The Effects of Silence in Cultural and Global Communication - Dissertation Example

? Giving Voice to Silence: The Effects of Silence in Cultural and Global communication Against a context of scholars and philosophers struggling with the mission of characterizing public opinion, Noelle-Neumann perceives public opinion as a form of social control; in this particular function, public opinion fosters social assimilation and assures an adequate degree of consensus prior to the implementation of actions and decision making. With this point of view, the theory of ‘spiral of silence’ has as a fundamental premise that societies threaten with seclusion those people who digress from norms, and that people, consequently, feel a fear of seclusion. The intimidation of individuals by society and the level of individual fear of seclusion are believed to operate together to create a unified community by, among other things, affecting the public voicing of opinions. With this in mind, this essay examines the factors encouraging the eagerness of individuals to voice out their opinions publicly, with a specific emphasis on the notion of fear of seclusion and the European community, as well as the effects of this spiral of silence in cultural and global communication. Introduction A group is a collection of people who are resolved to keep silent about the same thing: a thing that then becomes a secret. This ‘point of silence’ holds the group together, sustains it, and even structures it. To violate it is to violate a taboo, to re-open a great wound. It is to risk driving the group to despair because it has absorbed and digested this silence to ensure its very survival (Sibony, 1993, as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 174). In the cultural communities of the world the media industries occupy a major and critical role: they are expected to represent the ‘intense unity’ of shared culture and shared consciousness (Duncombe, 2002); and, all at once, they are tasked to show the remarkable diversity of the world’s societies. There is the faith, or expectation, that this cultural mission will contribute in the creation of a sense of community needed by different cultures to face the new world order (Hourigan, 2004). However, in so far as some cultures can envision themselves as a community, it appears that these are inconceivable communities that are being visualized. For example, over the recent decades, there has been a concentrated series of activities all over Europe, intended for the revolutionizing of the media and broadcasting industries (Schlesinger, 1993). In actual fact, a new media order is emerging, and what policymakers and public servants who are its creators are aiming for is that media technologies and industries will strengthen and maintain the plan for European harmony and integration (Hourigan, 2004). With the establishment of the EC Television Directive in 1991, they initiated a major action in the expansion of a legislative plan aimed at expanding the regulation and structure of broadcasting outside the limits of national borders (Morley & Robins, 1995). This essay will examine and discuss the past and current status of public opinion, or more particularly the ‘spiral of silence’, in cultural and global communication with special emphasis on imagined communities all over the world. Basically, what is under debate is the issue of media and community. It has been often argued that mass communication have served a crucial role in the history of national, and now, global identities and culture. Print and broadcast media created mass publics who initiated the imagination of nationalism and the community of the nation (Hall, 1993). On account of this historical development, it is currently being broadly perceived that the media are fated to serve a similarly crucial role in the development of national and global identity and culture. Transnational media, as supported by this essay, will create global publics, who will afterwards embark on the visualization of the new world order. What policymakers and public servants expect is that, in building the economic foundation of a particular market (Duncombe, 2002), they are simultaneously building the foundation for an upcoming cultural and political community at a national and global scale. Silence in Cultural and Global Communications The silence of the masses is also in a sense obscene. For the masses are also made of this useless hyper information which claims to enlighten them, when all it does is clutter up the space of the representable and annul itself in a silent equivalent (Baudrillard, 1985, as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 193). It is important, at this point, to present some final issues about the media in view of this wider subject matter of cultural and global identity and community. There are numerous concerns that may be included, for instance the style in which the media affect violent behavior, anxiety, and fear (Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001). At this point it is important to examine specifically how the media are involved in the methods of defense and avoidance of fear and anxiety. The issue of media and community is often examined in terms of the constructive meaning of community, which is suggested by the Yeos (1988, as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 193): … imagined community is about feelings of shared culture and identity in common. But there is another aspect to community, that in which it is held together not by what it avows as its collective values, but by what it collectively disavows. Community can function as a social defense system, serving partially to contain or to avoid fear and anxiety, but also to inhibit the real working through or modification of those feelings. The institution of community then serves as a mechanism of closure, driven by the compulsion to avoid the painful