Simmons Theory of Philosophical Anarchism - Essay Example

Simmonss Theory of Philosophical Anarchism Philosophical anarchism tries to eliminate the by questioning itslegitimacy. This school of thought claims that the state does not have moral legitimacy and so to them, they have no obligation to obey the state and the state on the other hand has no right to command. This theory refers to certain set of philosophical perceptions on the nature of political society. Anarchists believe in the social and political life in which the state plays no important role. Some anarchist theories completely deny the legitimacy of the state while others consider the state as unjustifiably coercive institution. Political obligation theorists focus on individuals’ duty and responsibility to conform to the state’s laws and support the state when necessary. According to philosophical anarchism, the existing states are not legitimate in that the way the use coercion cannot be morally justified and so individuals have no moral duty to obey the law proposed by the state. Moreover, this theory argues that social stability can be maintained without centralized legislative powers and that individuals are capable of treating each other justly if no state ever existed. In short, philosophical anarchists mainly consider the existing state institutions as unjust. They posit that individuals have no moral obligation to comply with the state when its laws are not in line with individuals’ autonomy. Simmonss theory of philosophical anarchism and all anarchists have been justly criticised because they do not support State and they also deny political obligation; however, it is necessary to consider individuals’ liberty to have an autonomous life. Philosophical anarchism is not a successful analysis of obligation and legitimacy. Anarchism is a form of moral scepticism focusing on the position of authority and morality in the society (McLaughlin, 169). Philosophical anarchist claim it is difficult to solve the problem of authority and so there is need not to recognize state’s authority (Gaus, 462). In order to criticise philosophical anarchists, scholar have developed various strategies including political obligation theory to defend the traditional perception of political obligation (Klosko, 721). Some of the main arguments of philosophical anarchism include political ties must be voluntary; states are not voluntary associations; and that states are illegitimate and so there is no obligation to obey the state. According to priori anarchism, all existing states are not legitimate morally claiming that some important characteristics of a state like the coercive character contributes to the absence of both a state and legitimate. On the contrary, posteriori anarchists believe that existing states are perceived as illegitimate due to their contingent characters (Simmons, 105). Instead of eliminating the illegitimate state, philosophical anarchists have focused on how to free individuals from what they believe are oppressive laws and social constraints of the contemporary state. They have been working on how to allow everyone become self-determining and value oriented. Philosophical anarchists reject the state as they claim that the state destroys un-coercive social bonds arising from individuals’ cooperation and mutual respect. More so, anarchists are convinced that states have no authority to coerce. Some scholars believe that the state is legitimate if only it has a right to exist and to issue command, enforce commands using coercive force. Many scholars particularly based on their argument on political obligation and the state’s legitimacy have criticized philosophical anarchism. Based on anarchists’ argument on state illegitimacy, they failed to take illegitimacy of states to involve a strong moral imperative to judge or do away with states. Instead, philosophical anarchists consider state illegitimacy to eliminate any strong moral presumption to spare obedience, compliance and support to existing states (Simmons, 104).The first criticism advanced against philosophical anarchism is that voluntarism is an inappropriate mode of political association and so it is not relevant. Anarchists argue that voluntary acts are the sole acceptable source of political obligation and that many individuals do not assume their political obligations voluntarily. Critiques argue that political life incorporates both voluntary and non-voluntary bonds. Therefore, a totally voluntarist form of political organization is not complete similar to existing non-voluntary defences of political obligation. In addition, philosophical anarchists have been criticized for their claim that individuals rights and duties of justice can be fully guaranteed without any political authority existing. Anarchists believe that individuals’ rights and duties can be defined through their fulfilment of obvious interpersonal moral duties. More so, philosophical anarchism does not provide proof that legitimate authority needs to establish a requirement to obey. Many scholars claim that the authority of a command and its power to establish a requirement to obey is separate from its legitimacy. The other criticism of philosophical anarchism is based on its a priori rejection of coercion. Horton opposes the stance of philosophical anarchists about non-voluntary ties and he argues that non-voluntary ties are necessary. According to Horton, the denial of coercion cannot inform or direct the society on what to do if individuals flout moral requirements. The anti-anarchist group claims that the state is not the sole coercive institution in social life. Philosophical anarchists have been accused of taking mutual agreement to social norms for granted and failing to unveil how to enforce compliance. According to anarchists, political coercion is not all about individuals’ inability to do whatever they want but it is about being in a situation in which other individuals are articulating choices forcefully. Horton posits that anarchists failed to inform the society how to tackle inevitable existence of coercion. He argues further that social life is not possible without coercion and so he claims that there is need to clarify issues around coercion such as who is supposed to exercise coercion and for what reasons among others. The other criticism is based on the radicalism of philosophical anarchism. Some scholars have claimed that the implications of this theory are too radical to be acceptable. For instance, anarchists aggressively support mindless disobedience of the state law arguing that obeying law is not individuals’ political obligation. Furthermore, the stance of philosophical anarchist on coercion is not