia tradition of martyrdom, he called on the faithful to peacefully confront the army fearlessly and demonstrate their willingness to sacrifice themselves (314). In effect, Khomeini chose to wage a moral attack on Iran’s armed forces (315). He explained: “We must fight the soldiers from within the soldiers’ hearts. Face the soldier with a flower. Fight through martyrdom because the martyr is the essence of history. Let the army kill as many as it wants until the soldiers are shaken to their hearts by the massacres they have committed. Then the army will collapse, and thus you will have disarmed the army.” (Hiro 1987, 100). DeFronzo 315 As predicted, Khomeini’s tactics worked. On February 1979, delegates from the lower-ranking personnel of the air force, army, and navy met with Khomeini and pledged allegiance to him (DeFronzo 316). The unified efforts of the protest groups allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to sieze power politically and institute a theocratic government based on Islamic fundamentalism. The re-emergence of religion in politics in the 20th century was viewed by some as an aberration, others as an anachronism and by Shiite fundamentalists as a major social victory. As current event analyst Ivor Benson writes, “An exploration of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its impact for the rest of the world can begin with three wide-ranging generalizations: 1. The Iranian Revolution showed that religion can still be a more potent mobilizer of mass political action than can secular ideologies; 2. The revolution challenged the cultural hegemony of Western ideas, not only as a religion but as an alternative social model and way of life; 3. The Iranian Revolution can be regarded as one of the most important happenings in modern history, comparable to the French Revolution in the 18th century and the Russian Revolution in this century.” (Benson, 1989) The watershed impact of the Islamic Revolution did not resolve discontents within society. Religious and secular leaders of the Revolutionary regime sought to consolidate power, destroy opposition, and promote Shi’a populism through social development policies targeting the mostazafin (‘downtrodden’), the lower class (‘rural and urban workers’). Regardless of the social improvements in technology, health care and education, the implementation of theocracy alienated the progressive democratic reformers and isolated the radical leftist groups within society. The establishment of theocracy was not the result of the revolution that they were seeking collectively or ideologically. Rather than address their grievances, these groups became marginalized and repressed politically by the theocracy. Over the years they have regrouped or re-organized to form the basis of the Green Revolution for social change that exists in Iran today. The Green Revolution emerged following the disputed 2009 Iranian presidential election between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the opposition candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who were considered by many to be more moderate, reform-oriented and supportive of women’s rights, greater freedom of expression, and better relations with the United States (Black 2009; New York Times, June 18, 2009: DeFronzo 331). A tsunami of protests ensued when authorities claimed, with just two-thirds of votes counted, that Ahmedinejad had beaten his rival- and with him the forces of reform- by a not too credible 63 to 34 percent (Afshari, 2009). Discontents and disillusions finally culminated in what constituted the largest and broadest opposition gathering in the Islamic Republic’s three-decade history. The Wave formed a decentralized organization that brought together civil society leaders, political activists, regime insiders, and (importantly) new participants from groups that had not been previously politically active. Like the 1979 Revolution, two main groups formed: in this case, secular-radicals who wish to ‘overthrow’ the Islamic regime and religious moderates/reform-leaning regime insiders who still hope to ‘improve’ the existing system through progressive reforms of society, laws, and institutions (Akhlaghi, 2011). Initially, the movement’s greatest unifying force was Ahmedinejad himself. The brazen manner in which he had been governing, his outrageous and embarrassing statements about Israel and the Holocaust, his mismanagement of an economy that had flagged badly under his stewardship despite the record-high prices of Iran’s oil exports, strengthened discontent among society. Musavi and Karrubi capitalized on this unrest, referencing Barack Obama’s successful US presidency campaign for “change” (Afshari, 2009, p.8). The religious moderates and reformist-leaning regime insiders spoke of altering the existing Islamic system by strengthening civil society, protecting the rights of women and minorities, securing economic empowerment, and a range of other issues. The Iranian public, exacerbated, identified with this movement for change. Many critics interpreting the role of the Iranian public within the Green Revolution characterize it as a “middle class” uprising; this implies that it is not as broad based as the Iranian experience in 1979 and therefore it does not represent a formidable popular front against the regime. Scholar and author Hamid Dabishi counters this perception, suggesting that it is a misinterpretation. He argues, “How could this be a middle-class uprising if the overwhelming majority of those who are supporting it and putting their lives on the line are in fact jobless 15-29 year olds who still live with their parents—who cannot afford to rent an apartment, let alone marry and raise a family and join the middle class in a principally oil-based economy that is not labor-intensive to begin with?” (Dabashi, 2009) In fact, the participation of the Iranian public