The Evolution of Consciousness, Ethical Treatment of Animals - Research Paper Example

The Evolution of Consciousness: A Case for Ethical Treatment of Animals Animal sentience and the ethical debate over what constitutes abuse of animal rights has been the subject of scientific and philosophical writings since the time of Aristotle. It’s a subject that has for centuries raised questions about the ability of animals to feel and manifest states such as pain, fear and anger. In modern times, the issue has polarized scientists and ethicists, framing as it does the argument over whether science has the ethical right to experiment on animals, particularly if experimentation causes pain and results in death. Are medical researchers within their rights to experiment on animals if their research helps cure diseases? Do animal rights properly belong to the realm of philosophy and pedagogy, or is it a matter for the courts? At the crux of the issue is the meaning of “sentience.” Does feeling (i.e. physical sensation) equate to intelligence? The main thrust of this paper is to argue that the ability to feel pain establishes a minimum ethical criterion for not experimenting on animals and, if by extension, feelings and other “emotions” are deemed to be present, then animal protection should acquire the force of law. Aristotle wrote that animals meet this minimum criterion, arguing that they are endowed with perceptive sensitivity, “which appears inherent in all animals, for they have an innate power, which (is called) sensible perception…” (Aristotle, 354). But when it came to this sensitivity, Aristotle said, not all animals are created equal. He said that “sense being inherent Name 2 in some animals, a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in others it is not engendered,” as would be the case with insects, for instance (Aristotle, 354). Descartes made a similar distinction, but one which drew on man’s supposedly divine nature, asserting that while animals wield an intelligence that allows them to carry out basic tasks, such as finding shelter, this intelligence “is of a significantly inferior type to the rational intelligence of man, which comes from his soul” (Kang, 117). Ultimately, Descartes decided that animal intelligence cannot be compared to that of humans, because animals are unable to reason or communicate verbally. Nevertheless, whatever the limits of animal consciousness might be, countless theories have been developed to support the validity of animal intelligence. Physicalist and Neurofunctionalist – philosophical approaches Physicalism postulates that consciousness canbe identified with neuron activity, a position that allows for the possibility that intelligence is a characteristic humans and animals share, so long as they are built upon the same “biological, chemical and physical” properties (Allen, 2010). Such an approach also claims that questions about the relative intelligence of different species becomes “trivial” “once neuroscientists have carried out the non-trivial task of determining the physiological basis of consciousness in animals for which no reasonable doubt of their consciousness can be entertained” (Allen, 2010). Neurofunctionalism considers the existence of neural cortex activity in primates as “the most plausible candidate for being the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness in these species” (Allen, 2010). In “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness,” N. Block associates phenomenal consciousness with brain processes in certain higher-level perceptual representations. “Since the evidence for Name 3 such processes is at least partially derived from animals, including other primates and rats, (Block’s) view is supportive of the that phenomenal consciousness is found in some nonhuman species (presumably most mammals)” (Allen, 2010). Other “first-order” theories take a more direct line, including representationalism, which insists that an animal’s ability to perceive its surroundings equates to conscious awareness. Aristotle and Locke took a somewhat more philosophical approach, one that proposed that consciousness derives from the internal perception of mental states, a model that favors the notion of animal consciousness because it does not require the ability to conceptualize such mental states (Allen, 2010). Scientific approaches Genus classification and the scientific study of animal brain structure tell us that humans and mammals share the same basic brain physiology, and with many other types of vertebrates as well. Scientific research has found that similarity in brain anatomy between humans and some animals establishes a basic premise that animals can be said to possess at least a rudimentary form of intelligence. The work of science is aimed at showing to what extent this may be the case. For instance, research may reveal the similarity between the ways in which humans and certain animals perceive and respond to visual stimuli, and what those similarities may mean for the debate over animal consciousness. Scientific arguments range from common sense observations that gauge the similarity between human and animal behavioral traits, to a detailed study of the evolution of consciousness. Science has even considered the possibility that some phyla may exhibit responses to visual experience. “Neurological similarities between human and other animals Name 4 have also been taken to suggest commonality of conscious experience. Even structurally different brains may be neurodynamically similar in ways that enable inferences about animal consciousness to be drawn” (Allen, 2010 ). If, as has been proposed, the physical manifestation of pain constitutes consciousness, the study of animal reaction to pain and fear may have much to teach us about the degree to which animals may be said to possess conscious awareness. In recent years, research conducted in America and Great Britain has studied the similarities among mammalian nervous systems. Results determined that the nervous systems of humans and other mammals can be similarly affected by drugs and anesthetics. As well, fish may also be affected by, and