Democratization in the Third Wave European Countries - Essay Example

? Democratization in the Third Wave European Countries Democracy is a system of characteristics opposite to autocracy, lying on the opposite end of the political spectrum (Jaggers & Gurr 1995, p.469). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall some political scientists, such as Fukuyama, have claimed that the world has reached the end of history (Fukuyama, 1991). However, democratization is not finished yet, at least for some countries. The third wave countries in some cases failed to consolidate democracy (Geddes 1999, p.115 – 116). Others, such as Spain and Greece, succeeded. The characteristic common to all third wave countries is that unlike the first wave countries, the third wave countries first introduced democracy and then built institutions needed for it to function (Rose & Shin 2001, p.333). Moreover, some such as Spain and Greece were ruled by the military regimes before they transitioned to democracy. Some of the factors that made Spain and Greece a success are that both experienced economic growth and were high income countries. In both countries, the elites were in favor of the transition. Opposing sides were pacified. In case of Spain, the leader was an eloquent and skilled negotiator and labor was in favor of democracy. In case of Greece, the military regime was willing to hand over the power in order to survive. Moreover, the European Union (EU) supported their transition to democracy. Spain and Greece both transitioned from military regimes to consolidated democracies as third wave countries, but their success was conditioned on solid economic growth, EU and willing elites. There have been three waves of democratization. The first wave started in the 1820’s, as suffrage widened and more citizens in Europe demanded their rights (Huntington 1991, p.3). It started in the US and then spread across the British dominion (Huntington 1984, p.196). However, in 1922 Mussolini came to power, which marked the return to autocracies. By the end of World War II, only 12 democracies were left, in comparison to 29 beforehand (Huntington 1991, p.3). The second wave was supported, and imposed by the Allied Forces after World War II. In 1962, the zenith was reached with 36 democracies (Huntington 1991, p.3). Many of them were also former colonies (Huntington 1991, p. 31 – 108). After 1962, democracy again experienced a decline (Jaggers & Gurr 1995, 477). In 1974, the third wave started. This wave was marked by the shifts to democracy in Portugal, Greece and Spain (Huntington, 1991, p.4). The Catholic Church became an opponent of autocracies in the 1960’s (Huntington 1991, p.77). The European Union (EU), then known as the European Community (EC), conditioned the benefits of access to their markets on democratization. Greece joined EC in 1981, and Spain and Portugal followed. By 1994, according to Jaggers and Gurr (1995, p.479), there were 50 percent democracies and only 18 percent autocracies in the world. However, they also classified countries into incoherent systems, claiming that 19 percent countries were autocracies and 13 percent democracies (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995, p.479). These are less stable than coherent systems. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008, p.384) determined that among 174 countries between 1960 and 2005, there were 63 democratic transitions and 3 reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy. In the 1990’s, it was questionable whether young democracies were going to survive. According to Shin (1994, p.137), since governments depend on people or demos, democracy can only survive if people support it. However, at the time, newly democratic countries lacked factors that facilitate democratization such as civic organizations and market economies (Shin 1994, p.137). According to Rose and Shin (2001, p.334), “[w]hile the third wave has increased by 77 per cent the number of countries holding competitive elections, the number of countries recognizing political and civil liberties has increased by only 40 per cent.” As a result, the third wave in many countries only produced a superficial skeleton of democracy. There are four stages of democratic transition. These are: “(1) decay of authoritarian rule, (2) transition, (3) consolidation, and (4) the maturing of democratic political order” (Shin 1990, p. 143). The third wave countries are considered to have undergone the decay of the authoritarian rule. Transition might still be occurring in some, as this stage is characterized by coexistence of the old and new institutions (Shin 1990, p. 144). Many social scientists argue that consolidation is complete once democracy is able to endure and survive (Schedler 2001, p.67). However, the “paradoxical nature of democratic politics” (Shin 1990, p. 169) makes it hard for new democracies to undergo major reforms, so that some become “frozen” (O'Donnell, 1994). Spain and Greece as the European and the EU member countries will be analyzed. The two countries, though similar since they both became democratic in the recent years, approached consolidation of democracy in different ways. Spain was affected by a shift in the Catholic Church’s approach to authoritarian regimes. As mentioned previously, the Catholic Church moved away from supporting authoritarian regimes. In Spain, the Catholic Church helped authoritarian Franco come to power and remain there. However, with the revival of Church as the defender of human rights and democracy, their attitude toward Franco changed (Huntington 1991, p. 79). In 1971, the Church publicly denounced