The Case of Jane Nicklinson versus Ministry of Justice - Coursework Example

In many places, the summary lacks clarity due to spelling errors or failure to follow the appropriate norms of writing. For example, “whether” is spelled in the second paragraph as “weather” and the name Pretty has not been capitalized, thus creating a misunderstanding in the readers that the word is used in the sense of an adjective rather than as a name.    The summary also fails to use the exact legal terminology while referring to several of the legal aspects of the case. For instance, the term “blanket prohibition on euthanasia and assisted suicide” has often been referred to as merely “blanket” which confuses the readers. In addition, the summary also flouts many conventions of professional writing and on occasion relegates itself to the level of an informal talk. The use of contractions and second-person POV are some examples of this.  The summary calls for a revision, and rewriting, by meticulously following the usual conventions for writing professional legal summaries. It needs to be outlined properly and structured logically by organizing it in an appropriate sequence. The writer also needs to be specific and use proper legal jargon rather than writing in layman's language. This will render the text a better flow and cohesiveness apart from clearly communicating the ideas of the writer to the audience.   Rewritten Summary: An appeal was filed by Nicklinson & others in the Divisional Court against a decision of the European Court of Justice, naming the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) as prime respondent. The terms of reference for the court were: (1) to determine whether necessity constitutes a sufficient reason as a defense against prosecution in the case of euthanasia or assisted suicide, (2) whether the prohibition of assisted suicide constitutes a disproportionate interference with Art 8 of ECHR 1950, and (3) whether DPP has to set out the circumstances under which prosecution will be initiated in cases of assisted suicide to make the law more transparent to healthcare professionals.   The appellants, terminally suffering and crucially disabled, did not want to continue their lives but could not self-terminate. Thus, they wanted to seek medical assistance to kill themselves. With the above terms of references and using precedence in such cases, the court held that the case could not be ruled in the appellant’s (L) favor because such a decision would violate the sanctity of life as envisaged in Article 2. The court further held that it is unlawful under Sec 2 of the Suicide Act 2010 and if any person assists another in euthanasia or suicide, he or she will have to be prosecuted for homicide. Further, on the issue of whether necessity constitutes and defense against prosecution in the case of assisted suicide, as in the case of Purdy Vs United Kingdom (2010) AC 45, the court ruled that the blanket prohibition on euthanasia or assisted suicide cannot be construed as a disproportionate interference with Article 8 of ECHR 1950, which protects the privacy of a citizen.  The court further asserted that the immunity from criminal process, conferred by Sec 1 of the Act applies to only those who committed suicide and the decision to allow people who seek to kill themselves to follow the practice of euthanasia or assisted suicide does not fall under the purview of the court but is a matter to be decided by the parliament. The court also pointed to the case of NHS Trust Vs Bland (1993) as a precedent to this ruling and further maintained that the right to life was fundamental in the common law and also enjoined in the European Law. Thus, when the parliament has already stated that assisted suicide is a serious offense, for which a person can be sentenced to 14 years, the court sees no justification in allowing a person to commit suicide.   Further, the court also stated that it would be inappropriate on the part of the court to rely on domestic rules when statutes such as European Law and ECHR laws exist to protect the sanctity of life and, thus, the blanket prohibition on euthanasia and assisted suicide cannot be removed by local courts. In so far as it relates to the question of whether the DPP should have set out the rules clearly as to how they would proceed against a medical professional who assisted in suicide, the court held that the DPP’s policies should be amply made clear to the medical professional so that regulations for prosecutions become transparent and they will understand their responsibilities under the law. Finally, the court also held that family relation was not accorded any special significance under the DPP’s policies and, therefore, no policy exists to sufficiently enable M or anyone else to help him to make an informed decision about the likelihood of prosecution. Read More