General Public Lacks the Knowledge and Time to Contribute To Debates about New Technologies - Essay Example

General Public Lacks the Knowledge and Time to Contribute To Debates about New Technologies It is a well known and generally accepted fact that new technologies have the capacity to bring great benefits to society. However it is also a fact that the same technologies also come with various risks and uncertainties. The general public does lack conclusive knowledge about how these new technologies work, and therefore, they have to rely on the information disseminated by scientists and policy makers (Joffe, 2003). More often than not, the public’s acceptance of new technology is pegged on the level of trust they have on the scientists and policy makers. Risk communication is one of the areas of concern in new technology communication. Risk communication can be defined as an all inclusive process that involves information and opinion exchange (Joffe, 2003). The information contains multiple messages regarding the nature of risk, the concerns that result from the risk and any arrangements that might be made for risk management. There seems to be a lack of proper communication between experts and policy makers on one hand and the general public on the other. There have been a number of crises and accidents related to new technologies that resulted in major damages mainly due to lack of appropriate and timely risk communication (Plough and Krimsky, 1988). This paper discusses the issues involved with public communication of risks related to new technology. Researchers have come up with models to explain the lack of knowledge regarding various risks. This paper will focus on exploring these models and evaluating them in the reference to the public’s views. Modern day examples of new technology risks such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and the recent Fukushima accidents have been discussed in detail to ascertain the level of knowledge that the public has on certain risks. Models and Theoretical Perspectives of Risk Communication The Deficit Model denotes how lay people process information regarding risk and new technologies. According to this model, the general public lacks in knowledge regarding new technologies, and therefore, cannot contribute to debates arising from this issue (Irwin and Wynne, 1990). Proponents of this model point out that there is need for the public to discuss the hard facts concerning new technology without considering any other issues. However, the reality is, when lay people discuss issues to do with new technologies, they do not just think about the scientific facts. They are likely to consider the consequences such technology would have on the environment, science, and in their personal lives (Schwartz, 2000). For instance, when debating about nuclear power, which is a highly emotive topic, the general public will not just consider its scientific facts, they will also consider how having such technology would impact on their lives and also on the environment. The deficit model sees the public as lacking on the intellectual sense when compared to the knowledge of authoritative science. The sociological model on the other hand emphasizes on the fact that systems are not acknowledged as being significant in the social context. In the contemporary world, the level of awareness of various risks is quite high. However, the general public lacks trust in the policy makers and experts who are responsible of offering protection against the consequences of those risks (Beck, 1992). In conditions such as this, there are normally high levels of anxiety since the nature of risks that come with new technologies normally escapes the protective institutions of the society (Latour and Woodgar, 1979). Past experiences have shown that the public’s attitudes towards new technologies change significantly following major accidents. For instance, although the use of nuclear energy has been termed as revolutionary in the scientific world, accidents involving nuclear energy have sparked a lot of controversy in society (Morgan, 2002). In many instances, there has been increased opposition to the use of nuclear energy. This situation can be blamed on the lack of knowledge that the public has on new technologies (Slovic, 2000). Due to this lack of knowledge, the pubic lacks the empowerment to contribute to debates about new technologies, which means that they play no role at all in the formulation of risk mitigation policies (Beck, 1992). It is important to involve the public in debates concerning risks associated with new technologies. It is normal for people to have questions for which they want answers regarding issues they do not understand. In times of crisis it is a normal thing to experience heightened public emotions and this can cause more harm if the same public lacks access to facts revolving around the crisis (Schwartz, 2000). In a situation where the pubic operates in an environment of limited access to facts, it is likely that there will be lots of speculation and unfounded rumours which only makes the emergency situation even worse than it is. The public has the capacity to digest any information regarding new technology risks (Beck, 1992). This means that experts and policy makers should not shy away from their duty which involves giving conclusive and accurate information about inherent risks. World Community and Globalisation Most of the disasters that are connected to new technologies are not normally situated in