consisted of the reform-minded youth. The youth makes up 35 percent of the population throughout Iran and accounts for 70 percent of the unemployment (Dabashi, 2009). Coming from diverse backgrounds, they consist of a wide-range to values based on modernist, democratic, and socialist elements (Dabashi, 2009). The failure of the regime to provide for employment needs, economic developments, and social opportunities for the urban youth ignited unrest. The culmination of grievances among young protestors- both male and female alike- resulted in the abandonment of politically indifferent attitudes and the promotion of apolitical signs of defiance (Afshari, 2009). Alas, there has been a demise of the relative apathy of the youth that plagued this generation after Khatami left office in 2005. Neda Agha-Soltan, the 27-year old woman whose videotaped gunshot death on June 20th, became the protests’ iconic image: young, activist youth seeking to resist the regime’s actions. According to political scientist Afshari, “the Iranian experience seriously undermines the assumption that the future success in building a democratic polity depends on the success of rediscovering of Islam’s humanistic-egalitarian nature. Young Iranians characterize their lives not so much by their anti-religious ethos as by their practical disposition towards contemporary needs and desires” (Afshari, 2009). As the Green Revolution progressed, the Iranian public- particularly the youth- increasingly pronounced secular-radical demands. Chants of “Ahmedeni-bye-bye” and “marg bar dictator” (‘Death to the dictator’) gave way to “azadi baraye Iran” (‘Freedom for Iran’) and “mimirim, mimirim; harfesh nemipazirim” (‘We will die but never compromise’) (Afshari, 2009). The secular-radicals within the Islamic public grew in numbers and came to believe that the election was no longer about whether one man could stay in office. It was about the future of the country and the prospects of democracy. The fulfillment of democracy in Iran remains uncertain due to the limited capacity of the current leadership under the auspices of Musavi, Khatami, and Karrubi. Rather than unify the broad-based discontents as exemplified in the 1979 Revolution, the religious moderates and reformist-leaning regime insiders outwardly confine themselves to social conservatism, implying that although they want the incorporation of liberal democratic elements in society, such elements have to be consistent with the theocratic structure of the regime. This is no surprise; after all, the three main leaders of the Green Revolution are still part of the foundations of the Islamic Government. They are not looking to overthrow the government and form a full-fledged democracy; rather, they are eager to reform the theocracy from their existing position of power and impact their role within the system. Musavi, recognizing this fundamental divide within the movements’ ambitions, admits that he is “an accidental leader” who was not truly guiding the protest movements. (Afshari, 2007) Although the movement has avoided factionalism so far, it lacks a formidable leadership and a clearly defined agenda for future action. Musavi may be a rallying figure, but his window of opportunity for stepping decisively forward is closing rapidly. The ideal leader for such a democratic movement would not be a 68-year old with strong ties to the regime (Afshari, 2009). Unlike the 1979 Revolution where the army gave up and the lower ranking members joined the masses, the regime during the 2009 protests had the fervent support of the Basij-e Mostazafin (Mobilization of the Oppressed) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, both firmly loyal to the Islamic regime and never abandoning their posts to join the protestors as in Egypt and elsewhere. The Basij, a volunteer militia created post-1979 by decree of Ayatollah Khomeini, protects the Islamic Republic of Iran against counter-revolutionary uprising as well as external threats. In addition to their focus on security, they also safeguard the cultural, scientific, and defensive domains of the Islamic Republic, embodied in the present Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) extends this dedication to security and stability of the regime. The IRGC subordinate any dissidents, for instance, feminists, mystics, dervishes, journalists, bloggers, secular students, intellectuals, and reformists, classifying deviants as threats to the national security of the country (Merip). Both the Basij and IRGC receive large organization budgets as well as preference in University admissions, job and housing, as well as mobile phones, loans, and stipends (Merip). These material inducements motivate their fervent dedication to the regime and its Islamic identity. With this increasingly repressive loyalist base, the establishment of democracy seems unlikely. In addition, the larger Islamic identity of the population poses challenges for the Iranian people to oppose a theocracy in place for a democracy. For many, the theocratic system integrally relates to the religious institutes of Iran; in effect, elevating the Islamic scholars such as the Ulema and Imams to high and respectable reverence within society. Continually, theocracy represents the unique cultural identity of Iranian Shia’s. That Shia’s are a minority in the Islamic world compared to the Sunni and are concentrated only in Iran geographically as a political majority makes the cultural system a reinforcing aspect in support of the theocracy. Therefore, the Green Movement- in addition to other concrete obstacles- must overcome issues regarding social conservatism and religion as it is interwoven in the State. Furthermore, the regimes implementation of many policies on a socialist economic basis that shares oil revenues with a broad class of merchants, agriculturalists, and urban poor, maintains and