The Global Financial Crisis has as its basis a failure of regulation. A Critical Discussion - Coursework Example

The Global Financial Crisis has as its basis a failure of regulation. A Critical Discussion The sequence of events building up to the global financial crisis can be traced from 2001-2008. It started with a financial innovation in 2001 which was followed by the imposition of other financial innovations. The gradually led to the building up of the housing and credit bubble which ultimately burst in 2008. The last quarter of 2008 witnessed market failure as well as a regulation failure. Thus it is expected that the global financial crisis will encourage the authorities to strengthen the regulation regime and make new regulations as well.1 The Global Financial Crisis The Global financial Crisis first began in USA’s sub-prime mortgage market and this gradually resulted in a global economic recession of a huge magnitude. In this mortgage market, the financial institutions issued sub-prime mortgage loans to householders. In most cases, these borrowers had unstable incomes and failed to fulfill the basic criteria of credit worthiness. The borrowers mostly kept their respective properties as mortgage and the loans were issued to them against the value of this collateral security. During that time, there was an upswing in the property market and the financial institutions could easily realize the value of this collateral asset by a forced sale. Therefore, the lenders considered the property market a safe place and did not hesitate to issue loans against the property assets kept as collateral security. A regime of low interest rate was prevalent at that time and the mortgage loans were issued at this floating interest rate. As a result, the borrowers had to repay a small amount of the loan every month. However, the U.S Federal Reserve Bank increased the lending rate of interest in the country. During 2004-2006, the lending interest rate in USA’s housing market recorded a sharp rise. Following this, the borrowing householders had to repay a higher installment of the loan to the financial institutions each month. This proved to be a major burden for the sub-prime borrowers and many of them defaulted. In fact, this resulted in an unprecedented rate of default among the borrowers of these sub-prime loans. The lending institutions panicked and started to sell off the property assets that they held as collateral security for the mortgage loans. They tried to improve their financial situation in this way.2 In the property market, the supply of property exceeded the demand by a large amount, resulting in a huge decrease in the prices of the properties. Now, there were institutions in Europe, Asia and even Africa who had invested in the U.S market. The property assets which were given as collateral security in exchange of the loans issued in the USA were held by these institutional investors across the world. This was made possible by a complicated method of securitization resting on strategies of globalization. Thus, the repayments of the loans made by monthly installments by the borrowers were actually delivered to these institutional investors around the globe. Once the borrowers started defaulting, the monthly repayment of the loans stopped reaching the institutional investors. This resulted in huge losses for the institutions. Banks in the U.S.A and Europe defaulted; various stock indexes declined considerably, the market value of equities and commodities plummeted and there were large scale job losses resulting in unemployment in the economy. This financial crisis continued to spread to several countries of the world.3 4 The global financial crisis of 2008 had four features that were common with the other crises of the world: the increase in the assets prices that did not prove to be sustainable, upsurges in credit that resulted in increasing of debt burdens, the accumulation of marginal loans and the build up of systemic risk and the failure of regulation to control the crisis. It was seen that in the crisis, the regulatory regime had proved to be insufficient. In the developed countries, finance companies, investment banks, merchant banks operated outside the banking regulations in varying degree.5 The financial crisis was reported as one of the worst economic disasters to have been recorded in history. The crisis affected the real economy as well and caused a massive loss in jobs and a rise in prices. The effects of the crisis were felt in countries all across the globe.6 7 Failure of Regulation was a main reason of the Global Financial Crisis The financial crisis of 2008 represented a perfect example of market failure. The different parts of the financial system were not uniformly regulated, neither were they supervised properly.89 As the speculative bubble prevalent in the U.S.A’s housing market burst, this resulted in a huge financial crisis worldwide. One of the main reasons for the crisis was a regulation failure in the financial market and the fact that the financial institutions failed to comply with the strict corporate governance rules in the U.S.A. Following the Asian currency crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision formulated the Basel II Framework in 2004. This stipulated capital adequacy requirements for all banks. Under the formulated norms, banks had to support their claims on the non-banking private sector by a limit of 8% stipulated for capital endowment. This allowed the banks to differentiate between the various risk categories of claims. (The capital endowment of a bank was its capital in terms of the equity of shareholders’ or retained earnings expressed as a percentage of the bank’s credit exposure weighted by its risk). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006 formulated a set of requirements for information sharing that were necessary for implementing the Basel II norms.10 11 However, with the change in the business cycles, the risks in the financial market are also subject to alterations. Thus the capital adequacy requirements stated by the Basel II should have changed to maintain parity with the economic situation. Goodhart in 2008 declared that the capital adequacy norms should not have been defined with regard to the levels of the risk-weighted assets but instead with their growth rates. Also, the risk position of a particular bank is set to vary with that of other banks. The Basel II norms did not address this problem of interconnectedness of the risk position. Therefore, the Basel II norms could not provide the banking system with a foolproof protection against financial crises. As we have discussed earlier, inspite of the implementation of the Basel II regulations, the banking system indulged in taking excessive risks which ultimately led to bank failures and a huge financial crisis. Therefore, the Basel II can be considered as a regulatory failure. In 2004, the Regulating Bodies in the different countries reached a consensus internationally to implement the Basel II stipulations. It was expected that the banks would adhere to these recommendations which in turn would lead to the prevalence of sound business practices in the banking systems. Instead, it was found that the banks discovered a method to bypass the Base II rules by shifting risky business off their balance sheets.12 13 The United States Securities and Exchange Commission had a regulation by which it restricted the debt-to-net-capital ratio of the broker dealers’ to 12:1. In 2004, the Commission decided to grant an exemption to this rule to some firms allowing them to raise their debt-to-net-capital ratio to 30 or 40:1. These firms included Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merill Lynch, Bear Sterns and Morgan Stanley. Incidentally, all these firms faced trouble in the financial crisis. It can be concluded from this, that the Commission’s exemption of its regulation did not produce positive effects in the financial market.14 The global financial crisis in 2008 originated from within the financial market itself. Many developing economies encounter economic and financial crisis under the effect of external shocks which the authorities of these countries are unable to control. On the other hand, the financial crisis of 2008 had its origins in a developed economy like the U.S.A. It was mainly caused by the underperformance of financial self-regulation, behavior irrationalities of market actors, short-term incentives on the side of the executives and an absence of market foresight on the part of the State authorities.15 Daniel Yergin, founder of a known Cambridge Energy Consultancy enumerated eleven possible interpretations of the global financial crisis of 2008, in an article in the October 2009 issue of the Financial Times. The three main explanations given were (1) excessive leverage in the financial system (2) speedy innovation in the financial instruments (3) regulation failure to shield the “shadow banking sector”. In fact, there is one single overriding impression about the financial crisis of 2008: it was caused by indulging in an excess amount of financial risk and also the absence of a prudent system of market regulation. The financial companies were not adequately supervised. As a result, they accumulated an increasing amount of risky obligations on their account books that were usually over borrowed In 2007, when crisis started in the mortgage loan market of U.S.A this effect started penetrating into the other financial markets. In 2008, institutions which occupied a significant position in the economy declared bankruptcy and the financial institutions were left stranded with a huge amount of their funds remaining in the form of toxic assets. In the opinion of Birdsall and Fukuyama, had the Government Authorities imposed more stringent regulations on the banks and other financial companies, the financial crisis could have been avoided. They state that imposing more norms of the same economic policies will not provide the solution to this financial crisis. Instead, world leaders and policy makers will be compelled to explore and implement other frameworks of economic policy models1617 18 There were many people in Great Britain who felt that the financial crisis exhibited enough evidence to prove that it resulted from a failure of the regulators rather than that of the regulations. However, a report by the Pricewaterhouse Coopers on the financial crisis in Great Britain stated the economic hardships were caused by the under performance of the existing regulations together with failure of the supervision system for these regulations.19 The financial crisis of 2007-08 was not produced by any external factors which affected the banking system. Instead, it was an internal crisis that originated within the financial system itself. The crisis occurred because the regulators in the United States and Europe failed to identify the problems that were threatening their banking systems and did not take corrective measures in time. The international financial system had many structural flaws and even the International Monetary Fund did not address these flaws and thus the financial crisis could not be averted. Prior to the global financial crisis, Great Britain adhered to the policy of exercising light regulations over its markets. The regulation regime in the financial market of the UK was informal since a long period of time. This made the politics of the country dependant on the markets. Gradually the authorities lost control over the markets as the financial crisis started to build up20 21 22 The financial