experience of change and development. What are crucial are the processes of inhibition that militate against thinking and against acting in the light of clear thought (ibid, p. 193). The media are currently viewed, as mentioned earlier, as vital to the formation of imagined community and global integration (Marris & Thornham, 1996). It is assumed that through the media it will be possible to create political public arena and cultural domain (Hourigan, 2004). For instance, it has been observed by Stig Hjarvard (1993) that, up to now, there is no significant public domain or public at the European stage. Hjarvard (1993) explains that this is due to fact that the Europeanisation process remains at a premature stage. Nevertheless, he does recognize several of the issues that should be dealt with. For instance, European political institutions have ‘unclarified legitimacy’ (Morley & Robins, 1995, 194). There is also the issue of the massive dimension of European political sphere, and the issue of the mere presence of aspirations that will demand for representation at the European stage (Duncombe, 2002). In addition to these problem is the issue of segregation brought about by the evolving nature and size of the European Community (Hourigan, 2004). According to Hjarvard (1993), what is evident is that “a European political sphere cannot have the same character as its national counterpart” (ibid, p. 89-90). A new form of media system is needed, and to build this kind of system will necessitate both imagination and dedication. Certainly, it should be expected that the media can be encouraged to reinforce the growth of European political culture and public domain. The media could definitely play an important role in the formation of a global civil community, and in arbitrating between that civil community and the European Community’s supranational institutions as well (Morley & Robins, 1995). However, if this is to be the situation, problems should be considered besides those expressed by Hjarvard (1993); problems of another order, related not with issues of execution, but with the character of present-day media culture and media itself (Hjarvard, 1993). This essay will discuss only two aspects. First, it will emphasize the reality that the media can in fact submit themselves to the inhibition and defense mechanisms; there is the likelihood that the media may work to strengthen the processes of deceitful relationship, agreement, and communication related to social isolation and defensiveness (Hourigan, 2004). Second, this essay will explain that there have been new trends in media practices and systems that run counter to the formation of a developed and decisive political culture, and could even function in support of privatism and depoliticisation (Hourigan, 2004). The theory in most discourses about the public arena is that media audiences want information and facts, which afterwards become the source of political discourse and expression (Kennedy, 1997). Wilfred Bion (1994), a psychoanalyst, put emphasis on the ‘desire not know’ (ibid, p. 250). According to Bion (1994), reflecting is upsetting and troubling: in reflecting “you have to take the risk of finding out something you don’t want to know” (ibid, p. 251), and, as a result, “most people want to closure off what they do not want to see or hear” (Bion, 1994, 252). There is an aversion toward finding the truth which can force individuals to allow the restriction of their freedom of expression and thought (Bion, 1994). Jean Baudrillard has introduced an unusually related observation in the perspective of political and media culture. According to Baudrillard, “The deepest desire is perhaps to give the responsibility for one’s desire to someone else… Nothing is more seductive to the other consciousness than not to know what it wants, to be relieved of choice and diverted from its own subjective will” (as cited in Marris & Thornham, 1996, 193). Baudrillard states that the masses have eventually agreed “that they do not have to make a decision about themselves and the world, that they do not have to wish, that they do not have to know, that they do not have to desire” (as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 194). In view of the argument, even though it is not the way Baudrillard explains it, it can be seen that the ‘silence’ in action and knowledge shows itself in a general way as a social pathology (Morley & Robins, 1995). Although one is hesitant to follow Baudrillard in viewing this as a form of dispute by the general public, one should certainly recognize that he has named a major change in political culture and communication (Moy et al., 2001). Baudrillard describes “the disappearance from the public space, from the scene of politics, of public opinion in a form at once theatrical and representative as it was enacted in earlier epochs” (as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 195). There are those who have put emphasis on the weakening of political culture and on the role of the media as public domain. There is at times the idea politics has currently become only a television show, but it should be understood that politics had constantly played as a show (Morley & Robins, 1995). The premise, as explained by Paolo Carpignano and his associates (1990), … is not so much that politics has become a spectacle, but that the spectacle form itself is in crisis. Put in a different way, the crisis of representational politics could be read as the crisis of a communicative model based on the principle of propaganda and persuasion (ibid, p. 38). The core principle of public opinion has been challenged, the idea that public awareness can, and must, influence and enlighten political life. This downfall of the public opinion era is connected to major changes in the operations of mass media processes and systems (Marris & Thornham, 1996). Carpignano and colleagues (1990) explain