The Role of the United Nations in Transforming Global Governance - Essay Example

 The Role of the United Nations in Transforming Global Governance Introduction Global governance can be best defined as the “political interaction of multi-national individuals attempting to solve problems or issues which affect more than simply one region” (Davison, 2004: 82). The United Nations was developed so as to act as a regulatory body and as a decision-maker regarding global initiatives, with modern efforts aimed at providing a more democratic global environment for citizens across the world. This paper will describe the role of the United Nations in transforming global governance to be more legitimate, democratic and transparent, drawing off of secondary research literature describing the role of the United Nations as both a peacekeeping organisation and ensuring human rights as related to democracy. The modern United Nations As a peacekeeping entity, with a focus on democratisation as an outcome for maintaining global stability, the United Nations has recently come under considerable scrutiny in regards to whether the agency has failed in the task of guiding post-conflict societies, such as Kosovo, toward political stability (Pritchard, 2001: 185). Having an ideology focused around democracy as the most viable method of national governance, likely inspired by the many Westernised nations incorporating the United Nations, the UN appears to have adopted the values of democracy, in terms of promoting human rights and maintaining global peace and stability. As part of their governing authority, various resolutions are created which focus on sanctioning nations which maintain potential threats to international stability. The aforementioned is quite evident in the UN today as the United Nations has agreed to a new round of sanctions on Iran due to the threat of chemical and biological warfare stemming from the nation (Financial Times, 2008). Using their authority for global governance, the new sanctions involved attempts to stop the flow of nuclear materials into Iran and to halt the efforts of those who support underground nuclear sales (Financial Times). Additional sanctions include restricting travel for Iranians expected to be involved in nuclear efforts. The main concept of these new UN sanctions are to send the public message that the agency believes in democratisation as an expected outcome of global governance, publicising efforts to halt activities of nations which provide threats to democratic living and the promotion of human rights. However, despite the best efforts of the UN, the agency is continuously under attack for failing to meet social or civil expectations. For instance, peacekeeping forces in Sudan, a country riddled with economic and social problems, appear to have missed their strategic mark in terms of transforming the Sudanese political and economic environment (Morris, 2008). The UN Security Council has begun distributing peacekeeping forces across Sudan (and further abroad) but has stretched the peacekeeping forces’ resources so far that the agency has been unable to deliver on promises of creating democratic stability or economic improvements on a global level. Thus, it might be said that the public relations campaigns of the United Nations, in terms of promoting their efforts to provide a more democratically-inspired international environment, are one of the largest elements of global governance which fully make efforts toward global democratisation more transparent to the stakeholder community. Hence, despite the agency’s inability to satisfy social expectations regarding the UN role as a promoter of democracy, the agency maintains a marketing focus which promotes its internal and external activities to ensure the social community that the UN remains focused on changing difficult national heritages into stable democracies. Additionally, the United Nations has maintained a UN refugee agency, which allows for assistance programmes for individuals seeking refuge from difficult political climates. Peel (2008) offers that Iraqi refugees seeking asylum in more stable, democratic nations, has doubled since last year at a total of 45,200 individuals. In some respects, the UN refugee agency might be creating a double-edged sword in terms of maintaining positive international relationships. Western influences, the strongest backers of democracy and transformational leadership, exert significant pressure on the UN to support efforts related to democratisation, especially in the Middle East region which is currently plagued with warfare and commercial expansionary efforts on behalf of the United States and its allies. When the UN begins accepting or transferring refugees from areas in conflict (in terms of different social values stemming from Iraqi and U.S. citizens), this creates a conflict of interest between broader UN goals and those strictly stemming from the U.S. This conflict in democratic values is also illustrated with the U.S. focus on destroying vast acres of poppy fields in Afghanistan due to the Westernised belief that such drug production becomes a global threat. Essentially, where the UN attempts to wean Afghan farmers from the opium drug trade, the U.S. would rather spray and burn their products to end what is perceived as a global problem (Soble, 2008). In this scenario, the UN remains under constant pressure by nations such as the United States, thus any resolutions or efforts designed to curb Afghan opium production are well-publicised