the Franco regime (Huntington 1991, p.81). Moreover, both experienced high levels of economic growth. According to Huntington (1991, p.76), Spain as a Catholic country for the first time had higher growth rates in the 1960’s than the Protestant. Both countries, Spain and Greece, were high – income countries already before the transition (Minier 1998, p.249). Greece experienced a growth rate of nine percent in the period 1974 – 1979 (Minier 1998, p.249). According to Lipset, both were more suitable candidates for democracy than their poorer counterparts, as they had an educated middle class which could spread democratic norms and values (Lipset 1959). The elite contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Spain. According to Weingast (2000, p.5), Aldofo Suarez is seen as an architect of democracy in Spain. He was appointed by King Juan Carlos as President in July of 1976 (Weingast 2000, p.5). In 1975, one year after Franco’s death, the King appointed Arias Navarro, who failed to reform Spain and instead provoked unrest (Weingst 2000, p.30). Unlike Navarro, Suarez was an excellent negotiator, who initiated democratization in a series of steps. In 1976, the first major reform and break away from the old system was made. Suarez managed to convince the Francoist Cortes to pass the Bill for Political Reform. Under the bill, the Cortes dissolved itself and called for new elections (Weingast 2000, p.32). Voters voted in favor of establishing a democracy on 15 December 1976 (Weingst 2000, p.32). Suarez was seen as a hero among the political elites. Suarez pacified his adversaries. He accommodated the Communist Party, which was widely supported across Spain (Weingast 2000, p.6). Communists abided by the democratic rules and the presence of a Monarch in exchange for legitimacy in the eyes of the governing system. He also incorporated the old regime into the new (Weingast 2000, p.5). Through old institutions, a moderate reform was started (Weingast 2000, p.5). Elections, Cortes and legitimacy of political parties were established. Three parties were present in the 1977 elections: the Communist Party, the Centrist under Suarez and the Francoists on the right (Weingast 2000, p.6). Because neither party could rule the country without a compromise with the other, they accepted Suarez’s reforms. Identity as Spanish people was strengthened. The memory of Civil War that led to Franco’s rule remained in minds of many Spaniards as an ambiguous event, lacking legitimacy. Both sides needed a commonality. Suarez provided it to them in form of tragedy both sides suffered during the Civil War (Weingast 2000, p.6). He was responsible for the passage of the 1977 Pact of Political Amnesty (Encarnacion 2008, p.438). According to Weingast (2000, p.5), he invented new traditions such as “mutual accommodation, compromise, and reciprocity.” Pacto del Olvido (Pact of Oblivion) was made instead of reconciliation, which enabled the Spaniards to come to terms with 1936 when they were ready (Encarnacion 2008, p.437). If it were not for this pact, more than already 400 deaths would have occurred during the transition to democracy (Encarnacion 2008, p. 440). Spain had first elections on 15 June 1977. Two years after Franco’s death, a bicameral Cortes (Parliament) was elected with the “authority to write a constitution for Spain” (Meisler, 1977). The last free elections were held in Spain on 15 February 1936 (Meisler, 1977). By the 1980’s, democracy was consolidated in Spain. According to Fishman (1989), by 23 February 1981, when an attempted coup took place, Spain consolidated democracy and managed to survive the fragility the uprising brought along. The King on the other hand, refused to give in and remained a firm proponent of democracy. Other parties too benefitted from democracy, as did the general population. The Francoists were alone in their quest (Weingast 2000, p.39 – 40). According to Weingast (2000, p.2), most analysts agreed that democracy in Spain was consolidated by 1982, when Socialists won the elections. Civic culture lived through the labor. As already noted, Franco’s Spain experienced economic growth, which strengthened labor, whose expectations changed (Weingast 2000, 44). They became firm supporters of democracy, and through that, their own rights. The early Spanish governments focused on liberalizing the economy (Fishman, 1989). The labor unions weakened by late 1970’s, as did the economy. However, the 1980’s were marked by a boom. At the same time, in 1987, the government attempted to reduce labor costs. Workers rebelled and went on a strike. Fishman (1989) attributes this increase in activity on behalf of workers to the consolidation of democracy. On 14 December 1988, there was a general strike in Spain (Fishman 1989). Through labor, Spanish citizens exercised their right to free association and civic engagement. As Linz and Stepan (1996) would have argued, these workers acted within the framework of the democracy, and thus confirmed that democracy was consolidated in Spain. In Diamond’s words (1999), democracy in Spain became self – enforcing through labor forming the civil society. Greece underwent a similar path to democracy. Greek population was relatively homogenous, with the largest urban population in the Balkans (Close 2002, p.6). Similarly to Spain, Greece too had a civil war. In the 1940’s, after the end of World War II, communists were in conflict with the British led opponents (Close 2002, p.13). The latter won. Greece held elections on 31 March 1946 (Close 2002, p.26). However, the People’s Party under Tsaldaris won. Dictatorship in light of Metaxas’ ideology was installed