Al-Qaidas Goal In 9/11 And Its Accomplishment - Research Paper Example

Internal Assessment Internal Assessment: Al-Qaida’s Goal In 9/11 And Its Accomplishment SECTION A The following investigation assesses the goals of terrorist group Al-Qaida in September 11, 2001 and the extent to which they accomplished these goals. The investigation uses news articles, research articles, reports, books, and intelligence agency releases surrounding the 9/11 event and groups associated with its perpetration. Section B of this assessment is an outline of evidence provided by the stated sources concerning Al-Qaida’s goals for 9/11. Section C is an evaluation of the stated sources concerning their credibility relative to the data they present. Section D analyzes the evidence provided by the sources in relation to Al-Qaida’s objective for 9/11 and the degree to which they realized this objective. Lastly, section E summarizes the information between sections B and D. This investigation is an effort to assess the event 9/11 itself, rather a mere in-depth look into why the Al-Qaida attacked the United States and the outcomes of this reason and action over the years. SECTION B Immanuel Wallerstein says Al-Qaeda clearly set off to obliterate nearly a century of disgrace for the Islam in 9/11. What Al-Qaeda managed to accomplish since this event is fix deep fears amongst United States citizens regarding their physical security and overall future.1 Clint Watts argues that the Al-Qaeda has not organized any serious attack against the west since 9/11, which indicates they most likely did not accomplish any of their goals apart from attempting to “cut off the head of the snake.”2 Writer Mortada Radwan says the first goal of the Al-Qaeda was to “awake” Americans by dealing a major blow on American soil, followed by engaging the United States in battle as the second goal. A series of hands-on military and resources acquisition activities, recuperating with other minor jihadi revolts, proclaiming an Islamic state, and entering into a full-blown war were the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth goals respectively.3 In 2006, Paul Haven said Al-Qaeda attacked the United States because their affairs in Afghanistan were questionable and of purely selfish interests.4 Bill Steiden wrote in 2009 that the Al-Qaeda attacked the United States because their localized approach against US forces in the Middle East was failing.5 Eileen Sullivan and Lolita C. Baldor believe the 9/11 attacks were Al-Qaeda’s way of gaining global notoriety and reputation in an effort to spread their agenda and propaganda across the world.6 Newsday released an article in 2011 claiming the 9/11 attacks were Al-Qaeda’s way to force United States’ hand towards a counterattack. The article further says that the terror group has gained support from Middle East since 9/11.7 Amy Zegart wrote that the Al-Qaeda’s goal in 9/11 was to push United States troops out of the Middle East, Afghanistan specifically. With inspiration from the 1983 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia, Al-Qaeda leaders thought attacking the United States would cause them to withdraw their troops.8 A report by the “Intelligencer Journal/Lancaster New Era” in 2012 said the Al-Qaeda had accomplished their goal of spurring revolts in Muslim nations despite being weak and “still plotting.” The report contended that the Al-Qaeda had encouraged an anti-American narrative by 2007 in Middle Eastern nations and accumulated enough publicity to trigger uprisings from minor jihadist groups.9 Sam Ser wrote that the Al-Qaeda took credit for the 9/11 attacks because showing their strength to the world, and particularly the west was important for furthering their agenda of ultimately setting up a caliphate or Islamic state.10 Lastly, Reuel Marc Gerecht argued in 2002 that Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden wanted to convey the message that the United States’ interests in the Middle East were no longer acceptable.11 SECTION C Wallerstein fails to mention the statistical reports he obtained his figures12. It is true that United States Special Forces have killed Al-Qaeda leaders time after time. However, citing this statistic as proof that the Al-Qaeda caused the Americans to panic, conflicts with the argument that the group has accomplished a great deal of its original goal. Evidence presented by Watts, Mortada, and Paul are for informing purposes, which makes them only reliable when attempting to find out what the Al-Qaeda have accomplished since 9/1113. For instance, Watts argues that denying the Al-Qaeda a safe haven in Pakistan, Israel, or even Afghanistan barred them from accomplishing their goals after 9/1114. This