Is Logic a Nuisance from Understanding Intelligent Behavior - Essay Example

of Is Logic a Nuisance from Understanding Intelligent Behavior? This essay is primarily a critique of Gerd Gigerenzer’s I Think, Therefore I Err. The problem that the author addresses is the simple question: “Why do we make errors” (Gigerenzer 1)? Herein, the author distinguishes between two types of errors, namely, unnecessary errors and good errors. The former is what is deemed as harmful to the development of a given intelligent system. It is in this regard that Gigerenzer claims, “to err is not to think” (1). On the other hand, the latter is what is deemed as necessary and beneficial to the development of a given intelligent system. These good errors serve a functional role in the development of knowledge and, in turn, intelligence. It is in this regard that Gigerenzer makes “the study of human errors in experimental psychology” as his primary concern in inferring the laws of cognition (1). In his study, Gigerenzer defends an ecological versus that of a logical analysis of cognitive errors. In doing so, he claims that a proper analysis should not be based content-blind logical principles. Upon addressing the aforementioned problem, I shall deal with Gigerenzer’s analysis of the role of logic with regards to the workings of the human mind and intelligence. Specifically, I shall focus on his claim on logic as “a content-blind norm for good reasoning” (7). Herein, I shall argue that his analysis of the role of logic as a purely syntactic and content-blind theory is mistaken. Like Daniel Kahneman and Amon Tversky, I agree that not all judgments can be analyzed by using empirical methods such as sampling and frequency estimates, for such are “unlikely to illuminate the processes that underlie such judgments” (589). Rather, I shall argue that Gigerenzer overlooks an important aspect of logic, that is, the intensional aspect of logic. By doing so, I shall focus on his explication of framing and invariance. In this essay, I intend to advocate the value of logic from an intensional point of view. In doing so, I shall show that Gigerenzer fails to prove that the study of cognitive errors in the light of logical forms of analyses fail to unravel the laws of mind. Summary In a section entitled, “Logic and Blunders,” Gigerenzer argues against the position of using logical theories as a foundation for analyzing and comparing the presence of errors in judgment, and thus, fails to define what really “errors of judgment” are, as well as to “open a window into the human mind” (4). In other words, logic does not help us understand and gain intelligence by pointing out our errors in judgment, rather; it blurs our understanding of what these “errors” really are, and thus, fails to open the possibility for progress and evolution of the human mind as an intelligent system. Given this perspective, Gigerenzer provides an example in logic to support his point, namely, framing. “Framing is defined as the expression of logically equivalent information in different ways” (Gigerenzer 7). Similarly, according to the principle of invariance, “different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between options should be independent of their description” (Gigerenzer 8). Thus, if different representations of the same choice problem yield different preferences, then it violates rational choice. Such violations are deemed as errors in judgment that should not happen to any rational person. Gigerenzer gives the example of two ways of saying the following: “The glass is half full, and the glass is half empty” (8). Given the principle of invariance, these two formulations should not affect the choice of the person in picking which glass to hand over. However, it was shown that when asked to hand over the “half full glass, most participants picked the previously empty one” (Gigerenzer 8). The author then claims that such an example proves to show that two logically equivalent statements are not pragmatically equivalent after all. Different ways of framing a statement do affect the choices of the respondents, which involve the historical, cultural and social factors that affect a person. It is in this light that Gigerenzer claims that the principle of invariance is a content-blind principle in logic that cannot detect these kinds of information that affect the various choices of a person. Therefore, the use of such a principle in defining errors in judgment is mistaken and insufficient. As Gigerenzer claims: It is sufficient to say that the use of these logical rules as content-blind norms has led to the same problem: It eliminates the characteristics of human intelligence from the definition of good judgment. These include abilities that are yet unmatched by today’s computer programs, such as inferring the meaning of polysemous terms from the semantic context, and decoding information that is given “between the lines.” As a consequence, we have learned next to nothing about the nature of thinking or other cognitive processes from research on content-blind norms (8). It is in this regard that Gigerenzer deems logical norms as inappropriate that tend to suggest the wrong method of analyzing errors in judgment. Such a method yields more confusion than clarity as to the task of defining the nature of human judgment and intelligence. Therefore, in studying rational behavior and errors in judgment, we should not rely on logical principles, for such principles will not suffice to provide an ample definition for the laws of thought. Gigerenzer concludes, “What is correct or erroneous is no longer defined by a syntactic principle, but rather, by the success of the heuristic in the real world” (11). It is here where Gigerenzer replaces the typical logical view with an ecological view that emphasizes not on mental syntactical structures but on semantically environmental structures that affect the rational choices of a person. For, it is in an ecological view that we derive “good errors” versus that of irrelevant errors, wherein the latter is the fruit of following content-blind logical principles of thought. Critique Given the aforementioned summary, I disagree with Gigerenzer’s claim that logical principles are content-blind norms that does not lead towards an understanding of the workings of the human mind. First, his understanding of logic as a purely syntactical principle is mistaken. Second, his explication on framing