Russia Judicial System Reforms - Essay Example

?Russia Judicial System Reforms and the Extent of Their Success Introduction Russia’s judicial system has its history stemmed in the system of prisonlabour camps that existed in the early twentieth century. The word Gulag is a short form of Glavnoe Upravlenie ispravitel’no-trudovykh LAGerei (Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps) which was part of the Soviet bureaucratic establishment. While the Gulag was drastically reduced in function and size after Stalin’s demise in 1953, political prisoners as well as forced labour camps remained in the Soviet Union until Gorbachev’s reign. A new body of the people's representatives was nominated in 1990, in Russia. The sovereignty and self-government of the Russian Federation and the initiation of judicial reforms was announced. On the orders of President Boris Yeltsin, in 1991, the highest ranking body in the Russian nation, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, accepted the idea of reform for the Russia’s judicial system. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in 1993 ratified the Law on Jury Trial despite the resistance that was staged by the Prosecutor General. All major court cases that the local courts came under the jurisdiction of the jury trials. This system of jury trial was realised in 9 areas of the Soviet Russia. Since then, the practice of jury trials has become normality. In the year 2000 alone, judges in Russia had tried about 900,000 legal cases, with 1,300,000 defendants, and 450,000 appeals. This number pales in comparison with the numbers of court cases that the judges before the introduction of jury trials were forced to cope with. Though even after the reforms of the nineties many Soviet residents were forced to deal with lengthy procedures in order to get justice, it was a considerable improvement from the days when residents could not possibly hope for their cases to be tried due to the backlog of cases in the court. In 1996, further reforms were summarily stopped. This was because the Russian authorities realised that the reforms were not affecting the most critical of institutions. For example, law enforcement establishments, and institutions such as the public prosecutors and the militia were not inspired to implement change. Russian society had long accepted the reality that the only way through which people could be coerced to tell the truth in some circumstances was through the use of torture. This was an accepted practice that even had supporters among the members of the Russian public. Another reason why the reforms of the early nineties period were not far reaching is because there were not enough finances to implement the reforms in all areas. For example, Russian judges were given measly salaries that left them open to being bribed. In Russia, the highest courts have their requirements provided by the President's Administration. For this reason, there are many verdicts of the Russian Federation’s Supreme Court which are divergent (Hoffman 2011). Though often democratic in theory, the decisions of the Constitutional Court can actually end up intensifying the real situation. Following the verdict of the Constitutional Court, the legal right of defendants to come before the jury began to be viewed as a provision that was specially authorised by the president’s administration. However, this remained something that could only be practiced in the highest court. Other lower level courts continued the practice of accepting money as well as gifts from the regional governors. This is outlawed by the Russian Constitution; nevertheless the courts had no choice but to take bribes. If they refused to accept such gifts, they would be forced to stop all operations because of outstanding bills, and the lack of amenities such as chairs, and paper. Even the buildings in which court cases were tried were decrepit and in serious need of repairs. The regional courts situated in Saint-Petersburg and Moscow were some of those involved in the most cases of bribery. Therefore, the mayor of Moscow tended to win in all libel cases that were tried in capital courts. There were also other issues that plagued Russian courts. There were often numerous unlawful delays when people bribed their way to be among the first whose cases would be presented in court. Many times, arrested citizens had to wait for months or even years for their cases to be mentioned. Given that the Russian prisons were extremely unhealthy places to live in, most of the prisoners contracted serious diseases or died before their cases were mentioned. Not only did the reforms correct such issues, but they also looked into the cases of persons that had been wrongly arrested. In the years of Stalin's absolute rule, approximately 10% of all the defendants were declared innocent. After the reform of the judicial system was passed, 99% of defendants are found guilty. Less than 50% of the "not guilty" verdicts and 0.5% of verdicts of "guilty" were rescinded by the Russian courts of appeal (Ross 2003). Moreover, the reforms of the nineties have also served to highlight areas in which more reform is needed. In the judgments of cases in Russia, the judges usually consider many informal mechanisms. To protect themselves from annulment of their verdicts, trial judges usually conduct discussions with chairmen of the court, public prosecutors, and high court judges who will assess their judgments, if any appeals should be made against their final decisions. After consulting widely, the trial judges then adjust their verdicts according to the advice they have received. It is a fact that the number of complaints about the professional misbehaviour of judges rose from 4,000 in 1995 to more than17, 000 in the year 2000. The Russian citizens claimed that judges were not only rude, but also intentionally delayed court proceedings (Pascal 2003). The implementation of new rules of judicial reform became a serious national priority after the Russian government restarted the reform process (Ross 2003). Some reform operations were carried out by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and others by the State Duma. First, a new Civil Procedure Code was drafted. The new reforms stipulate that the civil procedure will be more basic, and adversarial. The prosecutors, under this new reform, will nearly be excluded from participating in any aspect of civil cases. This is because they will lose their authority to sue people on behalf of private persons, who themselves wish to steer clear of litigation (Trochev 2008). Moreover, there are Russian lawyers and civil bodies that wish to amend the rule