consolidates their political alliance with the State and theocracy. “In analyzing Iran, there is always the danger of underestimating the Islamic Republic's survival skills. Its demise has been predicted many times—during the tumultuous early years after the shah fell, during the Iran-Iraq War, after Khomeini's death, and during Khatami's presidency—yet in each case the regime managed to endure. It would be ill-conceived to point to Iran's modernizing youth and a growing student movement as evidence of the regime's inevitable collapse. There are good signs for the future of democracy in Iran, but it will take time and energy to organize these promising pieces into a greater democratic movement.” (Afshari, 2007) Because of the social respect given to Islam, the unique aspects of the cultural expression of Shiite religious identity, and the arguable pride and success that many Iranian citizens felt in building a society based on a unique model, reform- rather than renouncement- of the theocratic State is seen as a more viable and more realistic goal. The Ulema are indigenous to Iran and are at the heart of the local culture and value system. The degree to which the Green Revolution and its organizers have become identified with foreign values and politics results in lessening the popularity of this movement within traditional and mainstream Iranian societies. Only if the Green Revolution can change this association through building an indigenous leadership that can express “modern” values in Iranian terms in a way that is accommodative to Islam socially can there be a prospect of a future revolution and establishment of democracy. In particular, the degree to which the Green Revolution is associated with “Western” values, jeopardizes its potential impact. In effect, secular attempts to establish democracy may be viewed as less desirable because of its association with “Western” ideals and civilizations. Unlike 1979, the current international system of the UN, NATO, EU and U.S., supports the revolution as part of a broader democratization movement that relates to the political and social goals of modern capitalism and societies. Indeed, much of the success of the first Islamic Revolution was based on the appeal of indigenous ideology opposing oppressionist historical traditions. Regardless of grievances, the unity of state and religion for over three decades makes for an inherently conservative populace that respects Islam. Thus, the question remains as to whether democracy, modernism, and liberalism, as they exist in the Western context, will prove to be consistent with the values of mass-society in Iran, or whether society will continue to rely on local Ulema and religious leadership for governance. The Western concern for this movement may neglect an honest concern for the people of Iran. Are the Western interests truly hoping for the best for the Iranians, or are they hoping the best for the Iranians to benefit themselves, as in the imperial model. Khomeini’s system, in foreshadowing opposition, is firmly rooted on anticipating and rallying public support to counter this exact type of Western interest in controlling indigenous Iranian affairs, further complicating democratic establishment. Finally, the stamina and perseverance of the Green Revolution is questionable. For example, how much of the popular movement specifically opposes President Ahmadinejad and his policies, rather than the greater theocratic system? With Ahmadinejad out of power and another leader in the Presidency, would the social forces of opposition be less? If the youth movement in Iran seeks greater freedom of opportunity in society, can policy changes and reforms settle their issues while still leading to the continuation of the Islamic Theocracy in Iran? These questions are currently unanswered but address a critical aspect of the future progress of the movement for change. It is too early to tell what the success of these social movements for change will be in the long run. Above all, the Green Wave needs strategic direction and unified motivations: will it seek to promote democracy or reform within the theocratic system? In this context, the Islamic Revolution in Iran is an example of a “third way” in the anti-colonial and people’s liberation movements of the 20th Century that implemented a successful revolutionary solution based upon Shiite Islamic culture and practice that is unique in the world to Iran. Even the Arab states and Sunni Islam remain separated ideologically from the Iranian system. This cultural uniqueness and distinct Iranian identity that is represented in the Islamic Republic and theocratic system may be seen as a historical anachronism that will soon change and become a footnote in history, or as a representation of Iran’s own unique system of government that may reform and continue to hold control of the State. For over thirty years, the opposition of the West to Khomeini and other leaders in Iran has failed to undermine the system; however, economic pressures from the UN, EU as well as US sanctions may heighten the pressures on the Iranian society, leading to more turmoil within society. In summary, a successful revolution can only occur if the Iranians develop indigenous, democratic leaders that can effectively organize wide segments of the population to seek change in politics; in other words, the future revolutionary movement must reference Khomeini’s 1979 model as an example of how to unify motivations across major groups and fulfill revolution. The force of Islam in culture will be difficult if not impossible to surmount; thus, in order to succeed, the Green Revolution must also convince the public that its ideology is not inconsistent with Islam. Any attempt to implement a purely secular system of government or to repress Islam in Iran will inevitably fail. 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