The Scottish Parliament and the Palace of Holyroodhouse - Essay Example

"Its seven acres of wooded gardens and lawns and the 450-acre Royal Park shield it from the on three sides" (Anderson 2000, p.22) Indeed, the Palace of Holyroodhouse has enjoyed its fame and glory for centuries and continues to thrive on the royalty. Rich in history, it has been marked with 500 years as a Royal residence in 2002, the year of the Queen's Golden Jubilee. The Palace of Holyroodhouse has been a Royal residence for centuries and is the Queen's official residence in Scotland. On the fourth side of this prestigious Palace is where Scotland's new Parliament Building's were constructed-thus, the Holyrood Project. On October 9th 2004, the Scottish Parliament building was officially opened, marked by the Queens words, "Holyrood is a landmark for 21st century democracy" (The Scottish Parliament n.d.). Brief Background: Holyroodhouse is the only Scottish Palace that is still used by the Queen as Her Majesty's official residence. As can be inferred, a royal residency with only five centuries of history has been of vast interest of the Scottish. As illustrated in the words of Ian Gow, "[Holyroodhouse] is a picturesque visual experience" (Gow 1998). Gow's furthermore meaning was portrayed in his quote, 'If in spending as much money as we do as a nation on the preservation of our great houses, we are sincerely trying to preserve part of our cultural heritage and not merely providing subjects for Christmas calendars, we must present these houses coherently to the public so that it can indeed learn to appreciate what their true place was in our history' (Gow 1998). It was essential to demonstrate first the status of Holyroodhouse as a Royal residency and its relishing architecture before analyzing the Holyrood Project. From the beginning of the project, there was a lot of controversy going on regarding the Holyrood Project. The Holyrood Project was, in short, building Scotland's new Parliament buildings adjacent to the Palace of Holyroodhouse. The plans were finalized in late 1997 that the location of the new Scottish Parliament was going to be Holyrood. However, before starting the Project, there was pending evidence that the site had been occupied since Medieval times. Headland Archaeology and SUAT Ltd. led the largest urban archaeological excavation in Scotland's history (The Scottish Parliament n.d.) The Project went on as planned, but the estimating cost of the Project as well as the completion date was completely off tangent. The Project can be discussed in depth, however for the purpose of this paper, only certain stages of procurement with respect to the successes and failures will be analyzed. Procurement: On July of 1998, it was decided that construction management will be adopted as the procurement vehicle and it was also decided that the appointment of a construction manager would be taken at the earliest opportunity (The Holyrood Inquiry n.d.). It was perhaps the most significant decisions taken during the course of the Project to make construction management as the procurement vehicle. It is necessary to understand what the function of the construction management is. It was developed in the late 1980's as a fast-track method of construction procurement. Prior to the construction management, else known as traditional contracting, a design would be completed before the construction work starts and then is put out to tender until a contractor is chosen to carry out that work. However, with construction management, the tendering and construction overlap (The Holyrood Inquiry n.d.) The advantage of construction management is that it speeds up the process; however a big disadvantage is the uncertain cost of the project. As can be seen with the Holyrood Project, speed and cost were both an issue. Around late December of 2003, a well renowned advisor, who had nothing first-hand to do with the project, was called in to consult on the concept construction management. Mr. Colin Carter of independent professional advice and services was appointed to give construction expertise to the Auditor General for Scotland and the Holyrood Inquiry (The Holyrood Inquiry). Mr. Carter has had a lot of expertise with construction management and illustrated a picture of the high risks involved on the part of the client when working with construction management. However, the project initially started in 1998, and the comparison data was presented by Mr. Carter in 2003. According to the Scrutiny of Construction Procurement by the Government (Scottish Executive Publications 2005), four key areas of consideration: the client body, the project team, and objectives and constraints, and the risk profile. The adjacent figure demonstrates the risk profile component. As can be seen, the risk is seen the least with PPP/PFI Figure 1-Risk Profile and the greatest with construction management. PPP/PFI is a service delivery where only a partiality of the risk lies with the contractor and the majority of the risk lies with the contractor; vice versa is true for construction management where practically all the risks lies with client and only a small risk is on the contractor. Parties Best able to Deliver the Work: Referring back to the Scrutiny of Construction Procurement by the Government, one of the valid points made was that construction management is most efficient when teams are able to work well together. The architect that designed the Holyrood Project should have worked in sync with the Project Manager. In a dialogue between Holyrood Project's Manager, Mr. Armstrong, and Mr. Campbell, the relationship is given a closer look: Mr. Campbell QC: I am trying to find out, Mr Armstrong, how much dialogue there was between the appointed designer, who succeeded in a competition in July 1998, and you, the Project Manager, charged with evolving the brief for the building, which that designer was going to design. Mr. Armstrong: Very little. Mr. Campbell QC: Looking back on it, do you think that was the right way to go about it Mr. Armstrong: It was not my choice. Mr. Campbell QC: That was not what I asked you. Mr. Armstrong: I think that is my answer. (The Holyrood Inquiry n.d.) It can clearly be seen that this type of attitude does not deliver the kind of great architect the Scottish were hoping to build. The lack of communication resulted in the lack of results as well. Enric Miralles, who won the competition in 1998, was to select an architect to work with on the design. His envision was that, "The Parliament should be able to reflect the land it represents. The building should arise from the sloping base of Arthur's seat and arrive into the city almost surging out of the rock" (The Scottish Parliament Debating Chamber n.d.). A vision so strong needed dedication and communication enough to let the imagination create and succeed in the Holyrood Project. However, what the Project Manager failed to recognize were the advantages and disadvantages of the construction management. The relative speed of how fast the project might be accomplished was perhaps among the only actual advantage on construction