The nature of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917 - Coursework Example

?The nature of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917: Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the failures of the Provisional Government were the main factors in enabling Lenin and the Bolsheviks to seize power The Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in October 1917 was the result of a growing discontentment among the masses and the military about their immediate future and sustenance that was called into question due to Russia’s continued participation in the World War I. This participation in war as well as the economic downturn of the country was the result of the policies of the Provisional Government. However, it is also debatable among Historians that the failures of the Provisional Government were the main factors that enabled Lenin and the Bolsheviks to seize power. There are some scholars like (C) and (D) who show Provisional Government’s only failure was perhaps to adequately deal with the rising power of Kornilov and the mishandling of the entire Kornilov affair. Others like (B) show clearly how Lenin was able to cleverly take advantage of the multiple and varied failures of the Provisional Government on diverse accounts ranging from food shortages, poor working conditions and the economic maladies. However there are others like (A) who offer a very weak interpretation of the events that perpetuated in the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 and hence does not add anything substantial to the debate on the role of the failure of the provisional government in the rise of the Bolsheviks. This is tersely and aptly put across in (B) where the authors delineate the growing discontentment of almost all sections of the Soviet society with the Provisional Government and the increasing influence of Lenin who promised a better life to all. However, both (C) and (D) have postulated the Bolsheviks’ rise to power only as an offshoot of the failure of the Provisional Government to deal with the Kornilov affair. “The Bolsheviks were the principal beneficiaries of the Kornilov crisis, winning their first majority in the Petrograd Soviet on 31 August” shows that (C) simply links the Kornilov crisis with the Bolsheviks winning the Petrograd Soviet; as also does, “in party-political terms, the prime beneficiary of this reaction to the Kornilov affair was the Bolshevik party” in (D). Both (C) and (D) have highlighted the Kornilov affair and Kerensky’s lack of insight and management of it as the prime causes leading to the Bolshevik’s gains. However, this was just one isolated incidence, and this (Kornilov affair) too was an outcome of the failure of the Provisional Government on many different levels which are well and succinctly explained by (B). Also, (A) is completely off the mark and provides no information or insight on the topic under discussion; instead (A) reflects on the serendipity of Bolsheviks’rising to power at all. While this makes a good and interesting read, (A)’s reminiscences go waste when it comes to evaluating the role played by the failures of the Provisional Government in the rise of Bolsheviks. In fact, if anything (A) provides some dubious evidence to support the contention that the Provisional Government was seen such a failure by the soviet masses and the military, that even in spite of the many exigencies and limitations, the Bolsheviks were able to gain mass support at the grassroot level and come to power. In contrast, (B) provides substantial evidence to support the believe that it was the failure of the Provisional Government that allowed the Bolshevik to stage a coup in October 1917 and ultimately the Bolshevik take over. This contention is explicitly backed by Weiner (2001) who states that the Provisional Government that headed the country post the fall of the Tsar was expected to take the reins of the economy and politics and steer the nation on the path to democratically elect a more permanent government. Instead, the provisional government was mired in political intrigues and mismanagements and complete lack of focus on the exigent problems like food shortage and massive war casualties (Figes, 1997). As such, (B) provides a comprehensive and panoramic view of the economic, political and social turmoil that had ensured during the regime of the Provisional Government, and which paved the way for the Bolsheviks. (C) and (D) place an inordinate focus on Kerensky’ mishandling of the Kornilov affair, and so present a myopic view of the circumstances that led to the fall of Kerensky’s power and the resulting benefit to the Bolsheviks. As (B) rightly puts it, “the rate of growth (of Bolshevik membership) was most impressive in the Petrograd area, where the Party (Bolsheviks) benefited from the feverish atmosphere of the capital”. This undeniably establishes that the atmosphere was already feverish and resentment against the Provisional Governments’ failure to deliver on its promises was high. Unlike the compelling narration of the Kornilov incidence and its role in strengthening the Bolsheviks as suggested by both (C) and (D), this particular incidence was not the causing factor but a mere perpetuating factor that resulted in bringing back the Bolsheviks and their agenda into the focus. (B), though the article never directly mentions the phrase “failures of the Provisional Government” provides substantial evidence to support the contention that there was unrest and dissatisfaction with could only be the outcome of the failures of the Provisional Government. (B) mentions, “the struggle against employers and for food and raw materials could only be resolved in their favour with the aid of government action, and the State alone could end the war. The Bolshevik Party and programme offered a solution”. This convincingly implies that the masses and the army were short of food, and the industrialists were short of raw materials and all these problems were directly linked to the ongoing participation of Russia in the World War I. It also irrefutably signifies the growing sentiment among all sections of the soviet society that their ills could be put an end to “with the aid of government action”, which was nevertheless not forthcoming. Hence, the Provisional Government was already seen as a failure on many counts; and there was simmering discontentment with it and a readiness to make changes. “The Bolshevik Party and programme offered a solution”, which means that people were already aware of the Bolshevik Party and its Programme and the Bolshevik Party was already gaining a slow and steady support for itself over the months post the February 1917 revolution. However (A) tends to undermine the Bolshevik seizure of power (As it turned out, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd was rather a minor event, important only in retrospect.) in 1917 and even amazes at the success of the Bolsheviks in gaining the popular support as is show in