An Analysis of Scope and Effectiveness in Aiding the Eventual Allied Victory - Essay Example

Section/# Strategic Bombing of Germany During the Second World War: An Analysis of Scope and Effectiveness in Aiding the Eventual Allied Victory World War II was unique from a number of different perspectives. First and foremost, it was the largest armed conflict that the world had thus far experienced, extending the scope, combatants, munitions employed and overall death toll far beyond even the First World War. As a function of the recent memory of the First World War and a general horror that defined the manner in which it was fought, both sides set about to find unique ways in which to avert such an outcome leading up to and during the hostilities that defined the Second World War. The Germans sought to forego the horrors that dominated trench warfare by technically re-engineering the way in which soldiers met with enemy combatants on the battlefield. However, the Germans were not unique in such an alternate approach as the Allies sought to find a way to avoid a protracted ground battle that would likely see both sides grind to a halt and re-invoke the painful lessons and memories of trench warfare during the Second World War. As a means to avert this, the Allies opted for a litany of approaches; however, for the purposes of this brief research, the one that will be focused upon with the most depth will be that of the CBO (Combined Bomber Offensive) which aimed to bring about the combined destruction of German industry, economics, and moral by providing a steady stream of aerial bombardment to Germany throughout much of the latter part of World War II. Though this aerial bombardment has come to be collectively recognized as a key determinant with respect to the Allied victory, this analysis will attempt to define the campaign, categorize its intended and realized goals, and attempt to draw a level of meaning upon overall effectiveness based upon these prior definitions. Thought it would be foolish to claim that the importance of aerial bombardment was determined as a useful means by the Allies completely of their own volition and in a type of vacuum as it were, it would also foolish to fail to consider the means by which the German aerial bombardment of Britain had a profound effect in guiding and directing the way the Allies thought concerning such a tactic (Childers 2005, p. 79). As night after night for nearly an entire year, the cities and infrastructure of Britain was tormented by nearly incessant German aerial bombardment during the Battle of Britain, it is without question that the formulation of what would become CBO took careful note of the means by which such a form of warfare affected the populace, the moral, and was a useful, albeit costly mechanism, whereby the Allies could seek to leverage an advantage over Germany while at the same time seeking to undermine the nation economically, morally, and industrially (Parramore 2012, p. 75). Similarly, before delving into the overall effectiveness of such a strategy in bringing about the end to the war, one must also consider the fact that after the Battle of Britain was all but decided, the strength and potency of the German Luftwaffe had been so seriously degraded that it no longer had the capability to successfully counter the streams of lumbering bombers that pummeled its cities with tonne after tonne of payload. Likewise, the fact that the Luftwaffe was not only degraded from losses from the Battle of Britain but also from the fact that Operation Barbarossa had already begun in the East ensured that a supreme lack of equipment and support for air defense of the homeland was something that was all but assured (Gentile 1997, p. 53). Approaching the issue from this light, it is easy to understand why the Allies used this opportunity to leverage the seemingly inexhaustible production strength that the United States was able to supply Great Britain as fighter blames and bombers were replaced on the front lines at a rate greater than the Luftwaffe and supporting aerial defense ground forces could bring them down. As a function of this, the CBO that took place over the skies of Germany for the remainder of World War II was one in which the numerical and logistical superiority of the Allies all but ensured that a competent and/or competitive could not great them in the skies (Westermann 2003, p. 207). From this perspective, the strategy showed its true brilliance in that it was able to leverage the competitive advantage that the Allies were able to bring at the time while underscoring the weakness that Germany exhibited at the same time. In this way, the Allies were greeted with a fundamental sense of success and accomplishment even if the actual rewards of the bombardment oftentimes proved to be quite small (Ortensie 2012, p. 51). When one attempts to consider the overall effectiveness of the aerial bombardment of Germany during the Second World War, the question itself is too complex to be answered categorically; rather, it should necessarily be divided into the effectiveness of the campaign upon the destruction of German industry, the effectiveness of the campaign on the destruction of German moral, and the effectiveness of the campaign on the destruction of infrastructure (both civilian and institutional) (Snow 1943, p. 23). As a function of such a nuanced approach, the overall answer to whether or not the campaign achieved a degree of success can more appropriately be answered. As a way to generate a degree of understanding within the reader with regards to the overall level of precision that is up for discussion with regards to the aerial bombardment of Germany during the Second World War, it is important for the reader to understand that the statistic, oftentimes cited by scholars and non-scholars alike, is indeed true; only 50% of all munitions dropped during the bombardment of Germany landed within ? of a mile of their intended target (Ross 2005, p. 17). Such a statistic, although perhaps not appreciated, helps to engage the reader with the root level of precision that is up for discussion. Much opposed to the technology of the current time in which GPS and laser guided logistics allow for bombs to literally be flown inside windows, the bombing of Germany performed during the Second World War was done without the use of such technology. Further, due to fear of anti-aircraft (AA) guns and the scuttling of German response fighters, the bombardment invariably took place at altitudes that ranged from anywhere between 20,000 to 25,000 feet (Gentile 1997). At such a height, the means by which the bombardier and supporting staff could adequately judge the successive layers of wind