Russo-Japanese War - Essay Example

Russo-Japanese War. The Russo-Japanese War (February 1904-September 1905) was the first truly modern conflict of the twentieth century. With its useof machine guns, modern artillery, trenches and barbed wire, it foreshadowed the First World War in many ways. It was also the first great modern war that was observed and reported in almost every detail leaving expert analysis for posterity. Over 80 observers in all were dispatched by the armed forces of 15 nations to report on the conflict1. 1. Origins of the war. This war was fought between the belligerent nations for hegemony in northeast Asia, specifically for the control of Manchuria and Korea. At the beginning of the twentieth century various Western countries were competing for influence and trade on this territory, as Japan strived to be a modern great power2. Traditionally, Japan had been the only Asian country to escape colonization from the West, it had traditionally sought to avoid foreign intrusion, though Russia, France, and England tried, but with little success. The first significant crack in Japan's trade and travel barriers was forced by the United States in an effort to guarantee and strengthen its shipping interests in the Far East. Japan's guns and ships were no match for those of Commodore Perry in his two U.S. naval expeditions to Japan (1853, 1854). Thus, the United States forcibly opened Japan to the outside world3. The Japanese, well aware of the implications of foreign penetration through observing what was happening to China, tried to limit Western trade to two ports. In 1858, however, Japan agreed to a full commercial treaty with the United States, followed by similar treaties with the Low Countries, Russia, France, and Britain. These unequal treaties (in the judgment of the Japanese government) granted foreigners in Japan extraterritoriality in legal cases and which imposed on Japan low tariff rates for which the imperialist countries did not grant corresponding concessions in their rates. At the same time, the Western nations did not pursue their attempts to control Japan as aggressively as they did elsewhere. In Asia the interests of the more aggressively expanding powers had centered on India, China, and the immediately surrounding areas. Furthermore, in Japan itself, the danger of foreign military intervention, a crisis in its traditional feudal society, the rise of commerce, and a disaffected peasantry led to an intense internal power struggle and finally to a revolutionary change in the country's society and a thoroughgoing modernization program, one that brought Japan the economic and military strength to resist foreign nations. The opposing forces in Japan's civil war were lined up between the supporters of the ruling Tokugawa family, which headed a rigid hierarchical feudal society, and the supporters of the emperor Meiji, whose court had been isolated from any significant government role. The civil war culminated in 1868 in the overthrow of the Tokugawa government and the restoration of the rule of the Emperor. The Meiji Restoration also brought new interest groups to the centre of political power and instigated a radical redirection of Japan's economic development. The nub of the changeover was the destruction of the traditional feudal social system and the building of a political, social, and economic framework conducive to capitalist industrialization. The new state actively participated in the turnabout by various forms of grants and guarantees to enterprising industrialists and by direct investment in basic industries such as railways, shipbuilding, communications, and machinery. The concentration of resources in the industrial sector was matched by social reforms that eliminated feudal restrictions, accelerated mass education, and encouraged acquisition of skills in the use of Western technology. The ensuing industrialized economy provided the means for Japan to hold its own in modern warfare and to withstand foreign economic competition. The leaders of the new government considered national security and defense to be the top priority in order to prevent subjugation by the Western powers. The nationalistic policy of fukoku kyhei (rich country, strong military) emphasized Japan's goals to develop the country economically to catch up with the Western powers and to increase its military strength to ensure its existence as an independent country. Japan emulated the imperialistic behaviors of the Western powers. From the beginning of the Meiji Period in 1868, Japan's leaders sought to make the country an industrial and military power on par with the Western imperialist powers. When Japan emerged from its isolation and took steps to industrialize and modernize, the international environment was one of intense competition between powers that tried to maximize their political and economic positions relative to other powers and less developed countries4. Yukichi Fukuzawa, one of Japan's educational leaders and founder of one of Japan's most influential newspapers, expressed Japan's early imperialistic desires in 1882, We shall someday raise the national power of Japan so that not only shall we control the natives of China and India as the English do today, but we shall also possess in our hands the power to rebuke the English and to rule Asia ourselves5. The Japanese people also