The Crux of the 1939 German Invasion of Poland - Essay Example

The Crux of the 1939 German Invasion of Poland Germany had spelled out by the startof August that her requests from Poland involved not just the return of Danzig to the Reich but the occupation of the land of the ‘Corridor’-- mostly Polish populated—as well. This demand meant a furthering of the previous claim of the Foreign Minister of Germany Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop, for a ‘corridor across the corridor’ (Fraser 1945, 127). Poland had previously declined that request. Their reasons were lucid and sound. If Poland had allowed it they would be detached from the sea and would have weakened her against the forces of Germany. The Polish government is aware that to submit to Germany in her current disposition would have been to invite annihilation. And thus Poland came to a decision that if she must defend herself she would exchange blows before being cut off rather than later (Fraser 1945). This essay discusses in detail the German occupation of Poland during the Second World War. A Prelude to the German Occupation of Poland during the Second World War Afterward, on the 31st of March, France and Britain promised support for Germany (Henderson 1940). In the meantime the German propaganda instrument had been working solidly to sway public opinion against Poland for false and suspected acts of violence against Germans, and the National Socialists in Danzig, on orders from Berchtesgaden and Berlin, were working on methodically breaking the foundations of the Free City and terrorizing and harassing its Polish occupants. Danzig was already a strong German military base, occupied by Army members and the Party’s military units amounting to a sum of almost 15,000 (Fraser 1945, 127). Poland’s customs inspectorate—retained there within the provisions of the Free City’s agreement-- was one of the primary targets of the wrath of the Danzig National Socialists. A number of occurrences had taken place where in these officials were stopped from accomplishing their tasks, and they had on several instances endured atrocities with casualties (Henig 2005). The Polish government, on the 31st of July, declared that because of the situation they would consider different Danzig institutions as those situated outside of the import-export tax structure of Poland and would place their exports to Poland under the established import taxes (Henig 2005). According to Henderson (1940), as a counter-step, the Danzig National Socialists carried on to notify several Polish custom officers that they would not be permitted to continue their jobs anymore. The Polish government, on the 4th of August, taking action under the consent of the British Ambassador at Warsaw, dispatched a solicitous note to the Danzig Senate. It proposed to pull out its tariff policy if the Senate would consent to end its intrusion with the inspectorate’s job, but included an admonition of the grave outcomes which would ensue if the Senate kept on capriciously intruding on Polish civil liberties (Fraser 1945). The Senate gave its approval and awhile it appeared as if the conflict were dying down. But meanwhile, Forster—the Gauleiter of Danzig—had went to Berchtesgaden to consult the state of affairs with Adolph Hitler (Fraser 1945). According to Glen (1941), Hitler made a decision to revive this tension, which had by now been resolved between the Polish government and the Senate; and the strategy he picked was to have a critical letter dispatched from Berlin to Warsaw reprimanding the Polish government for their appeasing letter. The Polish government retorted by showing that it had took action fully within its liberties and in the defense of its legal welfare, and warning that it would consider any intrusion with such interests from foreign entities as an aggressive act. The reply of Hitler was to send huge numbers of forces to Poland’s border (Fraser 1945). On the 22nd of August the British Prime Minister addressed a private note to Hitler ordering him to carry out measures to pacify the conflict, so that the issues under consideration might be resolved by nonviolent arrangement (Henderson 1940). This note was given to Hitler by British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. Afterwards he illustrated the talk (Henderson 1940, 269): Hitler was in a mood of extreme excitability. His language as regards the Poles and British responsibility for the Polish attitude was violent, recriminating and exaggerated. Everything was England’s fault. She had encouraged the Czechs last year, and she was now giving a blank cheque to Poland. He preferred war, he said, when he was fifty to when he was fifty-five or sixty. More than once he repeated to me that if he had been Chancellor of Germany in 1914 she would never have lost the war in 1918. The response of Hitler to the memo of the British Prime Minister was a stubborn negative. However, he had another talk with the Ambassador and attempted yet again to use his previous strategy. According to him, he was resolute to mend the Polish issue in his own means. Nevertheless, if Britain would not fulfill her vow to Poland, he would vow himself to the defense of the British Empire and pledge German support if that should be needed (Henderson 1940). Moreover, according to Fraser (1945), he was ready after the mitigation of the Polish tension to recognize a sensible control of weaponries, and he maintained that he does not envision any change to the borders of Western Europe. Simply put, Britain was invited to terminate a formal oath in return for