contention is refutable by the report findings about Bin Laden planning attacks against United States military bases while in the UK, Somalia, and even Ukraine. When it comes to the terrorist group’s goals, news bulletins share watered down if not biased evidence. A similar argument can be made for news magazines “Newsday” and “The Atlantic” considering their evidence is secondary. However, these magazines retain their credibility by citing or referring directly to their sources of evidence while providing links to corresponding websites.1516 The news report center “Intelligencer Journal/Lancaster New Era” is a primary source of evidence regarding the agenda of the Al-Qaeda before and during the 9/11 attacks.17 Utley’s book sheds light on the outcomes of the 9/11 attacks with respect to the Al-Qaeda agenda, which makes it a more reliable source of information in contrast to the news articles18. Farrall’s article is comprehensive about what Al-Qaeda’s leader Bin Laden wanted from attacking the United States directly. At the same time, the source shows skepticism about the treatment of the terrorist group’s agenda as a “franchise” by the Middle East.19 As a reader, Farrall needed a colder approach to determining what the group has achieved since 9/11. To some extent, Farrall, like Steiden, Sullivan, and Ser over-evaluate the evolution of Islamic faith and culture over the last ten years, which risks the sources missing the basis of Al-Qaeda’s goals.20 SECTION D Nearly all evidence points to Al-Qaeda’s moderate success over the past ten years. Even though the group attempted to use minor Islamic-Egyptian movements to achieve its goals between 2003 and 2010, Bin Laden’s original critical efforts at unification contributed the most. Without a clear ideology or “manhai,” Bin Laden sought after a predatory strategy. By using his financial resources, Bin Laden purchased the allegiance of weaker groups or harassed them into joining with Al-Qaeda. Before 9/11, Bin Laden singlehandedly attempted to recruit militant groups led by Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Khabab al-Masri but was unsuccessful. Between 2000 and 2001, efforts to manipulate Ibn al-Khattab were not effective until the handing over of the leadership of Afghanistan foreign combatant Taliban leader Mullah Omar to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.21 Through Bin Laded, Al-Qaeda was continuously unsuccessful in convincing other Islamic extremists to join his group because he knew their support was extremely crucial for the agenda. As a result, Bin Laden resorted to attacking a major western nation to show them the might of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was also moderately successful in “awakening” the world and “opening its eyes” to the United States’ foreign interests in the Middle East by 2004. By attacking a major city in the United States, the Al-Qaeda pushed the United States government to respond in a manner that would make the world view them as the true, chosen leaders of the Islam faith. Realizing this goal meant engaging the enemy, the United States, in war while building resourceful skills in preparation for major political and economic reforms in areas surrounding Iraq. The 9/11 events corresponded with a wave of revolts in Syria, which was a coordinated move by the Al-Qaeda that served as an accomplishment by 2006. Al-Qaeda concentrated on collapsing regimes by explicitly partaking in rebellions against them. Regionally, Al-Qaeda saw numerous changes starting with the death of the Anglo-Saxon alliance and the rise of new world powers that Muslims have no robust resentments like India and China, in line with the exponential expansion of the Al-Qaeda. Today, Al-Qaeda can possibly pat itself on the back for successfully dejecting the Saudi government. To a small extent, the Saudi regime continued the uncertainty of Al-Qaeda’s undermining efforts for a small period. During this period, Saudi Arabia just kept a longer distance from the United States’ involvement with the Middle East and Al-Qaeda. The Saudi regime took on this measure because they feared any uncooperative measures would be seen as a sort of breakdown in foreign affairs the same way Pakistan is dealing with the aftermath of Bin Laden’s death today. Utley wrote in her book in 2012 that the Al-Qaeda’s goals arose from ideologies by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member Sayyid Qutb. According to Qutb, the Islam world had too much influence from modernism that led Muslims astray.22 With the United States being a key spreader of modernism and secularism, doing away with them was a goal for the Al-Qaeda in an effort to purify Islam. To an equally significant extent, the