speed and weather conditions, as well as adequately discern the targets, was an issue that provided for the abysmal statistic that has previously been stated. By such an understanding it is readily understood that the actual level of precision that could be brought to bear with regards to such a bombardment was extraordinarily low (Meilinger 1999, p. 107). This level of precision is of utmost importance due to the fact that without a degree of precision, the ability of bombardiers to effectively select and neutralize key targets is all but non-existent. As such, the overall effect that was brought to bear on the destruction of German industry was minimal. This is of course not to say that the sheer mass of numbers of aerial missions and bombings had little effect on German industry. However, the combined effect of the Germans being able to engage their construction and defense industries to harden their key industry from such attacks has been noted by a litany of historians and military strategists (CITE). As such, the combination of the imprecision of the bombing with the rapid response of German industry meant that German industry was able to adapt to the changing environment that the Allied bombardment affected upon it with minimal losses. As a function of this, although valuable resources were disrupted thereby slowing the Nazi war machine, the power of German industry was still functional even up until the very end of the war. German industry adapted as a means to counter the incessant bombardment which took place over the skies of Germany since 1941 (Layne 2008, p. 400). A corollary to this particular view is the fact that it is perhaps useful to view is whether or not the more important factor was the redistribution of German air power, defense forces, and construction that the air campaign necessitated more important towards achieving the allies goal than was the actual destruction to German infrastructure and industry that the bombing effected. It should be noted that although the material losses that the German Wehrmacht sustained could be labeled as minimal, the resource allocation, labor demands, and necessity to split minimal forces yet again to defend native airspace doubtless had no small effect in the ultimate victory of the Allies (Haskew 1998, p. 18)). In this sense, the effectiveness of the Allied bombardment cannot be seen in a running tally of industrial buildings damaged, workers killed, infrastructure damage, or even reduction of overall moral (Goldstein 2012, p. 6). Instead, the necessary labor, diverted resources, and requisite defense forces that the CBO necessitated meant that these resources were pulled from the litany of other theaters of conflict in which the Wehrmacht was also engaged. As a function of this resource reallocation, the means whereby the German armed forces could affectively engaged within the aforementioned theaters of conflict was necessarily decreased (Air Forces 2011, p. 1). This unique approach to the CBO is something that few scholars have contemplated; however, it also has a flip side (Guttman 1998, p. 30). When one considers the massive amount of individuals that the CBO required with regards to air force personnel, mechanics, support staff, aircraft controllers, runway maintenance/construction crews, refueling specialists, cartographers, target selection personnel, and a great host of other specialized professions, the full cost of such a campaign comes into clear focus. As such a means of understanding, the reader can recognize that rather than necessarily advancing or hurting the cause of the Allies, the CBO and the aerial bombardment of Germany that it affected may very well have cancelled itself out with the level of defense preparation and response that Germany implemented (Connelly 2002 p. 39). In such a way, it is doubtful if the sustained bombardment contributed to any great extent to the ultimate victory in Europe. Similarly, with respect to the damage to the moral of the populace as a result of the aerial bombardments, this too was another aspect of CBO that was over-estimated by Allied leadership (Carey 2008, p. 50). This particular aspect of CBO is perhaps the most unique to consider due to the fact that the formulators of such a strategy knew and understood full well that the bombardment that Britain had received just a few scant months prior to the formalization of CBO had not served to demoralize the British populace as Hitler and the Nazi leadership had hoped; rather, it only served to steel their resolve and provided a unified front to resist the German onslaught. Why the strategy makers would choose to adopt a plan that had the very same hallmarks of a failed German plan remains a mystery. However, the result speaks for itself (Arnold 2011, p. 447). Whereas total civilian causalities as a result of the Battle of Britain exceeded 20,000 whereas the total civilian casualties within Germany as a result of CBO account to more than 300,000 (Biddle 2012, p. 286). Such numbers are meant to show that the damage to the civilian populace was well known by the Allies during the bombardment of Germany during the Second World War and it was hoped that such a massive toll could be utilized as a leverage to encourage the capitulation of Germany. Yet, as history has documented, this never occurred Though the CBO was envisioned as a means to render a ground invasion of Germany unnecessary, the fact that of the matter was that Germany industry was able to rapidly assess the threat and work to mitigate the eventuality of aerial bombardment, the German populace was unable to be demoralized, and the damage to infrastructure was not to the extent that the Allies had initially hoped. As such, rather than say that CBO had little to no effect on the way that the war progressed, it is the belief of this author that General Carl Andrew Spaatz best put it in the following quote: ““One may argue the exact degree of contribution made by strategic bombing to the final decision. The war against Germany was fundamentally an infantry war supported by air power” (Barth 1945, p. 547). References Arnold, J 2011, '‘Once upon a time there was a lovely town … ’: The Allied Air War, Urban Reconstruction and Nostalgia in Kassel (1943–2000)*', German History, 29, 3, pp. 445-469, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 19 December 2012. 'Air forces' 2011, Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6Th Edition, pp. 1-2, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 19 December 2012. Barth, A 1945, 'Strategic Bombing - an Autopsy', Nation, 161, 21, pp. 546-548, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 19 December 2012. 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