Intelligence Community Credibility - Research Paper Example

?Intelligence Community Credibility- How do we get it back? Introduction In this research paper challenges in a modern intelligence society are discussed. With regard to the fact that modern world shudders at possible terroristic attacks, there is a need to transform many governmental institutions and organization responsible for country’s protection. Intelligence community is the Central American organization which has always provided American government with relevant information concerning potential external threats. Unfortunately, September 11 was a date when IC failed and didn’t prevent America from the most dreadful terroristic attack of the centuries. Therefore the accent in activities of intelligence community was shifted to a multi-perspective consideration about challenging issues of American society and the main goal of this organization is currently seen in serving American nation and not only to respond to the President. For the majority of people Intelligence Community is associated with films about spies. In America 14 agencies and organizations are united in a group where its participants develop their intelligent activities for provision of national security. Intelligent Community has a regulative basis specified in Executive Order 12333, which was signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981 (Intelligent reform, 2008). In accordance with this order Intelligence Community provides American government with the information appropriate for foreign, defense, and economic policies. There are “four methods of intelligence collection: human, signals, imagery, and measurement and signatures intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT)” (Intelligent reform, 2008). All activities of IC are conducted under the guidance of the Director of Intelligent Community. Since 1947 Intelligent Community experienced numerous reforms. The most recent reform was conducted in the beginning of the XXI century, in 2004. After a dreadful terroristic act on September 11 the main claim of the act was a propagation of "unity of effort" (Intelligent reform, 2008). It was necessary to integrate and develop information sharing. Potential threats facing American society had to be more properly considered by Intelligent Community. Information is the central focus of representatives of intelligence community, policymakers, enforcement officers and other participants of this organization. A more detailed discussion of information is a way out to forecast potential terroristic threats. Intelligence community currently is supposed to perform the following function: “The threats posed today by terrorist groups, rogue states and transnational criminal networks are severe and daunting, and the increased effectiveness of the intelligence community is helping us combat these threats” (Fixing Intelligence: for a More Secure America, 2003). Currently a mutual collaboration of DNI and CIA is directed on an intelligence community efficiency increase. In such a way, ‘group think’ may facilitate ideas competition, which is relevant to intelligence analysis. Moreover, DNI is supposed to undermine power and authority of the Defense Department and intelligent support may be neglected. Nevertheless, DNI confirmed expectations and shifted its accents to consideration of community-wide matters. Consequently, management aspect of intelligence community is also better regulated now. A creation of the National Counterterrorism Center is another modern innovation introduced in the activities of the intelligence community, because it is directed on facilitation of terrorism-related intelligence analysis and deals with counterterrorism efforts regulation on behalf of the federal government. A modern generation of intelligence analysts is surrounded by enormous possibilities and tools facilitating their work. Electronic resources and information technologies facilitate a process of information sharing/discussing (Herrington, 2008). With regard to a wide-spread occurrence of social networks, officers of intelligence community have a perfect chance to trace and analyze relevant and non-relevant information which may present a threat for American society (Collins, 2002). Analytic disciplines are on their way of a quick development also. For example, such disciplines as the following: "National Intelligence Estimates on the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland" on "Prospects for Iraq's Stability" are developed on the background of a modern context of turbulent society, past and future national terroristic threats (Intelligent Reform, 2008). In order to develop intelligence community as effectively as possible, the DNI appeals to management authority and management strategies directed on the increase of IC maximum effectiveness (Intelligent Reform, 2008). It is relevant to mention the fact that the DNI implemented its budget authority in order to finish a process of wasteful money spending on DOD intelligence program. It is necessary to mention that a modern intelligence society argues against this program, because it is not relevant anymore. Moreover, there are a lot of uncovered issues which have to be solved in order to provide efficient functioning of intelligence community. Bureaucratic culture has deep roots and it requires much time and efforts in order to eradicate it. An establishment of new authorities is the first step on the way to a new tolerant and modern culture of intelligence community creation. New legislation is to be expected in coming years, but it should be developed with regard to current issues of potential national threats. Consequently, it is clearly seen that policy of a modern intelligence community is conducted under conditions of reforms implementation. What is the background of such a desire to changes? On the one hand, terroristic attacks are undoubtedly primary triggers of changes implementation. On the other hand, intelligent community