this in relation to ‘a crisis of legitimacy of the news as a social institution in its role of dissemination and interpretation of events’ (ibid, p. 40), and of the formation of social bonds of communication which, as claimed by them, have placed televised open forum or talk show the most excellent articulation of the ‘public mind’ in the television’s golden age (Carpignano et al., 1990). Another scholar, Ignacio Ramonet (1991) has further emphasized the weakening of the media as a source of reliable information. He, as well, views the downfall of news coverage as crucial to recognizing the changes in practices and systems, stating that, as the function of the press have been challenged, ‘it is the force of the image that now prevails’ (Hourigan, 2004, 48): ‘the objective is not to make us understand a situation, but to make us take part in an event’ (ibid, p. 48). In the point of view of Ramonet (1991), this rejection of the importance of the image has a tremendous negative social implication. He states, “Becoming informed is tiring, but this is the price of democracy” (as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 195). The method of information at present runs counter with the ideals of accurate knowledge and political behavior. The question is what is concerned in this undermining of political and public culture? How are people to make sense of how transformations in the media system are involved in these changes? Without assuming to provide a complete answer to these issues, this essay would propose that the processes of social defense mechanisms should be considered. At least, one aspect in the political problem possibly will be the preference not to know, not to act. In particular, it could be that television works to reinforce the mechanisms of repression and avoidance of fear. New media structures proclaim to convey more facts or information and bigger influence on events, and but, all at once, it would appear that they also facilitate seclusion and distortion of reality (Hjarvard, 1993). It could be that the popularity of talk show indeed embodies a reaction to the demands and conflicts of present-day individuals (Hourigan, 2004); that ‘reality shows’ and talk shows are the respite of people who experience social exclusion (Noelle-Neumann, 1991). Through this sort of medium the marginalized and the excluded are balanced by the fact that they are at least experiencing this disadvantage collectively (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Maybe this will be sufficient in a culture where the public domain and public opinion appears ever more repressed (Baudrillard, 1985). As stated by Baudrillard (1985), in such culture “people are at the same time told to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free, and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive subjects, inert, obedient and conformist” (as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 196). People are trapped in a twofold chain, “exactly that of children in their relationship to the demands of the adult world” (ibid, p. 196). In the general public within such culture a schizophrenic sentiment is formed (Morley & Robins, 1995). As remarked by Francois Brune, “You cannot at the same time, be treated as a marketing target and be respected as an active political subject” (as cited in Kennedy, 1997, 71). The child then falls into some form of autism; according to Brune, the child grows within him/her an ‘inner silence’ (ibid, p. 71) or ‘the silence of the target’ (Kennedy, 1997, 71). As eloquently depicted by Cohen (as cited in Morley & Robins, 1995, 174): And I’m neither left or right I’m just staying home tonight, Getting lost in that hopeless little screen (ibid, p. 174) Traditionally the media have served a crucial role in the imagination of local cultures and communities; it is perhaps the instance that the formation of a shared identity and culture would have been unattainable without the help of the mass media (Morley & Robins, 1995). As stated by Stuart Hall (1993) in relation to the British nation-state and the BBC: Far from the BBC merely ‘reflecting’ the complex make-up of a nation which pre-existed it, it was an instrument, an apparatus, a ‘machine’ through which the nation was constituted. It produced the nation which it addressed: it constructed its audience by the ways in which it represented them (ibid, p. 32). The belief in several sectors is that the formation of a European media structure will nowadays enable the development of an imagined community all over Europe from the diverse and usually opposing cultures in the region (Hourigan, 2004). The purpose of the policymakers and civil servants seems to be “to project public service broadcasting onto a European level, by allowing it to act as an integrative, homogenizing force, producing an informed community, conscious of its shared history and traditions” (Morley & Robins, 1995, 197). The expected vehicle for the formation of a European community is the media industries. There should be great doubts about this prospect. If there was an instance when it appeared likely that the media may help the re-imagination of culture and community, current global and local trends have worked to identify the serious challenges that hamper such a program (Duncombe, 2002). The conflicts that burdened the plan of the European Community have been ever more vivid (Morley & Robins, 1995). If there has been great success in building the economic community of the expanded market, the formation of political foundations and a public domain at a regional level is still challenging (Hourigan, 2004). Moreover, if the principle of pan-Europeanism has initiated several developments, it is also a fact that the world has witnessed the rebirth of particularistic ties (Morley & Robins, 1995) which could spur fragmentation and collapse. It is hard to determine how any cultural rule or