crisis in 2008 revealed that the global financial markets which were closely interconnected with each other had not been regulated properly during the last twenty years. Taking advantage of the interconnected global financial market, banks conducted their operations in their respective domestic markets as well as the international market. There were capital flows from one country to another. However, the supervision and regulation of these banks was done by only the respective domestic authority of the country where the bank belonged. Singapore’s Minister for Finance Tharman Shanmugartnam echoed the opinion of many financial analysts when he declared that the financial crisis had been caused by a failure of regulation and not by the underperformance of the global market economy. Any market needs to be strongly regulated and supervised for it to function effectively. Shanmugaratnam further advocates that Governments and the Central Banks of countries need to strongly support a free market system. This could be done by formulating rules that would check the free market system.23 The failure of corporate governance was also one of the main reasons of the global financial crisis. Thomas Clarke has pointed out that before the crisis, there was an upsurge for the deregulation of financial institutions and markets. This resulted in a rapid expansion of securitization. Large financial institutions neglected risk management and corporate governance as the global derivatives market rapidly expanded. The failure of the banking regulations in Great Britain during the financial crisis naturally requires a thorough review of the existing corporate governance system.24 Implications of the Financial Crisis on the Regulation Regime The global financial crisis does throw up important implications as to how the future financial systems should be regulated and managed in order to avoid such crises in the future. Analysts opine that the existing financial market should be managed both by macroeconomic policy instruments as well as financial regulation norms. Regulators, bankers, central banks, financial authorities and academicians all over the world were not able to identify that the financial system which existed before the crisis was filled with systemic risk throughout the market. Adian Turner, Chairman of the Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom describes the characteristics of the UK’s economy at the time of the global financial crisis. In the Balance of Payments, UK had a large deficit in the current account. The housing sector witnessed a rise in prices of houses. In the banking sector, there was a rapid expansion of credit and U.S institutions were buying securities that were supported by mortgage in the UK. The financial regulators which included the financial authorities and the central bank needed to respond to the increase in the total risk in the financial system. Instead, they were engaged in other functions. The Central Banks were busy in maintaining a tight monetary policy in order to meet inflationary targets. Regulators were engaged in supervising the individual risks associated with the separate financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report had warned of a very fast expansion in credit in both the U.S and the U.K, but the Authorities had ignored this. Turner advocates that in future, regulators need to decide whether the business models would be sustainable or not. They need to possess a more analytical outlook on the sectors. Central Banks and Regulators also needed to determine a set of measures that would check the financial system before a crisis develops. These measures can be identified by integrating macroeconomic prudential analysis with pure macroeconomic analysis of the economy. Turner also advises that countries need to develop mechanisms through which they can respond to warnings from the IMF or other international supervisory agencies. This advice should be applicable to the developing countries (who are dependent on the IMF for monetary support), as well as to the developed countries.25 26 According to Turner’s opinion, regulations governing the functioning of the financial system need to have more effective approaches. Regulators are required to have a foresight about the evolvement of the financial system and formulate the regulations accordingly. It will help the regulators if they question the nature of the institutional relationship between extending loans, taking deposits and providing payment services and also the relationship between treasury activities and trading activities. 2728 Regulations to supervise the securitized credit model: When banks are involved in a considerable holding and trading of securitized credit instruments on their respective balance sheets as a measure of maturity transformation, this gives rise to inherent risks in the system. However, the originate and the distribute model of securitized credit should continue to remain in this case. This model distributes the regional and sectoral credit risk in the banks’ balance sheets among different investors, which proves to be beneficial. It is better to use quantitative scoring techniques instead of individual officer judgment methods, to assess some types of credit like residential mortgages. They can then be considered as securities and their risk can be calculated by credit rating methods. In Turner’s opinion, the future system of regulation should consist of both the conventional intermediation of credit on the balance sheet of banks and also the securitized intermediation. Therefore, the original and the distributed securitized credit model can be improved upon by combining a better market response to financial crisis and an improved system of regulation. Under these, the securitized model would be