Comparative Analysis of American and Soviet Perspectives on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis - Essay Example

Comparative Analysis of American and Soviet Perspectives on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Introduction More than five decades has gone by since the Cuban missile crisis. One primary purpose of this paper is to comparatively analyze the perspectives and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union in intervening in the crisis, and in mitigating it. Any mention of this issue in the United States is normally to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The crisis is usually believed to have raged from the 16th to the 28th of October, from the time America found out about the ongoing building of launch sites in Cuba for medium-range missiles of the Soviet Union, to the time Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, officially consented to pull out missiles from Cuba and President Kennedy vowed to leave the country alone (George 2003). More comprehensive reports involved the phase from October 28 to November 20, according to Nathan (1992), when serious talks more fully clarified and amended the agreement that had been made, the U.S. Naval quarantine was removed, and the alert state of the U.S. and Soviet armed forces came to an end. Soviet perspective of the ‘Caribbean crisis’ puts emphasis on the enduring antagonism of the United States to Castro’s regime in Cuba, the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs attack by U.S.-supported Cuban exiles in 1961, and a suspected ongoing threat of an American invasion of Cuba (Hirschbein 1997, 136). The major crisis is believed as commencing, not on the 16th of October, but on the 22nd of October, with the declaration of President Kennedy that the Soviet was setting up missiles in Cuba and his directive that they be pulled out, along with a naval quarantine to thwart more delivery of missiles to Cuba (Byrne 2006). That distinguished the start of a rigorous six days of Moscow conventions. According to Byrne (2006), the solution to the crisis theoretically on the 28th of October is emphasized, with just a momentary focus on the succeeding weeks of deliberation before it was actually resolved. A number of aspects should be explained about the basic differences in point of view. First, in contrast to assertions largely held in both nations, neither has an absolute power over the truth. The two nations have some valid grounds for assigning different relevance to different truths, and even to similar truths. Apparently, the truths themselves, regardless how popular, understood, or overlooked, are similar for both (Fursenko & Naftali 1997). Furthermore, as claimed by Fursenko and Naftali (1997), even nowadays, the crisis is not accurately known. Scholars on both sides have concentrated on how the events of the crisis have made subsequent leaders more cautious and more keenly sensitive to the importance of preventing decisions that could provoke another war. However, there is insufficient knowledge in the United States as to the reason that incident is referred to by the Soviet as the ‘Caribbean crisis’, and how it may be critically considered as originating even partly from the U.S. decisions (Hirschbein 1997, 137). There is insufficient knowledge in the Soviet as to the reason it is appropriately viewed in the U.S. as a crisis caused by the covert entrance of Soviet medium-range missiles into Cuba. And in these two nations there is inadequate focus on and knowledge of the entire interaction process, including not just conflicting points of view but conflicting paradigms of significant truth, or distinct groups of realities (Garthoff 1989). As stated by Nathan (1992), especially dissimilar base levels of transparency of documents or source materials in both nations complicate the issue of trying to attain some kind of consolidated historical and political point of view. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Comparing the Perspectives of U.S. and the Soviet Union The Soviet Union and the United States are superpowers with global ambitions, and at times those ambitions come to blows. Crisis management is needed if conflicts occur; but crisis avoidance rooted in political control and recognition of dissimilarities is much to be desired. Reductions and regulations of arms control are vital in themselves and since they can positively influence political affairs. Nuclear war avoidance, and thus avoidance of any war implicating the Soviet Union and the United States, is of the greatest concern (Stern 2005). Analyzing the experience and understanding the importance of the missile crisis of 1962 can help both nations to ascertain not only that this problem never happens again, but also that a bigger crisis never arises. The United States focused on crisis management. This inclination is true generally, and with regard to analysis of the Cuban missile crisis. In contrast, in the Soviet Union the common tendency and utmost attention paid to the 1962 Caribbean crisis has been aimed at improving crisis avoidance and political acceptance, instead of crisis management. Strangely invalidating the common stereotypes, the Americans have been moderate, cynical pragmatists, believing that, unfortunately, conflicts will arise and should be cautiously handled, whereas the Soviets have seemed to be hopeful, if not totally unrealistic, in claiming that crises can and should be avoided by political co-operation (Stern 2005). Still, more profoundly, the American ‘realism’ may originate from an unrealistic conviction that with a determination anything can be dealt with, and the evident Soviet faith in political acceptance may protect a profound cynicism over the capacity of the two nations to handle a crisis (Scott 2008). The focus of the Soviet on pursuing political ruling of dissimilarities in order to