an advance pledge of support. The strange thing about this event was that Hitler must have been quite consumed with the thought of his own convincing abilities as to believe such a proposal would be successful. The pledge of German support for the British Empire was a particularly odd stroke, because the only powerful nations from which the British Empire was in the farthest extent intimidated were Germany and her allies, Japan and Italy. Evidently, in that case, Hitler should have expected that the British would accept his consider his proposal intensely, but that the highly perceptive Japan and Italy would not be misled. What Hitler ultimately overlooked was that by 1939 no one outside his would embrace a Hitler pledge (Henig 2005). Nevertheless, the British response was not restricted to a dismissal of this unbelievable bid. It gave a string of counter-bids. The major proposals were the launching of direct talks between the governments of Germany and Poland and the implementation of direct measures to ease the conflict in the issue of the handling of minority groups (Henig 2005). At the same time, according to Fraser (1945), the British offered help, if they would be viewed valuable, both in finalizing an agreement and in securing its stability once it was achieved. In the meantime other nations as well had been giving their best to convince Hitler to pursue his rightful objectives by nonviolent ways. President Roosevelt sent requests to the Polish president and Hitler persuading them not to fall back on all-out violence; he also asked the King of Italy to work as a go-between (Fraser 1945). The King of Belgians also addressed similar petitions to Poland and Germany on behalf of the Netherlands, the Scandinavian nations, and Belgium. The Pope acted similarly in a special transmission from the Vatican. Every single one of these attempts was without success. The French Prime Minister addressed a memo to Hitler on the 26th of August wherein he stated (Fraser 1945, 128): I owe it to you, I owe it to our two peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests solely in your hands. There is nothing to-day which need prevent any longer the pacific solution of the international crisis with honor and dignity for all peoples if the will for peace exists equally on all sides. I can personally guarantee the readiness which Poland has always shown to have recourse to methods of free conciliation. There is not one of the grievances involved by Germany against Poland which might not be submitted to decision by such methods. This note was given to Hitler by the French Ambassador himself. Hitler was still unwavering. And in a note to the French Prime Minister he stated (Fraser 1945, 128): I do not see the possibility of bringing to a pacific solution to a Poland who now feels herself inviolable under the protection of her guarantees… or of obtaining any result by reasonable means so as to redress a situation which is intolerable for the German people and the German nation. However, the British suggestions for immediate dialogue could not be ignored that simply. If they were rejected completely, then it could be impossible to persuade the Germans that totally everything had been carried out to realize a nonviolent arrangement. In contrast, they could not be permitted to happen, for if Polish and German delegates talked in front of mediators and the Poles represented themselves as cooperative and civil whereas the Germans declined every proposal that failed to meet their conditions, then yet again Germany would have positioned herself at fault. Thus the German regime settled on two options (Fraser 1945): first, to approve the suggestion of Great Britain but take it in such a manner as to deprive it of any certainty; and, to blame Poland for rejecting it. The first of these schemes was performed along the following lines. Immediately after the presentation of the British plans, specifically, on the 29th of August, the British Ambassador was called for the Reich Chancellery, in which he was met by Ribbentrop and Hitler. Hitler presented to the British Ambassador Germany’s response to the British letter (Glen 1941). It closed with the statement, “the German Government counts on the arrival in Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers on the following day, Wednesday, August 30th” (Glen 1941, 237), so as to obtain the arrangement plans which the German regime would for the time being prepare. Thus that statement could simply have one implication. If both sides to a conflict will have a sincere talk with an eye to an agreeable arrangement, then either of two options will be pursued. Either they maintain communication with one another to agree on a time and venue of discussion amenable to both, and if the issue is quite pressing both parties will make sure that the date of convention is set immediately (Glen 1941). Otherwise they begin by communicating through letters; one side presenting his plans to the other and asking for his remarks, suggestions, or counter-plans. As stated by Fraser (1945, 128): The one thing that people do not do—if they genuinely desire a friendly settlement—is to order their opposite numbers to send a representative with full powers to sign an agreement, neither informing the other side what terms will be put forward nor giving it time to instruct its emissary as to the concessions he may make, and the point at which he must stand firm. Given that the plan of Ribbentrop and Hitler had been approved there would have turned up in Berlin an unlucky Polish representative without knowledge of what