had certain personal characteristics that supported the country's rapid economic growth and imperialistic expansion. Allen explains, Throughout their history they have shown a gift for rapidly assimilating new ideas and practices, a boldness in executing large projects and, above all, a trained and frequently exercised capacity for organization6. Japan's location encouraged it to focus on Korea and northern China, putting it in competition with its neighbor, Russia. The Japanese effort to occupy Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War; after the defeat of China the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) was signed, by which China abandoned its own claims to Korea, as well as ceding Taiwan and Port Arthur (Lshunkou). However, three Western powers (Russia, the German Empire and the French Third Republic) by the Triple Intervention of April 23, 1895 applied pressure on Japan to give up Port Arthur, and the Russians later (in 1898) negotiated a 25-year lease of the naval base with China. Moreover, in 1896 Russia had concluded an alliance with China against Japan and, in the process, had won rights to extend the Trans-Siberian Railroad across Chinese-held Manchuria to the Russian seaport of Vladivostok, thus gaining control of an important strip of Manchurian territory. However, though Russia had built the Trans-Siberian Railroad (1891-1904), it still lacked the transportation facilities necessary to reinforce its limited armed forces in Manchuria with sufficient men and supplies. Reluctant to accept Japanese leadership, Korea instead sought Russia's help. During the Boxer Rebellion (1900) in China, Japanese troops played a major part in the allied expedition to rescue foreign nationals in Peking, but Russia occupied southern Manchuria, thereby strengthening its links with Korea. Realizing the need for protection against multiple European enemies, the Japanese began talks with England that led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902). In this pact both nations agreed to aid the other in the event of an attack by two or more powers but remain neutral if the other went to war with a single enemy. Backed by Britain, Japan, steadily expanded its army, and by 1904 it gained a marked superiority over Russia in the number of ground troops in the Far East. Japanese forces were trying to take over Korea, which had a protection pact with Russia. Meanwhile, Russian forces occupied most of Manchuria and parts of Korea7. Japan, after failing to negotiate a favorable agreement with Russia, sent an ultimatum on December 31st, 1903, broke off diplomatic relations on February 6, 1904, and began attacking two days later, on February 8. Both sides issued a declaration of war on February 10. Formally, under international law, Japan's attack was not considered a sneak attack, because of the ultimatum. However, it is commonly mentioned as an example of Japan's preference for surprise attack8. 2. Military operations. The war started with Japanese ships attacking the Russian fleet at Port Arthur on February 8, 1904. Admiral Heihachiro Togo commanded the Japanese fleet. One of his subordinates, Admiral Shigeto Dewa, who commanded the Japanese First Fleet, suggested that the Japanese ships attempt to attack the Russian ships, which were anchored under the cover of various land artillery batteries at Port Arthur. Dewa's actual orders had been to lure the Russian ships toward the Japanese heavy ships, which were commanded by Admiral Togo. However, Dewa's reconnaissance had been somewhat incorrect, mainly because he was more than three nautical miles away from the Russian fleet when he made his closest approach. It seemed that the twelve battleships and cruisers were mostly aground and/or listing (after the recently successful Japanese destroyer attack), while the screening ships (namely destroyers, gunboats, and mining vessels) were in no formation. However, all of the Russian ships were ready and had their battle flags up, which was not visible to Dewa. The Japanese ships concentrated their heavier fire on the batteries. However, after about thirty minutes of inconclusive fighting, Togo, with his First Fleet decided to make a highly dangerous move: he turned his ships around and retreated, in full range of the artillery and Russian ships. Because of the heavy fire encountered, and the higher state of readiness than previously assumed (by the Japanese), Togo retreated completely and decided not to use the Third Fleet. The Japanese had suffered no more than 90 casualties, with no seriously damaged ships, while the Russians suffered about 150 casualties, with only two battleships and a protected cruiser damaged with torpedoes9. Then, on February 9, during the Battle of Chemulpo Bay (off the coast of present day Inchon, Korea) Japan defeated Russia and used the battle to land troops that went on to take Seoul. The first major land battle was that of Yalu River, which took place from April 30 to May 1. It was fought near Wiju on the lower reaches of the Yalu River, the dividing line between Korea and China. The Russian commander in the Far East, General Alexei Kuropatkin was aware that the Japanese were advancing from their forward army bases at Chemulpo (Inchon) to advance north and cross the river to invade Manchuria. Kuropatkin dispatched the Eastern Detachment under the command of