Battle of Midway - Research Paper Example

Battle of Midway The battle of Midway was already planned as early as in the month of January in 1942. This was after Japan had successfully acquired the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia as its colonies. Indonesia proved to be a highly resourceful colony to Japan because of its ability to supply Japan with oil since its oil reserves were vast and productive. This victory and progress motivated Japan to start planning for the next attack which was to be against the Americans. This plan to attack America was spearheaded by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. His most strategic goal was to do away with America’s warships (Parshall and Tully 62). According to him, this would be the biggest threat to the rest of the countries involved in the Pacific campaign. His mission was also hugely fueled by a raid conducted on the Japanese on 18 April 1942. Though the raid was not of any significance to the military, it sent quite a shock to Japan and its citizens. In addition, it exposed Japan’s weaknesses on its own territory, thus, exposing it to more attacks by the Americans. This meant that for Japan to be at peace, it must humiliate and eliminate America and end the threat completely. Yamamoto, therefore, planned to attack the main U.S. Port which was at Pearl Harbor. His reasoning was that if he led an attack on that port, it would provoke the Americans to sail out and go to war with the carriers. Yamamoto’s main challenge was the might and strength of America’s air power which was based in Hawaii. He decided to attack Midway instead, since Pearl Harbor could not be attacked directly and also because Midway was based at the extreme end in the Northwestern side of the Hawaii Islands. The Japanese thought that Midway was a significant outpost for Pearl Harbor, and, therefore, the Americans would defend it in case of an attack (Symonds 110). Unfortunately for the Japanese, the U.S did not think so highly of Midway. Yamamoto went ahead and prepared a complex plan. In his design, he premeditated that the U.S had only two carriers. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Americans knew of the planned attack, and they started getting ready for war. They even had some people on the Japanese side who told them of all the plans made by the Japanese. Led by Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Americans were set for a counter attack. Admiral Chester was the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S Pacific Fleet. His assistants included Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher who was the senior tactical commander and in charge of the task force 17. Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance was in charge of the task force 16. Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort was also among the officers who helped Admiral Chester to attack and invade the Japanese. The Japanese were led by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. His assistant was Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo who was in charge of the First Air Fleet. Just before the battle begun it was natural for both the Japanese and the American soldiers, to prepare for war. According to Yamamoto, Japan would have an access and control over the Pacific after fighting with the American Armed Forces. In his plan, he was sure of defeating the Americans, despite being well aware that Admiral Chester would not accept defeat easily without putting up a solid fight. His attack relied on decidedly accurate timing and employing tactics that would tamper with Americans attention and divert them from the main battle fleet (White et al. 96). This fleet was among the biggest in the world, and it carried many cruisers and destroyers. As complex as Yamamoto's plan was, it failed in two areas. He underestimated the impact and damage that an aircraft was capable of causing to a battleship. His staunch belief in how supreme a battleship could be was overshadowed. To him, an aircraft was supposed to support a battleship instead of the other way around. The second factor that was a limitation to his plan was that the Americans knew what Yamamoto had been planning. The plan to divert the Americans’ attention away from their main body did not work as Admirals Spruance and Fletcher were waiting for Yamamoto's attack in their ships. The Americans, on the other hand, were also busy getting ready for war. Cryptanalysts sent by Admiral Nimitz had been able to break the Japanese navy code for a long time before the war began. That enabled them to access and decode messages that the Japanese were using to communicate (Huang n.pag.). Commander Rochefort and his team were able to give confirmation that Midway was the targeted station. In response, the Americans sent a false message that the base was in need of fresh water as its distillation plant had been damaged. The Japanese quickly knew about this and started planning their attack (Parshall and Tully 136). The Americans got to know of the date that the Japanese were to attack them, and so they had got ready days before the actual date. Resultantly, the Americans went to war with a highly clear picture of what to expect from the Japanese. They knew that the Japanese would come separated into four different groups, and that it would be hard for them to support each other. Admiral Nimitz was confident that the aircrafts on his three carriers were better placed and more effective compared to what the Japanese had since his machines were