Reasons behind Britains decision to participate in World War I - Essay Example

? Reasons behind Britain’s decision to participate in World War I By: Presented [Institute] The Great War I-e World War I started in July 1914 and continued until 1918. On August 4, 1914, at 7.00 pm, United Kingdom’s most respected news source The Daily Mirror published breaking news from the foreign office that Britain is at war with Germany. The news was a surprise because until then Britain had aptly deployed a diplomatic foreign policy, and had substantially refrained from wars and European predicaments (Turner, 1988, p.23). Britain was referred to as the possessor of “Splendid Isolation,” and, until 1900, it was not a part of any significant military convention with any other states (Woodward, 1967, p.3). The factors that provoked Britain to enter this war has been debated a lot lately and no single factor can be termed as the sole reason behind Britain’s decision to enter the war. This paper is an attempt to unveil those salient factors that pushed Britain to join the Great War. German connection: In early 1500s, Europe entered a modernized era, and nations developed a strategy of "Balance of powers" (Orakhelashvili, 2011, p.123). It was done to eradicate or prevent the evolution of any single state as supremely powerful. However, this equilibrium was drastically shaken due to the occurring of several historically influencing incidents. These include the 16th century Hapsburg Crisis, which resulted in Thirty Years’ War that greatly affected Europe from Hungary to Spain and later broke Hapsburg Monarchy in smaller kingdoms (Kann, 1980, p.45). The period of 1792 to 1815 saw France became a domineering empire on the continent during the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. The German Crisis further deteriorated the situation and let Germany gain assertive control all over the Europe, which nullified the strategy of Balance of Powers. Hence, as an outcome of this unsettling scenario, two regions substantially gained the status of separate unified powers namely Germany and Italy. Kaiser Wilhelm II transformed Germany into an aggressive state, and ignored the long followed foreign policy of a status quo. (Wintle, 2002, p.55) Germany wanted to become as strong at sea as Britain, and hence, instead of renewing its treaty with Russia, Germany collaborated with Austria. The fear of Berlin’s resentment compelled Russia and France, two significant neighbouring states located on eastern and western sides of Germany, to come together for an alliance. Thus, the power in Europe was divided into two influential groups Central and Entente, and each group shared equal military strength. In 1879, Germany and Austria-Hungary collated together under a treaty called the Dual Alliance and Italy joined in early 1900s, which converted it into Triple Alliance whereas France and Russia collated and formed Dual Entente in 1892 (Wintle, 2002, p.55). In the last decade of 19th century, Germany started to build its navy, which posed great threat to the world’s most influential and powerful maritime state, I-e Britain. Germany’s naval in-charge Admiral Von Tirpitz formulated a new policy in 1897 targeting Britain’s naval powers and decided to outnumber them on Home Waters by building High-Seas Fleet. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin wrote: Germany’s already swiftly growing position as a world power into a dominating one. England is now regarded as the most dangerous enemy which, as long as Germany is not sufficiently armed at sea, must be treated with consideration in all ways (cited in: Afflerbach & Stevenson, 2012, p.116). Before the onset of 20th century, Britain and Germany shared friendly ties. However, this transformation of policy clearly projected the intentions of Germans and by 1907, British government realised that the most potential threat posed to its stability, and supremacy was from Germany. Hence, Britain had no other choice but to collaborate with rival nations Russia and France and the mutual alliance became Triple Entente. (Afflerbach & Stevenson, 2012, p.117) Naval connection and the concerns over Mediterranean Sea: Britain enjoyed its globally dominant trading position due to its strong and powerful naval forces. Britain’s five ports namely Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria; the Cape and Singapore were considered as ‘the five strategic keys to lock up the world’ (Lindberg & Todd, 2002, p.93). The Fleet of 10 battleships around the Mediterranean, presence of three battleships in the Far-East, and countless small ships that covered a vast area all over the globe guaranteed Britain’s naval supremacy and authority over the rest of the world. (Lindberg & Todd, 2002, p.93) The heavy-weight stature of Britain’s naval