le focus for the appeal, since the written request only attempted to request data linked to “outstanding real estate delinquencies” (Friedman et al 1). Additionally, the appellant appealed that the court had blundered by noting that that the off-site mailing addresses are “public records”. In its previous history, Goppelt, the Appellee had channeled a request to Appellant under the “Right to Know Act” Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, as revised, 65 P.S. § 66.1-66.9. The Appellee had petitioned for data linked to unsettled real estate felonies. As the Act requires, the appellant failed to reply the appellee’s written request. The appellee then went to the court after the appellant failed to respond and alleged that the appellant’s failure to respond to their request was observed as a denial under the Act (Friedman et al 1). The appellee served the appellant with a letter that required the appellant to provide the appellee with the required information. However, the appellant noted that the letter had not specified the information to be provided. When provided with the files, the appellee noted that some parts of the files were missing and that some of the mailing addresses were not accurate and differed from those of “off-site mailing addresses” for real estate tax bills. In the present case, the court dismissed the first appeal claim that addresses are not suitable focus for the appeal. On the second appeal claim, it affirmed its previous ruling.
In the case number 153 M.D., Pennsylvania State University, Appellee vs. State Employees Retirement Board, the Appellant, was argued and determined in 2007. The state Employees Retirement Board moved to court to appeal a court’s decision to grant the Pennsylvania University access to the requested information pursuant to the Right to Know Act section 1307 (g). In the previous history of the case, the appellees had moved to court and issued a Right to Know Act request to the State Employees