cannot suffice to provide an instance where a logical principle fails. For, his understanding of logic and “logically equivalent” information is limited to extensions alone. Thus, Gigerenzer fails to point out an important aspect of logic, which enables us to gain knowledge of the semantic content of a given statement, that is, the intensional aspect of logic. Take for instance the following: If I want to explain the relation involved in a logically equivalent statement, so as to validate the identity being asserted between statement a and statement b, then my concern is not only whether the relation is true or false (extension), but also whether if it is really identical to one another, i.e. its intuitive meaning (intension), or if it merely assumes the form of being identical or logically equivalent. In other words, I am also concerned with the proper knowledge I gain from my inferences of the equivalence in question. For we all can agree that matters are not so easily construed as either true or false; inferences are by nature intensional. The relation involved in logically equivalent statements is merely based on the assumption that statement a and statement b are well defined, given that (a = b) is true. Given that the foundation by which Gigerenzer’s analysis of logical equivalence rests upon is based on a mere assumption, then consequently, an adequate explication of the statement’s “content” will also lead to detrimental consequences. For Gigerenzer, the status of any form of logical intension is not merely superfluous but more so, useless and meaningless. But all of our logical assertions, regardless of its structure, contain ontological commitment once uttered and written, for in doing so, we are also reflecting the semantics we intend the readers to understand (i.e. the thought of our statements in logic). So how can one dismiss a statement’s meaningfulness and content without dismissing the entire statement itself? Given Gigerenzer’s analysis of logical principles and norms, I argue that he condones the perplexities of logically equivalent statements, and in doing so, misses out on several important points about it. The main root of the problem is Gigerenzer’s limited use of logic as a purely syntactical norm. To elucidate the point I am driving at further, take for example, the statement: “Spiderman is Peter Parker.” From a purely extensional point of view, both names are members of the same class or set, i.e. the set of fictional characters, or the class of non-existing objects. However, common sense intuitively tells us that it is not the case that Spiderman is the same person as Peter Parker inasmuch as they possess the same human properties or attributes. For, from an intensional point of view, it is not the case that Spiderman is the same object (in this case, person) as Peter Parker, for they essentially differ; to say otherwise would entail that all fictional characters are also, so to speak, the same, which is not the case. In fact, wouldn’t even one wonder as to why, despite their sameness of referent, both names were presented in two different ways? It is in my contention that Gigerenzer mistook and disregarded the nature logic, which dismisses not only “content” in terms of intension, but also, any complete logical account of human rationality regarding logically equivalent statements, for it fails to account for a statement’s cognitive value, which is the very factor which makes us understand the thought of a statement. Gigerenzer’s objections against logic are weak, if not mistaken, based on a false assumption regarding the nature of logically equivalent statements and the nature of logic itself. My grounds for presenting such a claim is that what ‘seems’ to be a logically equivalent statement is not an identity relation between two different names referring to the one and the same object, extensionally speaking. But rather, two different things are being identified, which explains why they are presented using different names, intensionally speaking. For, from an intensional point of view, Spiderman is not Peter Parker in the strict sense of the relation. They have nothing in common in terms of their intension; it just so happens that both names refer to one and the same person. But the issue is not whether they refer to the same object, but rather, whether they express the same thought, which thus constitutes their cognitive meaning. Given this alternative, it seems that a proper analysis of logically equivalent statements between names should be construed as intensional, where both syntax and semantics are taken into account. If we say that a is logically equivalent with b, we are establishing a relation between two different objects of inquiry, a and b. But we are also saying that in some way, they can be ‘identified with one another.’ With this manner of explicating logically equivalent statements, we get to show the possibility of having cognitive value and content in logic. It is in this light that Gigerenzer fails to prove that logical norms does not contribute in understanding intelligent behavior and human rationality, for logical norms are not content-blind, that is, they are not purely syntactical. Conclusion I take logic to be the art of correct or incorrect reasoning. But I disagree with the view that logic has nothing to do with reality; that it tells us nothing about the workings of the human mind, more so, of human intelligence. Indeed, logic has as its sole business, the pursuit of structure, but when we come to think about it, such pursuit is constitutively tied to our ontology, which is in turn reflected upon our rational behavior. Any philosopher, who attempts to write an article on the failure of logic in defining human rationality and intelligence, is already, in the very act of writing, committed to his ontology. Every logical principle has its own meaning, and this meaning is what gives logical principles cognitive value and content. Everything around us can be identified easily based on their external structure, just as logic has always been interpreted based on extension. But that is not the whole of reality inasmuch as that also is not the whole of logic. Works Cited Gigerenzer, Gerd. “I Think Therefore I Err.” Social Research 72.1 (2005): 1-13. Print. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. “On The Reality of Cognitive Illusions.” Psychological Review 103.3 (1996): 582-591. Print. Read More