Lieutenant-General Zasulitch. During the battle Zasulitch made many mistakes in tactics and strategy: he posted his troops in the wrong place, showing that he was unable to react to the situation, he ignored General Kuropatkin's orders. As a result, the Russian Eastern Detachment suffered some 2700 casualties overall, while for the Japanese the fighting had cost about 1000 dead and wounded out of the total 1st Army strength of 42,500. The battle showed that Japan would not be an easy enemy and that Russia might not be the overwhelming victor. Now, the road to Manchuria from Korea was open, and subsequently, on May 30 in the battle of Dairen Japanese forces under the command of general Hikato defeated Russian forces. By June of 1904, the Japanese armies had begun to lay siege to Port Arthur and had set up artillery to destroy the Russian warships in the port that had been trapped by the Japanese naval blockade. The Russian First Pacific Squadron, commanded by Admiral Vitgeft, decided to break out of the harbor and sail to Vladivostok. On August 10, the first main naval engagement of the war followed, it was the battle of the Yellow Sea (also known as the battle of Shantung). The First Pacific Squadron sailed out of Port Arthur to engage the Japanese fleet blockading the port. The Russian fleet consisted of 6 battleships, along with four protected cruisers and 14 destroyers. The Japanese fleet, under the command of Admiral Togo, was made up of 4 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, as well as eight protected cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 30 torpedo boats. By midday, the main body of Japanese battleships attempted to block the Russians' path off the Shandong Peninsula. By 13:00 the first shots were fired, and during the one-hour fight, the Russians succeeded in breaking out of the harbor. Togo began a long pursuit of the Russian fleet and gradually came up from the south-west, slowly overtaking the Russian battle line. At 18:00 Admiral Vitgeft was killed, his battleship fell out of the battle line, and the other Russian ships became disoriented. With darkness approaching and low on ammunition, Togo broke off the engagement and retired his battleships eastward out of range of the Russian squadron. He ordered a night attack against the Russian fleet by his destroyers and torpedo boats. Most of the destroyer attacks were repulsed with light casualties. Two hours later, the Russian fleet sailed back to Port Arthur having failed to break away from the harbor. Five battleships, a cruiser and nine destroyers survived to make it back to Port Arthur. Total Russian casualties in the battle were 343 killed and wounded aboard the ships that made it back to Port Arthur. The Japanese admitted 226 killed and wounded among their fleet during the battle. Within a few days, the Japanese fleet became completely battle worthy while the Russian fleet lay in disrepair. Tactically, the battle was a Japanese victory, since the Russian fleet never again attempted to break out of Port Arthur and the continuing siege spelled doom for the remaining ships trapped at Port Arthur. Four days after the battle of the Yellow Sea, a minor naval engagement occurred - the battle of the Japanese Sea (or the battle of Ulsan). At dawn, on August 14, the small Russian fleet were met by a Japanese fleet made up of 4 more modern armored cruisers and two protected cruisers under the command of Vice Admiral Kamimura, near Ulsan island. As a result of the battle, the Russian Vladivostok Cruiser Unit did not resume their raiding activities in the Sea of Japan, thus the Japanese were left unchallenged command of the Yellow Sea. One of the longest and most vicious battles during the Russo-Japanese War was the Siege of Port Arthur (1 August 1904 - 2 January 1905). At the outbreak of the war, the port was serviced by a newly built single tracked spur line of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the mainline of which terminated in the Russian port of Vladivostok, consequently, the Tsar was equally determined that the Russian forces (Land and Sea) should hold. The Russian garrison, about 40,000 strong, commanded by Major-General Baron Anatoli Stoessel had began to prepare their defenses as the Japanese dispatched the Third Army, about 90,000 strong, plus reinforcements, under the command of General Baron Maresuke Nogi to begin their advance towards the port starting on June 1, 1904. Stoessel delayed Nogi for over two months in vicious fighting to give the engineers and garrison troops time to prepare the defenses which included deep-dug infantry trenches, supported with barbed wire, machine gun pits, and 506 heavy artillery guns. When Stoessel was forced with withdraw to Port Arthur on July 30, Nogi then set up the Third Army around the town, backed by 474 artillery guns, to begin an intense bombardment of the Russian defenses. Between August 19 and November 26, Nogi treated his army as cannon fodder in three separate and prolonged major frontal attacks against the Russian defenses. All of them were beaten back with heavy casualties. Even night attacks ended in dreadful casualties as the Russians used powerful searchlight batteries to illuminate the storming parties for the artillery gunners. After the failure of the last big Japanese attack on November 26, which left over 10,000 Japanese troops killed