Nicaraguan War: Sandinistas Vs. Contras (1981-1990) - Research Paper Example

?THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION (1981-1990) Central America became an important front in the Cold War proxy struggles in the late 1970s, and was one of several areas in the war that was particularly tumultuous. The US had backed the government in Nicaragua up until its overthrow in 1979, when a group known as the Sandinistas took control of the country with a careful agenda of liberation and democracy, but also under a specific Lenin-Marxist ideology that called for the establishment of a vague socialist system of workers and peasants. The Sandinistas aligned Nicaragua with Cuba and the Soviet bloc, a stark contrast from the former regime’s relations with the United States. This alignment, along with a continuous supply of weapons flowing across the border to communist rebels in El Salvador, provoked several forms of US action (Chiet). The significance of this period of the period of revolution and civil war in Nicaragua from 1981 through 1990 is observed in President Reagan’s lobbying for action. In 1983, Reagan stated: "There can be no question: the security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere." For Reagan, there were four goals in Nicaragua. The first was to push for democratic development, fair elections, and human freedom. Second was an economic recovery and development as a response to the digressions made by revolutionaries. Third was to establish security for America and its allies against Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, and the fourth and final goal was to support dialogue and negotiation within and between Central American countries in order to resolve problems (Prevost 6). For Nicaraguans, it was a matter of preserving an old lifestyle or embracing a new one, which quickly deteriorated into a matter of life and death. Furthermore, the new Nicaraguan government had the capacity to encourage coups in neighboring nations, further destabilizing the region. Before the revolution of the Sandinistas, Nicaragua was ruled by a dictatorial dynasty. Anastasio Somoza Debayle succeeded his father as president in 1967. Somoza was not popular as a leader, and as a result often oppressed those who were opposed to his rule. He further tainted his reputation after an earthquake shook Managua in 1972. As a result of the earthquake, foreign aid was poured into the country, and Somoza declared emergency powers. However, these powers were used to claim and pocket a significant amount of the foreign aid, adding Somoza’s personal wealth. Violence erupted between Somoza’s ruling party and the opposing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) that sought to terrorize and depose Somoza. This conflict continued with sporadic violence between the state and the resistance until 1979, when the Sandinistas established control over Nicaragua (Chiet). The revolution beginning in 1981 was a result of the formation of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), a counterrevolutionary group that the Sandinistas referred to as the Contras. As early as 1979, disorganized groups of peasants in the Nicaraguan highlands began to resist the social policies implemented by Sandinista agents coming from the Pacific lowlands (Brown 13). The more official Contra force, the FDN itself, was formed later on by resistant peasants as well as local tribesmen and many former soldiers of the Somoza era. Also joining these groups were Catholics and Protestants, whose religion was opposed by the Sandinistas. American support for the FDN began when only 2,000 fighters had assembled. However, by 1983 that number was closer to 6,000 (Chiet). US support for the Contras varied over the years, but usually came in the form of foreign aid. Congress continually disapproved of the Reagan administration’s initiative on funding the Contras, and passed several laws prohibiting funding of any actions that supported the toppling of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The administration and the CIA, however, began funneling private funds, arms from an Iranian businessman, as well as foreign aid for the intent of blocking arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador. With this funding as well as material and instructional support, the Contras continued to fight the Sandinistas until a ceasefire in 1988. The time in between, however saw frequent shipments of weapons orchestrated by the US (Bowen). The specific types of weaponry used facilitated a violent guerilla war, and a report from the Congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra affair features detailed lists of many of the shipments made. The weapons supplied to the Contras include HK-21 machine guns, AK-47s, and hand grenades. Rifles, cartridges, mortar shells, C-4 explosives, 81mm mortars, fuses, detonators, and thousands of pounds of “lethal loads” were dropped by air to the Contras during 1986 alone (Hamilton 79-81). All this was modern weaponry allowing for significant firepower on the Contra side. Throughout the war, millions of dollars were poured into the FDN through independent donations of American allies, making up for the restrictions set by Congress. Saudi Arabia alone contributed $32 million in total. The CIA provided training and intelligence services for the Contras as well, especially beginning in 1986 when some restrictions were loosened. The war was fought on both a northern and southern front, with most of the US support coming from the Honduran border (Chiet). The war in Nicaragua cost many lives and damaged the economy more than any economic policy could have done on its own. Attacks frequently targeted agricultural sites, as well as other industrial sites that resulted in the destruction of equipment, infrastructure and forests (Prevost 16) By 1985 alone, over three thousand clashes occurred between the Contras and Sandinistas, and the number had been increasing drastically every year. The FDN had a goal of creating a liberated zone, but the result was not a successful campaign. Instead, many civilian casualties occurred, and human rights violations were reported on both sides (Prevost, 9, 15). After the two sides signed a peace treaty in 1987, the situation gradually grew calm. Elections were held in 1990, and afterwards the new president, Violeta Chamorro, brought in free-market reforms, democratization, and support for human rights and national reconciliation. As of 2006, the former Sandinista Daniel Ortega was re-elected as president of Nicaragua, but this time under a platform of anti-corruption reform. US contributions to Nicaragua are no longer weapons and covert operations, but instead are humanitarian and anti-crime in nature (Chiet). The decade long war in Nicaragua was one of many worldwide that saw both foreign support and deep domestic division, but also remains as an example of a conflict that has been resolved and presents a real chance for recovery. Lessons learned from Nicaragua have shaped US foreign policy as well as the lives of future generations in Nicaragua and elsewhere. Overall, the devastating war has had numerous negative effects, but the outcome has been a national unity and economic reform that resulted from years of violent struggle to form the ideal state. Works Cited Bowen, Gordon L. “Foundations of US Policies: the Contras campaign against Sandinista Nicaragua”. Mary Baldwin College. . Brown, Timothy C. The real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua. Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. eBook.  Chiet, Ross. “Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs.” Brown University. . Hamilton, Lee H. and Inouye, Daniel K. “Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair.” US Senate Select Committee On Secret Military Assistance to Iran And the Nicaraguan Opposition. Washington, 1987. Prevost, Gary. "The "Contra" War." Conflict Quarterly 007.3 (1987): 1-17. Web. 21 Mar 2011. Read More