What Foreign Pressure Could Do And What It Could Not Do In Japan - Essay Example

What Foreign Pressure Could Do And What It Could Not Do In Japan The of the book Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do is a political scientist who portrays expertise in analyzing the U.S and Japan negotiations. The American government has made all efforts to induce changes in Japan. The main tactic has been applying foreign pressure on Japan so that it can loosen up its restrictive trade policies. Japan has had many trade policies that America feels are very restrictive. America has great interest in penetrating into the trade scene with Japan. Japan’s decision on whether to yield to the pressure has highly depended on its domestic situations. The author of the book helps the reader analyze how much foreign pressure can achieve in Japan. In addition, the author brings out new ways in which the American government could have put into place to achieve its demands. The author highlights two case studies in the book that help the reader understand the effect of foreign pressure on Japan (Schoppa 10). One of these studies is the ‘Structural Impediments initiatives talks’ headed by President Bush. Earlier in 1988, America had described the unfairness in trade relationship with Japan. The book elaborates the American demands at the time and the threats coming along with the demands. Foreign pressure has had immense results in Japan several times. From history, policy change in Japan comes under the influence of foreign pressure. However, the pressure exerted on Japan by the American government revealed that pressure on Japan has its limits. The author highlights different hypothesis that can explain Japan’s uneven standings. He proposes that probably Japan had to cooperate on issues that would cost the nation only a little sacrifice. From a different point of view, maybe Japan only settled on accepting the demands that in some way could translate as beneficial to the Japanese society. The American stand is predictable because it sought to achieve the demands of its people. In cases where America could not achieve all its demands, efforts came into place to ensure that it achieved the majority of them (86-94). The uneven outcomes of the SII talks only acted as additional proof that Japan could not yield external pressure always. It had declined to yield in several other instances. However, because of its high dependency on America for economical stability, Japan was keen to grant America what it demanded at some point. During the SII talks, the negotiators tackled several topics. These talks occurred on the same sitting and this makes it obvious that political changes did not affect its stand on many issues. The negotiations lasted for a year during which Japan defended its policies against the American criticism. America presented its compilation of demands to Japan. It is worth noting that Japan did not show any signs that it would cooperate on any of the issues under discussion. In the end, Japan agreed on American demands concerning macroeconomics and Japanese distribution system. Japan also yielded to some compromise concerning its land policy. Regarding their business practices, Japan made minimal concessions. However, Japan completely objected to make any policy change regarding the keiretsu business group. America had applied uniform pressure with threats to force Japan to make readjustments in most of their policies. However, Japan’s compromise to some demands and objection to others was clear evidence that foreign pressure cannot exert changes to some of its policies. One fact became evident: Japan has its limit in conceding to foreign demands. All the demands from the American side aimed at penetrating the Japanese market. The American government wanted the government to invest its savings on infrastructure and other public spending projects. The land policy issue sought to force the Japanese government to reduce the cost of urban land through change of tax policies. This would enable American investors to venture into the market and acquire land easily (117). The distribution system delayed establishment of large stores and America demanded for its loosening. When loosened, American imports would find entry into the Japanese market. Concerning the keiretsu arrangement of cross holding, the Japanese government demanded the American government to readjust its view of such holdings. Although the Japanese government made an effort in all what they agreed on, they did not reach the levels the Americans wanted. This proved that the pressure from a foreign institution could not push them beyond some limit. The Japanese government felt that it had the right to run its affairs without dictation from a foreign government. The framework talks headed by Clinton, four years after the SII talks, only went further to prove that Japan could not yield to some demands from the American government. During the four years, many changes had occurred to both parties of the negotiation. However, these changes were not strong enough to make Japan’s response more even and predicable. This time, the American government wanted to strike deals with Japan over the auto business, medical equipment, macroeconomics, procurements dealing with telecommunications and the computer and satellite business. In addition, the American government demanded that Japan open its markets for easy access. The Japanese government only promised to make adjustments but was tactful enough not to tie itself by defining the adjustments with values. Americans threatened to impose a large prohibitive tax tariff if Japan did not compromise. However, this time Japan objected. During the framework talks, the Clinton team did not manage to convince Japan to accept its influence (254). It is clear that foreign pressure did not prove to have the potential to force Japan to change all of its policies. According to Schoppa, it is possible that the negotiation tactics of the two governments were different (18). However, Japan’s responses provide clear answers to the question posed in the title of the book. It is true that foreign pressure changed the distribution system in Japan and encouraged it to increase public spending. The pressure managed to get Japan into adjusting some of its land policies. However, despite the weight of the threats, Japan did not compromise to make any adjustments on Keiretsu cross-holding operations. In addition, Clinton negotiation team walked way with nothing that was specific. Schoppa highlights possible explanations on why Japan conceded to some demands. Moreover, factors that affect the effectiveness of foreign pressure come out clearly. Japan’s domestic interests and international implications of the demands determined how much Japan could loosen its trade policies. The book criticizes the negotiation tactics adopted by the American government. The SII talks and the Framework talks discussed in detail clearly draw the line of the limit of foreign pressure. The book succeeds in answering the question posed in its title. It is a good elaboration of what the pressures achieved. It also brings out the policies that foreign pressure would not alter. Works Cited Schoppa, Leonard J. Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Print. Read More