or wounded in just 15 hours of fighting, Nogi reluctantly decided that Port Arthur would not fall under massive frontal assaults and settled down to siege techniques. Under pressure from Tokyo, Nogi turned his attention to 203 Meter Hill, the highest point of ground in the Russian defense line. None of the Japanese positions afforded unobstructed observation of the harbor or town so the Japanese artillery could not be accurately directed against the port. 203 Meter Hill (so-called because of its height above sea-level) located about three miles north of Port Arthur and part of the Russian outer defense system, offered the best view upon which Japanese artillery spotters could offer the guns the exact points where the guns should direct their fire. Starting on November 27, Nogi had his engineers dig siege trenches from the nearby hill, called Akasakayama, towards 203 Meter Hill, as the Japanese launched more attacks on the hill using hand-grenades and bayonet-fixed rifles. Japanese artillery poured more than 4,000 rounds on the Russian positions, which were manned by about 5,000 men. Diversionary attacks around the Port Arthur perimeter prevented the Russians of 203 Meter Hill from being relived with reinforcements. By December 6, with the Russians down to only 1,000 men, most of them wounded, fresh Japanese troops launched one final attack at dawn on the hill and it was captured by mid-afternoon. For General Maresuke Nogi, the cost to capture 203 Meter Hill was costly indeed when his last surviving son, a soldier among the attack force, was killed in action on that day during the assault. It was only the intervention of the Emperor that prevented an emotionally shattered Nogi from committing ritual suicide, or hara-kiri. The whole operation from November 27 to December 6 cost Nogi over 8,000 troops, but he had finally had the observation post he so desperately needed. After nearly another month of artillery bombardments, Stoessel decided, on humanitarian rather than military grounds, that the garrison should surrender rather than subject the troops and the civilian population, both Russian and Chinese, to further misery and bloodshed. A cease-fire was ordered on December 30, and after a few days of negotiations, Nogi accepted the Russian surrender on January 2, 1905. The costs of the siege were terrible; out of the 40,000 strong Russian garrison, about 31,306 men had been killed, wounded or captured before the surrender. The Japanese casualties were later listed as 57,780 killed, wounded or missing. Another important battle of the war was that of Liaoyang (August 24, 1904 - September 4, 1904). It was fought on the Mukden-Port Arthur railway, south of the confluence of the Taizu and Liao rivers in Manchuria. Both the Russian armies and Japanese armies were attempting to inflict a decisive defeat on the other. The battle began on August 25, 1904, with the Russian armies, 150,000 strong, attempting to turn the flanks of the Japanese First, Second and Third Armies totaling 125,000 men. After a hard-fought action, General Alexei Kuropatkin, commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, believed that he had been beaten and withdrew towards Mukden. The Russian armies suffered about 17,900 casualties, the majority of which were captured or missing. However, despite the greater Japanese casualties (23,615 killed, wounded or captured), they were able to claim victory since the Russians quit the battlefield. After the defeat at Liaoyang, General Alexi Kuropatkin was reinforced by fresh troops from the nearby reaches of Siberia and was determined to counter-attack against the Japanese armies, commanded by Field Marshall Marquis Iwao Oyama. The battle of Sha-ho River followed: on October 5, 1904, the Russian armies, totaling 210,000 men attacked in a broad front determined to wrest the initiative from Oyama. The Japanese armies totaled 150,000 men. The Japanese fought back over the next two weeks with both sides unwilling to back down. It was not until October 17, that Kuropatkin called off the costly attacks, but the Japanese did not take advantage of the pause in the action, too exhausted to fight any more. The battle more or less ended in a draw. Total Russian casualties totaled 44,351 killed, wounded, captured or missing in action. Japanese casualties totaled 20,345 killed, wounded, captured or missing. As a result, both sides dug in to prepare for the next round, which was the battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai) - a major land battle of the war. It was fought within a group of villages about 36 miles southwest of Mukden. Knowing that General Nogi's Third Army, which besieged Port Arthur, was advancing from Port Arthur to the front, Kuropatkin hoped to attack the Japanese armies to force them back to Korea. In an all-out attack, the Russian Second, Third and First Armies, totaling 300,000 men, advanced against the Japanese First, Second, and Fourth armies which totaled 220,000 men. Despite the viciousness of the Russian attack, Kuropatkin failed to recover the strategic initiative and his failure to drive the Japanese back, with his heavy loses, further lowered the Russian morale. Total Russian casualties in the two-day battle totaled around 20,000 killed, wounded or captured. Japanese casualties totaled around 9,000 killed, wounded or captured. But the battle ended