Beslan Crisis: Implications for Terrorists, Civil Society, and Lessons Learned - Essay Example

? Beslan Crisis: Implications for Terrorists, Civil Society, and Lessons Learned 3 December On September 2004, a fully-armed group consisting of different ethnicities, some of them were Chechens, took over Beslan’s School No. 1 in Beslan, Russia and held more than 1,000 of the school’s inhabitants as their hostages. The hostage crisis lasted for 52 hours, where 146 adults and 186 children died, while 700 suffered injuries (Satter, 2009). Satter (2009), Zarakhovich (2006), and Banovac et al. (2007) asserted that Russia must be held responsible for what happened in Beslan because it was an internal insurgency conflict that was turned into a terrorism act by the Russian government. The official statement of the Russian government is that the Beslan hostage crisis was a terrorist act, and that it did not know the demands of the hostage takers. Satter (2009) asserted that the “terrorists” sent the government a video cassette of their demands to negotiator Ruslan Aushev, the previous president of Ingushetiya. Shamil Basaev, the Chechen “terrorist leader who planned the Beslan attack,” demanded that the Russian forces withdraw from Chechnya and recognize its independence (Banovac et al., 2007, p.5). The essay reviews the incident’s impact on the terrorists, long-term outcomes, effects of civil society, and lessons learned, wherein, the primary effects were fear and frustration for the public and greater authoritarian control for Russia. The terrorists did not accomplish anything positive for their cause. The Russian government controlled the media and information flow during this time, so it was not clear to the public what the hostage-taking was for (Banovac et al., 2007, p.6). Instead, the Russian government used the media blackout to shape public opinion, both nationally and internationally, that the event was a terrorist act that killed hundreds of civilians (Satter, 2009). Aslanbek Aslakhanov, Putin's top aide for Chechnya, stated to the media: “What has happened today you know yourselves was started by terrorists” (Baker & Glasser, 2004, p.1). If the terrorists wanted Chechen independence, the reverse happened. Brandt and Sandler (2008) noted that the absence of past concessions reduced future kidnapping events and it seemed that it worked for Moscow in Beslan. The demand for peace and independence in Chechen never happened. Zarakhovich (2006) reported that Putin invoked “hidden enemies” that threaten the integrity of the country, and he promised to organize the nation to fight terrorism through “the total and cruel and full-scale war” and to establish an efficient crisis-management system, “which will include principally new approaches to law enforcement agencies.” Instead of independence, Chechen leaders were killed and Putin increased its control over the country’s natural resources in contested areas. The long-term outcomes of Beslan included widespread political changes that culminated to greater authoritarian ruling in Russia. President Putin had put Beslan and Russia’s conflict with Chechen rebels into the frame of the international “war on terror” (Banovac et al., 2007, p.38). Putin stressed that there were connections between Beslan’s terrorists and the al-Qaeda because around ten of the terrorists in Beslan were “Arabs,” after which, a picture of a man with Middle-Eastern features was shown to the media (Banovac et al., 2007, p.38). Putin reflected Washington’s 9-11 rhetoric when he said that Russia would attack the locations of the terrorists in a preemptive manner (Banovac et al., 2007, p.38). Russia’s army chief of staff, Yury Baluyevsky, stressed that Moscow would “liquidate terror bases in any region” (Banovac et al., 2007, p.38). Putin opposed demands from the West and the European Union to find political solutions to Chechnya conflict through negotiating with Chechen moderates. He stressed that Russia does not negotiates with people who kill children (Banovac et al., 2007, p.38). Commentators argued that through Beslan, Putin was able to justify greater authoritarian control and repressive checks-and-balances in the government and Russian society. Zarakhovich (2006) Putin's new program for reforms against terrorism: …scrapping popular elections of regional governors; allowing the parliamentary elections only on tightly controlled party ticket…; and launching the so-called Public Chamber as a token Kremlin-controlled voice of civil society. Zarakhovich (2006) noted that two years after Beslan, Putin has completely attained this program. Banovac et al. (2007) confirmed the changes the Putin made in Russia. They reported that the Kremlin centralized power through having the authority to appoint regional governors (p.39). President Putin currently “nominates” candidates, and if the provincial assembly does not approve of his choice three times, he has the power to split up the