Leaders and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a Comparative Study - Research Paper Example

His visit marked the first time an Arab leader made significant overtures to the people of Israel. Egyptian-Israeli negotiations ensued and in March 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a formal peace treaty “desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security” (The Preamble of the Camp David Treaty). Then, Palestinian-Israeli relations witnessed a series of negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders during the 1980s and early 1990s.

A deep analytical look at the conducts of Arab and Israeli leaders throughout the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict will show that Chaim Weizmann was more effective and successful than Sharif Husayn, while Arab leaders Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Yasser Arafat of Palestine were more successful than Israeli former Prime Ministers Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon respectively. Starting by the Weizmann/ Husayn comparison, one can argue that Weizman was more successful in reaching his aim of establishing a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine.

The Zionist leader Haim Weizmann was introduced to Lord Balfour in 1904. Balfour was anxious to convince Weizmann that the Zionist movement should accept Uganda, rather than Palestine, as a national home. However, Weizmann was shrewd and clever enough to convince Balfour that Palestine ought to be the Jewish national home. So, the British Zionist movement began to lobby the British government in their cause, and during the early years of the war found a sympathetic advocate in Mark Sykes, who professed an interest to liberate the 'downtrodden people of the world' including the Armenians, Arabs and Jews.

(“The Balfour Declaration”). During World War I, Weizmann began drafting a proposal for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. Accordingly, the British had exchanged letters with Hussein ibn Ali, Sheriff of Mecca in 1915, in which he had promised the Arabs control of the Arab lands, exclusive of the Mediterranean coast. Hussein protested that the Arabs of Beirut would greatly oppose isolation from the Arab state, but did not bring up the matter of the area of Jerusalem, which included a good part of Palestine.

The fact that Hussein did not protest openly to the process of dividing lands for Arabs and Israelis reflect his failure and indecisiveness as an Arab leader, in comparison with Weizmann, who succeeded to enforce his plans for the Jewish people to have their homeland in Palestine. As a result of this weak attitude of Hussein, the British published a White Paper, in 1939, which marked the end of its commitment to the Jews under the Balfour Declaration. It provided for the establishment of a Palestinian state within ten years and the appointment of Palestinian ministers to begin taking over the government as soon as "peace and order" were restored to Palestine.

The 1939 White Paper met a mixed Arab reception and was rejected by the AHC. The Jewish Agency rejected it emphatically, branding it as a total repudiation of Balfour and Mandate obligations. Consequently, the tension continued and even escalated between both the Palestinians and Israelis. In his analysis of the Palestinian reaction towards the occupation of the Israelis to their land, the author of the memoirs stresses the fact that the Palestinians have a justifiable motive to fight occupation.

So, he did not find it odd or strange that Palestinian nationals and resistance