in a tactical stalemate with neither side claiming victory. This further led to the battle of Mukden, the last major land battle of the war, fought from February 20 to March 10, 1905. The Japanese forces progressed and threatened to encircle the Russian forces in the city. Subsequently, General Kuropatkin ordered a retreat to the north, leading to the collapse of the Russian forces in Mukden and the total evacuation of the Russian forces out of Mukden on March 1010. The last and most decisive sea battle of the war was the battle of Tsushima (May 27, 28, 1905), during which the Japanese fleet under Admiral Heihachiro Togo destroyed two-thirds of the Russian fleet under Admiral Rozhdestvensky. Reinforcement from the Baltic Fleet had to come to the seat of war: the Russians could have sailed through one of three possible straits to reach Vladivostok: La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose Tsushima in an effort to simplify his route. Admiral Togo also believed Tsushima would be the preferred Russian course. The Russian fleet was sighted when two trailing hospital ships were discovered by the Japanese cruiser fleet. The Japanese had superior gunners, their hits caused more damage to Russian ships in proportion to Russian hits on Japanese ships. The Russian fleet was in poor shape for a naval battle. The ships were older designs and ill-maintained. The long voyage and the lack of opportunity for maintenance, meant their bottoms were heavily fouled, significantly reducing their speed. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was knocked out of action with a shell fragment in his skull in the evening, rear Admiral Nebogatov took the command on the Russian side. The Russian fleet lost 4 battleships on May 27. Japanese ships only suffered light damage. At night, Japanese torpedo boats and destroyers were thrown against the Russian fleet, which was dispersed in some small groups by then, trying to break northwards: one battleship was sunk, another battleship and two old armored cruisers were damaged and had to be scuttled in the morning. Four other battleships under Rear Admiral Nebogatov were forced to surrender the next day. His group consisted of only one modern battleship, along with an old battleship and two small coastal battleships, they had no chance to stand against the Japanese fleet. Until the evening of May 28, single Russian ships were pursued by the Japanese. The small coastal battleship "Admiral Ushakov" refused to surrender and was sunk by Japanese armored cruisers. The old cruiser "Dimitry Donskoy" fought against six Japanese cruisers and survived until the next day, when she was scuttled due to damage. Three Russian cruisers escaped to the United States naval base at Manila and were interned. The fast armed yacht Almaz and two destroyers were the only Russian ships to make it through to Vladivostok. Nearly the entire Russian Baltic fleet was lost in the battle in the Tsushima Straits, while the Japanese lost only 3 torpedo boats11. 3. Peace. Both powers were indeed exhausted by the war. Both sides were seeking a peace - the Russians had been repeatedly defeated, but the Japanese were in considerable financial difficulties. However, only a diplomatic tour de force by US President Theodore Roosevelt initiated after a secret request by the war weary Japanese government got the Russians to the Peace Table. Russian fears were so strong, that in the eventual peace conference, Roosevelt had to strong arm the Japanese to accept a peace without reparations, these being a pre-condition of the Japanese for sitting at the table, and a precondition for the Tsar in the opposite way - he wouldn't send a plenipotentiary without an understanding that Russia would pay neither reparations, nor give up Sakhalin Island. Germany, the United States, and Great Britain were instrumental in forcing conciliation between the belligerents. However, the United States and Britain exacted certain concessions from Japan before smoothing the way for the treaty. President Theodore Roosevelt demanded that Japan follow the Open Door policy in Manchuria and return the region to Chinese administration. In the Taft-Katsura agreement of July, 1905, Roosevelt agreed to Japanese dominance in Korea in return for American freedom of action in the Philippines12. The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905 at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard near Portsmouth, New Hampshire, United States. The treaty acknowledged Japan as the dominant power in Korea (according to the text, Japan had its "paramount political, military, and economic interests" there) and both sides agreed to evacuate Manchuria and return its sovereignty to China, but Japan was leased the Liaodong Peninsula (containing Port Arthur and Dalien). The railway lines in Manchuria, constructed by Russia, were ceded to Japan without payment. Japan received the southern half of the Island of Sakhalin (not the whole island, as Japan wanted) from Russia. Japan obtained fishing rights in the waters adjacent to the Russian Far East. In general, formally, the Treaty of Portsmouth marked the emergence of Japan as the strongest power in the area13. However, following the 1905 'Treaty of Portsmouth' some divisions of the Korean Army led by deposed officials and Confucian scholars took up arms against the Japanese in the