respond to, pain (Allen, 2010). New research speaks to the prevalence of pain, and thus consciousness, among animals. Observational study by philosophers and researchers seeking emotional responses in animals dates to ancient Greece, and was famously addressed by Charles Darwin in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). This line of inquiry has carried through to the modern era, with scientists believing that the tendency of some animals to engage in playful activity (i.e dogs rough-housing with each other or with an owner) reflects a fundamentally emotional state, and thus a demonstrable level of consciousness. Self-consciousness is also thought to be present in some animals. In 1970, Gallup pioneered an innovative mode of inquiry designed to discern whether primates experience self-consciousness. Gallup’s inspiration for the experiment came from the habit of chimpanzees to periodically check their appearance in a mirror. In the experiment, Gallup anesthetized chimpanzees and placed dye marks on their foreheads. Animals that had the mark would, upon waking, touch the Name 5 spot on their foreheads far more frequently than the animals that had no mark. Other such experiments, involving orangutans, gorillas and rhesus monkeys revealed similar tendencies, albeit to varying degrees (Gallup, 86-87), though similar cognitive experiments done on other animals have not been as successful. Other scientists have concentrated on other, more complex levels of consciousness among animals. In the latter part of the 20th century, researchers began to delve into the social behaviors of some animals (such as dolphins) in an effort to determine whether animals exhibit an understanding of how their fellow animals think and act and, by learning, are able to anticipate actions and manipulate circumstances. To determine whether some animals display what scientists call a “theory of mind,” researchers David Premack and Guy Woodruff conducted an experiment with a chimpanzee, which was shown videos of humans solving various tasks. The chimpanzee was then shown pictures that depicted humans solving the tasks. It identified the correct photographs at a significantly high level, displaying a substantial degree of metacognition. The researchers concluded that the animal displayed “at least two states of mind to the human actor, namely, intention or purpose on the one hand, and knowledge or belief on the other” (Premack and Woodruff, 518). Premack and Woodruff interpreted the chimpanzee’s actions as meaning it grasped the basic intent, or mental states, of the humans. It didn’t, for instance, focus on the goal of the humans’ actions, but rather on the purpose of their actions. The observations and assumptions made by philosophers have over the centuries given way to scientific experimentation aimed at making specific determinations about the presence and nature of animal sentience. The goals and methodologies employed have become more Name 6 sophisticated as the mounting evidence seems to point to the existence of some level of consciousness among animals. Theories about animal emotions, consciousness, self-consciousness and metacognition have, to varying degrees, been tested using carefully formulated experimental protocols. While some researchers maintain that no scientific research is capable of truly determining whether sentience exists in animals, recent results have yielded interesting results, worthy of further consideration. Morality play – the debate over animal experimentation The Premack and Woodruff study, which make a case for multi-level thinking in chimpanzees, and Gallup’s work in determining the presence of self-consciousness have spurred further experimentation along these lines. In any event, interest in this field of inquiry continues to grow alongside the debate over the morality of animal experimentation. Some scientists insist that no research can ever truly determine whether or not animals possess some level of sentience. Yet there appears to be widespread agreement that the issue of animal experimentation carries sufficient moral weight to warrant further study and debate. The following statement lies at the heart of the debate: “animals deserve moral consideration if and only if they are sentient (especially possessing the capacity to feel pain)” (Allen,, 2010). The most compelling arguments proceed from the notion of sentience. One asserts that animals are deserving of humane treatment (i.e. no harmful experimentation) regardless of whether they have consciousness. Those who take the other side of the debate say that, given the need for progress in the field of scientific research, it is immoral not to experiment on animals, assuming that animals lack sentience. Not to experiment, so the argument goes, Name 7 would not be in the best interests of sentient beings (i.e. mankind), who stand to benefit from the results of experimentation (Carruthers, 1989). The gist of Carruthers’ position here is that the pains of non-human animals are nonconscious and, because of this, animals are due no particular moral consideration (Carruthers, 1989). This hypothesis caused a tremendous uproar in the scientific community, much of which has decried the idea that sentience should be used as a condition for moral treatment of animals. It is worth noting that Carruthers has modified his previous position, claiming that “sentience is not the sole basis for moral consideration, and that animals qualify for consideration on the basis of frustration of their unconscious desires” (Allen, 2010). Of course, there are many who insist on animal consciousness (presumably based on observation and extant scientific results) and that any who deny this state in animals are behaving immorally, experimentation or no. This is the basis for the “benefit of the doubt” position, which draws from the notion of reasonable doubt, meaning if there is any reasonable question as to the nature of animal sentience, they must perforce be accorded morally responsible consideration (Allen, 2010). When one considers the body of available research findings; the influence of this research (i.e. that it has inspired