Al-Qaeda did not accomplish to form a caliphate or proclaim an Islamic state within the region. Being a major goal, forming a caliphate required the unity, cooperation, and resources of all Islamic and Egyptian movements in the Middle East. However, following 9/11 groups headed by militants such as Omar were not fully on board with the idea of a leader of the entire Islam world from Afghanistan. In addition, the United States deployed a huge portion of its military to Iraq, Pakistan, and back to Afghanistan, which other groups saw as a failure rather than a realized goal. Another failure was the lack of a “total war” that marked the start of a conflict between Islam and other religions. SECTION E In conclusion, by perpetrating the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda hoped to convey a message about the might of a possible soon-to-be-united Islam nation or caliphate. As of 2014, the extremist group accomplished a handful of the goals in its original agenda, which included “awakening” Americans by dealing a major blow on American soil, engaging the United States in battle, overseeing a series of hands-on military and resources acquisition activities, recuperating with other minor jihadi revolts, proclaiming an Islamic state, and entering into a full-blown war. Evidence from news bulletins and books serve as secondary sources for the true goals behind Al-Qaeda’s orchestration of the 9/11 attacks. News reports with firsthand statistics and logs about Al-Qaeda’s activities during and after the 9/11 attacks serve as primary sources of information, and the most reliable ones for this assessment. By attacking New York, Al-Qaeda was successful in undermining the Saudi government, triggering a military response from the United States, garnering support and alliances from some minor jihadi, militant, and Egyptian Islam movements, instilling fear to the international community about their capabilities, and revealing confidential foreign interests of the United States in the Middle East. SECTION F "Al-Qaida Weak but Still Plotting." 2012. Intelligencer Journal/Lancaster New Era, May 03. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1010769950?accountid=458. Farrall, Leah. “How al Qaeda Works: What the Organizations Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength.” Foreign Affairs, April 2011. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67467/leah-farrall/how-al-qaeda-works Gerecht, Reuel Marc. “The Gospel According to Osama Bin Laden.” The Atlantic, January 1, 2002. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/the-gospel-according-to- osama-bin-laden/302376/ Haven, Paul, Associated Press. 2006. "Plot Likely 9/11 Al-Qaida Encore." Journal - Gazette, Aug 11, 5A. http://search.proquest.com/docview/411347147?accountid=458. Mortada, Radwan. “Al-Qaeda’s 20-Year Plan: From 9/11 to Final Victory.” Al-Akhbar English, January 29, 2014. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18437 Ser, Sam. 2006. "Israel and Al-Qaida." Jerusalem Post, Sep 08, 16. http://search.proquest.com/docview/319602006?accountid=458. Steiden, Bill. 2009. "Al-Qaida, Taliban --- Who they are." The Atlanta Journal - Constitution, Oct 11. http://search.proquest.com/docview/337621844?accountid=458. Sullivan, Eileen and Lolita C. Baldor. 2011. "10th Anniversary of 9/11:" The Charleston Gazette, Sep 10. http://search.proquest.com/docview/888454635?accountid=458. "The Futility of Al-Qaida Osama Bin Ladens Violent Movement is Failing Everywhere Around the World." 2011. Newsday, May 03. http://search.proquest.com/docview/864307012?accountid=458. Utley, Rachel E. 9/11 Ten Years After: Perspectives and Problems. Los Angeles, CA: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2012. Wallerstein, Immanuel. “How Would al-Qaeda Assess Its Achievements?” Immanuel Wallerstein 314 (October 2011): http://iwallerstein.com/alqaeda-assess-achievements/ Watts, Clint. “Assessing the Terrorist Threat 13 Years after 9/11: Old Guard Al Qaeda, Team ISIS & the Upstarts.” War on the Rocks, September 11, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/assessing-the-terrorist-threat-13-years-after-911-old- guard-al-qaeda-team-isis-the-upstarts/ Zegart, Amy. 2011. "Al-Qaida is Down, Not Out." Waterloo Region Record, Sep 13. http://search.proquest.com/docview/888796302?accountid=458. APPENDIX Figure 1: The Twin Towers minutes after being struck by two hijacked airlines Figure 2: Islamic State protesters days after the Al-Qaeda proclaimed responsibility over the 9/11 attacks Figure 3: Passport photos of al-Qaida members involved in the 9/11 attacks Figure 4: Al-Qaida supporters hail the attack of the United States late 2001 and declare a caliphate of the Islamic State Read More