southern provinces of Korea. For 5 years anti-Japanese guerrilla units, called the 'Righteous Armies' effectively harassed the Japanese occupation forces, especially in 1908 and 1909. With the 1910 annexation, however, the guerrilla forces were driven into Manchuria. According to the treaty, Japan gained a lot, but that was not nearly as much as the Japanese public had been led to expect, since Japan's initial negotiating position had demanded all of Sakhalin and a monetary indemnity as well. The treaty caused frustration and collapse of the government, generated riots in Japan as the conditions of the treaty were perceived as a loss of face. A feeling grew over the following decades that America and other western powers had treated Japan as the 'defeated party' of the Russo-Japanese, despite their uniformly successful military actions (it even subsequently became part of the Japanese rationale for the infamous sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, as they explicitly stated in the famously 'late delivered' communication declaring war)14. 4. Why did Japan win and Russia lose When one tries to analyze what factors cause the outcome of a war, one has to take into consideration situations in such spheres as economy, politics and ideology. In the Japanese view the war was a matter of national survival, it was the war for which Japan had prepared and Russia had not. Russia, the world's foremost land power and the third-ranking sea power, could not easily bring its strength to bear in the Far East because of the great distances separating its military and naval forces there from European Russia. Russian armies in Manchuria depended upon the nearly completed single-track Trans-Siberian Railway, and the two naval bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok were half a world away from the Baltic Fleet. The Russian Empire had all the advantages except proximity; it lost through bureaucracy and decadence. In several battles when Russian troops attacked with high morale and valor they were ordered to retreat following a new strategic theory. However, one of the capital reasons for the success of the Japanese was that, in general, every Japanese officer and seaman would have died rather than forfeit victory. The Russians were not so much outgeneraled as they were outfought, and they were outfought because they were lukewarm and not wrought to desperation as they had been, for example, in resistance to Napoleon's invasion or would be during the Second World War. Whereas every Japanese soldier and sailor believed, as was indeed the truth, that his country's fate was at stake and that his personal conduct might decide the issue. Thus, from the outset, as in the Sino-Japanese War ten years before, Japan correctly assumed that command of the sea would largely determine the course of the war on land and that Russian land forces in the Far East must be beaten before they could be substantially reinforced from the West. The war demonstrated the defensive strength of entrenched automatic weapons and the offensive power of indirect artillery fire. Russia, in losing every battle on land and sea, betrayed ominous military deficiencies; Japan, displaying the professionalism of its armed services, vaulted to great power status and destroyed forever the myth of Western invincibility. A victorious Japan forced Russia to abandon its expansionist policy in the Far East, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power. The defeat of Russia was met with shock both in the West and especially across Asia. That a non-Western country could defeat an established power in such a large military conflict was particularly inspiring to various anti-colonial independence movements around the world. Japanese historians think this war was a turning point of Japan and a key to understanding why Japan failed militarily and politically later. The acrimony that occurred in Japan's society went to every class and level, and shortly became the consensus within Japan that they had been treated as the defeated power during the peace conference The world's major powers, nevertheless, failed to heed the lesson of how modern technology had transformed land warfare into a deadly morass. Assimilating these lessons would be bought with blood and treasure only nine years later on the fields of World War I15. Bibiliography. 1. Allen, G.C. A Short Economic History of Modern Japan. 4th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 2. Busch, Noel F. The Emperor's Sword: Japan vs. Russia in the Battle of Tsushima. New York: Funk & Wagnall's, 1969. 3. Esthus, Raymond A. Double Eagle and Rising Sun: The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905. Duke University Press, 1988. 4. Martin, Christopher. The Russo-Japanese War. Abelard-Schuman, 1967. 5. Nester, William R. Power across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan. New York: New York University Press, 1996. 6. Nish, Ian H. The Origins of The Russo-Japanese War. Longman Group Limited, 1985. 7. Randall, Peter E. There Are No Victors Here!: A Local Perspective on The Treaty of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Marine Society, #8, Peter E. Randall, Publisher, 1985. 8. Walder, David. The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese Conflict 1904- 05. Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973. Read More