altered considerably, but it would continue to make a significant contribution towards credit intermediation in the national and international markets. The new model will be more simple and transparent to the end investors. It will depend more on the independent judgment of the investors instead of only relying on the credit ratings. The packing and trading of securitized credit through the multiple balance sheet of banks will also decrease under the new form of the model.29 Regulations to supervise narrow and investment banking: There is an important question often asked as to whether the traditional banking functions of accepting deposits, extending loans and offering provisions for payment services along with the more complicated functions of investment banking activities would be performed by a single institution or by different firms. During 2008, many important financial institutions merged with one another thus combining the functions performed by them. Bear Stearns had merged into JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch had merged into the Bank of America and part of Lehman Brothers merged into Barclays. In addition to this, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies who had an access to the Federal Reserve discount window.30 Although the merging of the banking activities has been the general trend noticed in the economy, analysts advocate a system of regulation that would separate the “narrow” banking activities from the risky investment banking operations. In that case, it would be the first time that such a separation would be introduced in the European banking sector. Turner advises that there is another important question to consider here. Large banks usually have the support of a stable retail funding system, a stable deposit insurance system and a strong reputation in the market. They often leverage the advantage of this support to divert their funds into activities of diverse economic value: a small business or a large proprietary trading business involving high risk. In Turner’s viewpoint, there should not be any distinction between financial institutions which are involved in conventional banking activities and those which are engaged in investment banking operations. He argues that apart from these two types of functions, there are other important banking operations through which the banks provide finance to the major corporations, lubricate the global flow of capital and also manage risk in a scenario of fluctuating commodity prices, interest rates and exchange rates. This indicates that large global banks are engaged in complicated treasury activities and market making operations apart from the traditional functions of accepting deposits and giving loans. Therefore, an important issue for the regulators would be to devise a method to supervise these large global banks which are involved in both conventional banking operations as well as treasury and trading activities.31 The Need for Reformed Regulation After the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the entire regulation regime of the financial markets was brought under scrutiny. The important issues of concern in this case were: was the existing structure of the basic compliance requirements for the financial sector adequate to prevent a crisis, what would be the method to encourage the financial institutions to comply with these requirements, what would be the levels of risk acceptable to the public and who would shoulder those risks. Genuine attempts on the part of the financial institutions to comply with the regulations could produce moral hazard and other unintentional results. What were the ways to avert these results and what would be the methods to ensure the quality of enforcements of the financial regulations. It was absolutely necessary to establish a supervisory committee to facilitate the compliance of the regulations. Besides, the Government also needed to ensure cooperation between the different regulators at the national and international level. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it is expected that both the developed as well as the developing countries will draw inferences from the crisis and will implement alternative policy models in their respective economies. We can expect that, the Governments will strengthen the regime of state regulation and strongly supervise the welfare state institutions. This will be along the lines of Europe’s social market model. Of course, there may be some developing countries, who may not be able to implement the European social model of economic development. In that case, they would strengthen their state authority and depend on it to restrict the market excesses. In developing countries, which were not structurally well connected to the Western countries, political and economic freedom was likely to be curbed. For them to implement the free market capitalist model again that was prevalent before the crisis, the model itself would need to be transformed in perceptions, ideologies and practices. The loyalists of the free market model would have to work hard to reconstruct the confidence of the policy formulators in the model, implement it in economies, ensure the success of the model and exhibit it as an example for the world to follow again.32 33 One method of preventing such bank failures resulting in financial crisis is to implement a system of regulation and supervision of the banks. The financial market can be regulated with the help of a number of policy instruments. These include adjusting the capital adequacy requirements, the margin requirements, the bank reserve requirements and placing restrictions on the selling of financial products of the banks. Such measures also comprise of implementing a maturity structure and risk transformation