and serve to promote that the UN strongly backs a democratic ideology. Further, Westernised values favour democratic living, especially in capitalistic societies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. With the international call for technological development and commercial production, the UN is currently pushing for a new approach to transforming various national economies from weak, low-skills manufacturing to highly technological, thus maintaining pace with the developed/developing world (Daneshkhu, 2007). Hence, modernisation is an aspect of UN global governance which is, again, well-publicised to illustrate the agency’s international focus on development and technological gains. Conclusion The United Nations maintains significant pressures from other nations to promote the Westernised agenda in terms of social rights and democratic advances. Clearly, the United States (as one primary advocate) is a strong supporter of democratisation on an international level, thus it is pressures from this nation (and others with similar values) that force the UN to publicise its efforts toward democratisation. Thus, from a global governance perspective, the UN capitalises on public opinion as a means of dictating democratisation policy across the globe. Bibliography Daneshkhu, Scheherazade. (2007). ‘UN agency calls for aid focus to shift on to technology’. Financial Times. 20 Jul 2007: 7. Davison, A.R. (2004). ‘New Guidelines for Global Governance and Transnational Policy’. Journal of Foreign Affairs, 33(2): 82. Financial Times. (2008). ‘UN agrees new round of sanctions on Iran’. 4 Mar 2008: 8. Morris, Harvey. (2008). ‘Ambitious UN attacked for overload on peackeepers’. Financial Times. London (UK). 12 Mar 2008: 6. Peel, Quentin. (2008). ‘Asylum bids by Iraqis increase’. Financial Times. 18 Mar 2008: 9. Soble, Jonathan. (2008). ‘US and allies split on Afghan poppy spraying’. Financial Times. London (UK). 6 Feb 2008: 2. Pritchard, Sarah. (2001). ‘United Nations Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Efforts: New and Continuing Challenges in the Case of East Timor’. UNSW Law Journal, 24(1). Retrieved 12 Mar 2008 from http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2001/Pritchard%20FF(e).pdf Appendices A: Case Study Articles for UN Project 2001 Comment: New and Continuing Challenges in East Timor 183 UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS: NEW AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES IN THE CASE OF EAST TIMOR SARAH PRITCHARD* I INTRODUCTION This commentary is intended to contextualise and expand upon Hansjoerg Strohmeyer’s article in this issue of the University of New South Wales Law Journal on post-conflict reconstruction of the judicial system in East Timor.1 In this commentary, I provide a brief overview of the history of United Nations (‘UN’) involvement in the governance of post-conflict societies generally, and describe some of the specific difficulties – both new and continuing – encountered by the UN mission in East Timor in responding to the challenge of creating a fair, transparent and effective judicial system as a critical part of its peace-building efforts in that country. I I UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN THE GOVERNANCE OF POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES Since the end of the Cold War, the role of the UN in the governance of postconflict societies has expanded significantly. Prior to and during the Cold War, the UN was frequently involved in monitoring borders and ceasefires, and in the conduct and monitoring of elections. However, this involved little actual governance of territories.2 Under art 77 of the United Nations Charter (‘UN Charter’), the international trusteeship system applied to territories previously placed under League of Nations mandate, that is, those which had been detached from ‘enemy states’ as a result of the Second World War and voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. The UN’s role in relation to such territories was typically limited to general supervision, with actual * Barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 1 Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, ‘Policing the Peace: Post-Conflict Judicial System Reconstruction in East Timor’ (2001) 24 University of New South Wales Law Journal 171. 2 See generally Michael Matheson, ‘United Nations Governance in Postconflict Societies’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 76 184 UNSW Law Journal Volume 24(1) governance carried out by the state which was granted the trusteeship.3 During transition from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian control in 1962-63, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority administered Irian Jaya (western New Guinea) for seven months pursuant to an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In 1967, the UN asserted the right to govern the territory of Namibia after the General Assembly terminated the trusteeship acquired by South Africa under the League of Nations. When South Africa finally withdrew from Namibia, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group was created to monitor the cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. However, the UN did not engage in governance.4 The first major UN exercise in governance came with the 1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.5 The Agreement created the Supreme National Council, composed of representatives of the various Cambodian factions, which delegated