Diplomatic Role of the US Forces in Sovereign Iraqi - Research Paper Example

?Now that Iraqi sovereignty has been restored as of January 2009, what is the diplomatic role of residual US forces in that country? The current of episodes has turned it both rational and inevitable for the United States to finish the army profession of Iraq as well as liberate the newcomer government of the nation to function unsupervised. The encroachment and profession, depending on crazy distortions and regal ambition, have hugely affected Iraq physically as well as socially having destroyed American fame and credibility. These days, Iraq said its freedom in the S.O.F.A. With the United States, this had taken impact on 1st January 2009. (Christoff, p. 10-12) For some years consecutively, President Bush constantly said that they will withdraw their army troops from Iraq as a strong and democratic government will be formed capable of taking care of the country. These benchmarks for taking back were hardly ‘straw men’ more than realistic anticipations. An efficient united government was never created, Iraqi security troops have always been considered inadequate, despite of been prepared and equipped by the United States, now around 200,000 men proved their efficiency in current clashes against Shi’ite armies. That is why American employment of Iraq is being continued for almost five and a half years along with little remediation by society without having the political equilibrium resolved. (Christoff, p. 10-12; Gearan,p 1) There is a cause to trust, in information, that President G.W.Bush never had any intention of taking back forces and camps from Iraq. Lately in 2001, Bush as well as associates clarified that the bigger locus of this War against Terror was in order to reorganize Moslem universe with lines sub serving our national concerns; the attack on Iraq was supposed to be the opening strike in that overextended plan. Precisely Iraq was attacked not because of its strong as well as threatening attitude, it was invaded for its weak nature and people were divided. The actual motive of the attack of Iraq resulted a permanent occupation for the compliant believer state and buildings of enduring army camps for the local projection of the power of American. The rationality of the neo-conservative regalistic plans include security of feeble pro-American administrating government, local protection troops perpetually abased on the control of America, and some degree of stable military profession. This discontinuity with realistic world may be the best representation of emphasis over the victory by President G.W.Bush and currently by presidential aspirant McCain. They demand of ‘Victory’ over Iraq, but safely avoided defining their meaning by that word. Likely, ‘surrender’ as well as withdrawal seemed synonymous which were utilized in suggesting that withdrawal as very embarrassing.( Cordesman et al, 5-7) While the current presidential campaign was going on, Mr. Obama insisted to take back most American forces from the land of Iraq within sixteen months, though a small amount of army will stay there. The left force would aim al-Qaeda to secure our diplomats as well as other personnel, prepare Iraqi troops, and attend other missions. The missions might be relative to his point that the American forces would be needed to help reconstruction of the nation and places for the castaways, events that need a year to finish. (Wehrey, et al, 23-35; Middle East policy council (US) p 65-70) The left troop would not, nevertheless, become engaged in ethnic clash. The phase of months was selected as it seemed Mr. Obama apparently believing that the recent Iraqi government is not strong enough, stabilized, or legitimate in functioning freely without United States army assistance. The elections in Iraq will occur on 31st of January and in the ending 2009 which may give strength to the government, with participation of Sunnis, though it is not guaranteed. The absolute taking back of the United States army from Iraq supposed to have a winning effect. The United States would not be accused with an expense of around $100-200 billion per year and unspoken accidents, and would benefit in reputation and fame as its focus shifts from army coercion to diplomatic genre. Undoubtedly the prestige of the United States for clearness and equal judgment in global issues has been harmed by the attack and interminable taking over Iraq. By the act of chief help of necessity of army, we have excused assault as well as other war criminal activities, which is atonable only by excusing the military way. (Katzman, p 30-33; Niblett, p. 50-53) The government of Iraq would be soon undercut with occupation authorities so should benefit in freedom and prestige. Iraqis not the Americans, supposed be in the charge of the army of Iraq, police force, reconstruction team, and oil manufacturing as well as the Iraqi court could face the responsibilities squarely. Authorities of Iraq supposed to be in the position of winning popular favor by the work projects targeted at reconstruction in national infrastructures, the demolition of which was huge. The view is foretold on assuming that the United States will place an event to penetrate wealth into the Iraqi administrative government or any other corresponding authority for replacement of refugees along with restoration of infrastructure utilizing Iraqi labors and the administration. (Katzman, p 30-33; Niblett, p. 50-53) Such help might finish when oil production of Iraq is capable of supporting the commerce. The capability to give employment is a very useful way to get political assistance. Lastly, American retraction would finish the rebellion, which are responsible for larger social splitting and anger and for numerous Iraqi and maximum Americans the casualties. Nothing is guaranteed, obviously, that the coming future of the nation after American retraction will go smoothly or become successful in every way. There possibly episodes of brutality, although the government will be in a better condition to speak of solutions. The summary says that the people of Iraq must have freedom from army subservience to take many decisions required to make their future as well as form a society. From a long time even before the reign of Saddam Husain Iraq used to be a well educated and very secular nation, where different religions were never a matter of conflict. There is cause for the belief