methods, placing price controls and also governmental fees. There are many advantages of implementing regulations in the financial sector of the economy. Regulations help in maintaining stability of the system, in averting financial crises and also provide better information to the investors. On the other hand, financial institutions can choose to avert this regulation system by conducting its transactions in another country. In this case, the financial industry is driven out of the country by the regulation regime. Therefore, regulatory organizations of a country can make it mandatory for the financial institutions to adhere to international standards of regulation.34 A Report by the Pricewaterhouse Coopers on the financial crisis in Great Britain declared that it had become essential to review the system of existing regulation as well as the system for supervising these regulations.35 The Turner Review recommends substantial alterations in the existing regulations in the financial sector of Great Britain. The suggestions include changes in the capital adequacy requirements of banks and incorporating rules to monitor the credit rating agencies. It was natural for these reports to suggest alterations in the existing regulation system for redressing such a huge financial crisis.36 As a result of the global financial crisis, the banking system of the entire world almost came to the verge of a collapse. Only after some large banks were extensively rescued, the financial markets started operating without hindrance. The prevalent model of financial regulation was not adequate at the national level as well as at the international level. These inadequacies were brought to the fore by the financial crisis. The G20 Summit enumerated some measures to restructure the national and international model of financial regulation. Some of these measures advocated building a stronger capital base for the banks and also taking steps to increase their disclosure. Some other measures were aimed at increasing the discipline of the financial market. Analysts like Emilios Avgouleas have argued that many of these measures do not take into account the behavioral patterns of the financial crisis and thus they would be less effective than they are assumed to be. Avgouleas states that the current model of national and global financial regulation needs to be radically transformed. He proposes some measures for reforming the existing regulatory framework model. These measures mainly deal with the licensing and supervision of the financial institutions. For transnational investment funds of systemic importance, Avgouleas advocates the setting up of a global licensing and supervising regime. Such a regime will be expected to eliminate most of the shadow banking operators. These proposals have actually been supported by the results of behavioral finance.37 There are many analysts who have suggested methods to reform the regulation regime of the financial market, post the global financial crisis. Erik, Gerding of the University of New Mexico School of Law states that the financial crisis has certain implications for the regulatory outsourcing system (1) There are some provisions under the Basel II that permit some banks to determine their own capital adequacy requirements in line with their internal risk models. Gerding advises bank regulators to abolish this special provision. (2) He advises regulators to encourage the use of “open source” in code for the marketing of consumer financial products, securitizations and derivatives in prices and in managing the risk of the financial institutions. (3) There were risk models utilized for price securitization and derivatives. The underperformance of these models exhibits some of the comparative advantages that the equity securities have in the spreading of risk. The answers to these questions will help to frame the future regulations.38 Conclusions The global financial crisis broke out in 2007-08. It originated in the economy of U.S.A and then spread to the other economies of the world. In the sub-prime mortgage market, the U.S banks were engaged in extending loans to borrower householders. In most cases, sub-prime mortgage loans were lent out to the borrowers. Most of these borrowers did not have a steady stream of income and thus failed to fulfill the basis criteria of a credit worthy borrower. Most of the households kept their properties as mortgage with the banks in exchange of these loans. At that point of time there was a upswing in the property market and the banks presumed that in the time of need, they could conduct a forced sale of these assets and meet their financial requirements. The sub-prime loans were extended to the borrowers at low interest rates which prevailed in the market at that time. As a result, the borrowers were required to pay a part of the loan amount every month to the banks. Following this spate of extending loans, the U.S Federal Reserve Bank increased the interest rate in the market. Therefore, the interest rate in the housing market also increased. Now, the borrower households were required to pay a higher amount to the banks every month as a form of repayment of the loans. This proved to be a major burden for the borrowers of the loans and most of them started defaulting. In fact, there was an unprecedented rate of default recorded on the part of the borrowers. There were several institutions across the world which invested in the economy of the U.S.A. The property assets of the borrower households which were held as collateral security by the U.S banks were actually held by these investor institutions. The loan installments that were paid by the borrowers to the lending banks every month were actually paid to these investor institutions. When the borrowers started defaulting in a