one specific area. The effects can be felt many miles away from the epicentre of the accident (Plough and Krimsky, 1988). The accidents also cause untold damage to the environment, property and also to human life. This is why such accidents normally elicit reactions from all over the world. In today’s globalised world, the world community shares the experiences that happen in different regions (Bennett and Calman, 1999). As defined earlier, disasters can cause serious disruptions to life and many times, it is difficult for a single community to cope with the situation. Therefore, international assistance and interventions are very important. A good example would be the reaction of the world after the Chernobyl disaster. In April 1986, a nuclear power plant in Chernobyl blew up causing radioactive isotopes to spread over a large area in Eastern Europe. Fire-fighters were the first people to reach the scene of the accident and they dies trying to put out the raging fires. What they did not know was the danger they were placing themselves in by getting do close to an erupted nuclear power plant. They also had no knowledge of how to deal with emergency situations arising from nuclear accidents. The residents of Pripyat, a city near the power plant were not evacuated on time, something that only worsened the radiation situation. Many people offered to clean up the debris after the accident, but many of them were there for the pay and did not know what the health hazard that they placing themselves in. Later, many of those who lived around Pripyat and those who helped clean up the debris dies of toxic radiation (Slovic, Flynn and Layman, 1991). There was clear lack of communication from government and experts regarding the Chernobyl disaster. In fact, the Soviet government at the time only admitted to a nuclear breach only after a power plant in Sweden unusual radiation. Lack of emergency communication had dire consequences since the level of radiation which could have been averted was not. Because of this one mistake, the Chernobyl disaster will continue to cause serious health problems in the affected and surrounding areas (Gow, 2008). The Chernobyl disaster is classified as one of the accidents involving a nuclear power plant. The catastrophe, though fatal, opened up new avenues for new technology communication and information dissemination in the international realm. The International Atomic Energy Agency developed a system to aid in the process of information exchange in case of any nuclear emergency that may arise in any country (Morgan, 2002). The Chernobyl case is not without its parallels, especially when compared to the Fukushima disaster that happened in Japan recently. The Fukushima accident occurred as a result of a disastrous tsunami that swept all across the west coast of Japan. The ensuing floods got into the nuclear reactors causing them to overheat and emit radiation which was transferred into the water. The government was reluctant to comment on the situation f the Fukushima power plants. There was a lot of speculation about the security or lack of it in the surrounding areas. The media which relied on formal government reports, did not give much information about the radiation activity at the power plant. However, the little information available was ale to reach the people who lived around the plant and government was swift in evacuating them. The world reacted swiftly to the occurrences in Fukushima. Not only was there worldwide support for the Japanese people, who had been affected by the earthquake and tsunami, there were also concerted efforts in other countries to re-evaluate their nuclear safety policies. However, as with other new technology accidents, the public seemed to have very little knowledge about how to deal with the situation. One thing that has cropped up in the Japanese case is the role of government in protecting its people and offering accurate information regarding new technology accidents. In order to properly cope with the resulting hardships, governments have to have the willpower and resources needed for recovery reasons. It is during such disasters that clear and strong leadership from government is most needed (Covello, MvCallum and Pavlova, 1989). The international law requires governments to initiate, organize, co-ordinate and implement humanitarian aid within their areas. According to the same law, the role of the international community is defined as offering support depending on each country’s abilities at the time of the disaster (Corner, Richardson and Fenton, 1990). In the case of the occurrences in Japan, the country’s government had dispatched over 100,000 troops for rescue operations following the earthquake. The emergency structures in Japan have made it possible for most emergency operations to be carried out successfully. An inter-agency Emergency Response Team was responsible for coordinating assistance and rescue missions at all levels. The kind of organized international and national rescue operations and leadership shown in the Japan incident can be contrasted with what happened in Haiti after the country was hit by an earthquake. There was no swift government response in Haiti. There were no rescue troops that were dispatched after the disaster. The lack of proper rescue organization and clear leadership also hampered international aid to the people who were affected by the quake. The general public, with no knowledge whatsoever about the risks that it was subjected to, was left to fend