prevent crises or conflicts may be created more by that interest than by any faith that the mission of political agreement will be simple or essentially victorious. Both Khrushchev and Kennedy were adequately informed of the risks of unrestrained events and of the problem gaining a force that might break out of their control. As shown by various accounts, those apprehensions were rational and well-supported (Frankel 2004). Lots of occurrences were understood by the other party as designed and manipulated measures when actually they were neither. Decisions were carried out on what is referred to as ‘inertial guidance’, or defined as ‘something moving by its own momentum but no longer controlled or even remembered’ (Gathoff 1989, 155). For instance (Garthoff 1989, 155): Only when a U-2 accidentally overflew Soviet territory at the height of the crisis did anyone recall there were still U-2s flying near the Soviet Union. The Soviet shooting down of another U-2 over Cuba the same day, October 27, we now know, was the result of an action taken by a local Soviet commander without authorization, stretching if not breaking his instructions. When a CIA-dispatched sabotage team blew up a Cuban plant on November 8 it was almost certainly seen in Moscow (and certainly in Havana) as an intended signal, yet it was the result of an inadequately monitored covert action program that had been stimulated at the start of the crisis in mid-October but then forgotten about while the crisis was being resolved (and not thought of again until October 30, when it was too late to recall three teams already sent in). With regard to the responses and decisions by intermediaries, let’s say the parting gesture of Colonel Penkovsky had been understood gravely? America possibly will have carried out additional measures that the Soviet could have interpreted as mobilization for direct aggressions. The talk of the president on Cuba could then have been viewed, in wary and distrustful Moscow politicians, armed forces, and intelligence, as a ploy to hide the preparation of the United States for an initial attack (Garthoff 1989). The military credo of the Soviet in 1962 required Soviet deterrence if there was affirmative cue that the U.S. was mobilizing threateningly and irreversibly for an initial attack. Strategic Air Command (SAC) credo also required avoidance if a Soviet incursion was forthcoming (Huchthausen 2002). Without a doubt, in both instances, a final political move was declared. Definitely President Kennedy and his chief advisers, and Chairman Khrushchev and his associates, thought initially that no other purpose can be of larger value than preventing nuclear war. That perspective, by these leaders just then and by their heirs, does not obviously imply that other purposes will not be sought at the same time (Huchthausen 2002). What it does imply is that in crucial circumstances with a considerable possibility of resulting in large-scale conflict, leaders will pursue strategies that include reconciliation of their different opposing perspectives, motives, and goals. A willingness to pursue a reconciliation solution to a conflict is, independently, no guarantee settlement will be attained, but this willingness on both parties is perhaps an essential requirement (Frankel 2004). The nature of the reconciliation, according to Frankel (2004), will differ with the situation, relying on such aspects as the issues under consideration, the assumed risks, determination of the parties, their pertinent power, and their perspective. One explanation for the Soviet misunderstanding of the American response to the shipment of missiles in Cuba was an inaccurate evaluation of the stakes of the United States, as they would be assessed by American leaders. The intended postponement in revealing the missiles to the U.S. until the end of the U.S. congressional elections was viewed by the Soviet leadership to handle any local political issue that President Kennedy could have in approving the minor deployment (George 2003). Apparently they seriously miscalculated the intricacy of political concerns that would affect U.S. actions. The Soviet Union certainly underestimated the unity the other countries in Latin America would express in favor of the perspective of the U.S. under the conditions that their own covert strategies had produced (Schier 2008). They also misunderstood the common global response. For its part, the U.S. did not discourage the Soviet from deciding to send its arms in Cuba and initiating deployment. Looking back, a number of Executive Committee (Ex Comm) members and subsequent scholars of the crisis have argued that the U.S. should have conveyed more definite and better warnings in advance; particularly, in advance (Garthoff 1989). However, it is difficult to envision how the Soviet strategy could have been anticipated. Basically, it is difficult to anticipate a foolish, or flimsy, or plainly distinctive scheme by another side. Firsthand contact between the leaders, and covertness of that and other political communication, were at least important and could have been crucial to the formulation of an equally adequate crisis resolution (Weldes 1999). This was the practically undisputed perspective of those directly involved on both parties and of subsequent scholars of the missile crisis. Khrushchev and his associates undoubtedly had thought in October that they were rational in shipping the missiles in Cuba. They found out that their prior view that the United States would, halfheartedly approve the deployment, and the similar view that they may set up missiles covertly and declare accomplishment in their own way and time, were incorrect. They did at that time understood that the plan to accelerate the crisis, unless the culpability and duty, depended on their choice to send the missiles (Weldes 1999). This understanding enhanced their willingness to shoulder