in October 2002 erroneously concluded that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Cooper, 2006). Administration of President Bush justified their invasion in Iraq because of this claim. Intelligence analysis is supposed to be erroneous and it requires to be corrected. Therefore it was decided to create House Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight (Cairo, 2007). It was clearly seen that government is not indifferent to reforms in intelligence community. Moreover, the government showed its great interest in such kind of reforms. Unfortunately, recent bombings in Britain and Egypt may witness that intelligence community is unable to provide country’s safety. New reforms in intelligence community are often metaphorically named ‘vitamins’ and representatives of IC claim that they are fed up with ‘vitamins’ and they are functioning (Herrington, 2008). From online database we could find out that there is a need to introduce structural transformations in intelligence community hierarchy. There is a need to create a “nonhierarchical network in order to pursue and counter decentralized terrorist networks” (Fixing intelligence, 2003). There are still no proofs that there won’t be any potential attacks, but intelligence community consolidates all its efforts and looks for alternative ways of their policy development. In spite of the fact that in 2004 new reforms were introduced in the practice of intelligence community, many researchers underline that it is not enough to introduce new legislative principles or destructuralization. There is a need for a more global approach on legislative and practical levels. Otherwise Intelligence community won’t be able to function with a minimum of challenges. On a practical level there are still obstacles, which prevent intelligence community from normal functioning. Thus a growth of staff number in combination with anti-terrorist analysts, who need their own office and resources to perform their jobs perfectly, is a crucial daily challenge for this organization. Technical programming required for IC operations is very expensive and requires essential budgeting. Information availability is another important component of efficient functioning of intelligence community. On this basis Information Sharing Environment was created (Herrington, 2008). With regard to a process of modernization happening on different levels, there is a critical need for cooperation with “the intelligence program managers and the Department of Defense to improve the requirements, system and architectural development process for all of our technical collection systems, and their integration” (Herrington, 2008). Nevertheless, there are also opponents who claim that introduced reforms will be inefficient. Military officers joined rows of opponents and made an emphasis on inefficiency of intelligence control mediated by CIA. In accordance with Admiral Bobby Inman, former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Deputy DCI, “they all remember the support they got primarily from CIA for carrying out their missions” (Fixing intelligence, 2003). The most intolerant criticism concerned a possible shift of accents to ‘politicization’ of intelligent community. With regard to the intelligence communication reforms, the main effect concerns reduction of CIA and increasing the importance of the Pentagon and controlling the White  House more directly with regard to experts’ assessment conducted (Herrington, 2008). Intelligence community reform conducted by the Director of National  Intelligence is directed on the development of “authority, direction, and control of the  President” (Intelligence Reform, 2008). There is another crucial issue: the intelligence community currently is subjected to challenges caused by terroristic attacks. There are two main challenges, which have remained in the intelligence community: a challenge of coordination and control and groupthink and the politicization of intelligence (Steel and Chambliss, 2005). A problem of coordination and control remains the most relevant challenge. There are 16 different agencies in the structure of intelligence community. Currently, a new shift of attention concerning regulation and management of IC, new directions underline budget allocation. “Thus $40 billion budget is divided among 15 rivalrous agencies and 200,000 employees” (Herington, 2008). In spite of changes, the old director of central intelligence remains responsible for the Central Intelligence Agency. A real responsibility for American intelligence community is not subjected to any particular person. From another perspective, the director of IC is restricted in his function. Thus a further bureaucratic tactics was taken from spies, analysts and others responsible for rises and falls of intelligence success (Lawrence, 2006). Opponents underline that DNI has created an atmosphere of bureaucracy (Steel and Chambliss, 2005). It did not to the least extent facilitated bureaucratic principles. Still, DNI is unable to control the Pentagon, which is the central institution of intelligence decision-making. Consequently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were strategically analyzed and assessed in the Pentagon.  In spite of the fact that Congress wanted to control intelligence, field  commanders have the greatest responsibility in this sphere. Authorities and power of the  Pentagon prevail over the DNI and can exert that power to prevail over  the intelligence policy-makers get back (Lawrence, 2006). For example, the Department of Defense received $38 billion of the $44 billion intelligence budget in 2006. From another perspective, the DNI is puzzled by control, which is exerted by Pentagon on it (Intelligent reform, 2008).  