communications can actually confront these complicated and opposing judgments. Philip Schlesinger (1993) is precise in stating that the situation of European media system is probable to show the weaknesses of a rationalist model of cultural management on a global level. The issue of public sphere and political culture appears mostly burdened with problems (Schlesinger, 1993), and the idea that the traditional public service framework can be integrated to local and global communications looks unattainable at best. Spiral of Silence This concept, which is largely related to public opinion, talks about the way in which “the commonwealth is held together by prevailing views, habits and prescribed behavior (Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001, 7);” from which, according to Noelle-Neumann (1989), nobody can violate “without running the risk of being ostracized” (ibid, p. 6). The concept of spiral of silence is motivated by the fear of seclusion (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Studies by Asch (1951) revealed that individuals are normally eager to disregard their moral principles in order to sense belongingness to a group. This trend is referred to as the ‘fear of isolation’ (ibid, p. 158). It was Noelle-Neumann (1984) who emphasized the idea of fear of isolation as the primary component in the theory of spiral of silence. This idea states that people will change their behavior, such as voicing concerns, caused by a natural fear of social seclusion (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). When individuals think their opinion or judgment conflicts with that of the majority, they will hold back their own views in an effort to shun the disapproval of the society and to prevent being ostracized (Noelle-Neumann, 1991). On the contrary, when they think their view is in harmony with that of the majority, they are more eager to express themselves (Noelle-Neumann, 1991). A number of scholars have substantiated this argument. There are those who have challenged the idea of fear of isolation. Yet, others have advocated a more neutral direction. They have proposed that the theory be expanded and that the phenomenon of fear of isolation belongs to the numerous reasons individuals change their readiness to express their opinions on issues (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), as well as avoiding hurting feelings, preventing disagreements, and timidity did find, nevertheless, that fear of isolation was the most frequently cited explanation for preferring to be silent on issues (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). A feature of the spiral of silence that has been paid significant attention, and is an important focus here, is the argument of Noelle-Neumann (1989) that fear of isolation is the driving element determining whether a person articulates or not, specifically on issues that are questionable and morally loaded. Possibly the most frequently thrown criticism relates to Noelle-Neumann’s application of quantitative research to support the theory (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). She mentions two studies on compliance as proof that fear of isolation reveals the point to which a person voices his/her opinion or stays silent (ibid, p. 268). Noelle-Neumann initially mentions the study of Asch where in participants were instructed to ‘match lines after confederates deliberately had given the wrong response’ (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000, 268). Findings revealed that ’74 percent of the ‘errors’ made by subjects were in the direction of the majority (confederate) estimates’ (ibid, p. 268), in comparison with ‘5 percent found in the control group’ (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000, 268). The study of Asch, alongside the cross-national research of Milgram on compliance among participants from Norway and France, where in the former constantly showed higher levels of dependency and compliance, hence created the empirical foundation of the spiral of silence (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). Basically, according to the results of previous studies, Noelle-Neumann (1993) hypothesized that people do not openly express unusual opinions due to fear of isolation. Nevertheless, this argument has been questioned. For instance, Salmon and Kline suggest that Noelle-Neumann did not consider the conclusion of Asch that confirmation from one confederate resulted in a substantial drop in the compliance of the participants to majority figures (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). In addition, other scholars have reported that submissive responses are given mainly by individuals who confronted the majority by themselves: participants taking part in the experimental situation with an outsider made lesser submissive responses than individuals by themselves, and even lesser compliant responses were discovered among participants who confronted the majority with an acquaintance (Duncombe, 2002). Claims have been stated that experimental methods, like those used by Milgram and Asch, may not be the best technique for investigating the process of public opinion as illustrated by the spiral of silence (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). Public opinion is normally unclear (Noelle-Neumann, 1977), for instance, not like the motivation mentioned in Asch’s study. Furthermore, interpersonal communication and relationship serve a crucial function in actual change in attitude, but were not permitted in these experiments (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). As stated by Salmon and Kline, in the real world, people in the minority normally find their judgments in agreement with others and “more importantly, by members of important primary groups, (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000, 269)” indicating that the studies on spiral of silence