in line with political voluntarism. Anarchists failed to consider non-coercive forms of political power and so the possibility of voluntary political association has been challenged. According to anarchists, obeying state’s laws is something that is not necessary and no one should be forced to do so. They claim that the law lacks independent moral significance and because of this, individuals have no political obligation to obey such laws or even support the leadership of the state. However, some scholars have strongly opposed this claiming that the denial of an obligation to obey the laws of the state is a denial of the justice of the state. From philosophical anarchists’ point of view on state’s illegitimacy, opposing or supporting the state entirely depend on the activities of the state. Arguably, authority is charged with the responsibility of commanding and individuals are expected to respect the authority and obey its commands. Additionally, state legitimacy is all about individuals’ political obligation to obey the law and support the state in any possible way. Moreover, individuals need to act morally based on moral principles and not just because the law expects them to do so. Societal members must sometimes obey the laws since these laws coincide with what they are morally expected to do. On the other hand, Rawls believes that there is no political obligation for individuals and that the natural duty of justice grounds obedience to law. Lastly, philosophical anarchism has been accused of focusing on obligation as obedience and abandons voluntary political self-determination. This school of thought perceives political obligation as obedience instead of recognizing voluntary assumed political obligations to take other forms of political action. Philosophical anarchists believe that there is no general and comprehensive political obligation to obey laws because they are laws. To them, obedience is not about doing what an individual has been instructed to do, but is a matter of doing what individuals are told to do because they have been told to do it. More so, philosophical anarchists refute arguments for political obligation and again, they depend on these same arguments to claim that been illegitimate states should not be disobeyed or disrupted. According to Chaim Gans, individuals will accept the common arguments for obedience to state law only if they realize that accepting political obligation does not imply that obedience to law is always a moral requirement (Simmons, 113). As this theory focuses on authority and ignores coercion, it removes the differences between the state and the government. According to philosophical anarchists, political obligation equals to comprehensive obedience but the truth is, voluntarist political obligation is content and independent in that, individuals determine what they are assigned to do only when they assume the obligation. This implies that political voluntarism involves political self-determination via individuals’ voluntarily assumed obligations. Anarchists claim that the duty to obey involves surrendering autonomy (Gans, 18). Simmons argues that legitimacy implies the same thing with both the state and government. According to him, the state’s legitimacy is the moral right to impose binding duties on individuals and come up with strategies to ensure that people obey such duties. The state also needs to make use of coercion so as to enforce duties. On the contrary, anarchists’ arguments are necessary because the state needs to provide citizens with an autonomous life in which they are at liberty to do whatever they desire. Some have suggested that the duty to obey laws in an obligation of duty and that equal freedom does not need individuals’ consent but it is important for independent life. Therefore, the state helps in making individuals’ freedom concrete hence the realization of freedom. Ideally, obligations are voluntarily assumed and come from the principle of fairness especially when the state is just and citizens have voluntarily accepted its benefits. The society’s structure is just and so societal members are expected to do what they are required to do (Rawls, 334). According to the principle of fairness, individuals are expected to perform their part as stated by the institutional rules. The perception of fairness is that individuals are obligated to obey just schemes, which offer presumptive benefits (Alan, 107). Individuals have a political obligation to any just state since the state formulates public rules of justice. A democratic state helps in defining freedom and what it entails; thus, individuals have a duty to respect the state’s coercive imposition of rights and duties through obedience to the law and participation in the democratic process defining these rights. Obeying the state is part of individuals’ broad ethical responsibilities. More so, some theorists mainly focus on the need for political institutions such as the state in order to realize equal freedom. In conclusion, philosophical anarchism generally argues that the state has no moral legitimacy and so individuals have no obligation to obey the laws of the state and the state itself. According to political obligation theorists, individuals have a responsibility of obeying state’s rules and support the state’s activities accordingly. Anarchists believe that individuals are able to treat each other in a more just manner if there was no state and they claim that social stability is possible without the state. In short, the main arguments of this theory include the political bonds need to be voluntary. Secondly, the states are not voluntary institutions and lastly the states are not legitimate therefore individuals have no political obligation to obey the state. Generally, many scholars have criticized philosophical anarchism and some of these criticisms are, voluntarism is not appropriate form of political associate as anarchists claim. Horton who claims that non-voluntary bonds are also necessary has also criticized this theory; more so, philosophical anarchists have been accused of denying political obligation. Works Cited Alan, Simmons J. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Pr, 1979. Print. Gans, Chaim. Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Print. Gaus, Gerald . The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print. Klosko, George. The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print. McLaughlin, Paul. Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Pub. Co, 2007. Internet resource. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. Internet resource. Simmons, John. Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print. . Read More