National Victory in the Spanish Civil War - Essay Example

National Victory in the Spanish Civil War Section A: Plan of the Investigation A military rising originated in Morocco, headed by General Francisco Franco which spread rapidly all over the country between 1936 and 1939. This was the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Italy and Germany supported the Nationalists. Germany had formed alliances with Japan and Italy. These nations had similar opinions and governments. They became known as the Axis Power. This was done in an effort to prevent the spread of communism and to oppose the Soviet Union, who supported the Republicans. After years of bloody war, Franco’s Nationalists defeated the Republicans, which added Spain to the list of European nations (Miller). The war offered both Hitler and Mussolini an opportunity to test their equipment and military strategies. Hitler also expected Franco's assistance in any future German war. Concerned about Hitler’s actions, British and French officials began to discuss an alliance with Soviet Union. But Soviet leader Joseph Stalin felt threatened by Hitler’s military actions and did not think British and French would protect his country. Hence in 1939, the Soviet-German nonaggression pact was revealed where each side agreed not to attack the other. The Spanish Civil War officially came to an end on April 1, 1939, without any reconciliation. Franco began a reign of terror aimed at the physical liquidation of all his potential enemies. Concentration camps were set up and tens of thousands were shot. Mass executions continued until 1944. Meanwhile, World War II was under way, and many of the volunteers took up arms against fascism again (Taylor). Despite almost universal support for the Republic amongst British intellectuals and widespread support amongst the working classes, the British government did not act. It was not only that they feared anything that might lead to a wider war in Europe but also that, British businessmen and a majority of the British Cabinet felt more sympathetic with Franco. Large corporations in America also worked on Franco's behalf. In France, the government's sympathies were with the Republic, but the government was weak and feared any acts that might alienate its own military. However, after providing the Loyalist government with a score of planes, France decided to propose an international policy of Non-Intervention that would bar all foreign aid to Spain (Miller). In fact, if Franco and the rebellious generals had been denied Italy's and Germany's aid in the early days of the war, the rebellion might well have collapsed. But Hitler and Mussolini simply ignored the Non-Intervention agreement to prove the fascism’s ambition. By the end of September 1938, British and French representatives met with Hitler and Mussolini and granted Hitler Czechoslovakia without Czech representatives being invited. This meant that another unrepresented nation's fate was effectively sealed. The signing of the Munich Accord meant the democracies would not stand against fascism in Spain (Taylor). The Internationals were withdrawn, and Spain fought on alone for several more months. In late November, Hitler provided the Nationalists with arms again. Franco started his final offensive, taking Barcelona in January. At the end of March, Madrid fell.German air forces bombed numerous Spanish cities and towns. Guernica, an unprotected town of no significant military value, was one such target. The republican forces received limited support from the democracies and as the war continued, communists came to dominate the republican forces. Section B: Summary of Evidence Waged between the Republicans and the Nationalists for a period of three years (from 1936 to 1939), the Spanish Civil War was indeed a ferocious conflict that has both destroyed and devastated Spain. The conflict began immediately after an attempt of a coup d’état triggered by a herd of dissatisfied Spanish Army generals who declared themselves the new authority in Spain wielding much excessive power. Remarkable is that the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, the Spanish landlords and some of the industrialists and financiers did not hesitate an instance to afford instinctive and unconditional support to the military insurgency. These people developed some kind of phobia and aversion for the elected government’s schemes for reform and sought to create a state of chaos and disorder in Spain with the aid of foreign countries. The Spanish Civil War demonstrated that the major democracies of Europe were not prepared to use force to protect another democracy. The war turned into an international conflict between Communism and civilization. For Germany and Italy, Spain was a testing ground for new methods of tank and air warfare. For Britain and France, the conflict represented a new threat to the international equilibrium that they were struggling to preserve. This ultimately collapsed into World War II. The war also produced some important advances in surgical techniques and blood transfusion as it has been estimated that around 600,000 people died in the war, and all Spaniards were deeply scarred by the trauma.The international press widely reported the atrocities committed at Badajoz and Guernica and major sieges like those that took place at Toledo’s Alcázar and Madrid. Civilian groups from around Europe and the Americas also became directly involved in the welfare of the innocent victims of war, particularly children orphaned by the fighting. Foreign relief agencies such as the Basque Children's Relief Committee in Britain helped to evacuate some 20,000 Basque children, during the siege of Bilbao, many of whom were taken in by families during the war (Esenwein). The dominant images of the Spanish Civil War in the English-speaking world have largely come from outsiders to Spain. Through the literary voices of George Orwell or Ernest Hemingway, or through the heroic picture of the volunteers of the International Brigades, the Spanish Civil War has been perceived less as an event in itself than as a struggle between good and evil, whether the gallant struggle of democracy against fascism, or, on the nationalist side, a crusade in defense of God and order against Bolshevism (Esenwein). Section C: Evaluation of Sources That Esenwein and Shubert's "analytical narrative" manages to be short is almost as worthy of applause as the skill with which they present their conclusions. All questions of politics or interpretation aside, one would hesitate to assign undergraduates the 1,115 pages of the 1986 edition of Hugh Thomas's The Spanish Civil War or the 1,074 pages of Burnett Bolloten's. Though the authors never state this as their aim, their book is well suited for undergraduates in need of an incisive text. Spain at War includes a selected bibliography of the most important English-language scholarship on the war, two extremely helpful glossaries of the profusion