bigger. The Japanese were unfortunate as they did not realize what they were getting themselves into. The weapons of war used by the two countries were to some extent similar, although, there was some little variation. Japan took to the battle field four carriers and two battleships. Inside the two battleships, there were fifteen other ships. Japan also had 248 carriers basing aircrafts and sixteen floatplanes to use on water. America, on the other hand, came armed with three carriers which had seven heavy cruisers. They also took the time to bring along an anti-aircraft cruiser. In addition, they had fifteen destroyers, much to the disadvantage of the Japanese. They also had 233 carrier-based aircrafts and a hundred and twenty seven land-based aircrafts. On April 1942, sixteen aircrafts of the United States bombed Tokyo and other major cities. Military actions showed the existence of a gap in the defense of the Japanese homeland. The Japanese saw that the only way to eliminate threat was to sink the America’s aircraft carriers and to seize the Midway Island which was the only vital island besides Hawaii in the Eastern Pacific. The task to create a plan to invade the island was given to the fleet Admiral Yamamota. He had a complex plan of divided naval forces including a second operation against the Aleutian Island near Alaska (Tully 603). The damage caused by the battle of the Coral Sea was the reason why he organized his cruisers and destroyers to guard the only four fleet aircraft. The initial attack against Midway by the use of dive-bombers, fighters, and torpedo bombers, was launched on 4th of June at around 16.00. As the attack continued, several reconnaissance aircrafts were simultaneously searching for any possible United States Navy ship in that area. The plans to neutralize Midway were unsuccessful because America could still use the Midway base to attack the Japanese. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded the Japanese to launch one hundred and eight planes to attack Midway at 4:30 on June 4. Seven scout planes were also in the search of the American Fleet (Hickman n.pag.). Midway installations which contained a small force of fighters were pounded by the Japanese planes. A second attack was recommended by the strike leaders as they were returning to their carries. Under Nagumo’s orders, the reserve aircrafts were rearmed with bombs. The American Fleet was located by a scout plane from the cruiser ‘Tone’ when this process of the bomb installation on the aircraft was commencing (White et al. 161) On the other hand, the Americans received the information that Nagumo had reversed the rearmament orders. They were aware that the Japanese decks were full of torpedoes, fuel lines, and bombs as the Japanese crew were hectically trying to reequip the aircrafts. Launching of the American aircraft started after Fletcher received the report about what was going on on the Japanese decks. The Japanese fleet was inflicted with an irreversible and inflicting damage by the United States Navy. This was totally different when it came to the United States side where they had only minimal damages. The United States lost only one destroyer and one aircraft carrier. The majority of the Japanese highly trained maintenance team whose work was to ensure the efficiency of ships and aircraft perished in the battle, leaving Japan with only a few pilots and maintenance teams. As a result, the Japanese armed forces became weak, thus, making them vulnerable to attacks. At this period, the federal governments of the United States continued to train new pilots and construct new ships at a very high rate (Tully 604). It was extremely hard for Japan to recover from losses that were inflicted by the United States. The United States started to enjoy the naval superiority from that period onwards. Eventually, America emerged victorious in the inferior position. Its commanders of the armed forces waited until they were sure that the Japanese were vulnerable to command to attack Japan. When the U.S. commanders were certain that Japanese armed forces were helpless, and their carriers were defenseless against air attacks, they commanded their troops to attack the Japanese fleet. The United States sent four separate squadrons which the Japanese had no knowledge of making it easier for America to defeat the Japanese (Symonds 179). It was difficult for the Japanese defenders to note the diver bombers which were flying at a much higher altitude. A store of torpedoes was detonated when the Japanese decks of the flagship ‘Akagi’ was attacked. ‘Akagi’ was doomed when the flames caused by the detonator reached the fuel tanks. However, it took approximately seven hours before the ship was abandoned by the Japanese armed forces. The disruption of the Japanese air patrol made the Japanese fleet vulnerable to attacks, hence, the American managed to attack from the north and the south striking the Japanese carriers (White et al. 201). The Japanese ship was turned to a burning wreck after approximately six minutes. The remaining Japanese carrier ‘Hiryu’ launched a counterattack, but later in the afternoon it was sunk by the American dive bombers, hence, the Americans became victorious. During the battle Midway power plant and oil installation were the main targets because they would make the United States vulnerable. As the attack took place the United States armed forces had already sent ten torpedo bombers, but only three returned. Japanese carriers were destroyed by the United States armed forces, thus, leaving