Electoral Reforms in Canadian Provinces - Essay Example

 Electoral Reforms in Canadian Provinces Introduction The Canadian Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system has been in existence since its inception and according to The Law Commission of Canada (2004) it was inherited from Great Britain over 200 years ago. The Canadians have been habituated to this system in such a way that policy oriented research to comparative merits of different systems is rendered fruitless. The plurality-majority governments which have been in place for decades are unwilling to even consider any reforms as they enjoy considerable advantages with this system, that is, they can have majority seats in the House of Commons even if the party does not enjoy popular support in many regions. This is due to the use of First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) method of electing candidates. However, the Canadian society has undergone many changes since the FPTP method was introduced and even British itself has ever since changed its electoral system. Canadian society is now more diverse and mobile and as such, this electoral system is proving ineffective in dealing with issues that affect society today. In other words, the system no longer responds to twenty-first century democratic values as political, cultural and economic reality has greatly changed (Law Commission of Canada 2004, p. 2). There is thus considerable pressure from citizen groups, academics, politicians and political parties to institute electoral reforms. In fact, provinces like British Columbia (BC), New Brunswick, Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Quebec have gone as far as starting the process of electoral reforms. It is believed that adding an element of proportionality to the existing system may go a long way in solving many of the problems inherent in current system. The question that needs to be answered is; will alternative methods succeed where FPTP has failed? This will be the focus of this essay. To answer this question, the essay will first discuss the shortfalls of the current electoral system. It will then examine the various proposals put forward for reforms such as the Alternative Vote (AV), Two-round or run-off system, list-Proportional Representation, Single Transferable Vote (STV), Mixed Member Proportion (MMP), and Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) systems. Their weaknesses and strengths will be evaluated to determine if they can be compatible with the Canadian democratic values and constitution. Various proposals in different provinces will also be examined to determine why they have not succeeded and what can be done to make them more applicable in Canadian context. A brief summary will be given at the end. Canadian Electoral System As noted earlier, the Canadian electoral system (SMP) was inherited from Great Britain over 200 years ago. During this time, women, Aboriginal groups and non-property owners had no right to vote. The system is based on “winner takes it all” in that one member from each riding is selected by plurality of votes rather than majority of votes (Law Commission of Canada, 2004 p. 2). In Canada there are 301 ridings although they have recently risen to 308. The party with the largest number of elected candidates automatically forms the government irrespective of its share of popular vote in the country. As such, the party that governs is the one that has a strong regional base which it is able to translate into votes rather than a nationally representative party without strong local base. For example, in 2000, out of 172 seats the liberals got, 100 came from Ontario (Jansen & Siaroff 2004 p. 46). It is therefore, not necessary for a party to garner more than fifty percent of votes to become majority or governing party. The system thus has a tendency of rewarding large parties and disregarding smaller parties even though they get seats all over the country (Milner, 2004a). For example, in 1990 the majority party (liberal party) received 39% of votes while in 2000 it received 49% of votes. The problem with this electoral system is that it leads to what Pilon (2007) calls “democratic deficit.” The political decision makers become more powerful and influential than citizens leading to huge disparities between the two organs. Citizens are made weaker through excessive party discipline, powerful executive (prime minister and his office), individual members of parliament lack influence, and overly adversarial politics in the House of Commons (Law Commission of Canada, 2004). This makes citizens to lose interest in voting as it is clear that by the end of the voting process, their votes won’t matter and their views will never be heard. The number of those who vote has thus been declining over the years and unless something is done, this trend will continue. For example, in Quebec those who did not vote in 2000 election were more that those who voted for winning party. The link between members of parliament and citizens is very weak in this kind of system thus acting as disincentive to vote. In the 2000 elections it is just over 61% of registered voters that voted and even worse, only 25% of eligible voters aged 18 and 24 voted (p. 39). This paints a dull picture for youth participation in politics although some of it can be attributed to lack of knowledge about politics and insufficient time to vote as opposed to lack of interest. Another problem with this system is that in the twenty-first century where “equality of rights” is emphasized and even incorporated in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, still women, minority