Actus Reus as the Element of the Crime - Essay Example

? Criminal law Actus Reus is the outward conduct element of the crime. The mental element necessary for a particular crime or the blameworthy state of mind that accompanies the act or conduct is called mens rea. These two ingredients form the basic element of the crime. Thus, mens rea by itself is not enough; the actus rea also has to be established. Causation is one of the actus reus crimes. This is where a conduct by one or by the defendant is the substantial cause of the consequence or the result. Parties to offences also crop up in this question. When there are different parties to a crime, principle offenders are deemed to have contributed to committing the offence. In this case Andrew decides to kill his wife Sue in order to be with Beth. He acts by hiring a hit man, John to do the work for him on some payment. In doing this, he acts as the counsellor. This is by encouraging, and inciting John to commit the crime and offering him money as payment for it. This makes him a party to the crime as a counsellor. A person who counsels or procures another person to commit a crime is a principle offender if the offence is actually committed. He is therefore liable for the same penalties as John as if he had committed the offence himself. It is immaterial whether the offence actually committed was the same as that counselled. Provided that the facts surrounding the offence committed are a probable or direct consequence of that counsel. For example in the case of Twelve v R1, where a son procured a witchdoctor to kill is mother whom he believed was a witch and was responsible for killing his children. He believed that the witchdoctor would superficially kill his mother however; the witchdoctor killed her by shooting her on the back in her hut at night. The son was held to have been likely convicted of murder for having procured the witchdoctor to kill his mother. The means used was immaterial, guiding another person to commit a crime, makes one a party to the offence. For example in the case of DPP of Northern Ireland v Maxwell2, A drove his car to a pub knowing that he was guiding another vehicle containing members of a terrorist movement. A realised that some kind of attack was to be made but did not know the form it would take. Members of the terrorist group threw a piped bomb into a pub but fortunately, it did not explode. A was held guilty for being an accessory to a crime and of doing an act with intent of causing the explosion and being in possession of explosives. The court found that those were offences within the range of possibilities, which he contemplated, would be committed. Andrew is therefore criminally liable for attempted murder of Tim and his penalty is the same as that of John. Even if the person killed was not the person he intended, he still is a party to the transferred murder of Tim. Similarly, since Andrew had procured John to kill Sue, who ended up attacking Tim instead, it still stands that Andrew advised him to commit a crime of that nature. It does not matter that it is Sue he wanted killed. As long as John acted on the procurement, Andrew also provided John with the gun to be used to commit the crime. Helping giving assistance to the perpetrator or offering the weapon in the doing of a crime, whether before or during the commission of the offence makes one an aider or abettor to the offence. Andrew had the intention to kill Sue and thus it does not matter that John killed the wrong person. There was still the intention to commit a crime. Andrew is then a principle offender by virtue of this and thus he is jointly liable for attempted murder of Tim since there is a common intention by the offenders to commit the murder. This is illustrated in R v Bainbridge3 where the appellant supplied thieves with cutting equipment for breaking into a bank. It was held that the equipment was to be used for some kind of breaking even if he did not know what particular bank. Likewise, since Andrew knew the purpose the gun was going to be used for, he is liable as a party to the offence. Further, Andrew decides to kill Sue himself as John killed the wrong person by mistake. Mens rea, according to Glanville Williams is the mental element necessary for a particular crime. Andrew had the intention to commit the crime, which is the highest level of criminal responsibility of the offender. This is because he intended to cause the result that is the death of Sue. Intention is of two types, that is direct intention and oblique intention. Direct intention is where the consequence is what one is aiming at. When Andrew killed Sue, we find that he had the intention of the same as he had first hired John to do the job and when failed, he decided to do it himself. He even drives to her house with the motive of killing her. Therefore, he had the intention to kill Sue as he had planned or calculated before. Even though Sue insulted him making him burn with rage or anger, it was not enough to provoke him to commit such a crime. From this, we can establish that not only did he have the intention but also enough malice aforethought to kill Sue. This is because he knew that stubbing Sue with a knife would cause her death. Therefore, Andrew is liable criminally for the murder of Sue by stabbing her continuously with a knife. He is therefore the perpetrator in this offence of murder. Transferred malice is where for example a person mistakes or using bad judgment causes injury to the wrong person or property. In such a case, he is still liable of the offence he intended. For example, if one has planned to shoot X and by mistake kills Y instead, he is still liable for the murder of Y as he had the intention to commit a crime and had the mental element for that. The facts that John meant to kill sue but instead went ahead and shot Tim is still evident that he had the mens rea to murder and even if he shot the wrong person, he is liable for the offence. This was upheld in the case of R v Latimer,4 where D aimed a blow at X with a belt but by mistake hit V. He was convicted of unlawful wounding under the Offences against Persons Act 1861. Upon appeal, the criminal Appeal Court held that he had intent to do an unlawful act and in carrying out that intent, he injured a person. The fact that he injured V instead of X was immaterial and in such a circumstance, he must be found guilty. In addition, the position was upheld in the case of R v Pembliton 5where D picked up a large stone to throw it at someone with whom he was fighting and broke a window. He was convicted for malicious damage. Further, in R v Mitchell6, D assaulted a man, aged 72years, in a post office queue. The man fell onto V, an elderly woman of 82 years of age who died from the injuries she suffered. D was convicted for manslaughter. On appeal, Straughton J, stated that “we cannot see the reason for holding that a particular act calculated to harm A cannot be manslaughter if it instead kills B”. Therefore, the appeal was declined. Hence, it clear that the fact that John had established mens rea to commit an offence, then even if he killed