for itself. International aid to Haiti took many days and sometimes even weeks to reach the people on the ground. The public’s trust or lack of trust in government plays a big role in the way a disaster and its aftermath is managed. For effective disaster management, there is need for an all-inclusive effort from the government and the general public (Covello, MvCallum and Pavlova, 1989). The public, scientific experts, government and other policy makers all need to come together to put across information regarding the risks that come with the adoption of new technology. It should not be assumed that the public does not need to know, or that lay people lack the intellectual capacity to understand such information (Lancaster, 2007). International aid management and disaster diplomacy Humanitarian tendencies require that any disaster-related activity be treated with utmost neutrality and independence. Disasters are naturally political and countries which have good political relations normally offer much needed assistance in times of disasters. Aid to disasters stricken areas is one of the many avenues that can be followed to foster international relations among different countries. However, it is argued that the results of disaster diplomacy can never be certain. This is because of the political interests of the governments of the countries involved in activities of disaster diplomacy (Frewer, 1999). The events in Japan may not have been anyone’s fault, but the damage caused by the flooding on the Fukushima nuclear plants could have been avoided had there been a better risk management and communication strategy in place. The tsunami that caused radiation leaks from the Fukushima Power plants can be compared to the events that happened in the Three Miles Island and Chernobyl years ago. On the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet government was blamed for not providing conclusive information and warnings to the general public about the seriousness of the disaster. The same thing can be said of the Three Miles Island nuclear accident in which the US government failed to pre-empt important information about the extent of the disaster. What followed after this failure of communication were chaos and loss of lives and property. In both cases there lacked emergency communications which could have minimized the ensuing damage. There was also a deliberate withholding of important information about the level of radiation release in both instances (Maxwell, 1999). The same case scenario was witnessed a few weeks ago during the Fukushima power plant radiation accidents. The Japanese government seemed unwilling to supply adequate information regarding the radiation emitted from the Fukushima nuclear plant. Officials in all the disaster situations believed to a certain extent that the severity of the accidents would not cause any danger, and these perceptions were played out in the media as well. The media made no or very limited mention of mismanagement, improper construction and poor workmanship at the three nuclear power plants. In other words, the public had very little information of exactly what was really happening. In all three instances, it was not clear whether or not the nuclear accidents could cause any severe damage to the public or to the environment. The lack of clear guidance on how to respond to such a situation caused too much harm that could have been avoided. In the case of Fukushima the international community was very swift to respond, and many countries sent monetary and non-monetary aid to help the Japanese. International assistance was well co-ordinated and since there was plenty of emergency information about the situation on the ground, a lot of people were able to get help on time. The media played its role in disseminating the details of the disaster as accurately and timely as possible. The government of Japan had proper structure in place to help victims and restore some kind of normalcy after the earthquake and ensuing tsunami. The country’s leadership was able to deal with concerns raised over the safety of the Japanese people after the Fukushima power plant incident. This helped create trust and enhanced quick relocation of people who lived around the power plant in order to avoid unnecessary radiation complication and deaths. The resilient nature of the Japanese also played a big role in their ability to deal with the aftermath of the deadly earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident. UK Governments practical advice on risk communication The UK’s Risk and Regulation Advisory Council categorizes public risks as “those risks that may affect any part of society and to which government is expected to respond” (Risk and Regulation Advisory Council, 2010). The council highlights five elements of public risk communication. The first element is assembling the evidence. This helps in demonstrating authentic basis for a particular position. The second element is the acknowledgement of public perspectives. This acknowledgement helps the persons involved in risk management to understand how the people who are affected understand the risk. An analysis of options is the third element of pubic risk communication. This element is concerned with the options available as well as the available trade-offs (Cabinet Office, 2006). From effective communication comes better understanding of risks by target groups in the communities that we might want to influence (Joffe, 2003). Effective communication helps to ease