he would be about to officially agree upon, and just the assurance that he would be bashed and harassed, just like how Czechoslovakia’s Dr. Hacha had been harassed and bashed several months prior, until he formally agreed upon what was given to him (Henig 2005). In reality, the proposal of Germany was a final warning to Poland to acknowledge the German conditions by the 30th of August or bear the price. As soon as the British Ambassador mentioned this, Ribbentrop and Hitler angrily denied the allegation (Henig 2005). Yet their later actions disproved their objection. The Polish government did not dispatch an ambassador within the set deadline. Apparently, they were completely within their liberties in this; excepting that the German plan was meant as a final warning they had nothing to be alarmed from seeking an initial discussion of the process to be implemented in the assured settlements (Henig 2005). The British Ambassador once more summoned Ribbentrop. He informed Ribbentrop that although Poland had approved the British plans unreservedly, the demand of Germany appeared to the British regime perverse in itself and completely irreconcilable with the essence of those proposals. Furthermore, he asked Ribbentrop, in the name of the British administration, to meet with the Polish representative and talk about the most appropriate system of process (Glen 1941). According to Henderson (1940), the response of Ribbentrop to the key of these propositions was mad violence; to the second his response was a similarly annoyed refusal. He afterwards stated aloud the conditions which Germany requested from Poland as the terms of an agreement. Earlier, Hitler had stated in his response to the British plans that the German regime would allow the British administration to familiarize itself to the conditions of their requests on Poland if these had been made by the time Poland’s representative had arrived at Berlin. By reason of this idea the British Ambassador requested to Ribbentrop a print of the manuscript containing the terms of the German proposals (Glen 1941). Ribbentrop turned down the request. And the reason he stated was that the conditions were at the moment ‘obsolete’ for it was past the deadline for the Polish representative (Glen 1941). Simply put, the 29th’s German demand was a final warning in the perspective of Ribbentrop and that final warning had at the moment ended. One important thing that has to be mentioned is that the Polish administration did not get any copy of the German provisions. The Polish representative got a message from Warsaw on the 31st ordering him to validate officially Poland’s acknowledgment of the British plans for immediate compromise (Henig 2005). However, he was notified at the Wilhelmstrasse that if he had not turned up with absolute powers to approve the so-far undisclosed German provisions his appearance was futile (Fraser 1945). Which then introduces the second option of the German process: the accusation that Germany had approved, but Poland had declined the British plans. This was not only a deception; it was a very unlikely deception at first glance. According to Fraser (1945), even to those who were not aware of the details it might have appeared unexpected that the Polish regime, having struggled for a long time with limitation, having made it completely definite that although resolute to protect the rightful interests of Poland it was, most of all, concerned with a nonviolent and diplomatic negotiation of the issues in conflict, should all of a sudden swivel and throw out an opportunity to realize that aim. Quite more unexpected, to anybody who regarded the circumstances without bias, was the German claim that Great Britain supported Poland in the suspected dismissal of Britain’s own plan. The recognized National Socialist account of the event by November 1939 was that Britain, as portion of an extensive preparation for the demolition of the Reich, intentionally acted in front of Germany as if Poland had approved direct compromises when actually she had rejected them (Henig 2005). This would imply, if factual, that ‘Britain went out of her way to give Germany the chance of appearing the more reasonable of the two parties to the quarrel and so of justifying herself in the eyes of the world; it hardly squares with the more general allegation that she had for years been systematically engaged in stirring up public opinion against the Reich’ (Fraser 1945, 131). Nevertheless, according to Henderson (1940), whatever the case may be, the details were disclosed to Ribbentrop and Hitler. The message wherein Poland approved the plan for direct compromises was made public by the British administration. Conclusions If Adolph Hitler had aimed for a nonviolent agreement with Poland he may perhaps have attained it. And by preferring the peaceful route he would have achieved the recognition, and the admiration, of the entire world. No one disbelieved that Germany was powerful; the sole matter was whether Germany would exercise her power for aggression or alliance. But the German occupation of Poland during the Second World War spoiled the chance for peace. Works Cited Fraser, Lindley. Germany between Two Wars: A Study of Propaganda and War-Guilt. London: Oxford University Press, 1945. Print. Glen, Douglas. Von Ribbentrop is still dangerous. New York: Rich & Cowan, 1941. Print. Henderson, Nevile. Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940. Print. Henig, Ruth Beatrice. The Origins of the Second World War 1933-1941. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print. Read More