assembly (Banovac et al., 2007, p.39). To further understand the changes that Putin made in the Russian Parliament, the Parliament’s characteristics should be explained further. The Russian parliament has two parts – the Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house). Members of the Federation Council can hold on to their jobs, until their regional governor resigns. If President Putin seeks to dismantle the Federation Council, he could just dismiss the member’s regional governor (Banovac et al., 2007, p.39). In addition, Putin increased his control over the Duma. Single-constituency voting is no longer applicable, and political parties should attain 7% of the popular vote – instead of 5% before Beslan happened– to have representation in the Duma (Banovac et al., 2007, p.39). Moscow has also created hindrances to the creation of political parties and these parties could not make electoral blocks anymore (Banovac et al., 2007, p.39). These changes support pro-Kremlin parties, but dissuade the opposition (Banovac et al., 2007, p.39). Thus, the political changes were long-term outcomes that centralized power in Moscow. The effects of the Beslan hostage crisis on civil society were mixed frustration and discontentment over the actions of the government after it. Conflicting reports on what truly happened in Beslan made Russia responsible for the hundreds of deaths because of lack of preparation and proper response (Banovac et al., 2007, p.6). An example is the report from Russian MP Yuri Savelyev, an expert on explosions, where he opposed the official records of the Beslan crisis (Zarakhovich, 2006). Savelyev stated that Putin and the military did not plan on conducting a precise offensive to capture the terrorists and to save the hostage victims, and instead, it only reacted to bombs exploding inside the school (Zarakhovich, 2006). He also presented disconcerting evidence that the shots did not come from Russia’s alleged positions, and instead, Russian forces shot first with their bazookas and flamethrowers, which resulted to substantial explosions inside the school and the collapse of the school gym’s roof that killed many children (Zarakhovich, 2006). His reports and other conflicting reports were denied legitimacy by Russia. Because of these reports, Beslan’s victims and their families have not fully gained the justice they deserve. Instead of peace and closure, the paper notes fear and frustration became evident after Beslan showed that Russia can do anything it wants with the evidence and get away with it. The lessons learned are different for the officials and commentaries. For Putin, the lesson learned is that a hard-line approach to insurgency and terrorism is the only best approach. Zarakhovich (2006) suggested that one hostage-taking crisis can result to greater tyranny, instead of a true resolution to internal conflicts. Satter (2009) asserted that Russia is a terrorist too for sacrificing children’s lives, so that it can promote its wider political interests and plans. Banovac et al. (2007) agreed with Satter (2009): “President Putin has successfully exploited the crisis to institute further “reforms” that centralize more power in the Kremlin” (p.7). These reports indicate that though Russia was right to not negotiate with terrorists, it would have also done better by saving more lives through a moderate negotiation. The Beslan crisis has diverse implications for civil society and the Russian government, as well as the terrorists. For the terrorists, no negotiation means that hostage-taking will no longer give them leverage, but it will not stop them for fighting for their causes. For Moscow, Beslan became a ticket to political aspirations for authoritarian changes. Civil society, on the other hand, feels less secure because Beslan is waiting to happen again in a repressed society with little space for democracy. Beslan has ended years ago, but its effects continue to linger on Russian society and governance. References Baker, P., & Glasser, S.B. (2004, September 4). Russia school siege ends in carnage. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58381-2004Sep3.html Banovac, S., Dillon, P., Hennessy, M., Idoko, R., Patterson, C., Paul, A., Sonneborn, I., Steve, C., & Stubbe, K. (2007). Anatomy of a terrorist attack: Terror at Beslan: A chronicle of on-going tragedy and a government’s failed response. Brandt, P.T., & Sandler, T. (2008). Changes and breaks in hostage taking: Understanding terror event dynamics. International Studies Association, 2008 Annual Meeting, 1-28. Satter, D. (2009, October 1). Remembering Beslan. Forbes.com. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/01/beslan-putin-politkovskaya-basaev-dzasokhov-chechen-opinions-contributors-david-satter.html Zarakhovich, Y. (2006, August 31). Should Russia share blame for the Beslan massacre? Time. Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1516216,00.html#ixzz2mN4btvPw Read More