governmental functions to the UN to be exercised by a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (‘UNTAC’). UNTAC was created and given its mandate by the Security Council acting not pursuant to its mandatory powers in Chapter VII of the UN Charter but pursuant to its Chapter VI powers to make recommendations to states for the settlement of disputes. Subsequent to the signing of the 1991 Cambodian accord, the Security Council exercised its Chapter VII powers on numerous occasions to, inter alia, end conflicts, disarm hostile forces and restore order. In May 1994, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council adopted Resolution 940,6 authorising Member States to form a multilateral force to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership and the restoration of the legitimate authorities. This mandate did not extend to the governance of Haiti. In December 1995, by Resolution 1031,7 again adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, the Security Council endorsed the deployment, under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,8 of a multinational implementation force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (‘NATO’). But again, governance was left to the Bosnian authorities. In 1999, the Kosovo conflict presented a different situation for the international community. The NATO air campaign began in March, and by its conclusion the province was in a state of economic and social chaos, with no functioning system of governance and the displacement of more than three quarters of the population. On 10 June 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, authorising, inter alia, the establishment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of an ‘interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence … to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional 3 Ibid 76; Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations (1994) 933-72. 4 Matheson, above n 2, 77. 5 23 October 1991, ATS 1991 No 40. 6 SC Res 940, UN SCOR (3413th mtg), UN Doc S/Res/940 (1994). 7 SC Res 1031, UN SCOR (3607th mtg), UN Doc S/Res/1031 (1995). 8 Initialed in Dayton on 21 November 1995, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. 2001 Comment: New and Continuing Challenges in East Timor 185 democratic self-governing institutions’.9 In response, the Secretary-General created the international civil presence known as the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (‘UNMIK’), and appointed a special representative possessing all executive authority with respect to Kosovo.10 Several months later, in the aftermath of the popular consultation in East Timor on 30 August 1999, the international community was confronted with the almost total destruction of East Timor – the collapse of civil administration and the judicial system, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Again acting pursuant to Chapter VII, the Security Council, by Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999,11 established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (‘UNTAET’), which was ‘endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and … empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice’.12 Like UNMIK, UNTAET identified as immediate priorities – apart from addressing the humanitarian disaster and facilitating the return of refugees – the restoration of governance and administration though the reconstruction of essential infrastructure, provision of basic social services, recruitment of civil servants, the revival of trade and commerce, and the rebuilding of the justice and law enforcement system.13 The complex and large-scale governance functions assumed by the UN in Kosovo and East Timor raise important policy questions about the capacity of the UN to perform such functions in territories severely affected by conflict. In weighing such questions, much will depend on whether the UN is judged to have succeeded or failed in the task of guiding post-conflict societies towards political stability, economic recovery and reconciliation. II I DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY UNTAET IN POSTCONFLICT JUDICIAL SYSTEM RECONSTRUCTION IN EAST TIMOR In his contribution in this issue of the University of New South Wales Law Journal, Strohmeyer concentrates on one of the major tasks faced by UNTAET in establishing a functioning governmental structure in East Timor: the reconstruction of the judicial and legal system. Strohmeyer argues that this task must, in general, be among a UN mission’s top priorities from the earliest stages of deployment in a post-conflict situation. 9 SC Res 1244, UN SCOR (4011th mtg), UN Doc S/Res/1244 (1999). 10 On the daunting tasks awaiting the UN upon its arrival in Pristina, see Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 46, 48 ff. 11 SC Res 1272, UN SCOR (4057th mtg), UN Doc S/Res/1272 (1999). 12 On the tasks awaiting the UN upon its arrival in Dili, see Strohmeyer, above n 1, 172-9; Strohmeyer, above n 10, 50 ff. 13 See Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN Doc S/2000/53 (2000) [40]-[62]. 