Napoleonic Wars: Influence and Results - Essay Example

Why was France ultimately defeated between 1812 and 1815 There are a number of reasons for the defeat of France between 1812 and 1815, Some were internal to France, such as the nature of Napoleon, and others were external such as the campaigns and the war in Russia, the campaigns in Germany and the ultimate defeat at Waterloo. Maybe Napoleon's personality is the major factor- he never wanted to give up and did not listen to his commanders. Perception is as important as reality within many political relations and within conflicts between countries. In 1812 Napoleon enjoyed a mythology as being almost invincible, even if he might have at least temporary setbacks. By the end of 1813 that mythology of invincibility had disappeared, mainly due to the disastrous campaign in Russia. The background to this campaign was the simplification of national borders and the increase of nationalist sentiments that had at least been catalyzed by French ideas that had developed since the French Revolution. Thus Napoleon's own use of nationalistic sentiment was causing resentment against French domination within other countries (Schom, 1998). This was perhaps not the best time to launch a campaign against a formidable enemy that would take Napoleon far from those countries that were starting to stir against French imperialism. But as with many military commanders both before and since, Napoleon had started to believe in his own legend, and it would eventually lead to his downfall (Gengembre, 2003). In the spring of 1812 Napoleon began to mass his troops in Poland, that was currently under French rule. This was clearly an attempt to intimidate Alexander, who had been showing an increasing tendency not to trust he official alliance between France and Russia. By the summer of 1812 about 453,000 men, probably the largest armed force ever gathered in one place up until that time, had been brought together in Poland. Napoleon called it his Grande Armee, and its message to the Russians was quite clear. The Russians, perhaps aware that the huge spaces and their most formidable "general" in the form of the severe cold of Russia, known as "General Winter", were on their side. Napoleon began to cross the Niemen River into Russia in late June. As would happen 130 years later to Hitler, Napoleon appeared to be advancing with miraculous speed, but in fact the Russians were adopting a "scorched earth policy" in which they destroyed anything of value before retreating in front of the French forces. This meant that the French could not gather together provisions and supplies that would be needed in the coming winter. Drawn to the centre of Russia, with the supposed prize of Moscow, as a moth is to a light, Napoleon advanced through the country until he met the Russian forces at the Battle of Borodino on September 7th, 1812. This was a bloody, violent battle, but was inconclusive as to its result. Even though neither side had gained a clear victory, Napoleon carried on advancing and entered Moscow on about September 14th. The Russians had deserted the city, Alexander would not meet with Napoleon to discuss terms for the Russian "surrender" and much of the city burned down within days of Napoleon's arrival.Napoleon had won perhaps the most Pyrrhic victory of all time: he was faced with a stalemate in which he had taken Moscow, but could not sustain it because his supply lines were desperately strained and he needed to retreat before the full onset of winter. One of the great mistakes that Napoleon had made was having neither enough nor the correct quality horses. In the retreat many of the cavalry had to kill their horses in order to eat them. Many others died of cold, disease and starvation. This meant that Napoleon's forces could receive neither food supplies nor reinforcements nor supplied for their weapons. The French lost about 200,000 horses in the campaign, as well as 1,000 artillery pieces. These were large losses that Napoleon could not really afford considering the various campaigns that were to come. He had also been beaten by the weather, both the Russian summer, which had exhausted his army on the push into Russia and then, more importantly, the Russian winter that decimated the French army. In fact winter in 1812-13 came early and was one of the most severe on record. Napoleon's forces were ill-prepared and suffered from massive attrition due to the cold, starvation, desertion and general illness. When Napoleon crossed the Bereniza river in November, fewer than 10,000 of his Grande Armee were left. With the collapse of the army had come the collapse of the sense of Napoleon's invincibility. Napoleon had made one of the cardinal mistakes that any military leader can make - he had failed to find out as much as possible about the physical and human environment that he was invading. Thus the inhospitable physical environment, essentially the weather, was little understood by Napoleon, and the fact that the Russians would not surrender after Napoleon had "won" a conventional war was not considered by the Emperor. This seems rather odd considering the successes of the past, but some historians, such as Schom, suggest that it was a logical result of Napoleon's "titanic personality". His past achievements, when combined with his utter self-belief, were inevitably going to lead to hubris on the part of the Emperor. Long-present emotions of ill will towards French domination of Europe now appeared, and people felt safer (if not entirely safe) in showing them. Thus in Germany there were a host of anti-French demonstrations. Prussian forces that had been part of the Grande Armee left it in December and essentially became enemies of the French. Soon afterwards the Austrians withdrew their troops and started to become increasingly hostile towards the French. Strife was also present in Italy, where demonstrations against Napoleon had started. How far these developments were a reflection of long-standing bitterness towards the French and how far they were created by the apparent demystification of Napoleon that occurred with his catastrophic