large scale, these resulted in huge losses to these institutions all over the world. The banks in U.S.A and Europe defaulted, the prices of equities and commodities decreased considerably, the stock indices came down sharply and there was widespread job losses and unemployment in the economy. This financial crisis had its effects felt all over the world. The failure of regulation was considered as one of the main reasons of this financial crisis. Financial analysts have opined that had there been more stringent regulations checking the U.S banks extending these sub-prime loans and thus increasing risk in their own respective balance sheets, this financial crisis of such a huge magnitude would not have happened. The Basel II Regulations stipulated the capital adequacy requirements for the banks. It was agreed in 2004 that the banks would have to abide by the Basel II norms. However, it was witnessed that most of the banks managed to bypass the regulations and were engaged in expanding credit limitlessly. If the banks had adhered to the capital adequacy requirements, they would have had less funds to extend as loans and the limitless expansion of credit in the economy would have been checked. Therefore the global financial crisis also threw up certain implications for the regulators and the regulatory authorities. It called for a more effective system of regulation. This would keep a check on the financial system and avert any crisis arising from it or through any external shocks. References: 1. Adair Turner The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation (2009) < http://w3.cantos.com/09/econ_cit-901-eywxa/video/turner_econ.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2011 2. Asli Demirguc Kunt, Douglas D. Evanoff, George G. Kaufm The International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed? (2011 World Scientific Singapore) 3. Delimatsis Financial Regulation at the Crossroads: Implications Forsupervision (2011 Kluwer Law International Netherlands) 4. Dick K. Nanto Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications (2010) DIANE Publishing USA 5. Emilios Avgouleas The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioral Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy (2009) < http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/jcls/2009/00000009/00000001/art00002> accessed on 30 August 2011. 6. Erik Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis (Washington Law Review 2009) < http://works.bepress.com/erik_gerding/3/> accessed 30 August 2011 7. George Megalogenis Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era (2010 Griffin Press Australia) 8. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Regulatory Reform Committee, Themes and Trends in Regulatory Reform: Ninth Report of Session 2008-09 (2009) The Stationery Office Great Britain 9. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Michael W. Taylor Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies (2009) Academic Press USA 10. Horst Siebert Rules for the Global Economy (2009) Princeton University Press, United Kingdom 11. Hubert Zimmermann, Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change (2010) Taylor and Francis, U.S.A & Canada 12. Jeffrey Friedman, Richard A. Posner What Caused the Financial Crisis (2010) University of Pennsylvania Press USA 13. Jeffrey Friedman, Wladimir Kraus Engineering the Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation (2011) University of Pennsylvania Press U.S.A 14. J.Jay Choi Credit Currency or Derivatives: Instruments of Global Financial Stability or Crisis (2009) Emerald Group Publishing United Kingdom 15. Justin Yifu Lin, Boris Pleskovic Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2010, Global: Lessons from East Asia and the Global Financial Crisis (2010) The World Bank U.S.A 16. Karen Tindall Framing the global economic downturn: crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions (2009) ANU E Press Australia 17. Kaushik Basu Blind Man’s Bluff in Outlook 29 October 2008 India 18. Nancy Birdsall & Francis Fukuyama New Ideas of Development after the Financial Crisis (2011) U.S.A the John Hopkins University Press 19. Nicolas Paul Retsinas, Eric S. Belsky Moving forward: the future of consumer credit and mortgage finance (2011) U.S.A Brookings Institution Press 20. Philip Sadler Sustainable growth in a post-scarcity world: consumption, demand, and the Poverty Penalty (2010) UK Gower Publishing Limited 21. Reuben Adeolu Alabi, Joy Alemazung, Hans H. Baas, Achim Gutowski, Robert Kappel, Tobias Knedlik, Osmund Osinachi Uzor, Karl Wohlmuth Africa and the Global Financial Crisis- Impact on Economic Reform Process (2011) Lit Verlag Berlin 22. Richard Morgan Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis: The Relevance of Adam Smith on morality and free markets (2010) Taylor Trade Publishing UK 23. Richard Youngs How will the Financial Crisis affect the EU Foreign Policy (2009) CEPS 24.Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge The Oxford handbook of regulation (2010) Oxford University Press USA 25. Roger B. Porter, Robert R. Glauber, Thomas J. Healey New Directions in Financial Services Regulation (2011) MIT Press U.S.A 26. Saw Swee Hock Managing Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia (2010) ISEAS Publishing Singapore 27. Tim Dwyer Media Convergence (2009) Open University Press UK 28. U K Stationery Office Banking supervision and regulation: 2nd report of session 2008-09, Vol. 2 (2009) The Stationary Office UK 29. Veronica Hagenfeldt European Financial Regulation and Supervision and the Onslaught of the Financial Crisis (2011) Grin Verlag Germany 30. William Sun, Jim Stewart, David Pollard Corporate Governance and Global Financial Perspectives (2011) Cambridge University Press United Kingdom Read More