groups, and Aboriginals are not well represented. The system does not consider these marginalized groups while voting as no special clauses exist to ensure more inclusive government. For example, despite women constituting half of the population, they only get one-fifth of seats in House of Commons making Canada rank 36th in women representation (Milner, 2004b). According to Katz (2004 p. 85) in 2001 elections, only 20.6% of House of Commons were female. Changing the electoral system would allow increased women representation. However, Flanagan ( 2005 p. 100) argues that the success of democracy depends on other factors other than electoral reform such as respect for constitution; adherence to rule of law; extensive franchise for all and property rights protection. He is supported by Trimble and Arscott (2003) who argue that electoral reform is not a guarantee for equal representation for women and other groups unless they are supported at local level. Moreover, women are challenged to compete fairly with men according to merit as being accorded special treatment would mean they have failed to compete effectively thus they would not be taken seriously (p. 67). The system also favors adversarial politics. Since it is the majority government that rules, it rarely cooperates with minority parties in making policies. Instead, it serves to weaken opposition and eliminate smaller parties as these are not represented in the House of Commons (MacDonald, 2005). The ruling party since it has majority of the members can impose its decisions on others and does not need to consult others. It is to the ruling parties’ benefit if the opposition is weakened as this would mean the party would not have a strong challenger in the next general elections. However, weak opposition means the government has no one to keep it in check thus it can pass draconian rules which are unpopular with citizens or which do not reflect their views and values. Cross (2005 p. 75) acknowledges the fact that although the population is increasingly becoming diverse, the SMP system does not allow for diversity of opinions as small parties, women, Aboriginals and other minority groups are not represented in the House of Commons. The system lacks proportionality since the votes won are translated into seats. The House is thus representative of concentrated geographic areas while some other areas are left without adequate representation. Despite all these shortcomings, Cross argues that “proportional representation has never been considered seriously as a possible alternative to existing system” (2005 p. 75). This is according to an essay written by Alan Cairns in 1968. In fact, in 1991 the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing categorically stated that it was ready to consider issues related to elections and political parties save for electoral system (p. 75-84). As such, out of its 23 research volumes, none considered electoral system. Their view is supported by Milner who argues that the electoral reform issue had never been brought for public discussion (Milner, 2004b). However, bearing in mind that five provincial governments: BC, New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and Prince Edward Island had already initiated electoral reforms, this assertion may not be accurate. So why is Canada bent on reforming its electoral system now? This is a question that begs answers since FPTP has been in operation for decades. Recently, there has been increased pressure from various quarters to reform the electoral system so as to reflect democratic values of Canadians. Examples of these organizations include: Fair Vote Canada, Democracy Watch, Equal Voice (by women), Every Vote Counts (Prince Edward), and Fair Voting (BC). More so there has been a decline in voter turnout, decline in youth participation, more mobile and diverse population necessitating for reform (Law Commission of Canada, 2004). Coupled with international precedents, it is the ripe moment to embrace change. Furthermore, those who feel aggrieved by current system such as the Green party led by Joan Russow are now turning to courts for intervention since the politicians are unwilling to institute reforms. Schwartz (2001 p. 141) indicates that Section 15(1) of the Canadian charter of rights guarantees “equality rights.” The Green party in May 2001 went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the FPTP system as it denies minorities their rights due to its disproportionality. For example, in 2000 federal elections parties votes per seat won ratios differed greatly. The liberal party had 30184 votes/seats won, progressive conservatives 130582 votes/seats won and NDP 84134 votes/seats won. The popular vote can thus end up with few seats in legislature. In BC in 2001, liberals translated 57% of votes into 97% of seats while the Greens got no seats despite having garnered 12.4% of the vote (Katz, 2004 p. 85). Electoral Reforms however, have not started today but in the late nineteenth and twentieth century when franchise was extended to non-property owners and women. This gave courage to Social Democratic parties to demand for more proportional representation (Tanguay, 2004). According to Law Commission of Canada (2004) it was the progressive and united farmers’ parties which began the adoption of proportional representation in municipal elections in the western provinces. The FPTP system came later and was meant only to curb the opposition in the 1950s. In 1921, women voted in the general election thus acquiring a milestone. Another important milestone was the franchise of First Nations Peoples in 1960 culminating in the election of an