186 UNSW Law Journal Volume 24(1) Strohmeyer discusses some of the major priorities and challenges identified and experienced by UNTAET in the early stages of its attempts to create a functioning judicial and legal system. He then provides a description of the main tasks assumed by UNTAET, namely: the creation of a legal framework within which law enforcement and judicial institutions could operate; the selection of judicial personnel; the prosecution of crimes against humanity; and consideration of the role of customary law and customary forms of justice. Strohmeyer was both Acting Principal Legal Adviser and then Deputy Principal Legal Adviser to UNTAET from October 1999 to June 2000, and was therefore well placed to describe the destruction and the challenges confronting UNTAET in the early days of the mission. In this section, I will endeavour to comment upon some of the areas in which UNTAET has encountered both new and continuing difficulties in the period since June 2000, both in meeting the challenges posed by judicial system reconstruction, and in performing the tasks assumed by it at the beginning of its mission. A Non-prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity and Gross Violations of Human Rights Of particular concern to observers from East Timorese civil society, such as independent lawyer and co-founder of the East Timorese Jurists Association, Aderito de Jesus Soares, as well as international non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’), are the difficulties encountered and lack of progress made by UNTAET in prosecuting crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights perpetrated in connection with the August 1999 popular consultation. On 13 June 2001, some 70 organisations with long-standing links with the peoples of Indonesia and East Timor (including La’o Hamutuk and other East Timorese NGOs) published a statement entitled Justice for East Timor, concerning the administration of justice for gross violations of human rights committed in East Timor. The primary purpose of the statement was to call upon the international community to set up an international tribunal for East Timor to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights. The organisations expressed concern about the performance of UNTAET and the East Timorese judicial system in delivering justice: The judicial system in East Timor has also failed to deliver justice to date. Investigations by the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (‘SCIU’) of UNTAET have been unacceptably slow. The SCIU initially concentrated on a select few cases and major atrocities, such as that committed at the Suai church compound on 6 September 1999 when dozens were murdered, have not been properly investigated. There are persistent reports that the SCIU’s work is severely hampered by problems relating to a lack of resources, management conflicts, poor communications, the lack of clear policy guidelines, and a reluctance to expose the systematic nature of the 1999 violence. There are also allegations of political interference in the judicial process.14 Accordingly, it is critical that the necessary structural and management changes are made and sufficient resources and personnel allocated to the SCIU 14 Justice for East Timor (2001) [14]. 2001 Comment: New and Continuing Challenges in East Timor 187 so that it can conduct credible investigations and prosecutions which take into account the systematic and planned nature of the 1999 violence. Observers from East Timorese civil society and international NGOs have also commented on the lack of due process attending the prosecution of some of the serious crimes. For example, there is a critical shortage of public defenders, with the consequence that many defendants have little comprehension of their rights, or of the proceedings in which they are involved. The lack of properly trained and adequately equipped judges and adequate interpreter services are also of concern. In a recent letter to Colin L Powell, United States Secretary of State, some 35 NGOs wrote: Further, East Timor’s own justice system is severely under-resourced and will likely become even more so upon the reduction of UN support once independence is declared, prohibiting investigations and trials of the magnitude needed to achieve justice. Currently, prosecutions are fraught with procedural and other errors, judicial infrastructure is poor, and highly-trained judicial personnel are scarce.15 At the same time, efforts to bring to justice in East Timor those responsible for crimes against humanity have been hindered by the inability to extradite, let alone question, military, police and militia leaders in Indonesia. In the letter to Secretary of State Powell, the 35 NGOs stated that [a]lthough UNTAET investigators have shared information with their Indonesian counterparts, reciprocity has not been forthcoming. UN investigators who traveled to Jakarta to question Indonesian suspects and witnesses were not permitted to do so despite the April 2000 Memorandum of Understanding signed between the UN and Indonesia. The chief of Indonesia’s armed forces, Admiral Widodo, has publicly refused to cooperate with any UN investigations. Indonesia’s parliament supports this position. This leaves the East Timorese courts with access only to low-level militia; officers with command responsibility are out of reach. Basing East Timor’s new democracy on the principle of [the] rule of law is made extremely difficult when those who designed and perpetrated heinous crimes are, in effect, above the law. It is essential, therefore, that UNTAET and the Security Council acknowledge the existence of overwhelming political and legal obstacles in the way of meaningful trials in Indonesia. Many of those obstacles have in fact been introduced since Indonesia first committed itself in 1999 to bring the perpetrators of the violence in East Timor before its own courts. It has become incontrovertible that the Indonesian authorities are unable to administer meaningful justice in relation to the crimes committed in East Timor. The international community’s inaction can no longer be justified. Civil society observers in East Timor are also agreed that the difficulties of the East Timorese judicial system in bringing the perpetrators to justice is having a serious effect on the building of confidence in, and respect for, the rule of law. The implications are grave, not only for the development of a commitment to the rule of law and confidence in the judicial and legal systems, but also for efforts to repatriate those refugees remaining in West Timor. According to the 70 organisations who endorsed the statement Justice for East Timor: 15 Dated 6 June 2001. 