Another challenge occurring on the basis of new reforms introduced in intelligent community is the issue of the politicization of  intelligence (Chambliss, 2005; Lawrence, 2006). Groupthink is often challenged as well. Chambliss (2005) claims that groupthink happens when policy-makers want to reach ‘unanimity’ and not simply assess realistic perspectives of the policy. Groupthink in intelligence analysis may be a serious challenge, the way it happened in Iraqi policy developed by Bush’s administration (Lawrence, 2006). Moreover, DNI may increase the politicization of intelligence and not to facilitate or decrease it. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was conducted in Iraq in order to make analysis of oversight and erroneous analysis of intelligence community (Roberts, 2005). It is relevant to mention that it was not necessary to propagate intelligence community in a rushing manner. In the result of NIE analysis we clearly understand that the price of war in Iraq is too high. There is a necessity to conduct a full-scale analysis of war Iraq (Chambliss, 2005). In October 2006, in accordance with a new release the Islamic-based terrorist  movement is expanding. With regard to critics, war in Iraq is often limited from war on terror and the result of NIE is often named “mischaracterized” and it was generally misperceived (Steel and Chambliss, 2005). “The NIE compiles data from different intelligence analyses, such as the State  Department, CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the military  services” (Steel and Chambliss, 2005). Consequently, we can conclude that two main challenges are groupthink and politicization. Congress may delimit political motivation of intelligence community. Currently, government puts a stake at good intelligence as a perfect chance to prevent America against terroristic attacks. Conclusion In this research paper it is clearly seen that intelligence community in America is being gradually transformed into a strategic group, which provides America with external protection. Intelligence community is the Central American organization which has always provided American government with relevant information concerning potential external threats. Moreover, a necessity to discard political ‘mask’ from this organization is rather challenging issue nowadays. Management reform next to internal transformation and reforms in intelligence community is a perfect way to prognosticate and prevent potential threats which may devastate America. In spite of the fact that terroristic attacks and further war in Iraq was erroneously analyzed by IC, a chain of future reforms starting from 2004 witnesses that there is a need to manage this organization and update its working principles in accordance with modern norms and social events. Thus the reformation of intelligence community is almost the only one way out to show to a modern society that America works at its mistakes. DNI establishment is little discussed in the sources of mass media and it may seem that there is a lack of democracy. A shift to centralization of intelligence community justifies the fact that there is a tendency to unity in modern organization of IC. The influence exerted on intelligence community by Congress is currently facilitated, because this organization responds to President directly. Though one of the challenges of intelligence community is politicization, reforms introduced in intelligence community are connected with American government. Thus, it is impossible to separate intelligence community from politicization; otherwise it will be a ‘reform’ of reforms’ of previous years, which were introduced by previous governments. Works cited 1. "Fixing Intelligence: for a More Secure America." The Virginia Quarterly Review 79, no. 3 (2003): 93+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5037516298. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 2. “Intelligent Reform; Making Sense of Commonsense Intelligence Gathering”. The Washington Times (April 23, 2008): A17. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/ Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 3. Cooper, H. H. "Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11." Journal of Psychiatry & Law 34, no. 1 (2006): 91+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5034942762. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 4. Cairo, Michael. "Who's In Charge? Problems and Challenges in the Intelligence Community" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, (Feb 28 2007). Available from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180860_index.html. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 5. Chambliss, Saxby. "We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform." Parameters 35, no. 1 (2005): 5+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5011208593. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 6. Collins, Jennifer M. "And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Information with the Intelligence Community under the USA Patriot Act."American Criminal Law Review 39, no. 3 (2002): 1261+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000674307. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 7. Herrington, Vee. "Intelligence Reform Brings New Opportunities for Info Pros."Information Outlook, March 2008, 10+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5036897015. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 8. Lawrence, Marta. "Intelligent Reform Still Elusive: If It Were to Receive a Grade, Intelligence Reform Might Get a C." Security Management, March 2006, 32+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5014278659. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 9. Roberts, Marta. "20-20 Spy Sight: Will Intelligence Reform Help Spies See Terror Threats before It's Too Late?" Security Management, February 2005, 76+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5008671643. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. 10. Steele, Robert David, and Saxby Chambliss. "Intelligence Reform: More Needs to Be Done." Parameters 35, no. 2 (2005): 135+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5010936462. Internet. Accessed 28 January 2011. Read More