Aboriginal to the House of Commons in 1968 (p.28). In the 1980s, the Parti Quebecois began implementing reforms by adopting proportional representation which was seen as more democratic. It proposed the list-PR system for 28 multi-member regions and mixed system for two-third of members of National Assembly elected by single-member ridings using FPTP and also multi-member regional ridings. In the end, the ministry recommended list-PR system. However, Parti Quebecois disagreed with the ministry of state for parliamentary and electoral reforms and proposed a different model. In the end, due to the disagreements no reforms were made to the electoral system. This will be apparent in other jurisdictions that have attempted to initiate reforms. Worse still, when Mulroney government assumed office in 1989, it excluded any consideration for alternative electoral systems. Currently, there have been various reform proposals but they have not yet succeeded. Electoral Reform Proposals As stated earlier, there are various types of electoral systems applicable worldwide but their application in Canada depends on the constitution and values embraced by Canadians. The current system which is a type of Plurality-majority system is favored by some for enhancing government accountability, effective government and geographical representation (Massicote, 2004 p. 65). Besides, the system is easily understood by the average voter. However, due to shortcomings listed earlier, there is a need for a more representative system that would fulfill the ten criteria enumerated by the Lortie commission. These include: party representation; demographic representation; and geographic representation; diversity of ideas; effective government; accountable government; effective opposition; valuing votes; regional balance and inclusive decision making. So far, FPTP fulfills only three criteria. In British Columbia (BC) an independent non-partisan assembly of citizens was chosen to recommend changes to the electoral system from January 2004 to December, 2004. The assembly comprised 16 members representative of the people in terms of age, gender and geographic make-up. It examined different electoral systems and conducted public hearings to get public opinion. Whatever the system they were to choose, it had to be consistent with Canada constitution and Westminster parliamentary system (Barnes & Robertson, 2009). The process produced the single transferable vote (STV) system as the best for BC. This system is also used in Ireland and Tasmania and addresses proportionality, local representation and voter choice. A referendum was carried out on May 2005 but was defeated as it gained 57% of validly cast ballots instead of 60% and 77 ridings out of the 79 required. Another referendum was held in May 2009 but also failed with 39% of votes cast and 7 out of 51 districts required. New Brunswick on the other hand, set up a commission on legislative democracy in 2003 comprising 8 persons to examine and recommend a proper system which is ore fair, open, accountable and accessible (Barnes & Robertson, 2009). The commission was to use public hearings and submissions to come up with a proportional representation (PR) system and fixed election dates. It came up with the Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) as the best suited for the province. This system is also used in Scotland and Wales, New Zealand and Germany. Referendum was held in next provincial elections (2008). Fixed election dates were set as Monday 15 Oct 2007 and thereafter third Monday in October every four years. However, Lieutenant-governor was to retain his powers. However, change of government in fall of 2006 crushed the efforts as the new government did not endorse the reform rather it came up with another report on accountable and responsible government and ignored the earlier report (Barnes & Robertson, 2009). The premier of Ontario also created a renewal secretariat to strengthen democracy by increasing role of legislative members, increasing government accountability and reform democratic institutions (Barnes & Robertson, 2009). It came up with internet voting, transparent and effective money limits on politics, fixed election dates and increase youth participation. The Election Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005 set fixed election dates as first Thursday in October every four years beginning 4 Oct 2007. Rules for disclosure of political contributions were also set out. After public meetings and written submissions, one ballot-two votes system was recommended. Members to be elected on party lists to serve as provincial members of parliament in legislature (MPPs). However, the referendum did not sail through as the alternative received 36.9% popular vote against existing FPTP 63.1% votes. Proposals were also put forward in Prince Edward Island. The Commissioner appointed by the Prince looked into a number of major electoral systems, and in April 2003 he released a discussion paper containing four models. This was followed by public meetings across the province in May and June 2003. The report evaluated how electoral reform aligned with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its impact on wider society. The commission recommended Mixed Member Proportional System (MMPS) or the Single Transferable Vote System (STVS) but endorsed MMP. Its advantage was that it would involve less change to the current electoral system and also preserve the existing relationship between the voters and their member of the legislature as well as enhance participation. However, even after much publicity and public education, majority (63%) voted to