further such work); and the fact that anti-sentience opinions (such as that of Carruthers) have been modified; and, perhaps most importantly, because there is no prevailing research proving that animals do not possess sentience, there is sufficient doubt to assert that animals are worthy of moral consideration. Cartesian dualism The work of Rene Descartes serves as the basis for our modern perception of an ancient Name 8 concept known as dualism. Descartes made reference to animals in explaining the difference between dualism in man and animals who, Descartes said are machines, or “automata,” not possessed of the divine spark that sets man above them. The inference is that, as machines, animals do not have intelligence, which makes them inferior. “Most commentators recognize this as denying intelligence to animals, and many object just as strongly to (Descartes’) denial of sapience to animals as they do his (alleged) denial of sentience” (Baker and Morris, 90). Thus, as machines, animals cannot be capable of exerting free will, of taking action on their own behalf or of their own volition. In other words, an animal’s actions are “mechanically explicable” because they are automata. However, to insist that they do not have free will “is to assert that, just like (lifeless) automata, they cannot be praised or blamed for what they do” (Baker and Morris, 90). But as we have seen, there have been a number of innovative experiments in recent years, which have determined that a degree of sentience does, in all likelihood, exist in animals. This research has revealed there is sufficient reason to at least consider the possibility that such a thing as animal sentience exists (in other words, there is reasonable doubt that animals are not sentient). “It is now widely accepted as a fact that higher animals do have some (perhaps limited) capacity to think” (Baker and Morris, 90). The foundational principle of Descartes’ theorem was that in order to think, a creature must have a rational soul, a divine nature which sets man apart. This runs counter-intuitive to the outcome of recent research findings. Baker and Morris argue that no observational study, no experimentation can determine whether an Name 9 animal possesses a rational soul. But experimentation can discern to what extent animals exhibit consciousness. If, as several researchers have shown, some animals manifest at least limited signs of sentience, what becomes of the argument that, because God created all “finite things,” an organism must possess a “rational soul” in order to possess intelligence? “Indeed, this is absurd given the axiom that possession of a rational soul would make an animal a moral agent. Could anybody seriously think that moral agency is an observational property of any organism?” (Baker and Morris, 203). In her treatise on the social image (or infamy) of the pit bull, Theresa Allen said Descartes’ theories provided the impetus for a “constructed chasm” that established the tradition whereby animals and man have been seen as “binary opposites” (Allen, 67-68). “The Western practice of classifying humans and animals as binary opposites was not a neutral phenomenon but instead, was used to make an important distinction between the two, emphasizing the uniqueness of humans” (Allen, 67-68). Allen goes on to say that Descartes’ “beast-machine paradigm” took this view to its extreme limit, a point from which science may be hard pressed to establish a viable counterview. Particularly difficult to overcome has been the insistence of many on the primacy of the soul in this debate, a claim that, as has been noted, cannot be tested and defies the very idea of scientific investigation, which many have embarked upon over the past 50 years. Conclusion If the issue of animal ethics breaks on the question of whether or not animals exhibit some observable form of sentience, then the results of recent experiments must be said to have Name 10 provided enough evidence to make at least a tentative claim that they are endowed with a rudimentary form of intelligence (primates in particular). That this question is still in such doubt speaks to the influence of Cartesian thought, which for so long relegated animals to an inferior status, in which they were regarded as “machines.” Descartes’ prevalence in the field of animal ethics has made a moral issue of whether the ethical treatment of animals should hinge on whether or not they possess intelligence. This matter has persisted until the present day, despite growing pressure that the humane treatment of animals should not be reliant on their intelligence. Animals should be treated humanely regardless of mental acuity. The fact that some animals exhibit signs of what humans would consider consciousness only serves to strengthen this point. Name 11 Works Cited Allen, Colin, "Animal Consciousness." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2010 Edward N. Zalta (ed). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/consciousness-anima. Allen, Theresa. Petey and Chato: The Pitbull’s Transition from Mainstream to Marginalized. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest. 2007. Aristotle. The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle. London: Henry Bohn. 1853. Baker, Gordon P. and Morris, Katherine J. Descartes’ dualism. New York: Routledge. 1996. Block, N. (1995). “On A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. 2005. Carruthers, Pete. “Brute Experience,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 258–269. 1989. Darwin, Charles. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1886. Gallup, Gordon G. “Chimpanzees: Self-recognition.” Science. 167: 86:87. Kang, Minsoo. Sublime Dreams of Living Machines: The Automaton in the European Imagination. Boston, MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard College. 2011 Premack, David and Woodruff, Guy. “Does the Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?” Behavioral and Brian Sciences. 1: 515–526. 1978. Name 12 Seth, A., Baars, B.J., and Edelman, D.B. “Criteria for Consciousness in Humans and Other Mammals.” Consciousness and Cognition. 14: 119–139. 2005. Read More