188 UNSW Law Journal Volume 24(1) The absence of credible justice in East and West Timor is seriously undermining attempts to repatriate those among the 100 000 or so refugees remaining in West Timor who wish to return home. The failure to prosecute those responsible for serious crimes helps to fuel an environment in which intimidation is widespread, humanitarian assistance is severely hampered and refugees are unable to make free and informed decisions about where they wish to live.16 B Inadequate Professional Training and Support Observers from East Timorese civil society and international NGOs have also commented on the insufficient attention which has been given to support for and training of the judiciary, prosecutors and lawyers. The training which has been provided has been uncoordinated and without continuity; it has also been of a theoretical, rather than applied nature, with little emphasis on the Indonesian procedural and other laws which the judges are required to apply. Little, if any, training has been provided in practical judicial skills such as decision writing, drafting directions and orders, and following courtroom procedure. While a mentoring system was adopted early on, as described by Strohmeyer, it is reported that many judges sat alone during the hearing of early cases. Numerous concerns have been raised about the inadequate supply of the texts of relevant Indonesian laws, with many judges sitting without legislation or with photocopies made by them at their own expense. The Dili Court House Library first acquired a complete set of Indonesian legislation in December 2000. The judges’ dissatisfaction with low salaries and inadequate personal security are widely known. The need for greater professional and financial support for inexperienced East Timor judges, prosecutors and defenders is manifest. East Timorese lawyers such as de Jesus Soares are calling for a comprehensive reassessment of the training needs of judges, prosecutors and lawyers, and the institutionalisation of a coordinated, ongoing system focused on practical training needs. C Non-establishment of a Mechanism to Address Land and Property Disputes Despite Strohmeyer’s identification of the establishment of a mechanism to address land and property disputes as one of the main challenges in the building of the judicial system in East Timor, no such mechanism has been established to date. A draft regulation was rejected by the National Council in December 2000. Accordingly, there are no mechanisms or standards for resolving the highly sensitive, politically volatile and numerous land and property disputes. The result is that such disputes are being dealt with by the Dili District Court in its civil jurisdiction. The decisions of the District Court in land and property matters, such as that in the Hotel Dili Case determined in the last week of June 2001, have been highly controversial. Approximately 700 complaints concerning land and property disputes have been received by UNTAET’s land and property unit. East Timorese lawyer de 16 Above n 14, [15]. 2001 Comment: New and Continuing Challenges in East Timor 189 Jesus Soares predicts that unless UNTAET acts to reinvigorate discussion of appropriate norms and mechanisms for the resolution of such disputes, East Timor will be left with huge, possibly intractable, but certainly politically explosive problems upon independence. D Inadequate Supply and Training of Interpreters Observers from East Timorese civil society and international NGOs have also commented on the general lack, and the very poor level, of interpreting services in court. There has been little if any training of East Timorese in the skills of courtroom interpreting or in legal terminology. Few East Timorese interpreters have competence in both English and Bahasa Indonesian. East Timorese lawyers have commented on the many mistakes in the translation into Bahasa Indonesian of critical UN documents, such as Regulation No 2000/30 on transitional rules of criminal procedure.17 E Lack of Civics Education Some observers have also commented on the lack of civics education in the first 18 months of UNTAET’s mission. The lack of knowledge about peoples’ basic legal rights is said to have helped to contribute to a climate in which violence was able to prosper. In May 2001, in the lead-up to the election for the Constituent Assembly on 30 August, the first civics education was commenced. Criticism has been directed at the rushed manner of delivery and narrow focus of such education. Until May 2001, all information and training about legal rights and human rights was provided by the non-governmental sector. F No Attention to Issues of Customary Law Despite Strohmeyer’s identification of consideration of the role of customary law and customary forms of justice administration as one of the main tasks of UNTAET, these matters have not as yet been the subject of any research or official discussion. The potential of traditional local methods of dispute resolution in post-conflict reconstruction, democratisation and stabilisation, and in easing pressure on the fledgling court system, needs to be properly explored.18 IV CONCLUSIONS The joint UNTAET-World Bank background paper prepared for the International Donors’ Meeting (held in Canberra on 14 and 15 May 2001) contains only three sentences on judicial capacity building. This is somewhat 17 UNTAET Regulation No 2000/30 on Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure. UNTAET Regulations are available at at 27 May 2001. 