that stipulates that defence attorneys are restricted in questioning any witnesses. This is because defence attorneys would then be unable to amass any evidence and file it unless he or she had the express permission of the (Tomila 2004). The Russian Federation’s Supreme Court has already drafted the bill on Administrative Courts. The aim of this draft is to institute a number of such courts that are well equipped and supplied. These courts will have well paid judges who are accustomed to handling cases that involve taxes, electoral laws, and disagreements between local and federal authorities. The presidential administration is the main body that seeks to implement further reform proposals in the judicial system (Burnham, Mikhailovich-Danilenko and Maggs 2009). There are numerous points that have been suggested by the president’s administration, some of which are in the process of being implemented (Vereshchagin 2006). The first number of laws seeks to address the issue of the salaries of the presiding judges. The Russian government has made plans to raise the low salaries of all judges. It also plans to conduct a major restoration and renovation of the buildings that house the Russian courts, and purchase amenities such as papers and chairs for courts that have low supplies of them The second major reform has to do with the dominance of the federal regulations all over the nation. The Constitutional court is slated to be given powers to declare when the law of the issue of Russian Federation breaches a specific condition of the federal Constitution. In the past, such rulings were frequently disregarded by the regional governors and legislative bodies. According to the judicial reforms plan, all the major authorities in Russia have to be subject to the new law. The President's Administration, Federal Government, and municipal governors must obey the rulings of the Constitutional Court. They are also obliged to prepare the required draft bills in less than 4 months. The regional Dumas will be expected to implement such bills in the shortest time possible. The court representatives can be discharged for procrastinating on critical documents by simple presidential decree. The Ministry of Justice will also have the authority to supervise the efforts to endorse regional legislation that complements federal laws. These stipulations have already been realised in many Russian courts with great success (Ferdinand and Feldbrugge 2007). Other judicial reform laws have to do with court proceedings. Their main objective is to broaden the defence’s rights during criminal proceedings, while almost eliminating prosecutors from trying civil cases. This reform calls for instituting jury trials right through the nation, and, concurrently, for the control of their abilities. When this reform is ratified, the decision of the Constitutional Court to suspend capital punishment will be subject to revision. Court judges will also be given the right to sign warrants. Another reform law that has already started being implemented, concerns the tenure of judges. Under this law, judges who are appointed to be chairmen of the courts will have their terms limited to terms of either of 5 or 10 years. The reform also addresses the need for changes to be realised in the bodies that choose and discharge judges. In the first days of implementation of this particular reform, it is the institutions that chose and dismissed judges were made up of merely judges. In the new laws, the protection that court judges in the past had from being prosecuted will no longer hold. The decision to impeach or arraign a judge will be left to a board of three judges from a higher court. This process can be started by the request of a deputy procurator general. Once approved, the permission will end the civil liberties enjoyed by the judge in question and all further verdicts about incarceration would be made by legally authorised representatives according to the laws of procedure. Moreover, there is a push to include other members of the professional legal society. At present, the Collegiums no longer have the right to stop law enforcement establishments from indicting and taking legal action against erroneous judges. Even though these suggestions have faced stiff opposition in all points of their implementation, the support of the Russian president has allowed their realisation. The president’s administration has constantly addressed the need for reforms to be effected in the Russian judicial sector (Burnham, Mikhailovich-Danilenko and Maggs 2009). The president has in the past stressed that the reforms are meant to strengthen the administration (Ferdinand and Feldbrugge 2007). After the accomplishment of all the reform proposals, the body of the judiciary will be closer to the federal Government, and controlled by the President's Administration. The President’s Administration’s influence will be applied through the functions of selecting non-judiciary affiliates of Qualification Collegiums, financing, and choosing the courts chairmen of courts out of ordinary judges. The selected governors will function under the strict control of the President’s Administration and the Ministry of Justice. The general reform package should lessen the reliance of judges on regional power structures. In addition, the courts’ new responsibility for judgments concerning searches as well as detention will compel the law enforcement authorities to be more obsequious to the judges. The judicial reform efforts that commenced in 2001 to tackle the failures of the courts and to develop their status will remain successful if the political commitment to realising them is sustained or upheld. References Burnham, W. & Mikhailovich-Danilenko, G. & Maggs, P. (2009) Law and legal system of the Russian federation, Juris Publishing, Inc., New York. Ferdinand, J. & Feldbrugge, M. (2007) Russia, Europe, and the rule of law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden. Hoffman, D. (2011) The oligarchs: wealth And power in the new Russia, Public Affairs, New York. Pascal, E. (2003) Defining Russian federalism, Greenwood Publishing Group, New York. Ross, C. (2003) Federalism and democratisation in post-communist Russia, Manchester University Press, Manchester Tomila, L. (2004) Governing the locals: local self-government and ethnic mobilisation in Russia, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford. Trochev, A. (2008) Judging Russia: the role of the constitutional court in Russian politics 1990-2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Vereshchagin, A. (2006) Judicial law-making in post-soviet Russia, Routledge-Cavendish, London. Read More