the wrong person it is still an execution of his intention to commit an offence and therefore he is liable for injuring Tim as well founded mens rea can be established. Further authority is the case of R v Saunders7, where the defendant poisoned an apple with arsenic and gave it to his wife. His intention was to kill her in allowing him marry another woman. The wife bites the apple then gave it to their daughter to eat. Consequently the daughter died. The defendant was held liable for murdering his daughter as his intention of killing his wife was transferred to his daughter. Applying this to John, the intention to kill Sue was transferred to her brother Tim. Further, a person who actually does an act or makes an omission, which constitutes an offence, is a perpetrator. John is given the work by Andrew to kill. He was the perpetrator in shooting Tim. This is further proof of John’s liability. Omission or failure to act is where one neglects or fails to act when he ought to act. Legal duty to act may arise through holding a public office. When one holds a public office, they are under a duty to act and failure to do so results into an omission. Tracey is a police officer when she saw Tim injured, she decides to do nothing and walks away. This is an omission since in her office as a police officer; she had the duty to act in such instances at all times. This is illustrated by the case of R v Dytham8 where the police officer was standing by a hotdog stall in Duke Street St. Helens. Some thirty yards away was Cindy’s club. A man by the name Stabs was ejected from the club by a bouncer. A fight ensued which a number of men joined. There were cries, screams, and other indications of great violence, resulting in Mr. Stabs becoming an object of murderous assault. All this was audible to the police who took no step to intervene and instead drove off. He was convicted for misconduct while acting as an officer of justice. On appeal, it was held that he could be found guilty of the offence of misconduct in a public office. Likewise, Tracey is liable for misconduct in a public office as a police officer as she ignored her duty and omitted to act where needed. Factual causation is where one accelerates the crime. Here, the “but for” rule is applied that is, but for the defendant’s action, that consequence could not have occurred. John with the intention to kill Sue There was intention as he intended to cause the death. He is the one who did the act of trying to kill Sue and therefore he was the perpetrator of the crime. Although Sue did not die, there was factual causation. That is, to accelerate under factual position. Here, the “but for” rule applies. That is but for John’s action, that consequence of death of Sue could not have occurred. Where the required consequence would not have occurred without the defendants act, an intervening act by third parties can contribute to it. This can be where the defendants act was not the immediate cause of the required circumstance but contributes to it by providing the setting for an intervening act for someone else, which is then the immediate cause of the consequence. Here we can apply the Hart and Honore principle that, “the free deliberate and informed intervention of a second party, who intends to exploit the situation created by the first person but is not acting in concert with him is usually held to relieve the first person of criminal charge . Therefore, if the treatment is negligent, it is only the most exceptional cases that will break the chain of causation between the act causing the injury and the death. When treating Tim, the doctor was negligent. In addition, according to R v Smith9, the court Marshall stated that it is only if it we can say that the original wound is merely the situation in which another cause operates can it be said that the death did not result from the wound. Therefore, if the second cause is so overwhelming as to render an original wound merely a part of the history then we can say that the result or death does not flow from the original wound. According to the case of R v Jordan10 where the defendant stabbed the deceased. The wound had almost healed when the deceased was given terimicine, which he was intolerant to and as a result, he died. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and he appealed. In the court of appeal, the conviction was quashed. The court held the immediate and direct cause of the death was a separate and independent feature, the treatment, and not the stab wound. If the death arose from normal treatment for an injury, the injury could be said to be the cause of death. However, this treatment was not normal and so broke the chain of causation. Therefore, in the case, Dr. Hawthorne was negligent and did not check if the deceased was allergic to painkillers or even bother to read Tim’s notes before administering the drug. This therefore broke the chain of causation as it was from this exceptional treatment that caused the death of Tim. The complication has to be the direct consequence of this act, which remains the significant cause of death. The chain of causation would not be broken unless negligent treatment was so independent of the defendant’s conduct that is in itself so potent to render the contribution of the defendants conduct insignificant.11 This was held in the case where, in an argument in a fish and chips shop, D shot P in the leg and stomach, seriously wounding him. Two months after the operation, P developed respiratory issues thus a tracheotomy tube was inserted to assist him breath. P died and the immediate cause of death was the narrowing of the wind- pipe where the tracheotomy tube was inserted. Such a condition is rare, but not an unknown complication arising out of tracheotomy. P had complained of further breathing difficulty and suffered a chest infection after the tracheotomy. The death was caused by the negligence of the hospital staff failing to diagnose and treat P’s respiratory condition. Therefore, we find that John only provided the setting for the death and the “but for” rule would not apply as the doctor’s negligence broke the chain of causation thus causing the death of Tim. This rendered the contribution of John insignificant. The doctor is therefore liable out of his negligence for manslaughter. Bibliography A Reed, Criminal Law (3rd edn Sweet &Maxwell 2006) Arthur Leavens, ‘A causation approach to criminal Omissions’ (1988) Carlifonia Law Review 76(3) CM Clarkson & H.M Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2003) George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 1998) J.M Scheb, Criminal Law (4th edn Thomson Wadsworth 2006) Joel Sahama, Criminal Law (10th edn Wadsworth Cengage Learning 2011) N Padfield, Criminal Law (5th edn Oxford university press 2006) Ormerod, David, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (9th edn Oxford 2005) R Card, Card, Cross & Jones: Criminal Law (18th edn Oxford University Press 2008) T.J. Gardner & T.M Anderson, Criminal Law (9th edn Thomson Wadsworth 2006) "Criminal law." www.jstor.org/stable/3480633 . N.p., n.d. Web. 7 Jan. 2013. . Read More