this sentence, “and even when they held power, they did so tenuously, having to combat not only political enemies as desperate as themselves but also incredible disorganization, hunger, cold, exhaustion, explosive anarchy and all the miseries of backwardness compounded by war and revolution”. Probably, (A) intends to highlight the inherent weaknesses of the Bolshevik and the external harsh realities that they faced, and which somehow limited their achievement, even though no other historian has called the October Revolution un-creditworthy (Davenport, 2010). More importantly, (A) fails to make a point about the role of the Provisional Government in creating situations that facilitated the rise of the Bolsheviks. The lack of positive action to alleviate the living conditions of the people of the country on the part of the Provisional Government is well documented in (B) and on a closer scrutiny, also gets a passing mention in (D). In (D), “The Third Coalition cabinet could not get to grips with the military, social and economic problems it faced. Exacerbating everything else was an increasingly desperate shortage of food”, reasonably strengthens the support for the theory that the Provisional Government was responsible largely due to its own failures for the rise of the Bolsheviks. This is also backed up by Engdahl (2013) who faults the Provisional Governments’ regime of wrecking further havoc with the nation’s economic condition. The situation was also made worse by the disgruntlement of the soldiers with the continued hardships on the war front, as well as the unrest among the industrial workforce against shortages and wages (Haupt and Marie, 1974). These facts are delineated well in (B) but also subtly implied in (D) as, “The Third Coalition cabinet could not get to grips with the military, social and economic problems it faced.” (B) explicitly agrees with this assertion and points out that the Bolsheviks campaign was primarily centred on relief from hunger, exploitation and war. But (D), like (C), nevertheless explicitly continue to assert that the collapse of the Provisional Government was the work of the showdown between Kerensky and Kornilov. However, the physical collapse of the Provisional Government was just the end point of a process that started, perhaps right after the February revolution. As (B) indubitably chalks out the progress of the Bolsheviks, with their victories with the proletariats (Corney, 2004), with their forays into military ranks (…As Menshevik and SR influence declined in both the army and navy, Bolsheviks cells mushroomed there too, and the Party developed a whole network of Military Organizations..) and with their appeal to the urban workers (The struggle against employers and for food and raw materials….), the description evokes creative parallels to be drawn about the failure of the Provisional Government with each of these sections of the society. (B) provides legitimate evidence that the Lenin campaign featured clear and hard-hitting propaganda that targeted the underlying problems in the country. (B) also recounts the meticulous and systematic methodology that Lenin used to gain political ground and mass support. Lenin focused on building trust among the industrial workers through supporting them from the inside and by enlisting them in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. He even developed affiliations and secured loyalty of a large section of the military. The perspicuity and vision of Lenin is also applauded by Wade (2001) who states that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were able to position themselves as the alternative and better political party, Vis a Vis the Provisional Government whose own legitimacy was undermined by its numerous failures in the past six months. The provisional government was preoccupied by internal squabbles within its system and it seems to have forgotten the ideals on which it was formed. (D) too implies that Kerensky and his cabinet’s main objectives were limited to keeping them in power and preventing any major political changes that could reduce their personal influences. In so doing, the Provisional Government left the Russian public and its welfare on the backtrack (Medlin, 1974). This was a gross miscalculation on the part of the Provisional Government as it underestimated the power of the public. It is also probable that the enormous bureaucracies that were a part of the Provisional Government were unfocused or inefficient and actually hampered any measures that could have served the public (Corney, 2004). Conclusion It is seen that there were a variety of factors related to the failure of the Provisional Government on multiple accounts that led to the Bolshevik’s gaining stronghold and then power in the country. The Provisional Government was responsible for the continued participation of the country in the World War I that brought about food shortages and distress to the citizens and was a leading factor for the simmering of the public resentment. (B) provides a detailed and insightful account of Lenin’s acumen in staging the ground for the October coup and attributes the Bolshevik’s success to the support of the already disgruntled masses, industrial workers and soldiers. (C) and (D), both add that the immediate perpetuating cause for the Bolshevik revolution was the fall of Kornilov, which actually resulted in the political demise of Kerensky and his cabinet. (A) provides some insight about the dishevelled condition of the masses and includes that even the Bolsheviks’ suffered from the ills of food shortage and ailing economy and mass unrest. It can therefore be concluded that the Bolshevik seizure of power was a direct outcome of the slow and debilitating impacts of the deep-rooted and numerous failures of the Provisional Government, even though the Kornilov affair may have furthered the coup. References Acton, E. (1986). Russia. London: Longman. Acton, E., & Stableford, T. (2005). The Soviet Union: A Documentary History 1917-1940. Corney, F. C. (2004). Telling October: memory and the making of the Bolshevik Revolution. Ithaca, Cornell University Press Davenport, J. (2010). The Bolshevik Revolution. New York, Chelsea House. Engdahl, S. (2013). The Bolshevik revolution. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Figes, O. (1997). A people's tragedy: a history of the Russian Revolution. New York, NY, Viking. Haupt, G. and Marie, J. J. (1974). Makers of the Russian revolution: biographies of Bolshevik leaders. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. Medlin, V. D. (1974). The Russian revolution. Hinsdale, Ill, Dryden Press Von Laue, T. H. (1971). Why Lenin? Why Stalin?: An reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930. Philadelphia, Lippincott Wade, A. (2001). The Bolshevik revolution and Russian Civil War. Westport, Conn, Greenwood Press. Weiner, A. (2001). Making sense of war: the Second World War and the fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Read More