forces can be understood by the fact that in 1897, it solely possessed 62 battleships whereas the grand total of war ships owned by all the other countries in the world was 96 (Rose, 2007, p.55). Britain had to make sure that no threat was posed to its naval authority, as well as it had to further expand its territory to regions like the Americas, Far-East, the Cape, and Mediterranean to maintain its supremacy (Lindberg & Todd, 2002, p.95). Nevertheless, the increasing eminence of France, Russia, Germany, Japan, USA, Brazil, Argentine, Italy and Austro-Hungary made Britain’s naval position weaker. Mediterranean Sea provided the main trading route between Britain and India, and the issue of concern was that its Fleets were already outnumbered by Austrian, Italian and French ships. Russia’s increasing interest in Dardanelle (the location where Black sea opens up into the Mediterranean) was another critical aspect for Britain since this encouraged a free flow of its trading and war ships all across Europe. (Higby, 1932, p.361) Hence, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lansdowne changed the strategy and gracefully withdrew forces from the Americas, and the Far-East. Furthermore, Britain strengthened its ties with Turkey, which owned Dardanelle and did not have good ties with Russia, to prevent Russian ships from gaining authority at Mediterranean Sea (Higby, 1932, p.362). Even so, Britain’s naval power seemed insufficient in comparison to the combined number of Fleets and Cruisers acquired by France and Russia. The Admiralty in England decided to abandon the “stay aloof from continental entanglements” policy that it had followed for so long, and in 1902, Japan and Britain signed on a treaty of alliance, which entailed that both nations will help each other in case of a foreign attack. (Higby, 1932, p.362) Naval reforms were also instigated simultaneously by the Committee of Imperial Defence, which primarily focused on increasing protection at Home waters first and then the Mediterranean. However, it was a reality that Britain was substantially alarmed by the increasing naval superiority of Germany, France and Russia. Regional concerns: Another factor that created rivalry between the precursors of supremacy in Europe and played a crucial role in provoking Britain was the increasing tension over specific regions (Ashworth, 1961, p.140). African continent became a bone of contention between the domineering powers. Belgium and France had already occupied large territories in Africa, and Britain was at daggers drawn with France over the issue of possession of North Africa. The situation got worse when Germany also occupied several African colonies by 1900, and North Africa became its next target destination. Africa and Far-East was very important markets for Britain from economic and trading perspective. William Ashworth signified the importance of Africa for England as ‘in the twenty years preceding the First World War, South Africa and the British colonies in West Africa were areas of particularly expansive British export trade’ (1961, p.143). Belgium was another sensitive location which Britain could not afford to let go. Dr Gary Sheffield (2011) writes that entering World War I became indispensable for Britain because “Britain was highly sensitive about Belgium. In the hands of an enemy, Belgian ports offered a major threat to the British naval supremacy and hence the security of the British Isles." When Germany invaded France from Belgium, enacting on the Schrieffer Plan, entering into the war became inevitable for Britain. This step can be termed as the turning point and the most significant factor that provoked Britain’s participation in World War I. That is because Belgium's neutrality was very critical for England's security, since Belgian ports were close to British coast and also served the purpose of providing a direct access to European market. Another fact that garnered extreme concerns from British government was that Belgium was the perfect place for an enemy to target British islands and launching an invasion against Britain was most likely to be initiated from this location. Britain also was under an agreement with Belgium since 1839 known as the Treaty of London due to which defending Belgian territory was not an option but an obligation for the government. However, defending its boundaries was the utmost priority of British government and since an attack on Belgium provided the Germans an open and easy opportunity for invading Britain, therefore, protecting the Belgian neutrality became a requisite. Preserving the supremacy and dominance of British Empire: The historical legacy of British Empire, vastness of its territorial possessions and the highly esteemed stature of its royalty determined Britain’s greatness. Joseph Chamberlain rightly put forth this notion as ‘the British race is the greatest of governing races that the world has ever seen’ (cited in: Higgins, 2010). Various historians have criticised the enormous area occupied by Britain as a huge burden and financial drain on its economy (Higgins, 2010). However, the public and governmental urge to maintain sole authority and superiority throughout European region and the world prevailed profoundly. Public perception on preserving British Empire’s legacy of greatness and prominence can be understood by this statement from Joll ‘the maintenance of their imperial position was worth the risk of war.’ (1992, p.178) Defending all the occupied territories that constituted British Empire and maintaining its global prestige was one reason that pushed Britain towards war with Germany. The Royal Navy’s strength and protection were also important because it not just ensured the perseverance of British Empire, but also was directly related to various commercial and financial prospects, which were fundamental for Britain’s economic welfare. The protection of Home waters and the trade routes was very crucial for the survival of its economy as well as for the British society. Germany’s strategy to become a well-equipped and impressive naval power was against the interest of Britain. Although Germans had always adopted a diplomatic policy with Britain by declaring Germany as a “friend of England”, however, its negative stances during the Moroccan Agadir crisis, and South African Boer War exposed their hostile intentions (Higgins, 2010). Therefore, if Britain had elected to stay out of the war, and had let the other two Central Powers France and Russia fight Germany, there was a possibility that they might not be able to win against the enormous and aggressive Germans. The consequence of such a scenario is explained by Sheffield as [If] a hostile power did succeed in achieving a dominating position in Europe, with no powerful continental allies Britain would be very vulnerable to attack – particularly with major ports in enemy hands (2011). The invasion of Belgium in 1914 solidified this threat, and Britain realised that opting out of war will not secure its political and geographical position as an Empire, and it will most likely be the next target of German invasion. Another perspective on this scenario would be the defeat of Germany by France and Russia. In such a situation, Britain could not have survived either, since its opposition to help the allies during the war would definitely annul the Entente and the pre-war sentiments of imperial rivalries between these three nations would have emerged again. Britain clearly understood that choosing otherwise would unearth the underlying differences that the three central powers subsided to concentrate on Germany together and hence defending England against two supreme powers would be even more difficult. An analysis of the various factors that bore critical importance for the welfare and sovereignty of the Empire substantiates the fact that Britain entered First World War because it had no other choice. Either way Britain would have become a part of the crisis, hence, the government decided to fight the aggression with its allies instead of being the victim of foreign aggression later. Reference List Afflerbach, H., & Stevenson, D., (2012) An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914, Berghahn Books. Ashworth, W., (1961) An Economic History of England, 1870-1939, Methuen. Higby, P., C., (1932) History of Modern Europe: A Survey of the Evolution of European Society from the National Risings Against Napoleon to the Present Day, The Century Co. Higgins, J., (2010), Why did Britain Join the War Against Germany?, e-International Relations, [online] Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2010/12/14/why-did-britain-join-the-war-against-germany/ [Accessed: 23 Feb 2013]. Joll, J., (1992) The origins of the First World War, ed. 2nd, Longman. Kann, R., A., (1980) History of the Habsburg Empire: 1526-1918, University of California Press. Lindberg, M., & Todd, D., (2002) Brown, Green and Blue Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present, Greenwood Publishing Group. Orakhelashvili, A., (2011) Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Edward Elgar Publishing. Rose, L., A., (2007) Power at Sea, Vol. 1, University of Missouri Press. Sheffield, G., (2011) The Origins of World War One, BBC History of World Wars, [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml [Accessed: 23 Feb 2013]. Turner, J., (1988) Britain and the First World War, Routledge. Wintle, J., (2002) Makers of Nineteenth Century Culture: 1800-1914, Vol. 2, Routledge. Woodward, E., L., (1967) Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918, Methuen. Read More