the bigger portion of compromises so as to resolve the conflict. The plan is an aspect both parties consider in weighing the risks and choosing components of a compromise. The component that largely occupies the minds of most people, and those of numerous studies, is the comparative command of the two parties (Hirschbein 1997). This is certainly a base factor, but, according to Frankel (2004), it is not the sole and usually not the factor that establishes the resolution of a conflict. For the Soviet perspective of the Cuban missile crisis, its lessons, and its importance, one should start with some of the major official accounts given directly after the incident. Due to the scarcity of ensuing Soviet information and studies of the conflict, these previous official accounts not merely establish the perspective for 1962-63 but presented the grounds for the historical representation of the conflict as viewed in the Soviet for almost two decades, until the 1980s (Nathan 1992). Until the 28th of October 1962, according to Schier (2008), the Soviet source materials claimed that the U.S. had provoked a crisis due to its plans on Cuba and refuted that Soviet missiles were sent there. Afterward, all of a sudden, the letter of Khrushchev of that time was made public, laying down the agreement to withdraw the missiles due to the promise of the U.S. not to attack the country. Subsequently, on the 6th of November, prior to the full resolution of the crisis, Senior Presidium constituent and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin remarked on the crisis in his leadership speech on the revolution’s anniversary (Weldes 1999). He expectedly declared support for Cuba and held the U.S. culpable for the crisis. He mentioned the avowal of the U.S. president not to attack the island and to remove the blockade. He stated, “Now that, through compromise and mutual concessions, the conflict has lost its acuteness and talks are under way toward its complete liquidation, some people may ask: was it worthwhile to yield? In Our view it was right to yield, for both sides, because this was a case of mutual concessions, of a reasonable compromise” (Garthoff 1989, 166). One of the debated ‘messages’ of the incident is whether ‘concrete’ use of the armed forces by the U.S. would have involved war and hostilities outside Cuba. How the Soviet would respond if the U.S. had initiated an attack and air assault of Cuba in October to November 1962? There are indications that the Soviet leaders was resolute not to go sky-high even though the Americans assaulted Cuba, but these signs are full of loopholes. No Soviet officer has claimed any knowledge of it; secretly, some have admitted that they think Khrushchev would have had to act in response, anywhere, to counteract the failure; others have admitted they are certain that he would not have used the armed forces somewhere (Fursenko & Naftali 1997). But nobody holds the truth. Likewise, according to Fursenko and Naftali (1997), American contributors to the crisis and other scholars are divided. Some claim that Soviet leadership would have opposed with a powerful response someplace; others are certain they would refuse to do so. The interests, objectives, and perspectives of the United States and the Soviet Union diverged strongly and collided in numerous aspects. Maybe one or all of the powerful nations must have had other goals, but the prevention and resolution of crisis should address the difficult issues where there are conflicting interests, goals, and perspectives. Conclusions The rigorous and careful analysis of previous events and experiences divulge not just communicable ‘messages,’ but the interactions of occurrences and general perspectives on which present and future diplomatic actions depend. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis provides an excellent case of crisis perspectives and relations. In spite of the importance of the incident, an oddly broad array of information currently exists. As a somewhat fresh event in political history, it is unusual in the level and range of firsthand record already existing and in surpassing simple oral histories or journals into actual conversations between intellectuals and participants of the crisis themselves, and presently between the two parties implicated. This procedure involves the military, representatives, political icons, and intelligence agents. The Soviet Union and the United States share the same objective, which is to deter nuclear war. This objective can go above their individual differences, beliefs, and ideologies, and allow the two great powers to talk about arms control settlements which could lessen the threat of war. In other words, the United States and Soviet Union have several common global ambitions and concerns that could be reconciled. References Byrne, Paul. The Cuban Missile Crisis: To the Brink of War. Minneapolis: Compass Point Books, 2006. Frankel, Max. High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Ballantine, 2004. Fursenko, Aleksandr & Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khruschev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Garthoff, Raymond. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989. George, Alice. Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Hirschbein, Ron. What If they Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997. Huchthausen, Peter. October Fury. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2002. Nathan, James. The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 1992. Schier, Helga. The Cuban Missile Crisis. Minnesota: Abdo Publishing Company, 2008. Scott, Len. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War: Lessons from History. London, England: Continuum, 2008. Stern, Sheldon. The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. Weldes, Jutta. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Read More