18 See Jennifer Widner, ‘Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s Perspective on the African Case’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 64. 190 UNSW Law Journal Volume 24(1) surprising given that the very authority and credibility of the UN’s mission in East Timor is at stake in its response to the challenge of creating a fair, transparent and effective judicial system. The task of creating a stable legal system presents a particular challenge in a society such as East Timor where, under Portuguese colonial administration and repressive Indonesian occupation, there was little opportunity for the East Timorese people to develop an understanding of and commitment to concepts such as the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. After one and a half years, the UN mission in East Timor is currently confronted with a crisis in confidence in the judicial system on the part of the East Timorese political leadership and civil society. If enthusiastic judges who have admitted to a need for assistance must continue to express frustration at a perceived lack of institutional support, the prospects for the development of a corruption-free judicial system and a flourishing rule of law in independent East Timor are less than good. UN agrees new round of sanctions on Iran; [USA 2ND EDITION] Financial Times. London (UK): Mar 4, 2008. pg. 8 Abstract (Summary) A statement agreed by the foreign ministers of the UN's big five and Germany said proposals for a negotiated settlement would offer Iran and the region "substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits". The six were prepared further to develop proposals first put to Iran two years ago, the statement said. The European sponsors revised their original text to highlight the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to welcome its agreement with Iran on resolving all outstanding questions about its nuclear intentions. The western position was last week strengthened by evidence presented by the IAEA indicating that Iran continued nuclear weapons research until as late as 2004. Among the IAEA evidence were documents showing Iran was looking to design a "spherical warhead" suitable for the Shahab-3 missile that would explode at a height of 600 metres. The IAEA official who gave last week's briefing in Vienna excluded the possibility that an explosion at that altitude could be related to chemical or biological weapons. The IAEA also said at the briefing that it had been forbidden to interview Mohsen Fakrizadeh, the official who ran the weaponisation studies for Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. Full Text (642  words) (Copyright Financial Times Ltd. 2008. All rights reserved.) By JAMES BLITZ and HARVEY MORRIS The United Nations Security Council imposed a third package of sanctions against Iran yesterday, targeting individuals most closely involved with its alleged nuclear weapons programme and turning up the heat on banks suspected of financing it. In a separate statement, the five permanent members of the council and Germany nevertheless said they were committed to pushing for an early negotiated settlement of the standoff with Tehran. The sanctions were agreed in January by the permanent members of the council, including Russia and China. But four non-permanent members - South Africa, Indonesia, Libya and Vietnam - subsequently questioned the need for further measures after previous restrictions failed to persuade Tehran to abandon uranium enrichment. The vote was passed 14-0 with Indonesia abstaining on the basis that Iran was co-operating with the UN's nuclear watchdog and that more sanctions were not the best course. A statement agreed by the foreign ministers of the UN's big five and Germany said proposals for a negotiated settlement would offer Iran and the region "substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits". The six were prepared further to develop proposals first put to Iran two years ago, the statement said. The new measures contained in UN resolution 1803 will impose travel restrictions on Iranians suspected of involvement in a nuclear weapons programme and demands greater vigilance by UN states over the activities of Iranian banks, including Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Member states are also encouraged to avoid granting export credit guarantees that could be used to finance the nuclear programme and to search ships and planes suspected of carrying banned cargoes. Mohammad Khazaee, the Iranian envoy to the UN, lambasted the council for what he described as an "unjust and irrational decision on Iran's peaceful nuclear programme". Referring to previous international pledges of co-operation with a civilian -Iranian programme, he