miscalculation in Russia is uncertain. Whatever the cause, the French hold on Europe was within a few months rendered much weaker. It is thus understandable that there was a reaction against Napoleon within France as well (Guthenberg, 1980). A general attempted (and nearly succeeded) in carrying out a coup d'etat by stating that Napoleon had in fact been killed in Russia. It was this incident that caused Napoleon to hurry ahead of his army to Paris, causing another blow to his image of always being with his army at its head. Many of his enemies characterized this action as that of a weak coward rather than the probably shrewd political move aimed at survival that it was (Schom, 1998). While Napoleon survived this coup attempt through a series of draconian measures, the raising of money through new taxes and the expansion of the army through new troops, his position, and thus that of France, was permanently weakened. It can be seen that because Napoleon wielded such power within France and its Empire that the fate of the country and its leader were inexorably combined. Had Napoleon been replaced by the coup in 1812 there is a possibility that the French defeat might have been delayed. As it was, the route to it was now set almost irreversibly. By 1813 Napoleon (and thus France) were no longer faced by the armies of mercenaries with only a superficial adherence to their cause, but rather by armies of men that were fighting for the freedom of their countries. The degree to which an army believes in its cause versus the skill of its generals is a balance that has been argued about for centuries, and probably will for centuries more, but it does become clear that the French army was essentially weary of the conquest that Napoleon was so intent upon. Indeed, despite some minor victories against the Russians and Prussians at the Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, Napoleon himself seemed to be wearying of the whole process of war. Thus when the Austria proposed some very reasonable peace conditions - a return by France to its natural borders, Prussia to return to its 1805 borders - Napoleon neither accepted not rejected it. What he did was something that would have seemed unthinkable a decade before: he hesitated (Muir, 2000). The Peace Congress closed on August 10th, 1813, before Napoleon had replied, and Austria immediately declared war. The scales of war were steadily turning more and more against Napoleon. His Grande Armee was no longer "grande" and was scarcely an "armee" as increasing number of troops either deserted completely or, worse for the French/Napoleon, switched sides. At the Battle of Leipzig, also called the "Battle of Nations" (October 16-19, 1813) the French army was essentially decimated. A steady collapse of the whole French Empire within Europe now started to occur. The army in Spain had been defeated in Spain by the British and started to retreat rapidly into France. The Austrians took over Romagna in Italy and Murat, of Sicily, had started to enter negotiations with the Viennese court. By January 1814 France was being attacked on all sides and the Allied forces announced, somewhat unusually but effectively that they were not fighting the French people but rather Napoleon himself as he had reneged on so many treaties and refused peace. This was an attempt to divide the French from their Emperor, and while it did not succeed in its ultimate aim of having the French actually overthrow Napoleon, it did provide enough of a rift between him and his people that meant that they would not longer help him. The Legislative Assembly and the Senate, which had previously essentially rubber stamped whatever Napoleon wanted to do, were now starting to actively sue for peace. Here the willingness of the French to turn against leaders, however revered they had once been, comes into play. In some ways Napoleon had come to see himself as a mixture of King and Emperor, and he appears to have convinced himself that he had the divine right to loyalty that had once been claimed by the Kings of France. As he had risen to power on the ashes of the monarchy, and with the King recently executed because of his stubborn refusal to accept compromise, it seems somewhat surprising that Napoleon adopted this attitude. But again, it was a logical development of his larger than life personality that appeared to both believe and often actually live up to the mythology that surrounded him. But all military leaders, however brilliant, are in fact fallible, and as spectacularly successful as Napoleon had once been he now became equally liable to failure. While Napoleon was facing increasing internal dissent, countries that had previously squabbled among one another and even fought, now allied themselves in a coalition designed to defeat Napoleon. Thus Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain undertook not to negotiate separately and to work as one until Napoleon was defeated. This agreement occurred in March 1814, by the next month, with the Allied forces on the outskirts of Paris and all hope seemingly lost, Napoleon abdicated. In conclusion, the excursion to Elba, Napoleon's subsequent escape and eventual defeat at the Battle of Waterloo were essentially postscripts to a defeat that had already occurred. As can be seen Napoleon came to believe in his own invincibility, ignored the advice of his generals and attacked Russia. While many other mistakes, temporary rallies and seeming chances for victory occurred after this time, the French were essentially defeated at the moment Napoleon started to withdrew from Moscow in the late autumn of 1812 (Asprey, 2001). ______________________________________ Works Cited Asprey, Robert. The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. Basic Books, New York: 2001. Gengembre, Gerald. Napoleon: The Immortal Emperor. Vendome, New York: 2003. Guthenberg, Gunther. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Indiana UP, Bloomington: 1980. Muir, Rory. Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. Yale UP, New Haven: 2000. Schom, Alan. Napoleon Bonaparte. Harper Perennial, New York: 1998. Read More