retain existing FPTP (Barnes & Robertson, 2009). The last province to consider reforms was Quebec in 2003 and mandate was given to Estates General on the Reform of Democratic Institutions. It also considered lowering voting age and fixed election dates. The assembly proposed a German-style MMP whereby 60% are selected by FPTP and 40% by second ballot from party list. However, the committee disagreed with this system as it was still not proportional. In the end, a Scotland model of compensatory MMP was agreed upon due to its numerous advantages which will be discussed later (Barnes & Robertson, 2009). Merits and Drawbacks of various Electoral System In this case we will consider the models proposed by the different provinces and which include a proportional element: STV, MMP and also Mixed Member Majoritarian system (MMM). These according to the Law Commission of Canada (2004) are evaluated on the basis of how well they meet the ten criteria mentioned earlier. FPTP was faulted as it only fulfilled three criteria: geographic, accountability and effective government. The most viable solution for Canada was found to be adding an element of proportionality to the existing system (Howe & Northrop, 2005). The STV is a proportional system prevalent in Ireland and also Australian senate. It entails proportional representation (PR) in constituencies in multi-member ridings. Voters rank order the candidates; they can vote for one or rank as many as they wish. Members of same party also compete with each other in the same riding. Whoever gets more votes than the established limit or quota is declared the winner. The process continues until all the riding seats are filled (Wilson, 2009). The advantage of this method is that it is more proportional than FPTP and voters have greater choice of candidates. It also maintains geographical links with the electorate. However, it is a complicated process and time consuming. Moreover, it leads to intra-party competition and fragmentation as candidates of same party compete with each other. The method is not applicable in Canada as it violates the one member-one riding principle. Some countries use list-PR whereby each party has list of candidates and voters vote for the party hence parties get seats in proportion to their overall share of national vote. However, it alters geographic representation link and departs heavily from parliamentary tradition hence not appropriate (Pilon, 2007). The MMM involves assigning a portion of parliamentary seats on basis of a plurality method such as the FPTP in single-member constituencies and remaining seats are determined by share of popular vote for the party (Law Commission of Canada, 2004). In this case, voters are given two votes: one for candidate in a riding and the other for party list. In MMM however, there are no compensatory votes to cover for deficiencies in constituency votes. Seats are gained on the basis of percentage of popular vote (two-thirds by FPTP and one-third by party list) thus the method has little impact on disproportionality. The result is that the parties would be broad based and more proportionate but it would still not favor minority governments. Adoption of this method would thus not succeed in Canada as it would not meet the criteria of party representation or valuation of votes. Voters of minority parties would still feel undervalued or underrepresented thus lack interest in voting. The system is dominant in Japan and Russia. The MMP is more like the MMM but unlike MMM it links the two tiers through a compensatory element. The system is prevalent in Germany, Scotland, Wales, and New Zealand although the Scotland model is preferred (Cross, 2005). In this case, a proportion of representatives are elected from single-member constituency using FPTP and remainder using party lists on basis of party’s share of popular votes. Voters have two votes like in MMM. The method provides list seats to compensate parties under-represented in FPTP results thus some parties may have surplus seats. It is highly proportional and fair compared to others thus appropriate for Canada. However, it may not be acceptable as it increases the size of legislatures by the surplus seats. It could also violate the constitution by making seats disproportionate to population and this would require a constitutional amendment by two-thirds majority in provinces (Law Commission, 2004 p. 93). This makes the Scotland model more acceptable than the German model. The distribution of regional seats is derived by taking the number of votes cast for the party list and dividing it by number of constituencies won by the party in the region plus one to cater for those with zero representatives. This helps to reduce regional imbalances of all parties making them more proportionate. It also increases fairness, demographic representation, diversity of ideas, and enhances participation. It is thus more appropriate for Canada. However, Flanagan (2004) argues that no electoral system can eliminate regionalism and it does not also guarantee representation of women, minorities and Aboriginals unless measures are taken at local level. Policies to promote equal representation of women in House of Commons should be developed to deal with women representation. Besides, adding proportionality is criticized for creating two classes of citizens: elected MPs and those from party list thus making those from party lists second-class citizens (Jansen & Siaroff 2004). However, evidence from countries that have adopted these system shows that this does not arise and both classes of Mps play same role in the provinces. Schwartz (2001) on the other hand proposes