should consider the effect of opinion environments within actual groups. Noelle-Neumann (1974) stresses that for fear of isolation to influence an individual’s judgments and behaviors there should be a significant affective element to a subject matter. Hence the spiral of silence solely works for morally laden issues that are ‘strongly controversial’ (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000, 269). These issues that are morally laden should be in the domain of open judgment, in contrast to rigid or predetermined opinions that involve such societal components as decency (Noelle-Neumann, 1973).These topics are those that the public opinion process asserts to be urgent, necessitating that the concern be forwarded to the negotiating arena. They are value-oriented, affective, and suggest the idea of right and wrong but not only in terms of good and evil (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). The need to build harmony with society is essential for a subject matter to be morally laden. People do not only encounter fear of isolation in certain cases. Rather they constantly encounter some degree of fear of isolation (Noelle-Neumann, 1977). Due to this, they regularly monitor and assess their environment to try to analyze the opinion environment continually. This opinion environment involves the current opinion sharing and potentials for opinion sharing, like who will emerge victorious on a debate (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). Noelle-Neumann (1989) has referred to the practice by which individuals feel climates and modifications in public opinion the ‘quasi-statistical sense’ (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000, 269). The felt opinion climate is at the hands of people who articulates and who chooses not to, or more relevantly, who is publicly presented by the media while voicing out opinions (Noelle-Neumann & Mathes, 1987). Opinion climate and personal views of others communicated by the media are assessed by the quasi-statistical sense (Noelle-Neumann, 1989). The viewed opinion environment has to be precise in comparison with the real public opinion in contrast to the perceptions of several scholars (Noelle-Neumann & Mathes, 1987). In reality, piece of the advantage in the theory emanates from the misinterpretation of the public opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). It is this misunderstanding, frequently referred to as ‘pluralistic ignorance, (Noelle-Neumann, 1993, 216)’ that permits people in the minority to feel at ease expressing themselves on a topic while a submissive majority is present among the opponents. It is vital to the premise from the perspective of mass communication for individuals to have the capacity to distinguish the mood, or depicted sharing of opinion, of the media (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). This is particularly factual for television “with its color and sound [that] creates extensive confusion between one’s own observation and mediated observation” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993, 155). Nonetheless, the misunderstanding of opinion merely takes place when the opinion shown in the media is in some way distorted (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Unbalanced ‘exemplar distribution’ (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000, 269) is one form of distortion of presented opinion in the media. An exemplar research has investigated not just the influences on view of current judgment, but also the influences on future judgment, realizing that the view of which party would eventually succeed the debate on a topic was affected by exemplar distribution (Perry & Gonzenbach, 2000). This aspect is relevant, for the theory of spiral of silence states that individuals carry out environmental scanning to find future opportunities for public opinion, foreseeing which party will eventually triumph. Conclusions Therefore, the influence of the media to the proclaimed principles of local and global communities is debatable. However, what should also be considered is their participation in the more subtle community activities and processes. This essay has explained a particular form of closure that is attributable to local and global sense of community, trying to make sense of it in terms of geography and psychology. At any way, community could work as a means for avoidance of fears and social defense. This is the feature of its unity and rationality about which individuals or groups work together to stay silent. Hence, community is likely to serve to hamper the mechanism of understanding, acquisition of knowledge, and behavioral change. The mass media, which are believed to be operating in support of public awareness and knowledge, might come to work according to the ideals of repression. Current trends in media processes and systems would appear to support this role. Anxieties tied to understanding and knowledge could be something that should be considered in examining the ‘depoliticisation of media culture’. Therefore, the problem is the dominance of fear in new world communities, and the influence of the media in the current geography and psychological trend. At the advent of the new millennium, the media have been declared to be the most powerful institution in the world. They serve major functions in forming our understanding, behaviors, identities, and cultures through their diverse activities ranging from advertisements, information, education, and entertainment to creation of public opinion, ideological standpoints, and cultural diffusion, the impacts of which could touch modifying the basic principle structures of cultures and identities or exhausting them into a spiral of silence. References Asch, S.E. (1951). ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments’ in D. Cartwright and A. 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