Effects on Saudi Arabia - Research Paper Example

?SAUDI ARABIA AND THE ARAB SPRING The Arab uprisings of referred to in contemporary history as the Arab Spring, have targeted autocratic rulersacross the Middle East and called for democratic and social reform. Egypt and Tunisia have seen a change of regime, while Libya has plunged into civil war and Syria has experienced violent reactions from its own government. The revolts across the region are creating a separation between political ideologies, where a populist movement for liberation exists on one side, and on the other side is the incumbent regime with consolidated but challenged power. One of the most rigid regimes of the Middle East is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whose monarchy remains in full control despite the instability of its neighbors. Saudi allies have fallen out of power in recent months, including former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia responded quickly by distributing about $36 billion in state funds to youth throughout the country, hoping that money would satisfy any lurking desire to follow the examples of other Arab populations. The result, however, of the Arab uprisings has affected the population of Saudi Arabia, as demands for reform are being offered to the government while protests are emerging for different causes but with small turnouts. The list of demands includes lower taxes, better support for those unable to work, a solution to unemployment rates, higher minimum wages, and a cancellation of some restrictions on women (Bar’el). However, this is hardly radical, as this list calls for only a brief number of economic changes and very little social reform, even concerning women. What it lacks is any demand for governmental reform, regime change, civil liberties, or religious freedom. When compared to the revolutions of other Arab states, the issues in Saudi Arabia are of an entirely different nature. These demonstrations, however, have already been met with a violent response, urging them into the same categories of neighboring movements. Human Rights Watch claims that over 160 dissidents have been locked up since February. Protests were not limited to the usual Sunni Muslim citizens of Saudi Arabia, but also consisted of separate movements by Shia members of society who were speaking out against religious intolerance and the imprisonment of peaceful activists. As if reaffirming what the Shia Muslims were protesting, Saudi police made arrests in April that included a prominent intellectual leader of the Shia sect, Al-Saeed al-Majid. (HRW) The Saudi government has been forced into a position of vigilance, as it intends to swift put down any attempt to destabilize the country. Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al-Sheikh, a top Muslim authority with close ties to the Saudi royal family, decried the uprisings as “chaotic acts” that “have come from the enemies of Islam and those who serve them”. (Saudi) This statement may refer to Western powers, although Saudi Arabia usually depends on the American military for security on its borders and throughout the region—especially in the Gulf. The Gulf itself is in many ways entirely separate from the greater Arab world in that it tends to look inward rather than out. While Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt all have been concerned with their own neighbors as well as what is happening within their borders, Saudi Arabia looks across the Gulf to Iran, a rising Persian Shia power that is the antithesis of the Arab Sunni monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula. The Grand Mufti’s quote may indeed be referring to Iran and the Shia sect as the enemies of Islam, thus supporting Saudi crackdown on Shia protests. Saudi Arabia has taken specific action outside its borders, and has arguably put more focus into its foreign policy over its domestic policy in reaction to the regional uprisings. Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, Bahrain, is a Sunni monarchy as well, but rules over a Shia Muslim majority. In Bahrain, the government faced a grave threat as its citizens sought to uproot the monarchy, and the Saudi government shared the sensation. In March, Saudi troops were sent to Bahrain to quell the protests, reportedly on a request from the Bahraini government as part of a Gulf Cooperation Council pact for common defense. About a thousand Saudi troops arrived on Bahraini soil, as concern grew about the unrest in Bahrain leading to further unrest in the Gulf region. As a whole, the GCC have not seen the scale of popular dissent that North Africa and the Near East have seen. Saudi Arabia’s motivation is not only this security alliance, but may also be affected by rumors of Iranian support for the Shia uprisings in Bahrain—part of a larger fear of Iranian influence overshadowing that of Saudi Arabia. (Kessler) The concern over Iran may just as well be an excuse for Saudi intervention in Bahrain, as Saudi Arabia is probably more afraid of its own population taking over than of facing Iran. Reports claim that King Abdullah is indeed looking inward as he beefs up security, and has even made arrangements for Pakistani troops to enter Saudi Arabia to act on behalf og the monarchy in the case of a full-force popular uprising (Indyk). The government has also publicly threatened to “cut off any finger” that is raised against the monarchy’s rule (Lulu). It seems that the overall effect in Saudi Arabia has been a