Critically assess the merits of the international intervention in Kosovo - Essay Example

?Critically assess the merits of the international intervention in Kosovo Introduction It is an open truth that the sovereignty of every country is regarded as its most cherished asset (Warhurst, 2007; Alothman et al, 2010). This not withstanding, countries and states have not always had their sovereign rules to be intact. This is because of the international conventions and regulations that bind various nations and spell out some accepted codes of existence. In most cases, when these codes are broken, leading to all kinds of humanitarian crisis in individual countries, the resultant consequence has been for the international world to intervene to defend the interest of the ordinary person. A similar situation is what was experienced in Kosovo when the international body, led by the media cried out on what was supposedly a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The international intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which was largely led by the United States and NATO have come under intense scrutiny and review by scholars, the legal fraternity, historians, and the media. Even though the NATO and the United States had their own reasons and justifications for undertaking the international intervention they took in Kosovo, not much of these commentators who have researched and analyzed the events in the lead up to the intervention and the events specifically involved in the events seem to be convinced by the actions taken by the international bodies who staged their interventions in Kosovo (Vromen and Gelber, 2005; Alrajhi, 2004). It is from this perspective that the present essay is being written to critically assess the merits of the international intervention in Kosovo. By a critical assessment of the merits, the writer will clearly present the facts leading up to the international intervention, what went into the intervention, the outcome of the intervention, and then later pass a legitimate judgment as to whether or not Kosovo needed the staged international intervention that hit it in the spring of 1999. Lead up to the International Intervention Because the United States and NATO were the international bodies that largely took the center stage with the international intervention in Kosovo, much of the world look up to them for justifications behind the intervention. Indeed, from the estimates of these two bodies, Kosovo was experiencing a humanitarian crisis and so it was important to intervene to ensure that the lives of ordinary people were protected and secured (Pybus, 2001; Ankomah, 2005). This is basically the factor that led to an international intervention in Kosovo. Prior to the major intervention, the international community, led by NATO and the United States had actually said that the crisis in Kosovo was as a result of the Serbian nationalism. In this regard, they justified their merit in the intervention as a need to protecting the selected few, of whom crime and acts of atrocities were being perpetuated against (Macklin, 1996). Analysts say that there have been cases of humanitarian crisis boiling up in some countries before the 1999 Kosovo crisis, which received no international interventions. The case of Kosovo was therefore supposed to be a different one and thus justifiable to subjecting it to critical analysis as to why the intervention was necessary. But whenever this need for justification is posed to NATO, they are quick to defend the merit in the intervention, saying that there was a specific target in this case, who were the Serbs. From their estimation and argument therefore, if it had been a war within one sided front, the international intervention would not have been so necessary but for the fact that there was a united force rising against a weaker opposition, delaying on the intervention would have caused the growing human tragedy to continue (Maddox, 2005; Cliff, 2009). The outcome of the intervention The outcome of the international intervention has generally been criticized as one that did not yield the expected promise with which it was started (Papadakis, 2000). One of such schools of thought is those who view the whole international intervention from a legal analysis and paradigm. It is for instance argued that the forefront stage that was taken by the United States and NATO breaches the legal provisions of the United States, which should have had its United States Security Council taking the head-role. In the estimation of most analysts, the United Nations Security Council has more favorable options for intervening; keen among them is the use of persuasive efforts (Pybus, 2006; Muller, 2012). It is estimated therefore that if the backdoor had not been used in getting NATO and United States invading Kosovo in the spring of 1999, there would have been a better outcome of the whole fracas that went on. As it is now, the legal world chooses to assess and draw conclusions on the international intervention in Kosovo as one that was undertaken as a breach to customary international law, as against the use of a new custom based legal order (Joyner, 2002; Science Daily, 2012) to score unwarranted political point. In its logical legal sense therefore, the NATO and the United States could not give enough merit to their act, especially when it comes to the use of customary international law, which is more favorable towards the use of less violent and military backed interventions. Apart from the legal perspective given to the merit of the international intervention, there are other commentators who have also raised issues and questions bordering on non-humanitarian factors that could legitimately be associated with the NATO involvement in the Kosovo crisis. One of such factors has to do with the destruction of the Yugoslavian competitive socialist economic system (Jaensch, 1998). Even though the justifications raised by the NATO governments all point to the need for a humanitarian intervention, critics have said that the result of their actions warrants; whether intentionally or unintentionally, a validity to argue that they only ended up dismantling the rather competing socialist economy that was growing up in Yugoslavia. Chossudovsky (2003) alleges that there are documents from the Reagan era in 1984 that captures a United States policy toward Yugoslavia, aimed at destroying the communist system that prevailed in that country. Subsequently, the military intervention that was undertaken resulted in a situation whereby there was the need for a total restructuring of the governance system in the regions that were affected by the international intervention. To this end, even though much of the critics are given room to defend their suspicions in saying that indeed, there were other non-humanitarian interests that NATO and United States had in staging what was made to appear to the international media as a humanitarian intervention. Legitimate Empirical Judgment on the International Intervention In the midst of all of these arguments, the NATO and United States have also reported of their success rate in the international intervention that was carried. To the best of their interest, human tragedies were simply reduced to their barest minimum. But yet again, one would argue as the merits in this especially as it is clear that these actions of ‘salvation’ were not carried out in a holistic manner but filled with several rooms to suspect and raise questions of certain acts that were committed by the international community along the interventions that were being given. One of such questions that raises doubts on the genuineness of the international intervention has to with the revelation by a think-tank that “one month following the NATO intervention, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK] gave itself the authority to administer FRY and Serbian assets in Kosovo” (Stone, 2005; Tawiah, 2009). Having put together all of these arguments, against the backdrop that there was an eventual ethnic conflict as the aftermath of the international intervention, the line would be drawn that even though the international intervention had a perspective justification as to why it needed to be carried out in Kosovo, the players behind the game went far beyond their banks and thus defeated the overall support that they would otherwise had had critics and analysts. To this end, the merits of the international intervention in Kosovo were not rightly justified. Conclusion In conclusion, it will be stated that what could have been a good course by the international body, largely led by the United States and NATO in intervening in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was rather carried through the wrong premises, at the wrong time and fused with wrong elements (The Economist, 2011). There were therefore a number of things that could have been done well by the agents of the international intervention to ensure a more credible process that were overlooked. If for instance the United Nations Security Council were allowed to play their part to the very last minute so that the military intervention had come in as a last resort, there would have been better justification for the action of the international intervention. Again, if the international intervention had gone on in the absence of most of the non-humanitarian allegations against it being proven, there would have been a better credibility for the outfit that started it all in the international intervention. The way forward for world leaders should therefore be a means of ensuring that they have better and stronger justifications for their actions. On the part of the United Nations Security Council, perhaps the present assessment of the merit of the international intervention in Kosovo has brought out the need for it to be firmer in the application of its legal provisions. As much as possible, no single entity within the United Nations should be seen to be a superpower force ahead of the Security Council (Gauja, 2010). REFERENCE LIST Alothman, A., Altalhi, K., Al-Saedy, A. & Al-Enazi, T. 2010. What is the Real Prevalence of HIV-Infection in Saudi Arabia', Infectious Diseases: Research and Treatment, 3, 41-44. Alrajhi, A. 2004. Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Saudi Arabia', Saudi Medical Journal, vol. 25 (11), pp. 1559-1563, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ankomah, D. 2005. Dispensing Economic Partnership and Trade Reviews. New York: Dynamite Press Series. Chossudovsky, M., The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order (Second Edition), (Shanty Bay: Global Outlook, 2003,) pp. 259-60. 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