public concern during emergency situations. For this to happen the messages should be able to convey that the risk is low and the situation is under control. Target groups understand better the risk situation they are in if they are given the guidance on how they should respond. The messages should contain details of how the general public should react when caught in an emergency situation of a particular nature. For the messages to be as effective as possible, they should be delivered accurately and in a timely manner. They should also be relevant and easy to understand. This helps relieve tension when the actual disaster strikes (Frewer, 1999). The media should be used as an important tool of disseminating important messages to the public about risks and how to manage them. It is important for the general pubic to contribute to the risk management strategies that policy makers come up with. The media plays an important role in ensuring that the public’s voice is heard by both the experts and policy makers (Schwartz, 2000). Debates on new technologies should not be based on the media only. There can be forums where non-technical language can be used to explain different aspects of new technology risks to the public. This will make it easier for them to ask questions and understand whatever is necessary for them to understand regarding the risks (Kasperson and Kasperson, 2005). The best way to communicate risks to the general public is to first acknowledge the existing uncertainty (Plough and Krimsky, 1988). Although it is quite hard to use scientific explanations to make the public understand the risks that come with new technologies, people need to know the facts before they know how to respond to emergency situations (National Research Council, 1989). Honesty in risk communication is important as it helps the public to build trust in the experts and leaders, and this in effect fosters better emergency control and management. When communicating risks to the public, it is important to understand how people perceive those risks. Lay people often personalise risks and they are therefore likely to decide how to respond to risk depending on personal factors (Lundgren and McMakin, 2009). How we see causation is bound up with the way communities attempt to make sense of misfortune. Different communities have different attitudes when it comes to disaster and risk management. These differences are evident in the way such communities perceive different risks. For instance, in one community earthquakes may not seem as serious as famine or disease outbreaks. The way people understand the causes of disasters and calamities is also different among various communities (Sellnow, Ulmer and Seeger, 2009). While some people see it as an inevitable act of nature, others see it as a punishment or message from God. The way these communities perceive these calamities has an impact on how well they understand facts about the risks. Their perception also affects the way they choose to accept and respond to emergency situations (Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991). Well thought out risk communication can help experts as they try to prevent ineffective and damaging responses to crises among the public. According to Covello (2001) and Maxwell (1999), appropriate risk communication fosters public trust and confidence that are useful during emergency situations. There are a number of principles that should be followed when communicating risk to the general public. The first and most important principle involves the acceptance and inclusion of the public as a notable and legitimate partner (Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996). Conclusion New technologies have undoubtedly changed the life of man, mostly for the better. However, these same technologies also come with inherent risks that can cause untold damage to the environment, property and to human life. The general public lacks the knowledge and time to contribute to debates about new technologies. This is mainly due the assumptions made by policy makers and experts on the level of information that people should access regarding new technology risks. Past disasters and accidents have shown that when the public has access to accurate and easily understood facts about risks, than the people are normally ready to deal with the outcomes related to the risks. Proper information dissemination during and after a disaster or accident also helps emergency officials to properly carry out rescue missions and damage control activities. The international community can also take part in disaster diplomacy when there is a clear and accurate flow on information about the situation on the ground. Understanding the perception of the public regarding risks and disasters can go a long way in effectively communicating issues and facts to do with the risks. The public should be involved in debates and discussions about the risks that come with new technologies. This is one way of ensuring that all is taken into account when formulating policies to do with disaster management. References Beck, U. 1992. The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Bennett, P and Calman, K. 1999. Risk Communication and Public Health. London: Oxford University Press. Cabinet Office. 2006. Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty. Accessed: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/risk.aspxl/ Corner, J., Richardson, K., and Fenton, N. 1990. 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