that our abandonment will make the Iraqis capable of going back to their roots. However, similarly the political as well as the ethnic conflicts in Iraq, resembling those of Lebanon since the year 1975, will be multicolored, characterized by translocation alliances and estrangements. (Katzman, p 30-33; Niblett, p. 50-53) From the time since 1975, the political and ethnic struggles in Iraq will be kaleidoscopic like those in Lebanon, which is characterized by shifting alliances and feuds. This is actually the price of independence that they got, besides the fact that many governments can come and go. One of the outcomes that may appear once if occupation of Iraq comes to an end that US will lose a foothold in a Moslem country which is said to have vast oil reserves. This outcome is rather accepted as an added advantage as because the occupation is largely restricted by the Moslem world so that the continuous chain of occupation can get disrupted in both Western and Moslem societies, though this fact have not been accepted universally. There has been continuous threat to US national interests sufficient to maintain military bases in Iraq or to go along with the occupation. At present nor in the coming future, no country in that region has the strength to threaten US military on the same grounds. Thereby we can say that other than by heavy handed militarism, political influence can be thrived upon more effectively through diplomacy and persuasion. (Katzman, p 30-33; Niblett, p. 50-53) The Iraqi government will appear to people as an American puppet and interfere with its independent development, if they withdraw more troops and continue maintaining American military bases in Iraq. In addition to this, residual US forces and bases could easily be drawn into combat if some group believed it to be politically advantageous to provoke an American military response. Hence thereby it is clear that the withdrawal must be complete and unequivocal if it is to have favorable political consequences. Iraq must be freed to develop its future, and the US government must be freed from the enormous costs, unanticipated consequences, and widespread enmity engendered by an unprovoked and quite unnecessary war. In brief it can be said that ending the occupation of Iraq could afford an opening for the US to return to a policy wherein military force is truly a last resort and preventive war is unacceptable, barring imminent and certain threat. (Katzman, p 30-33; Niblett, p. 50-53) In order to make the Iraqi government democratic, responsible and universally popular before any withdraw is something an impossible task to achieve as because the occupation itself renders the goal to be impossible. The present Iraqi government is probably the best we can expect and at present it must be entrusted with the future of the country. (Bowers, 1) One important point to note here is one must take into consideration the fate of thousands of foreign civilian contract workers in Iraq that are not specifically covered in SOFA. The reason for this is to assume that the withdrawal of American troops and bases would negate the need for most construction and service contracts and that these contracts would be canceled, followed by the exodus of most contract workers. Overall, we believe that it would be best to withdraw all or nearly all of the American contract workers and contractors, and in particular all civilian security personnel. Otherwise, there would be a temptation to retain a residual force of American troops to protect these workers from potential danger. One cannot rule out the possibility, however, that the Iraqi government might wish to retain American workers, particularly technical experts in various fields, and contract with American firms who might supply American technicians and workers. Projects so contracted would be secured by Iraqi forces and would not require a residual American force. To the extent that US-Iraqi contracts are paid for by the US government, they ought to be subject to the oversight of Congress and made publicly transparent. (Katzman, p 30-33; Niblett, p. 50-53) The assumption that the Iraqi government is too weak to function independently and deal with resettlement, reconstruction, diplomatic relations and terrorist groups is the base for the need of a residual American force. This is exactly the position of the Bush administration over the past five years. In this view, there is never enough stability and governmental legitimacy to end the occupation and there is avoidance of the fact that the continuing military occupation is a major cause of these problems. It is said according to the opinion of majority of people that it would be unwise to leave any residual force behind. If it were very small in size and essentially incapable of combat, it probably would be ineffective in its several tasks, but would be symbolic of continued American hegemony. If it were large and equipped to fight, it could easily be provoked and swept up in chaos that would prompt the reinsertion of major US forces into Iraq. In other words, it could function as a tripwire to undo a sincere effort to quit Iraq. The withdrawal period was for 16 months which could be cut down eventually. This target was put up by Mr. Obama on the basis of his assumption that the Iraqi government would emerge as to be a popular and united country once the election 0f 2009 gets over. (Katzman, p 30-33) References: 1. Christoff, Joseph A. Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. DIANE Publishing, 2010. 2. Katzman, Kenneth. Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security. DIANE Publishing, 2009. 3. Wehrey, Frederic M., Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica WatkinsThe Iraq effect: the Middle East after the Iraq War. Rand Corporation, 2010. 4. Cordesman, Anthony H.Adam Mausner, Elena Derby. Iraq and the United States: Creating a Strategic Partnership. CSIS, 2010. 5. Gearan, Anne. U.S. To Leave Residual Force Of 50,000 In Iraq After "Pullout". Retrieved from http://www.countercurrents.org/gearan270209.htm on 3rd April, 2011. 6. Bowers, Chris. Obama Pledges No Residual Forces After 2011. Retrieved from http://www.openleft.com/diary/11898/ on 3rd April, 2011. 7. Niblett, Robin. America and a Changed World: A Question of Leadership. John Wiley and Sons, 2009. 8. Middle East policy council (US). Middle East policy, Volume 15. Middle East policy council. 2008. Read More