the Japanese with no means of carrying the fleet and nowhere to cover the fighters. The only thing that the carriers could manage was equipping the planes. The effect of the Midway battle was felt by both the Unites States and Japan. However, the effects were more severe for Japan than the United States. On 4th June, both the American armed forces and the Japanese armed forces withdrew to plan their next move (Parshall and Tully 239). The Japanese fleet returned to their base as it was commanded by Yamamoto. The cruiser ‘Mikuma’ was sunk by the American aircraft, whereas ‘Yorktown’ was sunk by the Japanese submarine. During the battle, the Japanese had already lost four of vital aircraft carriers. Those aircraft carriers were of great importance for Japan especially for the Pacific campaign. It was truly difficult for the Japanese to replace one aircraft carrier, let alone four. The Japanese carrier fleet was broken when they lost an invaluable number of air crews. These severe losses turned the tables around and marked an end to the offensive operation which was initially carried out by the Japanese. The American marines took the initiative of landing on Guadalcanal and began to match towards Tokyo. Great losses were evident for both sides, but the Japanese suffered most. The losses incurred by the United States Pacific Fleet were 340 killed, one aircraft carrier destroyed, one destroyer, and 145 aircrafts. Losses of the Imperial Japanese Navy were 3,057 killed, four aircraft carriers destroyed, a heavy cruiser, and 228 aircrafts. It is unusual to note that in spite of all the tactical plans that the Japanese had they were finally defeated. This was a result of many factors. The strategic scouting arrangements that the Japanese had for the battle were all in a disarray. Their submarine did not get at its destination place on time, hence, giving the American carrier a chance to reach northeast of Midway undetected (Tully 604). The intended refueling point of the Japanese aircraft was occupied by the Americans giving them an added advantage over the Japanese. This made it difficult for the Japanese to detect the Americans carriers instantaneously before the battle of Midway. It was extremely hard for the Japanese radios to intercept the American submarine activity and message traffic. Although Yamamoto knew about the marine activity at the sea all the way from Tokyo, he failed to inform Nagumo assuming that he had received the same signal. However, Nagumo antennae could not receive the long-wave transmission, thus, making the American carriers move undetected. This made it easier for the American fleet to attack the Japanese. In early 1950s Japan was polarized by a bitter left-right ideological confrontation over security matters and its proper role in the world. The right ideological confrontation was led by the Liberal Democratic Party which was allied to the U.S. in the cold war and was in a U.S-Japan mutual security treaty which guaranteed them security with a limited provision of arms. On the other hand, the left was represented by the Japan Socialist Party which positioned itself on the no-war clause in the article nine of the postwar constitution. By doing this, they were advocating a posture of the unarmed neutrality in the cold war and the pursuit of pacifist ideals. The right ultimately triumphed in this confrontation, but they did this mainly by inviting the views of the left. A unique peace state emerged from the Liberal Democratic Party compromising formula. In the treaty between U.S. and Japan, it was considered that Japan would be given fewer obligations, for example, the provision of the military bases for the American military forces and diplomatic support of the U.S. policies. It is evident that there has been a continuing shift in the Japanese and Americans policies. Some of these policies include the international, regional, and domestic conditions under which Japan conducts its diplomacy. The American and Japanese policies have radically changed in the last few decades. These changes have significantly affected the relationship between Japan and the rest of the world, especially America. The Japanese foreign policy has greatly been affected by loosening of the treaty. This is because it has been increasingly difficult for the Japanese to keep the Doctrine as its main guiding principle for the maintenance of the national interest. Both American and Japanese defense sectors have also undergone a noteworthy change. The security policy changes are expected to continue occurring in the near future. The security improvement will maximize the per capita of America and Japan because members will feel secure working improving the economy of America and Japan, hence, realizing their main goals of becoming an influential nation in the world. Works Cited Hickman, Kennedy. “World War II: Battle of Midway – Turning Point in the Pacific.” about.com. Military History, n.d. Web. 23 May 2013. . Huang, Jason. “Battle of Midway.” JEVSHistory, n.d. Web. 23 May 2013. . Parshall, Jonathan B., and Anthony P. Tully. Shattered Sword: the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2005. Print. Symonds, Craig L. The Battle of Midway. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print. Tully, Anthony P. "Midway Inquest: Why The Japanese Lost The Battle Of Midway (review)." The Journal of Military History 72.2 (2008): 602-604. Print. White, Steve, Gary Erksine, and Richard Elson. The Empire Falls: Battle of Midway. Oxford, England, New York: Osprey Pub, 2006. Print. Read More