Policy recommendations in counter-terrorism - Essay Example

? MEMORANDUM PAPER by 10 June Memorandum Paper June 10, President of the United s, Mr. Obama Name], USA’s National Security Advisor Subject: Policy recommendations in counter-terrorism Dear Mr. President, Ten years have passed since the tragic events of 9/11, but we are still in the midst of the international terrorism crisis. Major terrorist threats continue to persist, and we need to understand what and how should be done, in order to improve our strategic position. We have invested billions of dollars in the development of our domestic security doctrine, but our citizens are not secured from the risks of terrorist attacks. The goal of this memorandum is to highlight the most important elements of the current counter-terrorism strategy and propose new ways to improve our strategic achievements, domestically and abroad. The number of incidents involving U.S.-based Islamic terrorists continues to increase. Between 2001 and 2009, the U.S. reported at least 46 cases of domestic-grown terrorism (Johnson 2011). Compared to only six incidents in 2001, the number of terrorist conflicts in the U.S. rose to nine in 2009 (Johnson 2011). This is a worrisome sign and one of the major reasons why the United States decided to adopt a novel approach to domestic and international terrorism. “The threat comes as Americans and officials across the country […] are set to mark the anniversary of 9/11 with high-profile events at each site of the attack” (Lee & Entous 2011). The seriousness of the planned events suggests that, on the one hand, all Americans are aware of the effects which the events of 9/11 produced on their country and, on the other hand, they are not secured from the risks of another terrorist attacks when these events finally take place. No one is secured from terrorism, but it is within the country’s capabilities to make these risks minimal. A country as large and rich as the United States has everything needed to deal with the threat of terrorism. Part of the problem is in the way our counter-terrorism strategy is designed. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy relies on three basic rules. First, Americans never make any deals with terrorists and do not engage in blackmailing (Global Focus 2010). Second, all terrorists are treated as criminals (Global Focus 2010). Third, the United States can and does apply considerable political, economic, and military pressure on the states that are known to be supporting terrorism (Global Focus 2010). Based on these principles are the four rules on which U.S. counter-terrorism strategy currently builds. First, there should be no concessions or deals made with terrorists (Global Focus 2010). U.S. government will never make any concessions or deals with the foreign terrorists taking American hostages. Second, the U.S. will always seek to bring terrorists to justice for the crimes they have committed (Global Focus 2010). No matter how long it takes, America will track down, catch, and convict all terrorists who have ever attacked the American state, an American citizen, or their interests (Global Focus 2010). Third, the United States works hard to force the states that sponsor terrorists to change their attitudes and behaviors (Global Focus 2010). Fourth, the U.S. believes that it can bolster its allies to work individually or cooperatively against terrorists (Global Focus 2010). Needless to say, the current counter-terrorism strategy demands huge financial and intellectual investments. Simultaneously, while President Obama claims his counter-terrorism strategy to rely on cooperation, collaboration, and resilience, the scope of violence and military efforts applied against domestic and international terrorism cannot be ignored (Obama 2011). These are not the only problems facing the United States in its fight against terrorism. To begin with, most, if not all, counter-terrorism efforts developed in the U.S. rely on an implicit assumption that global terrorist organizations have narrow support and can be easily eliminated (Lempert et al. 2008). In reality, terrorist organizations originating from the Islamic world have already gained broad support across a number of Islamic states, and they have resources and capabilities to respond to changes in U.S. counter-terrorism policies. Furthermore, and according to President Obama, U.S.’s values cannot leave anyone indifferent about the seriousness of the global terrorist threat (Lempert et al. 2008). Therefore, it is possible to assume, that other states will respond to the U.S.’s calls for peace and stability. Yet, in reality, other nations and groups are not interested in spending their own resources to defend the U.S. from unclear threats; values do not matter, only immutable interests (Lempert et al., 2008). Finally, the U.S. believes that its law enforcement and military resources are large enough to withstand any challenge and eliminate any, even the most dangerous, terrorist (Lempert et al. 2008). Unfortunately, the disorganization and confusion across the American counter-terrorism institutions cannot be overstated, and it is high time for the country to realize that its institutions and resources do not match its strategy and expectations. In order to enhance its strategic position and improve the quality and efficiency of its counter-terrorism interventions, the U.S. must drop its violent intentions altogether and forget about its dominant political and economic position. The country must focus on the development of inter-state and global cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and trial of terrorists and the development of well-functioning law enforcement and criminal justice systems (Schrijver & Herik 2010). Counter-terrorism should not be violent; otherwise it is no better than conventional terrorism. By imposing its counter-terrorism demands on other countries, the U.S. will never achieve its goals. “Contemporary terrorist acts often implicate the citizens of one state, but may involve the complicity of nationals of other nations, or assistance in the form of funding” (Schrijver & Herik 2010, p.3). Consequently, not violence but collaboration and cooperation will create a good basis for reducing the scope of the major terrorist threats. Finally, the country should give up an implicit assumption that terrorists have no support in the Islamic world: fighting against terrorism is not a one-minute endeavor, and the U.S. should be prepared to spend years building a collaborative network of anti-terrorist supporters all over the world. The current state of the counter-terrorism strategy in the U.S. leaves much space for improvements. On the one hand, the U.S. relies on its values and beliefs and seeks to promote its vision of democracy and freedom across all foreign countries. On the other hand, violence and aggression have become extremely commonplace in the U.S.’s relations with countries that favor or support terrorism. The U.S. exercises serious pressure on the countries suspected of terrorism and forgets that no ally will engage in its strategies and interventions, unless their direct interests are at stake. It is high time for the U.S. to shift its counter-terrorist emphasis from interventions and aggression to cooperation and networking. Fighting against terrorism is not a one-minute endeavor, and the U.S. should be prepared to spend years building a collaborative network of anti-terrorist supporters all over the world. References Global Focus 2010, ‘Counter-terrorism’, Global Focus, http://www.globalfocus.org/GF- Counterterrorism.htm, accessed June 10, 2012. Johnson, T 2011, ‘Threat of homegrown Islamist terrorism’, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/threat-homegrown-islamist-terrorism/p11509, accessed June 10, 2012. Lee, CE & Entous, A 2011, ‘U.S. sees ‘credible’ 9/11 terror threat’, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904836104576559300758353100.html, accessed June 10, 2012. Lempert, RJ, Trujillo, HR, Aaron, D, Dewar, JA, Berry, SH & Popper, SW 2008, ‘Comparing alternative U.S. counterterrorism strategies’, Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2008/RAND_DB548.pdf, accessed June 10, 2012. Obama, B 2011, ‘National strategy for counterterrorism’, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf, accessed June 10, 2012. Schrijver, N & Herik, L 2010, ‘Leiden policy recommendations on counter-terrorism and international law’, Campus den Haag, http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/Leiden%20Policy%20Recommendations%201%20April%202010.pdf, accessed June 10, 2012. Read More