nervous reaction that seeks to contain its own popular as well as ensure that no revolutionary ideals flourish and succeed within the GCC, a reaction sprung from the downfall of Saudi allies in Tunisia and Egypt. The government is paying off its citizens while threatening them at the same time, as well as offering no reform to even a short, modest list of demands. Indeed, the Saudi ruling family intends to keep a strong grip on its power, and will exercise it in both domestic and foreign settings. The Saudi population, however, has expressed a shift in its sense of community and in its values. While the government has had little opposition from its citizens in the past, the current trend is a growing voice in media and local settings against the long-standing tradition. The Saudi government will allow women to vote in local elections now, showing a change in community attitudes that is not reflected in the monarchy. While changes for women are demanded, Saudi men still do not want to see a process of Westernization, showing that the shift in values has its limits (Bar’el). Over 30,000 people have expressed their support for democratic reform on Facebook pages, and these online communities called for organized protests that never manifested themselves. Police continued to make arrests at the sight of anti-government gatherings, but there was little incident of clashes or mass gathers (Said). Nonetheless, the Saudi people may still foster a growing democratic desire, and are only held back by an even greater fear of government reaction. The situation in Saudi Arabia is not one that is marked by successful or even competent resistance from the population. Instead, it is akin to the dissent seen in other strong authoritarian regimes such as Iran, China, and Russia. Iran has experienced well-known citizen protests, but Iranians are under constant surveillance of their government and have little ability to rise up against its superior power. Popular movements such as Iran’s Green revolution are a larger version of the small-scale protests see in Saudi Arabia, where anti-government demonstrations have failed to live up to the expectations of outside observers and the government still remains in full power. The Shia minority in Saudi Arabia can also be compared to the Kurdish minorities in both Iran and Turkey who have time and again been repelled by the government when they seek to rise up in support of their own rights. Similar minority movements exist in Russia, where Muslims in the Caucasus region hardly approve of Russian rule that show discrimination against such marginal populations, and pockets of revolt and uprising have had little effect on the government. The Saudi effort to quell Shia uprisings in Bahrain may also be reminiscent of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008-2009, as both Russia and Saudi Arabia sought to create a buffer that would protect them from experiencing unrest within their own borders. The reigning characteristics of these events are a strong central government that has a hegemony throughout its region that is defined by the power to control and contain events that may threaten the status quo. Just as Russia has made little change to its policy toward minority Muslim populations and Iran has given no credence to the Green Revolution, Saudi Arabia maintains a tight grip within its own borders and offers little opportunity for its minority populations—or a majority—to protest peacefully nor violently. The rumors that Saudi Arabia has arranged for Pakistani troops to assist in case of any possible uprising is also similar to Muammar al-Qaddafi’s use of foreign troops against his own citizens. In both cases, the ruling regime has recognized that loyalty to the government may be scarce among the native population. While the Egyptian military stood with the greater populations, Saudi and Libyan oil money both have the ability to pay for outside intervention that will prevent any such dilemma. Finally, events in Saudi Arabia could come to resemble Syria, where the government is surrounded by a hostile citizenry and finds its most effective options for retaining power is in violently suppressing uprisings rather than attempting to negotiate with an agenda that is completely contrary the government’s authoritarian principles. Saudi Arabia is the leading power in the GCC, and realizes that it can withstand the uprisings in the Arab world as a whole better than it can withstand any unrest in the Gulf. As long as the Gulf remains stable, oil income can continue to flow unmolested, and the monarchy can retain its power. Saudi reaction has led to increased security, and the monarchy will continue to carefully watch its own population as well as its neighbors to ensure that there is no strong, organized threat to its rule. Works Cited Bar'el, Zvi. "When Will the Protests Hit Saudi Arabia?" Haaretz.com. 9 Mar. 2011. Web. . "HRW: Over 160 Saudi Activists Arrested since February." The Daily Star. 22 Apr. 2011. Web. . Indyk, Martin. "Amid the Arab Spring, Obama's Dilemma over Saudi Arabia." NOW Lebanon. 8 Apr. 2011. Web. . Kessler, Oren. "Saudis, UAE Send Troops to Bahrain to Help Quell Protests." Jerusalem Post. 14 Mar. 2011. Web. . Lulu, Tahiyya. "Saudi Hegemony vs. the Arab Spring." Jadaliyya. 10 Apr. 2011. Web. . Said, Summer. "Saudi Protests Draw Hundreds." WSJ.com. The Wall Street Journal, 12 Mar. 2011. Web. . "Saudi Religious Head Slams Arab Uprisings." NOW Lebanon. 5 Feb. 2011. Web. . Read More