and it lasted until 1974 (Close 2002, p.26). Any form of groups was forbidden (Close 2002, p.27). Then, since the coup in 1967 and until 1974, Greece was ruled by the military regime under Colonel George Papadopoulus (Berg – Schlosser 2008, p.33). He ruled the country through his colonels, while the British remained indifferent (Maragkou 2010). Greek transition to democracy started in 1974. In 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 took place and Colonel’s promises of a united Greece disappeared (Berg – Schlosser 2002, p.33). The colonels lost legitimacy. The conservative party leader Constantine Karamanlis took over power as acting prime minister and parliamentary elections took place in December 1974 (Berg – Schlosser 2002, p.33). Karamanlis was elected and a referendum abolished the authoritarian regime together with a monarchy. Stability of the leadership, measured inversely in terms of a number of newcomers occurred by the 4th term in Greece, when only 13 newcomers came to the Parliament (Morlino 1995, p.329). Transition occurred under the tutelage of the European Union and pacified adversaries. The European Community (now EU), supported the transition and admitted Greece into the EU in 1981 (Berg – Schlosser 2002, p.33). The consolidation was successful because the Communist Party had by then split into two: “Moscow-leaning (KKE) and a more Euro-communist wing, along the lines of Berlinguer’s PCI in Italy” (Berg – Schlosser 2002, p.33). No nondemocratic influence was strong enough to prevent the consolidation. Since the previous regime was based on a military rule of officers, a regime based on a group of people, these individuals wanted to remain in power and thus were willing to accept democracy (Geddes 1999, p.131). They lost little by retreating to the barracks. Democracy consolidated by 1981. According to Morlino (1995, p.321), by 1981 voters stabilized their preferences so that volatility in shifts between left and right, despite the fact that Greece at the time had only two blocks, was lower than in Spain at the time. In the 1970’s, Greece had the dominant party Nea Democratica under Karamanlis, then socialists and communists and the center EDIK, which faded away (Morlino 1995, p.325). Competition in Greece increased above the competition levels in Spain, as in the 1990’s parties in Greece alternated between each election (Morlino 1995, p.325). Parties integrated into the regime by the end of 1980’s when communists entered into a coalition with Nea Democratica in 1990, marking an end to the process of consolidation (Morlino 1995, p.369). However, unlike in Spain, Greek civil society is underdeveloped. According to a study conducted by Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli (2006, p.2), the civil society in Greece lacks structure and impact on society. They attribute this to a centralized form of government. Despite the fact that some services not provided by the government are provided by informal organizations, majority Greeks do not demand accountability or transparency in Greece (Sotiropoulos 2004; Sotiropoulos & Karamagioli 2006, p.4). A part of the indifference could be attributed to the prohibition of any type of group formations before 1974, unlike in Spain, where lively labor unions existed before the transition. Spain and Greece both became consolidated democracies in the 1980’s, though they lacked democratic institutions, thus confirming that late 20th century depended on leadership to install democracy (Linz 1990). Unlike what previous social scientists believed, democracy did not need preconditions to grow and develop in a country. It could be transplanted to a country in presence of adequate leadership and good timing (Shin 1990, p.141). Both countries had military regimes before the transition and both regimes lost legitimacy right before the transition. The factors that contributed to stability and transition were economic growth and the EU, as well as the willing elites. However, in Greece more than in Spain, democracy was the work of elites and the EU since they initiated and controlled the entire process. The EU membership and its markets served as a powerful incentive for Greece and Spain, who wanted to access them. Greek political arena has been more competitive than Spanish. However, whereas in Spain civic life flourishes, in Greece civilian organizations have turned into a silent observer. Unlike in Spain, accountability and transparency are not demanded in Greece on behalf of civilians. In Spain, labor demanded a more egalitarian development and voiced themselves when their interests were jeopardized. In short, Spain and Greece both transitioned from military regimes to consolidated democracies as third wave countries, but they consolidated on different levels: one favoring a competitive political system, and another favoring a more egalitarian society. References Berg – Schlosser, D. (2008) ‘Neighborhood Effects” of Democratization in Europe’ Taiwan Journal of Democracy, vol.4 no.2 pp.29-45 Close, D.H. Greece since 1945: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Longman, 2002. Print. Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press Encarnacion, O.G. (2008) ‘Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping with the Past in Spain’ Political Science Quarterly vol.123 no.3 pp.435-459 Fishman, R. (1989) ‘Labor and the Return of Democracy to Spain’ [Online] Available: http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/118.pdf [13 May 2012] Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man New York: Free Press Geddes, B. 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