of Spanish political movements and of the key actors in the war, and four maps charting the war's course. Adrian Shubert of York University (Toronto) wrote the first five chapters of the book, taking the story up through the attempted military coup of 17 July 1936 that launched the Civil War. His chief agenda is to absolve the Second Republic of responsibility for its own destruction. As he puts it, "The Civil War was the result of the failure of a military rising against a legitimately-elected democratic government, not the failure of the Republic" (p. 33). On the contrary, the coup d'etat came not from the defects of the Republic, of which there were certainly many, but from the possibility that the Republic might succeed, transforming Spain into something that the Spanish Right was unprepared to accept (Stone). Shubert argues that the military coup "was provoked essentially by the threat that Left-Wing governments, impelled by the mobilization of the working class, would institute fundamental social reforms, and especially of the system of landholding.... It was in defence of property that the right organized itself politically during the Republic" (p. 78). This organization was quite effective, managing to block any signicant land reform under Azana, but what created true panic in the Right was the October 1934 Asturias insurrection, the "central event"of the Republic. This short-lived uprising not only provided a rallying cry for the Spanish Left, but gave the Spanish Right its image of what leftist government might bring. When the Popular Front won the elections of February 1936, it was driven from below by a wave of strikes and spontaneous land seizures to accelerate the pace of reform. The conspirators within the Spanish military could tolerate no more, and launched their coup on 17 July 1936. The failure of that coup to seize complete power, and especially the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, meant that the Nationalists would have to prevail through a long and bloody civil war (Stone). Paul Preston, the British historian and Hispanist and the director of the Cañada Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies, London School of Economics and Political Studies was harsh against Francisco Franco and his troops. He seems to sympathize with the Republicans instead and, in many situations, he was dwelling on his political background and giving his own judgments towards the Spanish Civil War. In this respect, he is quoted as saying that the rebel Franco wasn't a fascist, but something worse simply because he utilized the African mentality of repression and mistreated the Spanish government. Preston, I think, did not hinge on reliable sources as he was merely narrating the incidents of the war. He had not involved foreign participants who were omnipresent like eye-witnesses in the Spanish Civil War and, at times, the statistics he introduces prove inaccurate and dubious. Section D: Analysis There is no doubt that many countries have somehow interfered in the Spanish Civil War between the 17th of July 1936 to the 1st of April 1939. The whole Civil War indeed was the outcome of the complex political differences between the Republicans, who were regarded as the followers of the government of the day and the Nationalists who revolted against that government. Hence, while the first party is said to have a primarily power base, the second party seems rather to have a primarily rural and more conservative power base. The war ended, as mentioned somewhere above, with the defeat of the Republicans. Historical records have demonstrated that many artists, intellectuals, priests and religious people were either executed or forced into exile. Once emerged, the rebellion was strongly opposed by the government and urban workers. It is reported that Italy under the leadership of Mussolini and Germany under the leadership of Hitler were determined to send ammunitions to support the emerging rebellious leader-Franco. In addition, few volunteer recruits from other nations joined the party of the Nationalists to fight for the latter’s interests. Historical essays revealed and unveiled that Britain under the British government tried to hold a neutral position, but it happens that the British ambassador to Spain thought that a victory for Francisco Franco was to the benefit of Britain’s best interests in Spain. As a result, he devoted all his time and energy to generously support the Nationalists. In retrospect, it seems possible that world history might have proceeded differently had the democracies taken a strong stand against fascism in Spain in 1936. But they did not. Despite almost universal support for the Republic amongst British intellectuals and widespread support amongst the working classes, the British government preferred not to act. It was not only that they feared anything that might lead to a wider war in Europe, a fear that would eventually lead to the infamous Munich appeasement policy of 1938, but also that British businessmen and a majority of the British Cabinet felt more sympathetic with Franco. Large corporations in America also worked on Franco's behalf. In France, the government's sympathies were with the Republic, but the government was weak and feared not only a wider war but also any acts that might alienate its own military (Nelson). Section E: Conclusion The Spanish Revolution does not negate anarchism. If anything, long before Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary it showed the bankruptcy of Stalinism and the State Capitalism of Russia. The activities of the Stalinists were far from what real socialists would have done. Spain showed what ordinary people can do given the right conditions. The next time somebody says workers are stupid and could not take over the running of society, point to Spain. Show them what the workers and peasants (most of whom were illiterate) did. Tell them Anarchism is possible (Conlon). Bibliography: 1. Miller, Sue, et al. ed. World History - People and Nations. Austin: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 2000. 2. Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War. Fawcett, 1961 3. International World History Project: World History From The Pre-Sumerian Period To The Present. The Spanish Civil War. 16 Mar 2007 4. Esenwein, George R. Foreign Intervention in the Spanish Civil War. Encarta, 1995 5. George Esenwein and Shubert, Adrian . Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939. London and New York: Longman, 1995. Reviewed by David R. Stone (History Department, Kansas State University) Published on H-War (December, 1996) 6. Preston, Paul. “The Spanish Civil War: A New book”. October 07, 2009. ‹http://www.skeptic.ca/Spanish_Civil_War_Preston.htm.›  7. Nelson, Cary. The Spanish Civil War: An Overview. 2001 8. Conlon, Eddie. The Spanish Civil War: Anarchism in Action--An introduction to the role anarchism in the Spanish Civil War / Revolution of 1936.(1984). Read More