management. It is also noted that when the Project started in 1997/1998, the procurement of construction management was yet fairly new. However, the many disadvantages of the construction management should not have been overlooked. One such disadvantage being referred to is the greater client risk, the complexity of administering many different trade packagesthe relative difficulty of managing delay, and most importantly, the absence of any overall contractual programme or contract sum (The Holyrood Inquiry n.d.) Viewing the process of how well things were working, there is no doubt that choosing construction management was not a good option. Perhaps the best party for this job was indeed the PFI/PPP. As figure 1 illustrates, PFI/PPP had the lowest risk as opposed to the highest risk of construction management. Thus, for every reason that construction management was wrong proves more why PFI/PPP would have been a better choice. It is rather embarrassing that when it was decided to choose construction management, none of the critical questions were asked. The advantages and disadvantages were not critically evaluated as they should have been. The main elements of the generic procurement process starts off with first defining the business needs, giving it the first most priority. As with the case of the Holyrood Project, the priority was being able to construct a likable design and efficiently have the project completed on time without exceeding the budget. As the flowchart illustrates, each task is to be done on solely on its' own, but it does follow a certain pattern. It is a set structure of how one thing leads to another, in accomplishing the project as whole. It is after the business needs have been defined, the market capability has been understood, the extent of supply to be procured is decided and a business case has been prepared that a procurement strategy is decided. If deciding a procurement strategy has that many steps, how were the disadvantages of construction management so carelessly overlooked Figure 2-Generic Procurement Process (Scottish Executive Publications 2006) Better Option and Managing Relationship: This figure of traditional contracting seems to fit better with the principles of procurement. It has a better structure and the advantages supersede the disadvantages. The allocution of risk is going to be ever-present in every possible option available. The first key principle of procurement is the separation of duties (Scottish Executive Publications 2006). Though these duties are to be strictly separated, it does not mean that those abiding by the duties do not communicate, as was the case with the Project Manager and the architect. HM Treasury sent out this figure as a form of good procurement guidance team organization. Though all duties are bound to the respected separate persons, there are a few main people that overlook the process from an overall perspective Figure 3-Model Team Organisation and thus keep things in check. The three central figures can be seen as the Project Owner, Project Sponsor and Project Manager. However, without strong team chemistry, even the best of organization models prove to be no good. Thus, tensions did raise high as the Project prolonged further. It took six long years to complete the Holyrood Project. Also, the cost was estimated at 50 million pounds in the start of the project but then rose to an incredibly high 430.6 million pounds (The Holyrood Inquiry n.d.). With this kind on inconsistency in a project, the principles of procurement were clearly not followed as they should have been. Perhaps the traditional organization model was a very good procurement guidance to follow. Having a coherent and well structured model to follow allows for better ways to get along and manage relationships. The main concept to keep in mind is that each team member has to contribute and work together as a team. Alternatives The most astonishing aspect of the Holyrood Project is the discrepancy in cost evaluations. Going from an estimate of about forty something million pounds to an unbelievable 430 million pounds is not something tax payers will ever be content with. To quote Mr. Pete Wishart, "'Westminster is responsible for all of the key decisions about the Holyrood project - the site, the design, and the open-ended contractual arrangements - and they were all wrong'" (Wishart 2003). Clearly, the Labour party is being held responsible for being so careless in making prominent decisions. Had the cost mishap been a few extra thousand pounds, or even a few extra million pounds, the rage and controversy would not have been so great. What is done is irreversible, but this should caution the government to be more alert and careful when using the people's tax money to amount to such a discrepancy. How is it possible that the government was so clueless and helpless in managing the costs increase The original and final costs have a difference of almost about four-hundred million pounds! Next time when dealing with a project, whether major or not, the policies of procurement should be understood better and especially being consulted by some external, not involved in the project personality, might be the best way to realize what has been overlooked before it's too late. Works Cited Anderson, D. 2000, 'A Palace for the Queen', British Heritage, vol. 21, no. 3, p.22 Gow, I. 1998, 'Conserving the Historic Interior' Architectural Heritage Issue 9 HM Treasury 1997,Traditional Project Organisation: Essential Requirements for Construction Procurement Miralles, E n.d., The Scottish Parliament Debating Chamber. Retrieved on December 7, 2006 from www.arcsoft.com Scottish Executive Publications 2005, Construction Works Procurement Guidance Retrieved December 9, 2006 from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/11/28100404/04045 Scottish Executive Publications 2006, The Scottish Procurement Directorate's Policy Manual Retrieved December 7, 2006 from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/05/spdpolicymanual#_4._Generic_Procurement_Process%20:%20Ma The Holyrood Inquiry n.d., Chapter 6: Construction Management Retrieved December 7, 2006 from http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-07.htm The Holyrood Inquiry n.d., Chapter 7: Appointment of the Construction Manager Retrieved December 9, 2006 from http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-08.htm The Holyrood Inquiry n.d., Chapter 8 Project Management-1998 to 1 June 1999 Retrieved December 9, 2006 from http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-09.htm#1 The Scottish Parliament n.d., New Scottish Parliament Building Opens Retrieved December 8, 2006 from, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/projHistory/Buildingopens.htm The Scottish Parliament n.d., Site Selected Retrieved December 8, 2006 from http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/projHistory/HolyroodSiteSelected.htm Wishart, P. 2003, SNP News: SNP table Holyrood Project questions-"Must expose Westminster blame" Retrieved December 9, 2006 from http://www.snp.org/press-releases/2003/news.1242/ Read More