said: "There has never been, nor will there ever be, guarantees that our needs for fuel will be completely provided by foreign sources." Diplomats acknowledged that the package was weaker than they wanted and had been watered down to gain support in the council. Pressure exerted to try to win unanimity included a direct appeal by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, to Thabo Mbeki, his South African counterpart, on a visit to South Africa last week. The European sponsors revised their original text to highlight the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to welcome its agreement with Iran on resolving all outstanding questions about its nuclear intentions. The western position was last week strengthened by evidence presented by the IAEA indicating that Iran continued nuclear weapons research until as late as 2004. A US intelligence estimate last year that Iran had suspended such activity in 2003 took some of the urgency out of the debate over the nuclear programme. The IAEA, however, presented diplomats with intelligence indicating that the weaponisation studies had continued until January 2004. According to diplomats who attended the IAEA briefing, the agency said it had a wide range of documentation - including video evidence - that pointed to attempts by Iran to militarise its nuclear programme. Among the IAEA evidence were documents showing Iran was looking to design a "spherical warhead" suitable for the Shahab-3 missile that would explode at a height of 600 metres. The IAEA official who gave last week's briefing in Vienna excluded the possibility that an explosion at that altitude could be related to chemical or biological weapons. The IAEA also said at the briefing that it had been forbidden to interview Mohsen Fakrizadeh, the official who ran the weaponisation studies for Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. Tehran, which insists its nuclear programme - including uranium enrichment - is purely peaceful, has dismissed the evidence as fabricated and warned that further measures against it would complicate the issue. Ambitious UN attacked for overload on peacekeepers HARVEY MORRIS. Financial Times. London (UK): Mar 12, 2008. pg. 6 Abstract (Summary) The crisis facing the peace force last week prompted countries that could provide help, including the US, to form a Friends of Unamid group to discuss how to provide resources to the peacekeepers, ranging from helicopters for patrolling the region to clean water for the military units. "Nobody can be proud of what we have done yet, nobody," said Richard Williamson, President George W. Bush's special envoy to Sudan. "The areas we cannot reach have grown in the last year, not shrunk. The malnutrition has gotten worse, not better." Full Text (424  words) (Copyright Financial Times Ltd. 2008. All rights reserved.) The United Nations Security Council is criticised today for authorising big peacekeeping missions around the world in spite of warnings that demands on troop contributors are overtaking their ability to deliver. "Repeated warnings of overstretch did not forestall the authorisation of ambitious new mandates by the Security Council and regional organisations," says the New York-based Center on International Co-operation in its annual report on global peace operations. The criticism was made as the Security Council met to consider the latest report from Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary-general, on Darfur, where deployment of a combined UN and African Union peace force, Unamid, is badly behind schedule as the result of lack of vital res-our-ces and delaying tactics by the Sudanese government. "The mission was a compromise from the start," Sarjoh Bah, editor of the CIC report, told the Financial Times, "because Sudan resisted a UN-only force." In his report, Mr Ban lamented the slow pace of deployment and noted Sudan's failure to accept a number of units from non-African countries. With Unamid at less than half its intended strength of 26,000 peacekeepers, Mr Ban said it would "not be in a position to effectively fulfil its mandate or meet the tremendous expectations of Darfur's civilians with the meagre human and material resources currently in the mission area". An estimated 2.5m people have been driven from their land since the Darfur conflict broke out in 2003 and at least 200,000 have been killed. The violence continues in the absence of a peace settlement between Khartoum and rebels and is restricting the activity of aid agencies. The crisis facing the peace force last week prompted countries that could provide help, including the US, to form a Friends of Unamid group to discuss how to provide resources to the peacekeepers, ranging from helicopters for patrolling the region to clean water for the military units. "Nobody can be proud of what we have done yet, nobody," said Richard Williamson, President George W. Bush's special envoy to Sudan. "The areas we cannot reach have grown in the last year, not shrunk. The malnutrition has gotten worse, not better." The CIC report said some of the problems of international peacekeeping by both the UN and regional organisations stemmed from decisions to deploy forces in spite of the absence of peace agreements on the ground. "By year-end, peacekeeping was becoming a victim of its own success," the report said. "The complexity of operations began to outstrip the ability of inter-national organisations to keep peace." UN translator admits to visa fraud scam, www.ft.com/globaleconomy Read More