a “20% solution” whereby a reasonable dimension of proportionality is introduced. The number of votes according to him should be equal to number of seats such that if a party wins 62% of votes, it should get 62 seats in parliament. Massicotte (2004 p. 65) examined the consequences of proportional representation in Canada and noted that it would impact on shape and size of electoral districts; work of an mp; representation of political parties and minorities; position of prime minister,; federal-provincial balance as well as the way cabinets are formed and operated and relations with both houses of parliament. The diversity of ideas would increase and more women would be represented in parliament. However, he argues that for women to be properly represented, women would need to be selected for cabinet posts. The multicultural Canadians on the other hand would lose the advantage they had been getting due to their concentration. One serious criticism leveled against proportionalism is production of minority governments or coalition governments which are short-lived if evidence from other countries is something to go by. Evidence shows that since 1867, Ottawa lasted on average for less than twenty months while majority governments last for 50 months. According to study by Laver and Schofield, single-party minority lasted 19 months, minimal winning coalitions for 33 months while majority governments lasted 45 months (Massicote, 2004 p. 67). There is no evidence than coalitions are more durable in recent decades. This makes Canadians to fear changing the electoral system thus the overwhelming support for the existing FPTP. Furthermore, the presence of Quebec Bloc reduces the range of potential government formulas, making cabinets more fragile. The Bloc would not be willing to form coalitions as it values its sovereignty. Conclusion Canada is in the process of reforming its electoral system to make it responsive to twenty-first century democratic values. Many systems have been proposed such as the STV, MMM, MMP, and list-PR but none has been successful. Of the five provinces that have initiated reforms, none has been able to adopt any reforms as their efforts are defeated at the referendum or the government in place is unwilling to institute any reforms. Some governments have gone as far as stating they are not considering any electoral reforms. However, the various commissions entrusted with this work found the SMP or FPTP system currently used by Canada as inappropriate since it is disproportionate and adversarial in nature. It does not reflect the views of majority on the ground as few popular votes have the ability of translating them into majority seats in house of commons. Adding some proportionality would enhance geographical representation, demographic representation, diversity of ideas, effective opposition, valued votes, regional balance and inclusive decision making. References Barnes, André and Robertson, James R. 2009. Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian Provinces. Background Paper PRB 04-17E. Ottawa: Library of Parliament. http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublication. (Accessed 21 February 2014). Cross, William. 2005. The rush to electoral reform in the Canadian provinces: Why now? Representation 41(2): 75-84. Flanagan, Tom. 2005. The Alternative Vote. In P. Howe., R. Johnston., A. Blais (eds). Strengthening Canadian Democracy. Montreal, Quebec: IRPP Howe, P and Northrop, D. 2005. Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views of Canadians. Policy Matters, 1(5): 13-16. Jansen, Harold J and Siaroff, Alan. 2004. Regionalism and Party Systems: Evaluating Proposals to Reform Canada’s Electoral System. In Henry, Milner ed. Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and its Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Katz, Richard S. 2004. Problems in Electoral Reforms: Why the Decision to Change Electoral Systems is not Simple. In Henry, Milner ed. Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and its Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Law Commission of Canada. 2004. Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services. MacDonald,Jack. 2005. Randomocracy: A Citizen’s Guide to Electoral Reform in British Columbia. Victoria: FCG Publications. Massicote, Louis. 2004. That Bleak?: Fathoming the Consequences of Proportional Representation in Canada. In Henry, Milner ed. Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and its Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Milner, Henry. 2004a. First past the post? Progress report on electoral reform initiatives in Canadian provinces. Policy Matters 5(9): 1-36. Milner, Henry, ed. 2004b. Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in Canada and its Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Pilon, Dennis. 2007. The Politics of Voting: Reforming Canada's Electoral System. Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications. Schwartz, Bryan. 2001. Proportional Representation for Canada? Manitoba Law Journal 28 (2): 133-186. Tanguay, Brian. 2004. Reforming Representative Democracy: Taming Canada’s Democratic Deficit. In Canadian Politics, 4th ed., edited by James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, 263-285. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Trimble, L and Arscott, J. 2003. Still Counting: Women in Politics Across Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Wilson, Evan. 2009. Picking Winners: Provincial Electoral Reform Efforts, 2003-2009. Calgary: Canada West Foundation. http://cwf.ca/pdf-docs/publications/picking-winners.pdf (accessed 20 February 2014). Read More